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“The more I see, the less I know for sure.”
—John Lennon
“Not even the most tempting probability is a
protection against error; even if all the parts
of a problem seem to fit together like the
pieces of a jig-saw puzzle, one must reflect
that what is probable is not necessarily the





At the beginning of 2020 we, like many other people and probably like you, were
taken by surprise at the severity and the speed of spread of the novel coronavirus
COVID-19.
Like everyone else on the planet, wewerewatching the virus devastating countries
and jumping from country to country and from continent to continent. Reading
the reports of the OXFAM (a confederation of independent charitable organisations
focusing on the alleviation of global poverty) and the World Bank, we realised that
the viruswas killing not only directly but also through hunger and collateral damages.
The definition of vulnerable became vague and sometimes a condition of survival.
COVID-19 unsheathed once again and in a cruel clarity the gap between rich and
poor countries. Whilst the rich countries supported their citizens during lockdowns
and bought vaccines, some of the poor countries were facing famines or an epidemic
with no lockdown, no masks and no vaccine.
The question arises how can governments provide the needed social protection to
the population of their countries or at least to the most vulnerable population strata
in a quick manner? Could an insurance product provide the necessary protection?
Having had months of discussions with different experts on this topic, we realised
that many researchers and practitioners might profit from the combined expertise of
actuaries, mathematicians, statisticians, sociologists, virologists and jurists/lawyers.
This triggered the idea to put together a book explaining the facets of possible
pandemic insurance.
In this sense, the present book is not just a collection of loose contributions
on different topics. It is thought to be a combination of jigsaw parts that can be
put together to create individual or collective insurance products aimed to supple-
ment the social protection most governments promise to their citizens. We hope that
vii
viii Preface
the interdisciplinary nature of the contributions will help to build bridges between
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Chapter 1
COVID-19: A Trigger for Innovations
in Insurance?
María del Carmen Boado-Penas, Julia Eisenberg, and Şule Şahin
Abstract This chapter gives an overview of the consequences of the novel coro-
navirus, COVID-19 on the insurance branch. The main problems caused by the
pandemic on the commercial insurance, and in particular, on the business interrup-
tion and possible innovations are discussed. The aim is to prepare the reader for
the following chapters specifically by demonstrating connections between different
aspects ofmodelling a pandemic. Thesemodels are necessary to create new insurance
products supplementing governments’ actions in response to a pandemic.
1.1 Introduction
An actuary’s almost knee-jerk reaction to a pandemic is to model it. However, this
temptation has to be moderated and an actuary must consider the implications of
other important factors in planning for future pandemics. On the one hand, the legal
aspects of insurance policies might outweigh any actuarial considerations. On the
other hand, developing models for future pandemics based on the most recent one
bears the risk of preparing for the last war. The next pandemic will most certainly be
different.
Being a relatively rare event in theWestern world, epidemics are a growing public
health threat inAfrica andAsia. TheWorldHealthOrganization (WHO) considers the
zoonotic diseases, those caused by pathogens transmitted from animals to humans,
as the dominant cause of epidemics and pandemics. Coronaviruses (CoV) are a large
family of zoonotic viruses that cause illnesses ranging from the common cold to
more severe diseases such as the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome coronavirus
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(SARS-CoV) andMiddle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV). The
outbreak of SARS-CoV, started in China in 2002 and was defeated by disease pre-
vention and control systems (Deng and Peng 2020). MERS-CoV was first reported
in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and has since spread to several other countries. Although
most of coronavirus infections are not severe, more than 10,000 cumulative cases
have been associated with SARS-CoV andMERS-CoV in the past two decades, with
mortality rates of 10% and 37% respectively (Huang et al. 2020; Sohrabi et al. 2020;
Zhu et al. 2020).
COVID-19—the novel coronavirus pandemic declared as such by the World
Health Organization on the 11th ofMarch 2020—has quickly reached an incompara-
ble dimension, and every individual, every government has been caught by surprise
fighting against the crisis caused by COVID-19. The pandemic has triggered what is
likely to be the deepest global recession since World War II.
The COVID-19 pandemic has strikingly proved that “we are only as safe as the
most vulnerable among us”.1 Considering nearly 55% of the world’s population do
not have access to any sort of financial social protection, and many countries rely
on market-based solutions to fill the gap, the recent pandemic demonstrates that the
situation does not only hurt the poorest and most vulnerable, it threatens the well-
being of the entire global community. Thosewho are unable to quarantine themselves
because of precarious financial situations not only endanger their own lives but also
the lives of others. It is clear that if one country does not contain the virus, others
are bound to be infected and re-infected (ILO 2021). Therefore, developed countries
should provide assistance, not only for altruistic motivations but for self-protection.
Similar considerations hold true for the case of total vaccination.
1.2 Discussions from the Perspective of Insurance
and Social Protection
1.2.1 Commercial Insurance
Insurance can be defined as a contract under which an insurer or the government
agrees to offer a promise of coverage in the event of a specified loss, injury, sick-
ness, or death in exchange for the payment of a specified premium. Whilst injuries
are minor and occur in groups of individuals or companies, commercial insurance
does an outstanding job of distributing damages that are unforeseen individually but
anticipated collectively. Life insurance, pensions, insurance for motor accidents, bur-
glaries, household fires, marine insurance, etc. are examples which fit the definition
perfectly. However, significant catastrophic losses that affect large populations are
single events which cannot be pooled. War casualties, epidemics/pandemics, coastal
flooding triggered by rising sea levels, major tsunamis, earthquakes, big volcanic
1 https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_739678/lang--en/index.htm.
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activities are some examples of these catastrophic events which might affect entire
societies. Then, it becomes the responsibility of the society to share the losses, which
must be managed and performed by governments.
The limits of the commercial insurance are derived by both the severity and the
prevalence of the damages. Considering the extent of losses, insurance companies
might balance one type of extreme risk against others, such as forest fires in some
place versus earthquakes in others. Additionally, it might be possible to introduce
innovative insurance products, or adjusting the current ones to serve the aim to cover
specific parts of the uninsurable losses. COVID-19, in this regard, tested the extent
and the effectiveness of the current insurance products. Although it might not be the
aimor duty of the commercial insurance to protect societies frompossibly unbounded
damages, it could still contribute to pandemic response (i.e. social protection provided
by governments and international organisations) by dealing with some aspects of
the damages caused by the pandemic. Some possible innovative responses might
include life insurance products being adapted or converted to include deaths caused
by the pandemic, or occupational sickness insurance might be extended to include
new disease and conditions that have been caused by SARS-CoV-2 infections, etc.
In the case of the COVID-19 pandemic, in particular, applying these innovations
retrospectively in the existing insurance productsmaynot necessarilymean an overall
increase in costs to the insurance industry. For example, an increase in death claims
might be compensated by a decrease in future pension/annuity claims.
A tsunami-like amount of business interruption, travel, and medical treatment
claims crashed over the insurance sector in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Whilst some insurance companies had already added pandemic exclusion clauses to
their policies following the SARS-CoV epidemic in 2003, others did not incorporate
a clear defined list of possible diseases to be covered, leaving some ambiguity about
individual extent of cover.
Insurance associations all over the world declared that pandemic coverage had
been optional and most policyholders chose to save the money and did not purchase
this type of business interruption insurance. In France, the financial regulator super-
vising both banking and insurance, Autorité de contrôle prudentiel et de résolution
(ACPR), on the 22nd June 2020 made public that 93.3% of insurance policies did
not cover the pandemic, 2.6% did and 4.1% were unclear. For instance in Germany,
many pre-COVID-19 insurance policies merely referred to the Infectious Diseases
Protection Act, Infektionsschutzgesetz (2001) (IfSG), and the diseases listed therein.
This ambiguity created by the fact that COVID-19 was not explicitly mentioned in
IfSG led to a number of court cases. On the 1st of October 2020, theMunich Regional
Court ruled that the insurance company Versicherungskammer Bayern had to pay
out 1.01 million euros business interruption insurance to Augustinerkeller, a famous
restaurant in Munich. However, after the ruling the Berlin-based German Insurance
Association (GDV) stated that the Munich decision would have no implications for
other pending cases.
The refusal of some insurance companies to pay pandemic-related claims has
eroded trust in the sector in general. Numerous court proceedings followed as
claimants sought retribution in numerous countries. The lawyers, representing the
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interests of the insurance sector, insisted that businesses could not claim for losses
resulting fromnationwide lockdowns as itwould be catastrophic for the industry.2 For
instance, Michael Crane, a lawyer for insurance company QBEQBE.AX, stated dur-
ing one of the hearings that a pandemic had been foreseen, however a government’s
response in the form of introducing a nationwide lockdown had been an “inconceiv-
able” measure before 2020. This means in particular, that the actuarial equivalence
principle (expected future premium payments should be equal to expected future
benefits) does not work here. The premia charged by insurance companies did not
contain the possibility of protracted lockdowns, i.e. the customers did not pay for
the risk of business interruption to the extent that was widely experienced during
COVID-19 pandemic. In this way, COVID-19 has shifted the insurability question
from the actuarial to the legal sphere.
Even one year after the start of the COVID-19 pandemic there is still no clear
line of jurisprudence on the gray areas of contracts containing a list of diseases in
which COVID-19 is not mentioned. As a consequence, from South Africa to USA
legal decisions have been taken in favour of both insurers and policyholders. And as
of March 2021, it is far from clear which legal trend, if any, will eventually prevail
in this battle.
It is not surprising, now in light of COVID-19, that new contracts engaged after
the beginning of the pandemic often contain a pandemic/epidemic exclusion clause.
Many insurance companies are not ready to undertake the risk of a pandemic. The
reason is that when this rare event happens losses occur for everybody—pandemics
do not respect geographical borders—therefore collective risk sharing and balancing
over time are not working for a pandemic. As an example, the Wimbledon Tennis
tournament had a business interruption policy with a pandemic insurance clause
which costed them around £1.5 million per year. This annual premium had been paid
for 17 years before a claim occurred. Small and medium-sized businesses may not be
able to afford such-a-high premia over a substantial number of years. For instance in
the UK, before COVID-19 many small businesses had business interruption policies
that enabled them to claim up to a maximum of between £50,000–£100,000 in case
of a pandemic and lockdowns. This cap essentially reduced the premia. However, as
of March 2021 the actual losses in most cases exceed these amounts by a multiple.
Besides, some insurance companies are reportedly trying to reduce their losses and
to pay claims as quickly as possible by offering very low settlement or interim
payments. The news organisation Reuters reported on a café in East London getting
a settlement offer totalling £13.3
There is a clear demand for insurance coverage for the case of a new epi-
demic/pandemic. Thus, insurance companies are confronted with the challenge of
developing innovative policy structures and mitigation strategies for both public and
private sectors.
2 In this case, the contracts are subject to moral hazard since governments might influence the claim
payments through national lockdowns.
3 https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-insurers-idUSKCN2AT3B6.
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Partnerships and collaborations between governments and (re)insurance compa-
nies are needed to enable insurance protection for pandemic risks that would be
otherwise uninsurable. In this regard, a parametric pandemic insurance design for
governments has been introduced by Boado-Penas et al. (2021). As for the practi-
cal examples, in the UK Flood Re is a joint initiative between the government and
insurers to include flood cover in household insurance policies in an affordable way.
In practice, every insurer that offers home insurance in the UK must pay a fee into
the Flood Re Scheme and can choose to pass the risk to Flood Re for a fixed price.
This keeps the premia down for consumers, and protects insurance providers from
very large exposures.
1.2.2 The Role of the Governments and Social Protection
Governments must act promptly tomake rapid progress toward collectively financed,
comprehensive, and permanent social-protection systems which are already
wretchedly inadequate at safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of their citizens.
Having access to health insurance, unemployment, and sickness benefits is crucial
to protect vulnerable groups and thus the whole community (ILO 2021).
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the economic shutdown and the subsequent
business losses led to an unprecedented rise in the number of unemployed people.
In general, Eurostat (2020), the estimated income losses at the EU level represent
around 5% of total earnings and its distribution is very unequal. This inequality is
present both between nations, and within them, with the greatest effect realised by
the most vulnerable sub-groups of the working population. Emergency legislation in
some countries made significant concessions to increase the capacity of their health
systems and provide relief to those citizens and sectors that are particularly impacted
by the coronavirus crisis. Spain’s government, for example, launched amonthly basic
income scheme up to e1,015 for the most vulnerable households in June 2020. The
programme supported around 850,000 households. In the UK, social measures such
as the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme4 or the Self-Employment Income Support
Scheme were introduced so that a portion of usual monthly wage costs was paid for
the time the employee is on furlough (Machin 2021).
As a result of the economic recession caused by the coronavirus crisis, most
major economies lost at least 2.4% of their GDP over 2020. In developing nations
(excluding China) the pandemic crisis led to a fall in nominal US dollar GDP of 10%
while the private finance dropped by $700 billion in 2020 (OECD 2021).
Governments usually include several financial programmes in their budget which
target vulnerable social groups, i.e. those who are disproportionately exposed to risk.
Due to prolonged and strict lockdownswhichwill be discussed in Chaps. 7, 8 and 9 in
various dimensions, unemployment benefits have become vital formillions to survive
4 Through the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme, the UK Government have committed to reim-
bursing 80% of employees’ wage cost up to £2,500 per worker.
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during the COVID-19 pandemic. Persons who have not been considered vulnerable
at the start of a pandemic may be pushed to the edge of poverty or even beyond
by the loss of their jobs, illness and expensive medical treatment. Consequently,
governments are facing a challenge of identifying the vulnerable depending on the
current situation and preparing beforehand feedback response strategies, see for
instance The Lancet Editorial (2020).
At the same time, international organisations are working closely with global
experts and governments to provide advice to countries on measures to protect health
and bolster economic recovery. For themost vulnerable countries, theWorld Bank, as
we can see inChap.7, has approved somefinancial emergency support to urgent needs
in the wake of the pandemic. Also, the World Bank together with the International
Monetary Fund urged G20 to establish the Debt Service Suspension Initiative, so
that emerging countries concentrate their resources on fighting the pandemic and
safeguarding the lives.
1.3 Listening to the Wind of Change
The 21st century with its urbanisation, internationalisation and overpopulation has
created the optimal conditions for novel infectious diseases to multiply, and spread.
The increasing threat of experiencing pandemics more often in the near future will
force many institutions, the insurance sector being one of the pioneers, to propose
path-breaking solutions.
It is not a coincidence that the origin of actuarial modelling goes back to 14th
century and the Black Death, an outbreak of medieval plague which was believed
to kill 30–50% of Europe’s population. That is when the City of London started
recording the deaths and produced regular statistics of mortality with the aim of
recognising the patterns and use past data to predict the future. Seven centuries have
passed, and yet not much has changed concerning the data as it once again became
the driving force of actuarial modelling in a pandemic.
On the other hand, a core change has occurred to the perception of the number of
pandemic victims. Whilst in the 14th or even in the 20th century with no antibiotics
the general attitude towardswidespread deathwas rather fatalistic, in the 21st century
death is consideredmore andmore a technical problem, see for instanceTheGuardian
(2020). The number of COVID-19 deaths affects many people not least because they
strongly feel that these deaths have been preventable. Therefore, it is not surprising
that there is a high demand for amore structured andmore extensive additional social
protection during events like COVID-19.
This book provides a collection of interdisciplinary scientific studies that can
be used to develop epidemic/pandemic response strategies for both the commercial
insurance sector and government provisions (social protection). By putting together
innovative mathematical, statistical, actuarial, legal and social academic contribu-
tions, along with a review of existing realities, we have listened to the early breezes
of the winds of change triggered by COVID-19.
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Fig. 1.1 The structure of the book
There are direct and indirect connections between all chapters, as can be seen
from the contents presented below. Figure1.1 lists and collects the chapters of the
book under fourmain parts—actuarial models, responses, testing and data, actuarial
practice.
Below, we give a summary of each chapter and indicate potential links between
them. The book starts with actuarial mathematical modelling of pandemics for two
branches—compartment models and mortality models.
In Chap. 2, R. Feng et al. bridge the gap between epidemiological and actuar-
ial models and present insurance product designs to provide healthcare coverage
during a pandemic. This chapter starts with an extensive description of the main
compartmental models—commonly used in the medical literature—characterised
by a system of differential equations in the case of deterministic models or transition
probabilities for stochastic models. Then, the authors apply actuarial techniques to
COVID-19 data and calculate premia to be paid continuously from (healthy suscepti-
ble) policyholders and actuarial reserves for three epidemicmodels. This chapter also
discusses the application of epidemic models for contingency planning and resource
allocation.
In Chap. 3, A.D. Wilkie introduces an actuarial model for infections such as
COVID-19. The chapter presents variations of an actuarial multiple state model
which considers the duration of infection of the newly infected individuals. This is
a main distinguishing feature of these models compared to SIR models. The chapter
presents empirical results based on the UK data whilst emphasising the possible
problems of the use of a model for prediction purposes. The prediction accuracy of
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such models highly depends on actions of governments, the responses of individuals
to the measures taken by governments, and the disease itself, medical improvements
such as testing capacity and efficiency, advances in the treatments of those affected,
vaccine availability as well as efficacy, and possible new mutations with different
transmission and virulence characteristics. All these dimensions are discussed in
several chapters of the book (Chaps. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12).
COVID-19 has sparked research dramatically inmanydifferent areas butmortality
modelling deserves significant attention considering the heterogeneous effect of the
pandemic on population. The recent experience has proved that the pandemics might
have various impacts on themortality of different sexes, age groups, ethnic and socio-
economic backgrounds which necessitates advanced mortality modelling. The book
contains two chapters on mortality modelling presenting different methodologies.
In Chap. 4, L. Regis and P. Jevtić discuss the discontinuity in the trends displayed
in mortality rates as a result of the shocks caused by the pandemics. The chapter
summarises the current literature on stochastic mortality, with a focus on multi-
population models, and explores the characteristics that models should possess in
order to accurately represent the behaviour of mortality rates following the COVID-
19 pandemic. The authors also introduce a general framework using affine jump-
diffusive processes for multi-population models with continuous-time jumps.
Statistical analysis shows that mortality models are often missing systemic risk
elements which could capture the impact of the extreme events. In Chap. 5, G. Venter
introduces a mortality model for contagious events including pandemics by adding
annual jumps to capture both tiny and catastrophic risks. The chapter describes how
tomodelmortality based on parametric regression by fitting smoothing splines across
the age, period, and cohort variables in Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC). Fur-
thermore, the chapter examines the Bayesian shrinkage methodology for smoothing
as well as the predictive benefits of such smoothing. The analyses have been illus-
trated using French male and female mortality data.
Insurance is the transfer of risks from individuals or corporations who cannot
bear a potential unexpected financial catastrophe. When the number of individu-
als/contributors is high the insurers spread the financial risks from expensive claims
(risk pooling) and can offer a reasonable level of premia. In the unlikely event of a
pandemic, losses will happen at the same time for everybody, and consequently, the
risk pooling and balancing over time principles are not working. Thus, for the macro
level events, like a pandemic, insurance seems to be a suboptimal solution to miti-
gate risks. In Chap. 6, H. Assa and T. Boonen discuss three risk management setups:
risk-sharing, insurance andmarket platform. They explore the efficiency of insurance
schemes in the presence of a macro risk event with significant impact. They come to
the conclusion that a social insurance scheme in the form of “Insurance-by-Credit”
(no premia payments before the losses occur) outperforms standard insurance by
changing the ex-ante view to ex-post: borrowing from the future instead of the past.
This risk-sharing concept turns out to be optimal if one neglects credit risk and moral
hazard.
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Since theWorld Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak as a Public
Health Emergency of International Concern, governments across the world have
implemented a variety of policies and strategies to contain the spread of the virus
and its negative effects on their citizens. International organisations have supported
these efforts through policy and best practice analyses, as well as evidence based
policy recommendations. In Chap. 7, M.C. Boado-Penas et al. give an overview of
the responses of international organisations, in particular of the World Bank and the
EU, to the COVID-19 pandemic. Special attention is given to the guidance of these
organisations towards vulnerable groups through changes in social insurance and
pension plans.
Chapter 8 by N. Badenes-Plá focuses on changes in individuals’ behaviour in
different countries arising from a pandemic. While the virus spreads worldwide, the
strategies to defeat it cannot be designed without consideration of cultural values
and political organisation. This chapter presents an overview of the response and the
degree of acceptance of citizens to government interventions to stop the spread of
COVID-19 pandemic. The author analyses the behavioural characteristics of the citi-
zens of different countries, toughness ofmeasures, lockdown fatigue, and public trust
in their government on the extent of compliance to pandemic measures. Changes in
behavioural patterns due to isolation and/or social distancing are described in detail
indicating long-term consequences that might affect the pricing of insurance prod-
ucts. For instance, unhealthy habits acquired during lockdowns, or newly acquired
or exacerbated mental-health problems may impact on the quality of the remaining
life expectancy of individuals.
Once a pandemic happens, it is too late to start planning social protection actions.
Governments need to follow the proverb “Repair your cart in December, in July
your sledge remember”. Harsh suppression measures—that also include the social
distancing of the entire population, using Personal Protective Equipment (PPE),
closure of schools, leisure and hospitality sectors as well as non-essential retail have
been introduced during the COVID-19 pandemic in many countries. However, due to
the unprecedented surge inCOVID-19 cases and fatalities, after already a fewmonths,
most countries were forced to increase the intensity of the lockdown by restricting
the suppression rules to limit the spread of the virus. In Chap. 9, J.P. Caulkins et
al. consider the problem of optimising the start and the duration of a lockdown,
with fixed or variable intensity, considering the more virulent strains of the SARS-
CoV-2. One of the important features of the considered model is the recognition of
lockdown fatigue. At some point, people start breaking rules no matter how obedient
they have been at the beginning of the lockdown, see Chap.8 for details. The decision
to begin or to end a lockdown is always a trade-off between the economic prosperity
of a country and the saving of lives. The optimal strategy turns out to be extremely
sensitive to the assumptions of the model. The duration of a lockdown depends on its
start, and entering a lockdown after a certain number of days since the beginning of
the pandemic will feature a different strategy. One can even get the so-called Skiba
points, meaning that starting a lockdown at a particular day of the pandemic might
provide several completely different optimal strategies.
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Before theCOVID-19 pandemic, the general publicwas not familiar with PPE and
may not have given sufficient importance to hand hygiene. Since at least the spring
of 2020, everyone learnt the new terminology around the SARS-CoV-2 outbreak, see
for instance Yale Medicine (2020). Droplet transmission, incubation period, repro-
duction number—the COVID-19 virus has brought epidemiological language and
modelling literally to our living rooms as telework has become the every day real-
ity for many in 2020 and 2021. In 2021, one can recite like a prayer that seven
of the known coronaviruses, whose name comes from the crown-like spikes, can
infect people, that social distancing, masks and handwashing are the best methods to
“flatten the curve”. Chapter 10 by S. Dunbar and Y.-W. Tang provides a biochemical
overview of the testing procedures necessary to understand andmonitor the course of
an epidemic. Different biomarkers and possible laboratory specimen for identifica-
tion of COVID-19 are presented and explained. Furthermore, this chapter discusses
the lessons learnt from COVID-19 that would help to speed up the response to a
future pandemic. In particular, preventing the high numbers of deaths will require
an earlier detection of the disease by using specific biomarkers, targeted treatments,
and appropriate triage of patients, particularly those who are susceptible to the most
severe course of the disease.
At the beginning of a pandemic, even if the biochemical procedures to follow are
clear, the question arises of how to test: individually or in groups.When the resources
are scarce and the prevalence level (the ratio of the already infected to the entire
population) is still comparatively low, pooled testing, also called group testing, may
provide better results than individual testing. Firstly, pooled testing has the potential
for very large resource-saving and second, it requires less time than individual testing.
In Chap. 11, M. Aldridge and D. Ellis discuss the mathematics behind some one-
and two-stage pooling strategies under perfect and imperfect tests, and consider the
practical issues in the application of such protocols. The pool testing procedures can
be used for instance for surveillance purposes or to monitor the prevalence of the
new variants of a disease, which is particularly important if the new variants start to
threaten the success of vaccination programmes.
Data collection and analysis play a crucial role in decision-making processes.
Defective or deliberately forged data can have fatal consequences. For instance, an
underestimation in the number of needed tests can lead to a new upward spiral of a
pandemic and, consequently, tomore excess deaths. In this line, Chap. 12 byC.Rieser
and P. Filzmoser introduces outlier detection techniques applied to COVID-19 pan-
demic data from different countries. In many applications, outliers are considered
the most interesting subject for analysis, because they suspiciously differ from the
data majority and might indicate a “contamination” of the given data sets. The data
(for instance, the number of newly infected or dead) are regarded as compositions,
where the compositional parts are treated as multivariate smooth functions. Here,
only relative information expressed in terms of log-ratios between the compositional
parts is considered as relevant in the analysis. The presented outlier detection method
focuses on the evolution of the data over time rather than on the absolute values. If
the evolution of one data set steps out of line compared to similar other data sets
(for instance by analysing several different infection testing stations) this clearly
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indicates a problem with the data cleanliness. Considering the COVID-19 publicly
available data fromdifferent countries, Chap.12 exploreswhich countriesmight have
“contaminated” data sets.
COVID-19 has evoked legal challenges regarding the traditional indemnity insur-
ance to protect people and businesses from the losses caused by pandemics. Discrep-
ancies between the expectations of insurers and insureds considering the coverage of
the policies seem to be the origin of the disputes as mentioned earlier. The recent evi-
dence, once again, proves that indemnity-based pandemic insurance is obsolete and
leads to long delays in payments. InChap. 13, R.Hillier discusses the legal challenges
of insuring against a pandemic. The chapter builds upon the insurance indemnity
principle (the insurers cover just the actual loss) and illustrates the pandemic-related
problems of the traditional insurance schemes by several court cases that occurred
during the COVID-19 pandemic. The author states that a possible solution against
business interruption caused by a pandemic could be a parametric insurance, where
a pre-agreed payout is made if pre-defined event parameters (triggers) are met. This
type of insurance would provide immediate help without a time-consuming loss
assessment. Parametric insurance appears to be a simple method of providing quick
financial support in combination with the governmental economic packages in the
wake of a pandemic. Observing that a parametric design has challenges in terms of
defining a robust trigger, the chapter opens a room for possible innovative hybrid
insurance products combining indemnity and parametric features.
Last but not least, the closing chapter, Chap. 14 by F. Schiller, analyses the meth-
ods and ideas proposed in this book alongwith their feasibility in times of a pandemic
from an actuary’s perspective. The chapter discusses the insurability and risk man-
agement of extreme events and pandemics in particular and reflects on the potential
future consequences of COVID-19 for the insurance sector. The lessons learnt will
help the insurers to better adjust and response to the future extreme events. However,
the crisis caused by the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted that the capacities of
the financial and (re-)insurance markets are limited, and governmental help in “dark
times” is one the whales on whom the world rests. A global disaster cannot be dealt
with single-handedly—neither by states nor by insurance companies, no matter the
size. Just acting together in a determined and concerted manner can help to tackle
the problem.
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and Their Insurance Applications
Runhuan Feng, José Garrido, Longhao Jin, Sooie-Hoe Loke,
and Linfeng Zhang
Abstract Our society’s efforts to fight pandemics rely heavily on our ability to
understand, model and predict the transmission dynamics of infectious diseases.
Compartmental models are among the most commonly used mathematical tools to
explain reported infections and deaths. This chapter offers a brief overview of basic
compartmentalmodels aswell as several actuarial applications, ranging fromproduct
design and reserving of epidemic insurance, to the projection of healthcare demand
and the allocation of scarce resources. The intent is to bridge classical epidemiologi-
cal models with actuarial and financial applications that provide healthcare coverage
and utilise limited healthcare resources during pandemics.
2.1 Introduction
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the insurance industry in many ways. Some
notable impacts include a surge in insurance digitisation, volatile capital markets,
and disruption in supply chain. These issues have prompted researchers to think
beyond the standard actuarial framework to find ways to tackle them. While there
has been extensive research on the transmission dynamics in the epidemiology and
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medical literature, traditional actuarial work has largely focused on mortality and
morbidity rates using classical frequency and severity analysis. Actuarial life tables
and mortality models lack flexibility and robustness to describe the rapidly changing
environment during a pandemic. To that end, we explore the epidemiology literature
and combine some of the commonly used models with actuarial methodologies.
In the past decade, some developments in the actuarial literature have intended to
fill the gap between these two fields. A recent survey article by Feng et al. (2020)
offers an overview of several approaches for infectious disease modelling such as
compartmental, network, or agent–based models, and discusses their applications to
epidemic and cyber insurance coverages. These novel applications represent efforts
to integrate medical modelling with actuarial techniques.
This chapter focuses on compartmental models commonly used in the medical
literature and their applications in the context of epidemic insurance and pandemic
risk management. The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section2.2 intro-
duces some important compartmental models, such as the celebrated SIR and SEIRD
models. These are characterised by a system of differential equations, in the case of
deterministic models, or transition probabilities for stochastic models. Section2.3
presents an overview of some designs of epidemic insurance plans using compart-
mental models from the preceding section. Common actuarial concepts including
annuities, benefits, and insurer’s reserve levels are explored. The section concludes
with case studies using the actual COVID-19 data set. Section2.4 illustrates another
application of compartmental models in the subject of allocation of resources during
a pandemic. In particular, we project the demand for critical medical resources and
use actuarial concepts of capital allocation to optimally stockpile resources prior to
a pandemic and to ration limited existing resources during the pandemic.
2.2 Compartmental Models in Epidemiology
The modelling of epidemics has a rich history and dates back at least to Aristotle’s
work; see Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2012) for a historical account. A popular
framework is the so-called compartmental modelling, where the entire population
is segregated into multiple compartments which correspond to different stages of
a disease. Then the dynamics in the system is studied via a system of differential
equations.
2.2.1 SIR Model
Consider a population of size N (t)which is indexed by time t . Based on the seminal
work of Kermack and McKendrick (1927), the SIR model considers the following
three compartments: Susceptible, Infected, andRemoved. There are many variations
of the SIR model; in what follows we lay out the assumptions for the most basic SIR
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model. First, there are no births or immigration, i.e. no one is added to the susceptible
compartment, and the population mixes homogeneously. Second, the transmission
dynamic is driven by the law of mass action, which means that the rate of secondary
infection depends on both the size of the susceptible class and that of the infected
class. The rate β represents the number of contacts per individual per time unit
to transmit the disease. Hence β I (t) can be interpreted as the rate of contagious
contacts. Since the disease is only transmittable in a contact between infected and
susceptible individuals, then β I (t)S(t)/N is the actual rate of transmission. Third,
the size of the infected class is subject to exponential decay. The rate α represents
the proportion of the infected class being removed and hence αI (t) is the rate of
decrease in the infected class. Lastly, this simple model does not distinguish causes
of removal, which may include recovery, immunity, or death. Once in the removed
class, the R(t) individuals can no longer return to the susceptible or the infected
classes. The following figure summarises some of the assumptions in the model:
Susceptible Infected Removed
Based on the assumptions, the population size is fixed, that is N (t) = N . More-
over, the assumptions lead to the following system of differential equations
S′(t) = −β I (t) S(t)
N
, (2.1)
I ′(t) = β I (t) S(t)
N
− αI (t), (2.2)
where S(t) and I (t) are the number of susceptible and infected individuals, respec-
tively. The number of removed individuals is thus N − S(t) − I (t).
A main concern in epidemiology modelling is whether a disease will spread upon
its introduction. Observe from (2.2) that the disease spreads (i.e. I ′(t) is positive) if
βS(t)/N − α > 0, and if βS(t)/N − α < 0 the disease dies out. This explains the






which represents the average number of secondary infections due to a single infec-
tious individual at a given time t . It is also worth noting that 1/β is the average time
between contagious contacts and 1/α is the average time until removal. Then it is
easy to see that β/α is the average number of contacts by an infected person with
others before removal. When t = 0, R0 is known as the basic reproduction number,
a common measure used to determine if a disease will spread out during the early
phase of the outbreak. If R0 > 1, the disease will start to spread, but not if R0 < 1.
Zhao et al. (2020) gives a preliminary estimate of R0 for the coronavirus pandemic
in China (from Jan. 10 to Jan. 24, 2020) to be between 2.24 and 3.58.
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2.2.2 Other Compartmental Models
Here is a brief description of additional epidemic models that are commonly used
in disease modelling. Since mortality analysis is based on ratios instead of absolute
counts, consider the deterministic functions s(t), i(t) and r(t) that denote, respec-
tively, the fraction of the population in each of class S, I and R. Dividing equations
(2.1)–(2.2) by the constant total population size N yields
s ′(t) = −β i(t) s(t) , t ≥ 0 ,
i ′(t) = β i(t) s(t) − α i(t) , t ≥ 0 , (2.3)
r(t) = 1 − s(t) − i(t) , t ≥ 0 ,
where s(0) + i(0) = 1.
These ratio functions can be interpreted as the probability of an individual being
susceptible, infected or removed from infected class, respectively, at time t . Note
that movements between compartments depend on their relative sizes. Hence these
probabilities correspond to mutually dependent risks in the SIRmodel, as opposed to
the usual independentmultiple decrements in life insurancemodels (see, for example,
Chap. 8 of Dickson et al. (2013)).
To simplify the notation, the time variable will be dropped whenever it is not
strictly necessary. Also, we will use the convention that uppercase letters like S,
I and R denote the number of individuals in the compartments whereas lowercase
letters like s, i and r refer to the proportion of the population in these compartments.
2.2.2.1 SIS Model
In the SIRmodel, compartment R represents removal, either by achieving full immu-
nity or by death. Some diseases, such as AIDS, have no cure, and subsequently the
infected individuals who have recovered are susceptible to the disease again. This
phenomenon motivates a simpler class of models, called SIS, with only two com-
partments: S and I .
In the most basic SIS model, due to Kermack and McKendrick (1932), no births
or immigration can occur, so that the total population N = S(t) + I (t) remains
constant. Denoting the infection rate by β and the recovery rate by α, as above, the
corresponding differential equations are given by
s ′ = −βsi + αi,
i ′ = βsi − αi. (2.4)
Since s + i = 1, this yields a logistic differential equation
i ′ = (β(1 − i) − α)i, (2.5)
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hence, unlike the SIRmodel, the SIS admits explicit analytical solutions to the system



























To predict the evolution of critical cases, Hill (2020) develops an app based on
a variation of the SIR model, called SEIRD. It includes seven mutually exclusive
compartments, namely, the susceptible (S), exposed (E), mildly infected (I1), those
infectedwith hospitalisation (I2), infectedwith intensive care (I3), recovered (R), and
the deceased (D). This SEIRDmodel is characterised by a set of ordinary differential
equations that describe population flows among all aforementioned compartments:
S′ = −(β1 I1 + β2 I2 + β3 I3)S,
E ′ = (β1 I1 + β2 I2 + β3 I3)S − γE,
I ′1 = γE − (δ1 + p1)I1,
I ′2 = p1 I1 − (δ2 + p2)I2,
I ′3 = p2 I2 − (δ3 + μ)I3,
R′ = δ1 I1 + δ2 I2 + δ3 I3,
D′ = μI3.
(2.7)
All the parameters in this system of equations admit a clinical interpretation;
βi , i = 1, 2, 3, is the transmission rate to the infected class Ii ; 1/γ is the average
latency period; 1/δi , i = 1, 2, 3, is the average duration of infection in class Ii ,
before recovery to the class R; then pi , i = 1, 2, 3, represents the rate at which
conditions worsen and individuals require healthcare at the next level of severity; μ
is the transition rate from the most severe cases in class I3 to the deceased class D.
The system of ordinary differential equations above represents a decomposition
of the instantaneous change in the population into those in each compartment. For
example, the first equation shows that the instantaneous rate of reduction in the
number of susceptible, −S′ matches the sum of the rates of infection due to contacts
with the infected in all classes, β1 I1S + β2 I2S + β3 I3S. The products are due to
the law of mass action in biology. For example, the rate of secondary infection by
the mildly infected, (β1N )I1(S/N ) can be interpreted as the number of “adequate”
contact each infected individual makes to transmit the disease β1N , multiplied by the
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number of infectives I1, multiplied by the percentage of contacts with a susceptible,
S/N . All other equations can be explained in a similar way.
2.2.2.3 Stochastic SIR Model
Stochastic compartmental models form another popular framework in epidemiology
modelling. These are natural extensions of the deterministic models presented above.
Here we assume a continuous timeMarkov chain framework. Another approach is to
add a Brownian perturbation to each compartment (see e.g. Sect. 4 of Allen (2017)),
but it is not discussed here.
For an arbitrary time interval [t, t + dt], the probability of an infection and the
probability of recovery are given by:
P((S(t + dt), I (t + dt)) − (S(t), I (t)) = (−1, 1)) = β
N
S(t)I (t) dt + o(dt),
P((S(t + dt), I (t + dt)) − (S(t), I (t)) = (0,−1)) = αI (t) dt + o(dt)
(2.8)
Figure2.1 shows the dynamics in compartments S and I , respectively, comparing
the deterministic and stochastic SIR models.
Another random variable of interest is the duration of the epidemic, defined as:
T = inf{t > 0 : I (t) = 0}. (2.9)
In other words, this is the first instant when there are no more infectives in the
population (or the time of the disease–free state). Other related random variables are
the final size of the susceptible population (S(T )) and the area under the trajectory
of the stochastic processes
∫ T
0 S(u) du and
∫ T
0 I (u) du. For a thorough discussion
of stochastic epidemic models and methods for their statistical analysis, see e.g.
Andersson and Britton (2012).
Fig. 2.1 Ten sample paths of the stochastic SIR model (orange) in (2.8), the deterministic SIR
model (black) in (2.1) and (2.2) for β = 3 and α = 1.5
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2.2.2.4 More Compartmental Models
Several other compartmental models have appeared in the epidemiology literature,
but are not covered in this chapter. For example, the multi–group model separates the
population into different groups, allowing for varying infection and recovery rates
along groups. It can be applied to bordering counties, states or countries. Another
model pertinent for COVID-19 applications is the quarantine–isolation model; it
describes the effect of isolating susceptible individuals from the infected individuals.
When no vaccine is available, this is perhaps the only measure available to govern-
ments to contain the contagion. Interested readers can refer to Hethcote (1978) and
Brauer and Castillo-Chavez (2012) for a plethora of sophisticated epidemic models.
2.3 Epidemic Insurance
The idea of designing an insurance coverage against the financial impact due to
infectious diseases is similar to what motivates coverage against other contingencies,
such as accidental death or destruction of properties. Where it differs significantly
from property and casualty insurance, at least from an actuarial point of view, is in
the time–varying reference groups, such as the number of policyholders bearing the
premiums and the number of policyholders eligible for compensation, which evolve
quickly over time through an epidemic.
To illustrate these differences, this section first reviews some of the insurance poli-
cies and models proposed in Feng and Garrido (2011), using the basic SIR model,
and subsequently quantifies infection risk by combining epidemiological and actu-
arial methodologies. The reserve level of an epidemic insurer is also studied, and
using historical COVID-19 data, several case studies are presented.
2.3.1 Annuities and Insurance Benefits
Assume that an infectious disease insurance plan collects premiums continuously
from susceptibles, as long as they remain healthy and susceptible. In the meantime,
medical expenses are paid continuously to infected policyholders during the whole
period of treatment, or until death.
Using the Equivalence Principle to determine level net premiums, that is
E[present value of benefits] = E[present value of benefit premiums] (2.10)
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. Here, δ represents the force of interest. As in life insurance,
identities linking these APVs can be derived; see Feng and Garrido (2011). For









The intuitive interpretation is that, if each insured in the whole insured population is
provided with a unit perpetual annuity, the APV of payments to class S is given by
ās∞ and the APV of payments to class I is given by ā
i
∞ .
From this relation the net level premium for a policy of an infinite term with both
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.
If instead, the infectious disease insurance pays a lump sum compensation when
an insured person is diagnosed infected, and immediately hospitalised, then medical
expenses are to be paid immediately in a lump sum, terminating the insurance plan’s




e−δt s(t) i(t) dt , (2.11)
since the probability of being newly infected at time t is β s(t) i(t). In the SIRmodel,
this leads to additional useful identities:
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Then net level premium P̄( Āi∞ ) for an infinite term insurance planwith lump sum
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1 − (α + δ)āi∞
. (2.14)
Finally, if the coverage includes also a death benefit, say of one monetary unit,
paid immediately at the moment of death, then its APV, denoted by Ād∞ , is given by




e−δt i(t) dt = α āi∞ .
Therefore, the net level premium for an infinite term plan with both, a unit lump sum
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Similarly, the net level premium for a plan with both coverages, a lump sum benefit








= (δ + α + δα)ā
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∞ − i(0)
1 − (α + δ)āi∞
.
The above net premiums are expressed in terms of āi∞ , which is a Laplace trans-
form of i(t). Although an implicit integral solution is known in the SIR model, no
general explicit solution is available for s(t) and i(t). Different numerical methods
and approximations which have been proposed provide satisfactory solutions for
insurance applications, even for finite term policies; see Feng and Garrido (2011).
2.3.2 Reserves
Reserves are made of assets set aside by an insurer in anticipation of claim payments
in the future. It can be determined prospectively at any time t , as the accumulated
value of future premiums less that of future benefits. Alternatively, reserve can also
be defined in a retrospective manner (see, for example, Chap.7 of Dickson et al.
(2013)). Reserves are a critical tool for insurers to measure their liabilities towards
policyholders. When the reserve is adequately set, the insurer should have sufficient
funds to cover claims as they become due. In classical life insurance, reserves build
up from the beginning of the policy term, as the insurer accumulates premiums, to
ultimately run out at the end of the policy term, when all benefits have been paid
out to the policyholders. In other words, the reserve as a function of time, typically
exhibits a bell shape. However, for epidemic insurance, the reserve function may
exhibit quite different patterns, due to the dynamics of an epidemic. This section
presents different shapes of reserve functions, and the conditions under which they
arise in an epidemic insurance using the SIR and SIS models.
2.3.2.1 SIR Model
Here assume that susceptible individuals pay premiums at a constant rate π, and once
infected, the insurer pays hospitalisation benefits, say at a constant rate of 1. For this
particular policy, the insurer’s reserve level is given by:
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Table 2.1 Possible shapes of the reserve function
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where, for simplicity, we take δ = 0. Feng and Garrido (2011) shows that there are
four possible shapes of V (π, t), as a function of time. It turns out that the shape is
dictated by the effective reproduction number, Rt , as summarised in Table2.1.







where c = 1 − α
β
ln s(0). For further details, readers can consult Appendix 5 of Feng
and Garrido (2011). It is worth noting that a related quantity from the table, namely
1 − 1R0 , is called the herd immunity threshold; see Fine et al. (2011).
2.3.2.2 SIS Model
Now consider the insurer’s reserve function (2.15) for a SIS model. The following
results concern its first and second derivatives.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that the infection rate exceeds the recovery rate, β > α.
Then,
(1) V (π, t) is non-decreasing on π ∈ [ 1s(∞) − 1,∞) and non-increasing on π ∈
(−∞, 1s(∞) − 1) if s(0) > αβ .
(2) V (π, t) is non-decreasing on π ∈ [ 1s(0) − 1,∞) and non-increasing on π ∈
(−∞, 1s(0) − 1) if s(0) ≤ αβ .
Convexity results for V (π, t) are straightforward since:
V ′′(π, t) = πs ′(t) − i ′(t) = (π + 1)i(t) (α − βs(t)) .
Proposition 2.2 If the infection rate exceeds the recovery rate, β > α, then
(1) V (π, t) is concave on π ∈ [−1,∞) and convex on π ∈ (−∞,−1) if s(0) > α
β
.
(2) V (π, t) is convex on π ∈ [−1,∞) and concave on π ∈ (−∞,−1) if s(0) ≤ α
β
.
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2.3.3 Further Extensions
Feng and Garrido (2011) has motivated additional work on deterministic insurance
models. Perera (2017) considers control strategies in the simple SIR model as well
as the variation of premiums with respect to the model parameters. Then Nkeki and
Ekhaguere (2020) constructs the SIDRS model and studies its insurance applica-
tions. Billard and Dayananda (2014a) and Billard and Dayananda (2014b) develop
a multi–stage HIV/AIDS model, where a waiting time distribution models the time
one individual holds in one state. Premiums are defined for different insurance func-
tions, and health–care cost adjustments are also included. Shemendyuk et al. (2019)
investigates the deterministic and stochastic SIR models with multiple centres and
migration fluxes. The optimal health–care premium is determined by considering
different vaccine allocation strategies. Basic ideas in optimal resource allocation and
contingency planning are explored in greater detail in Sect. 2.4.
Building on the work of Lefèvre et al. (2017), that explores the interplay between
stochastic epidemiology and actuarial modelling, Lefèvre and Picard (2018a) gen-
eralised the SIR model to a controlled epidemic model, where the infectious are
quarantined to ease the severity of the disease, and studies the epidemic outcomes
and path integrals in terms of pseudo–polynomials. Then Lefèvre and Simon (2018)
considers cross–infection between two linked populations. A general approach to
study the Laplace transform of these integral functionals was developed by Lefèvre
and Picard (2018b). More recently, Lefèvre and Simon (2020) proposes a general
block–structured Markov processes for epidemic modelling.
2.3.4 Case Studies: COVID-19
This subsection illustrates a practical application of Sect. 2.3.2. Applying historical
data, we use three epidemic models (SIR, SEIRD, and stochastic SIR) to describe
the outbreak of COVID-19 and investigate their possible insurance applications. The
data comes fromWorldometer (2020), where as of Oct. 3, 2020, the U.S. population
stood at N = 328,300,000 people, and COVID-19 had resulted in I1(0) = 2,623,708
infected individuals, E(0) =335,272 exposed individuals,D(0) =214,637deceased
individuals and R(0) = 4,827,450 recovered individuals.
2.3.4.1 SIR Model
In the case of COVID-19, the Removed compartment in the SIR model can be
further divided into two sub–compartments, namely Recovered (R̃) and Death (D).
According to Bastos and Cajueiro (2020), the underlying differential equations are:
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Fig. 2.2 Percentage of population in compartments S and I
S′ = −βS I
N
,
I ′ = βS I
N
− α̃
1 − d I,
R̃′ = α̃I,
D′ = d
1 − d α̃I,
(2.16)
where β is the infection rate, α is the recovery rate and d is the death rate due to
COVID-19. From (2.16), one can easily reduce the model to the baseline SIR model
by aggregating the R̃ and D compartments into a single compartment R, resulting
in the system of differential equations in (2.1) and (2.2) with α = α̃/(1 − d).













where T0 is the end of estimation period.
Using COVID-19 data for the U.S., from Worldometer (2020), the estimated
parameters are β = 0.03014 and α = 0.01635, where we consider T0 = 92 days
from Oct. 3, 2020 to Jan. 2, 2021; interested readers can refer to the data analysis
section in Bastos and Cajueiro (2020). Assuming that the initial conditions are N =
328,200,000, I (0) = 2,623,708 and R(0) = 4,827,450, Fig. 2.2 shows the dynamics
of the population in compartment S and I for the next 700 days.
Similar to the setup in Feng and Garrido (2011), assume that the whole population
is enrolled in an insurance plan at the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak. Sus-
ceptible individuals pay a premium of π per day to the fund, and in return, infected
individuals receive $1,000 per day, until removal from the infectious state, to cover
medical costs.
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Fig. 2.3 Reserve of the epidemic insurance plan
Now, to determine the daily premium rate π of a 700-day insurance policy, it
should be set so that the reserve function is non–negative over the entire policy term.







Numerically, the premium level can be solved to be π∗ = 111.80 and the cash value
of the insurance fund at the end of 700d is V (111.80, 700) = 910.98. In other words,
with a daily premium payment of π∗, $910.98 is paid to the survivors at the end of
the policy period. Figure2.3 shows the change in reserves with respect to time during
the pandemic, where the reserve function is displayed in thousands.
We see that a daily premium paid by the susceptible class of about 10% of the
daily benefit paid to the infected class, leaving a positive final cash value left of the
order of one day of benefit.
2.3.4.2 SEIRD Model
The baseline SIR model cannot capture some important features of the COVID-19
outbreak. For example, although it is a highly contagious disease, it takes some
time for infected individuals to show symptoms and spread the virus. This time
is often referred to as the incubation period. Therefore, infected but not infectious
individuals should be classified as exposed. It is only after the incubation period
that these exposed individuals become infectious. Furthermore, infected individuals
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Fig. 2.4 Population flow of SEIRD model
Table 2.2 SEIRD parameters, U.S. data
Parameter Definition Estimation
βi Rate of infection in




γ Rate of transmission from
compartment S to E
γ = 0.2
δi Rate of recovery in




pi Rate of transmission from
compartment Ii to Ii+1 for
i = 1, 2
p1 = 0.033
p2 = 0.042
μ Rate of death in compartment
I3
μ = 0.05
should be divided into different stages according to their clinical record: infected
with mild symptoms, severe symptoms, or critical symptoms. Infected individuals
with critical symptoms need to seek professional medical treatment.
To that end, consider a 7–compartment SEIRDmodel, as presented inSect. 2.2.2.2.
A flow chart of the model is presented in Fig. 2.4.
The interpretation and estimation of the parameters are summarised in Table2.2.
All parameters come from clinical research findings; interested readers can refer
to Table1 in Hill (2020). For instance, Linton et al. (2020) shows that the average
incubation period is 1
γ
= 5 days, and so the rate of transmission from compartments
E to I1 is γ = 0.2.
The evolution of COVID-19 in the U.S. can now be simulated for the SEIRD
model using the parameters in Table2.2. Given the initial values for each compart-
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(a) Compartments , , 1 and (b) Compartment 2, 3 and
Fig. 2.5 Evolution in each compartment w.r.t. time t
Table 2.3 Premium rating for the AH and SH insurance plans
Plan P.V. benefits P.V. premiums Premium level
AH 2.456 ×1012 5.772 ×109 425.50
SH 2.339 ×1012 5.772 ×109 405.23
ment, E(0) = 335,272, I1(0) = 2,098,966.4, I2(0) = 393,556.2, I3(0) = 131,185.4
R(0) = 4,827,450, D(0) = 214,637 and N = 328,300,000, the evolution of the
epidemic is shown in Fig. 2.5. Since the parameters are not estimated by the same
optimisation problem as in the SIR model, a different time horizon of t = 100 days,
instead of 700days, is used here for the SEIRD model.
In terms of actuarial modelling, assume again that U.S. residents are enrolled
in one of the insurance plans proposed in Feng and Garrido (2011); the Annuity
for Hospitalisation (AH) Plan or the other the Lump–Sum for Hospitalisation (SH)
Plan. The insurance company provides $1,000 per day to the individuals in com-
partments I1 and I2, to cover medical, examination and consultation fees. There is
also compensation for individuals in compartment I3 to cover treatment fees. Hos-
pitalised individuals benefit payments of $1,000 per day from the AH plan, while
those enrolled in the SH plan, receive a lump–sum payment of $10,000 at the time
of hospitalisation. The discounted total benefit payments, and the fair premium level
for both plans are summarised in Table2.3.
Recall that the parameters in SIR model are estimated by the minimisation prob-
lem,while theparameters inSEIRDmodel come fromclinical researchfindings.Con-
sequently, the evaluation periods are different (100days in SEIRD versus 700days
in SIR) and the daily premium rates are seen to be about 40% of daily benefit rates
in SEIRD, compared to about 10% in the SIR model.
28 R. Feng et al.
2.3.4.3 Stochastic SIR Model
Lefèvre et al. (2017) considers an epidemic insurance model based on the stochastic
SIR model, in Sect. 2.2.2.3. It is assumed that the policyholders pay premiums at a
constant rate π per unit time, while they remain in the susceptible class. The expected







The insurer reimburses the medical expenses of infected policyholders, continu-
ously, at a rate of c1 per unit time. Furthermore, immediately upon removal, policy-
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The three expectations above are calculated usingmartingale arguments and recur-
sive methods. Interested readers are referred to Lefèvre et al. (2017) for the detailed
recursive formulas and proofs.
What follows is a numerical illustration of the stochastic SIR model. For simplic-
ity, assume constant removal and infection rates, where the infection rate is β = 1.5
and the recovery rate is α = 1. At time 0, the population counts in the three compart-
ments are assumed to be S(0) = 30, I (0) = 3 and R(0) = 0. Figure2.6(a) shows
the probability mass function of S(T ); it suggests a relatively large final number
of susceptibles at the end of the pandemic, with a high probability. Figure2.6(b)
shows the expectation of S(T ), as a function of different infection rates; if β is
small (resp. large), more (resp. less) individuals remain uninfected at the end of the
Fig. 2.6 Key quantities of the stochastic epidemic insurance model
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Fig. 2.7 Simulations of the reserve function V (t), for t ∈ [0, 10], 100 scenarios
pandemic and hence, leading to larger (resp. smaller) expectations of S(T ). Finally,
Fig. 2.6(c) illustrates the fact that the expected benefit (the numerator in (2.19)) is an
increasing function of the infection rate β; as the epidemic worsens, more payments
are made to policyholders in compensation of their medical expenses. Applying the
recursive formulas outlined in Lefèvre et al. (2017) and assuming that c1 = 1, c2 = 2,
gives a fair premium level of π = 0.576. In other words, for the insurer to break even
on average, the susceptible policyholders need to pay premiums continuously of
0.576 per unit time for each unit c1 = 1 of continuous benefits and c2 = 2 of lump
sum units.
Understanding the policy value at time t of an insurance plan is important to ensure
solvency of the company. To this end, define the reserve process of the insurer as
V (t) = π
∫ t
0
S(u) du − c1
∫ t
0
I (u) du − c2[N − S(t) − I (t)].
Figure2.7 graphs the reserve function V (t) of the stochastic SIR model for t ∈
[0, 10].Onehundred simulated scenarios of the stochastic reserve function are shown.
Some produce a positive reserve, when most individuals remain in compartment S
and fewer benefit payments go to policyholders. Other scenarios showmany infected
and recovered cases, producing very negative reserves when benefit payments out–
pace collected premiums.However, from (2.19),we conclude that the average reserve
function at time T should be zero, given the fair level of premium π and a sufficiently
large number of scenarios.
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2.4 Resource Management
This section discusses another actuarial application of epidemic models. Specifi-
cally, we propose a resource management framework for contingency planning and
resource allocation, to help prevent and respond to public health crises such as the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The outbreak of an infectious disease usually leads to a surge in the demand for
medical care and resources, such as ventilators and personal protective equipment.
Healthcare systems can experience a shortage of medical supplies that can have
devastating effects, such as the loss of lives or the inability to control the spread of
disease. A contingent plan in resource management is a critical tool for governments,
healthcare systems, and essential businesses to mitigate these inevitable pandemic
risks. Stocking resources is one possible mitigation strategy to help meet the demand
surge during a pandemic.
Resource management involves demand predictions, ex–ante planning prior to a
pandemic and allocation of limited resources during the pandemic. Here, we intro-
duce an overarching framework for an alliance of different regions to optimise stock-
piling and resources allocation at different pandemic stages in order to best utilise
limited resources. This framework was originally proposed in Chen et al. (2020).
Here we use inter–state resources pooling, as an illustrative example, but applica-
tions can also include international collaboration for the production, procurement,
distribution and pooling of critical medical resources, such as ventilators, pharma-
ceuticals or vaccines.
This resource management framework can be summarised in three pillars:
Pillar I: Regional and Aggregate Resources Supply and Demand Forecast. Any
pre–pandemic preparation plan should consist of supply and demand assessment
and forecast. The supply side should include inventory assessments of critical
resources and supplies, the maximum capacity of services, the capability of emer-
gency acquisition and production. The demand side requires an understanding of
the dynamics of a potential pandemic across regions and across borders. Historical
data and predictive models can be used to project the evolution of a pandemic and
the resulting surge demand on the healthcare system.
Pillar II: Centralised Stockpiling andDistribution. A central authority coordinates
the efforts to develop a national preparedness strategy and to set up reserves of
critical resources including preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic resources. A
response plan is also necessary to understand how the central authority can deliver
resources to different regions quickly to meet surge demands and to balance com-
peting interests and priorities.
Pillar III: Central-Regional Resources Allocation. A pandemic response plan is
critical for a central authority to contain and control the spread of a pandemic
in all regions under its jurisdiction. As demand may exceed any best–effort pre–
pandemic projections, the authority needs to devise optimal strategies that best












Pillar I Pillar II
Pillar III
Fig. 2.8 Three-pillar pandemic risk management framework
utilise limited existing resources and minimise the economic cost of supply–
demand imbalances. A coordination strategy needs to be in place to ensure smooth
communications with regional authorities. The allocation strategy should be based
on scientifically sound methods taking into account spatio–temporal differences
across regions to ensure fairness and impartiality.
Figure2.8 illustrates this framework and its underlying workflow. The rest of this
section takes a closer look at each pillar and uses numerical examples to illustrate
how this global framework can be implemented in practice.
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2.4.1 Pillar I: Regional and Aggregate Resources Demand
Forecast
Compartmental epidemiological models can be well integrated in this framework,
where the estimation and prediction of different medical resources are derived
directly from the evolution of the compartments. To demonstrate how contingency
planning and allocation can be optimised for scarce resources we use ventilators as an
example. Ventilators are typically durable resources that can perform their required
functions for a long period of time without significant expenditures of maintenance
or repair. Chen et al. (2020) provides a detailed account of single–use/disposable
resources such as personal protective equipment, using similar arguments.
To assess the needs for those resources, which is a key component in Pillar I,
consider the number of resources needed as a function of different compartments.
Ventilators are not necessarily needed unless patients are in critical conditions and
require additional respiratory aid for survival. So, naturally the demand for ventilators
can be seen as a function of the number of patients who require intensive care. To
predict the evolution of critical cases, we adopt the SEIRD model as presented in
Sect. 2.2.2.2. An important feature of this model is that it distinguishes between
patients that do not need intensive care and those who need it, which enables us to
make estimations and predictions on ventilator demand more accurately.
After the SEIRD model outputs the evolution of the number of cases requiring
intensive care, then predictions on ventilator demand can be made. Based on the
findings in the medical literature (c.f. Yang et al. (2020), Grasselli et al. (2020)),
there exist estimates of the percentage α of the infectives with intensive care that
require the use of mechanical ventilators. Regional differences can be addressed in
separate regional compartment models. These estimates can be used to project the
ventilator demand as XVEN(i)j = αI (i)3, j , where i indicates the i th region in the alliance
and j indicates the j th day of the pandemic.
To illustrate how this can be done in practice, consider a hypothetical three–
state alliance that includes New York (NY), Florida (FL) and California (CA) as
participating states, regardless of any barriers that might prevent them from a full
collaboration in practice. Further assume that 90% of ICU cases require ventilators.
Once the parameters in the SEIRD model are estimated using real data from those
states, we can create projections of the demand for ventilators as shown in Fig. 2.9,
where Fig. 2.9(a) represents regional ventilators demand predictions and Fig. 2.9(b)
represents the aggregate demand prediction in all three states.
In summary, the first pillar of resource management can be set–up with the help
of compartmental models to obtain predictions on the demand for various resources
over time.
Next, shift focus on how contingency planning and resources allocation can be
carried out to minimise the impact of epidemics and pandemics on the economy,
given these demand projections.
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Jul 2020
(a) Regional ventilator demand (b) Aggregate ventilator demand




























aggregate demand in three states
Fig. 2.9 Ventilator regional and aggregate demand prediction in NY, FL, and CA
2.4.2 Pillar II: Centralised Stockpiling and Distribution
As the pandemic unfolds, many hospitals and healthcare facilities can run out
of pharmaceuticals and other essential resources, before emergency production
ramps up and additional supplies become available. A centralised stockpiling strat-
egy is intended to provide a stop–gap measure to meet the surge in resources demand
at the early stage of the pandemic.
One should keep in mind that a practical stockpiling strategy is often an act of bal-
ance between adequate supply and economic cost. On the one hand, under–stocking
is a common choice as resources and their storage can pose a heavy cost, while the
actual demand during the pandemic outbreak could deviate from its projections. On
the other hand, excessive stockpiling for a long term can lead to unnecessary waste.
In the second pillar of this proposed framework, using the estimated aggregate
resources demand, the central authority could develop stockpiling and distribution
strategies in normal periods, before any pandemic. In the case of ventilators, the
central authority would have to determine an optimal initial stockpile size K0 of
resources to maintain in some centralised location. In addition, to meet surges in
demand, the authority may need to reach contractual agreements with suppliers for
emergency orders, which may be limited by the maximum production rate, say of a
units per day during a pandemic. Since ventilators are durable, the stock of ventilators
does not decrease over time due to usage. Assume that they can be deployed to dif-
ferent regions at negligible cost. Therefore, the total number of available ventilators
in the entire alliance is given by K j = K0 + aj , on the j-th day after the onset of
the pandemic. Hence, the only decision variable of the central authority in the case
of ventilators is the initial stockpile size K0.
Consider the following optimisation model for an initial stockpiling size.















X j − (K0 + aj)
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− + c j (K0 + aj)
)
+ c0K0, (2.20)
where m is the number of days of the pandemic, ω j is a weight for significance
of precision for the costs on the j-th day of the pandemic, θ+j is an economic cost
per square unit of shortage, θ−j is an opportunity cost per square unit of oversup-
ply, c j is the aggregate cost of possession per unit of ventilators per day, c0 is the
initial stockpile cost, which may include both the acquisition cost and the expected
cost of possession (storage, maintenance, inventory logistics, opportunity cost). The
quadratic form above can be interpreted as follows. While one copy of the quantity
X j − (K0 + aj) represents the amount of resource imbalance (shortage or surplus),
the other copy (θ±j /2)[X j − (K0 + aj)]± can be viewed as the (linear) variable cost
of the imbalance. The quadratic form is the product of cost per unit and the unit of
imbalance, which yields the overall economic cost of imbalance. The weightw j can
be used for different purposes. For example, it may be reasonable to make the weight
proportional to the daily demand X j as the demand–supply imbalance can have a
greater impact on population dense areas than otherwise, which is the weighting
scheme adopted here for numerical examples.
To find the solution to this problem, first calculate the projected shortage without
any initial stockpile, Y j := X j − aj , for j = 1, · · · ,m, which is the accumulated
demand less the accumulated supply apart from the initial stockpile. Then, sort
them in ascending order and denote the sorted sequence by {Y[ j], j = 1, · · · ,m},
where Y[ j] represents the j-th smallest projected shortage. The purpose of sorting
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Once J is identified, the optimal stockpile K ∗0 is given by
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The proof can be found in Chen et al. (2020). This result shows that the optimal
initial stockpile K0 is the weighted average of all projected shortages, discounted by
the cost of possession, relative to the economic cost of shortage, Y[ j] − c[ j]/θ±[ j]. The
adjustment term c[ j]/θ±[ j] indicates that, the higher the cost of possession relative to
the economic cost of imbalance, the fewer ventilators should be acquired.
Figure2.10 depicts optimal initial stockpile size in the case study. When the
resource shortage costs are the same or less than the resource surplus, Fig. 2.10a
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(a) θ+j = θ−j (Shortage costs = surplus costs) (b) θ+j = 20θ−j (Shortage costs > surplus costs)
Fig. 2.10 Optimal initial stockpile size K0 under different weights of economic cost
shows that the strategy requires less initial stockpile due to the excessive amount of
supply after the pandemic dies out. By contrast, if the shortage costs weigh more
than those of a surplus, the strategy is to reduce shortage in the early stages at the
expense of increasing oversupply in the late stages; see Fig. 2.10b.
2.4.3 Pillar III: Centralised Resources Allocation
At the time of severe resource shortages, a coordinated effort becomes necessary
to obtain additional supplies and to ration limited existing resources. There are two
common types of resources allocation problems in the course of a pandemic, both
of which can be cast in Pillar III of the proposed framework.
1. Macro level resources pooling. A central authority acts in the best interest of a
union of many regions to increase supply, as well as to coordinate the distribution
of existing and additional resources amongdifferent regional healthcare providers.
2. Micro level rationing. Facing an imbalance of demands and supplies in medical
equipment and resources, hospitals often have to make difficult but necessary
decisions to ration limited existing resources, as well as new supplies.
While in both cases the aimof the allocation exercise is to deliver limited resources
where they are most needed, the macro level pooling addresses spatio–temporal
differences and the micro level rationing focuses on healthcare effectiveness and
fairness. The third pillar of the proposed pandemic risk management framework is
about the allocation of limited resources to different regions, based on the proposed
optimal centralised stockpiling and distribution strategies.
Figure2.11 puts the regional resources demand and optimal aggregate supply
together for the ease of exposition.
Following the previously mentioned principles, consider the allocation of existing
resources in a healthcare system with n regions during a pandemic that lasts for m
days. We always use the superscript (i) to indicate quantities for the i-th region. Bear
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(a) Regional ventilator demand (b) Optimal ventilator allocations
Fig. 2.11 Optimal ventilator allocations in NY, FL, and CA
in mind that there could still be aggregate shortage of supply for ventilators in all the
alliance regions. The central authoritywould have to take a holistic viewof competing
interests among participating regions. On each day, during the pandemic, when the
aggregate demand exceeds the aggregate supply, the central authority should choose
to allocate resources taking into account spatial differences in demand and supply.




























K (i)j = K j , for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
where ω(i)j is a weight assigned the j-th day of the pandemic in the i-th allied region,
θ+(i)j is an economic cost per squared unit of shortage, θ
−(i)
j is an opportunity cost
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represent the
economic cost for demand–supply imbalance. Note that
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2 measures the rate of
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represents the linear variable
cost per unit. The variable cost in principle reflects the law of demand, under which
the price increases with the quantity demanded. Therefore, the total cost is the prod-




X (i)j − K (i)j
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and the total unit of imbalance(
X (i)j − K (i)j
)
. The economic cost is used to account for both potential loss of lives
due to the lack of resources and the opportunity cost of idle medical resources due
to oversupply. This structure of economic cost is used not only for its mathematical
tractability, but also to penalise large imbalances between demand and supply. The
weight ω(i)j can be used to measure the relative importance of the resource allocation
for region i at time t j to other regions and time points.





j = K j indicates that resources allocated to different
regions must add up to the total amount of supply available to the central authority.
The evolution of supply {K j , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m} is based on the centralised stock-
piling strategy discussed in previous sections. The evolution of demand {X (i)j , i =
1, . . . , n, j = 1, 2, · · · ,m} can be based on forecasts from epidemiological models
fitted to most recent local data.
The analytical solution to this allocation problem is summarised as a holistic
allocation algorithm and explained in full detail in Chong et al. (2021). Here we only
explain one particular case of the solution. As the allocation is carried out from period
to period, we shall suppress the subscript j for brevity, and use X (i) for ventilator
demand in region i and K (i) for the quantity of allocated resources in the same region.




X , then only the economic cost for oversupply θ−(i) applies and the optimal allocation

























The economic interpretation of the allocation formula (2.21) is that the optimal
supply for region i results from a balance of two competing optimal solutions.
• Self–concerned optimal supply: X (i)
If region i can ask for as much as it needs, then this amount shows the ideal supply
in the best interest of the region alone. The demand and supply for all other regions
are ignored in its consideration.
• Altruistic optimal supply: K − ∑nr=1;r =i X (r)
If the region i places the interests of all other regions above its own, then themedical
supply goes to other regions and region i ends up with the leftover amount.
The central authority has the responsibility to mediate among regions competing for
resources. Formula (2.21) indicates that optimality for region i , in consideration of
the entire system, is reached by a weighted average of two extremes, namely the self–
concerned optimal and the altruistic optimal supplies. The average of two optimal






to arithmetic weight ω(i)θ−(i)
/ n∑
r=1
ω(r)θ−(r). It is shown in Chong et al. (2021) that
in multi–objective Pareto optimality the harmonic weighting is always used for bal-
ancing competing interests of participants whereas the arithmetic weighting serves
the purpose of balancing competing objectives of the same participant.
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2.5 Conclusion
In summary, this chapter explores several well–known compartmental models in
epidemiology (Sect. 2.2) and studies their actuarial applications, in two different
compartmental models. Key actuarial quantities are studied for an epidemic insur-
ance plan in Sect. 2.3, such as annuities and benefits. In connection to the COVID-19
pandemic, three case studies are presented in Sect. 2.3.4, modelling the reserve level
of an epidemic insurance provider. A second actuarial application of compartmental
models in resource management is presented in Sect. 2.4 and contingency planning
during a pandemic. To optimise stockpiling and medical resource allocation, we
propose an overarching framework that includes supply and demand forecasts, cen-
tralised distribution, and regional allocations.
The first results obtained for the COVID-19 case study are that, as expected,
premium levels for possible epidemic insurance coverages vary greatly, depending
on the compartmental model calibrated to the available epidemic data. It highlights
the importance of developing compartmental models as well suited as possible to
the particular characteristics of the epidemic under study. Section2.3 also shows that
it is possible to set viable reserves, for epidemic insurance coverages, for different
compartmentalmodels, not just for the SIR. Similarly, the results in Sect. 2.4 illustrate
possible ways to quantify resources and manage them optimally during a pandemic.
As both actuaries and epidemiologists specialise in quantifying risks, each in their
own ways, we hope that this chapter motivates future research in bridging the two
fields, to gain further insight into how to quantify the impact of pandemics.
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Chapter 3
Some Investigations with a Simple
Actuarial Model for Infections Such
as COVID-19
A. D. Wilkie
Abstract In this chapter the author adds an infection feature to an actuarial multiple
state model to give a simple model for an infection such as COVID-19. The model is
simple enough to be replicated in an Excel worksheet, with one row per day of calcu-
lations. The whole population is treated as homogenous, with no distinction by age,
sex or anything else; to that extent it is unrealistic, but to include these features would
complicate it considerably. To fit it to observed data requires successive optimisation
by programme, and this is described. Different variations of the model allow it to fit
better and take account of, for example, immunisation by vaccine. It is shown to fit
the past events in the United Kingdom (U.K.) quite well, and it has also been fitted
to other countries, but this is not shown in this chapter. It is also observed that this, or
any other model, is of less use for forecasting the future, because it cannot predict the
behaviours of governments or of populations. But various assumptions can be made
about the future, as at the latest date of calculation (1 March 2021), and interesting
consequences are shown.
3.1 Introduction
Actuarial multiple state models have great similarities with epidemiological models
for infection. In this Chapter the author combines the two to give a simple model
for an infection such as COVID-19. In Sect. 3.2 multiple state actuarial models are
described. In Sect. 3.3 the elements of the simple model are explained, and compar-
isons with SIR models are made in Sect. 3.4. The necessary initial assumptions for
the model are stated in Sect. 3.5. How the variable daily parameters are estimated is
explained in Sect. 3.6.
An alternative, Model 2, is introduced in Sect. 3.7, and results for the U.K. (up to
the latest date of calculation) for the two models are shown in Figs. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4
with comments in Sect. 3.8. Two new Models, 3 and 4, are introduced in Sect. 3.9,
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with results shown in Figs. 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 and further comments on the results in
Sect. 3.10.
Some hypothetical projections from the latest date of calculation are described in
Sect. 3.11 and their consequences are shown.
Some remaining problems are discussed in Sect. 3.12, reference is made in Sect.
3.13 to other countries, and Sect. 3.14 concludes.
3.2 Multiple State Actuarial Models
Actuaries are familiar with several multiple state models. The simplest is the life
table. A person can be in one of two states, Living or Dead and can move from one
to the other, but in this case only in one direction. We assume that at age, or time,
x there are L(x) persons in state Living, and D(x) persons in state Dead. The total
T = L(x) + D(x) is necessarily constant.
To describe the rate of transfer between states we can use either a continuous or
a discrete model. The continuous model uses the derivate:
dL(x)/d(x) = −μ(x) · L(x) = + dD(x)/d(x)
whereμ(x) is the “force ofmortality” or “continuous transition intensity” from living
to dead. The discrete model uses a unit time step, often, but not necessarily, a year:
L(x + 1) = L(x) − q(x) · L(x) D(x + 1) = D(x) + q(x) · L(x)
where q(x) is the one-year probability of death of a life aged x .
A more complicated actuarial model is that for income protection (IP) insurance
for sickness, where the states are: Healthy, Sick and Dead, with exit from Sick either
by recovery back to Healthy or by death to Dead, and these rates depend both on
age at start of sickness, x, and duration in the Sick state, z, see Continuous Mortality
Investigation (1991). For this a continuousmodel is best,with the numbers in different
states as: H(x), D(x) and for sickness a continuum with density S(x, z). Transfers
are then:
new Sicknesses from Healthy at rate σ(x) · H(x)
new Deaths from Healthy at rate v(x) · H(x)
recoveries back to Healthy from Sick(x, z) at rate ρ(x, z) · S(x, z)
new Deaths from Sick(x, z) at rate μ(x, z) · S(x, z).
A discrete model is harder to define in this case, because of the possible circular
movements from Healthy to Sick and back, and the multiple reasons for exit from
Sick. In practice a daily step has to be assumed in the data for the estimation of the
(assumed) continuous rates.
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3.3 A Simple Daily Model for Infection
An infection model is similar to the IP model for sickness, with a fundamental
difference in one respect. Whereas in the IP model the transitions from Healthy to
Sick depend only on the numbers in the Healthy state, in an infection model they
depend also on the numbers in the Sick (or Infected) state. In the simple model we
ignore age and replace x by time t , measured now in days. Initially we also ignore
duration of infection, z, and denote those Infected at time t as I (t). We then assume
that an infected person can potentially pass the infection to others at a rate of r(t)
per day, but that only those who are not infected already can move to the Infected
state.
A continuous model would thus give us:
dH(t)/d(t) = −r(t) · I (t) · H(t)/(H(t) + I (t)).
We omit D(t) from the denominator, because we assume that they cannot become
infected at all. This is essentially the SIR infection model described in Chap.2 of
this book, with different names for the states.
For simplicity in practice I have used a discrete model, with daily steps, and with
the Infected at time t subdivided by days infected, d, giving us I (t, d). For this model
I ignore deaths and sicknesses other than from the relevant infection, and I ignore
age, sex and any other variability in the population.
Time is measured in discrete days, t , and changes happen at the end of each day.
On day 0 there are H(0) in the population, none of whom are infected. On each day
t , there are H I (t) new infections (I explain below how these are calculated) moving
from Healthy to Infected; thus on day t + 1 there are I (t + 1, 1) infected. On each
day these may die, with mortality rate m(d), so:
I (t + 1, d + 1) = (1− m(d)) · I (t, d)
and new deaths on day t are
I D(t) =
∑
m(d) · I (t, d).




and the total Living on day t are
L(t) = H(t) + I (t).
The proportion healthy among the living is
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g(t) = H(t)/L(t).
The total number of deaths by day t + 1 is
D(t + 1) = D(t) + I D(t),
and the grand total of the population on day t is
T (t) = L(t) + D(t).
This is constant, but it is useful to calculate it to check that the calculations are
accurate.
On day t there is a basic infection rate r(t), which can vary by t . Those infected
with duration d have a relative infection rate of pr(d) so their infection rate is
pr(d).r(t). The number of new infections generated by those infected on day t with
duration d is
H I (t, d) = pr(d) · r(t) · g(t) · I (t, d),
The total number of new infections on day t is
∑
H I (t, d) = H I (t),
as noted above.
To start the epidemic we need one or more initial infections. We put these in as
so many at the end of day t0, so that
H I (t0) = I (t0 + 1, 1) = 1,
or such other number as we wish.
Once infected, persons remain in the count of infected, but their relative infec-
tiousness pr(d) may reduce to zero by some duration, say M , so that all of those
infected on or after duration M can be added together in I (t, M), with zero infec-
tiousness. We think of them as recovered, but do not, as in the SIR model remove
them altogether. They cannot become infected again, so are correctly in the denom-
inator but not the numerator of g(t). All this is true for many infectious diseases and
I assume that it is true for COVID-19, but it may not be. For other diseases it may
also not be true, and once infected, always infectious. This can be represented in this
model by keeping pr(M) non zero.
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3.4 Comparisons with the SIR Model
In the simplest SIR model there is no allowance for duration of infection, so no
variation in infectiousness by duration. Nor is there any explicit mortality, since
those in the R state are recovered. But this simple model has many variations that
can include some of these features.
A value in the SIRmodel that is often publicly quoted is denoted R0 or just “the R
number”. This is the number of infections caused by the (hypothetical) first patient.
If R = 3, then one infected passes the disease on to three others, each of them to
three more, etc. It is given as an absolute number, but it needs also a time scale:
infecting three in a day is very different from three in a month. It seems that the
publicly quoted number in the U.K. is about “per week”.
In the simple model described above, a value of R0 can be calculated, along with
a time scale. A new infected is able to infect others depending on his/her duration of
infectiousness. The number of new infections on day d depends on the proportion
who survive to day d, and their rate of infectiousness. So we first calculate the
proportion of survivors, allowing for mortality, by putting
p(d = 1) = 1,
and then
p(d + 1) = p(d) · (1− m(d)),






and our estimate of R0 on day t is
R0(t) = S · r(t).
The average time till infection is given by first calculating
U =
∑
{d · p(d) · pr(d)}
and then the average time
T = U/S.
In this simplest model the values of, S, T and U do not vary with time t .
However, the effectiveness of infection at time t is diminished by the factor g(t),
the proportion of the population available to infect. Initially this is close to unity, but
as the disease progresses, more of the population may have become infected, and
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cannot be reinfected, so that a level of population immunity may be reached (“herd”
immunity is a term appropriate for cattle). The effective R value at time t is therefore
Rg(t) = R0(t) · g(t).
This damping by g(t) increases with time t .
3.5 Enhancements for COVID-19 and Initial Assumptions
The model so far described suits situation where all infections are known about as
soon as they occur, aswith a small closed population and a disease that is immediately
apparent. However, this is not the case far COVID-19 and we describe the features
as they became apparent in the U.K. In other countries it may not be quite the same.
In the first few days an infected person may show no symptoms, so the fact of
infection and infectiousness is not known. Then when symptoms do appear, the
infected may not be tested and counted as infected unless the symptoms are bad
enough for him/her to go to hospital. We represent this by postulating that, of all the
new infections on day t , I (t, 1), the symptoms do not appear until duration day K ,
and then only a fraction, f (t), are recorded as having COVID-19. Then we assume
that deaths only occur among those whose infection is bad enough to have been
recorded.
In the simplest model effected so far for the U.K., I have assumed that day K
is day 6, that day M is 36, that f (t) = 0.1 for all t , i.e. only one tenth of all cases
are reported (but this changed later). I then assume that pr(d) = 1 for d = 1–5,
= 0.5 for d = 6–15, and= 0 thereafter. This implies that in the first few days before
symptoms have appeared, the infected is wholly infectious, but that when symptoms
appear he/she stays isolated to some extent, so the relative level of infectiousness is
halved. I then assume that m(d) = 0 for d = 1–5, equals some constant level m for
days 6–15, and is zero thereafter.
All these assumptions are rather arbitrary. If one had access to full hospital data,
one could estimate the values of the mortality rates, m(d), by day of infection, but
if these have been calculated by anyone, they do not seem to have been made public
yet. With more testing of individuals, the value of f (t) may well increase with time,
but it is always difficult to estimate what faction of any large population is not in
some category without large sampling, or careful random sampling.
With this model one can insert arbitrary parameters and see what effect different
assumptions make. For example, if the infected continue to be infectious beyond day
M , then ultimately the whole population becomes infected, but with anything short
of this, there may be some value of r(t) that is low enough to leave an uninfected
residual. If the mortality of the infected is very high, then with a low enough level of
infectiousness the epidemic dies out, perhaps quite quickly, but with a higher level
then ultimately everyone dies. These are all extreme cases, but it helps to understand
what can produce them, although COVID-19 does not seem to be so extreme.
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3.6 Estimating Parameters Model 1
In order to compare this model with the available facts we need to use some available
data. I have used the data collected by the European Centre for Disease Prevention
and Control (2021), ECDC, which gives data, for a very large number of countries,
of the number of New Cases and New Deaths for each day up to 14 December 2020.
After that date ECDC gives the numbers in each week, from the start of 2020, but
not for individual days. To get continuing daily data one has to look for the records
of each country separately, which is much less convenient.
There are many ways in which one could choose parameters that would in some
way match the actual numbers of cases and of deaths with those expected by the
model. I follow an idea of Wüthrich (2020) and I have chosen one way to do it, but
many others might be as good or better. After an initial starting period, as described
below, I allow the rate of infection per day, r(t), to vary for each time day t , and I
estimate it for each t . I assume that the rates of morality, m(d) are equal for day of
infection fromday 6 to day 15, and zero outside those days, but that at each estimation
step they are the same for all times, t .
To estimate the rates for time t , I choose a 14-day period, with day t as day 7, so
from day t − 6 to day t + 7. For days up to t − 7, I assume the values of r(t) which
have been estimated already, but the value of the mortality rates, for this estimation,
is constant for all t and d and equals m(t). I then choose the values of r(t) and m(t)
by equating the expected (E) and actual (A) cumulative number of Cases (C) and
the cumulative number of Deaths (D) as at day t + 7, the end of the 14-day period.
This can be done by minimising the function F(r,m) calculated as:
F(r,m) = (EC(t + 7) − AC(t + 7))2 + (ED(t + 7) − AD(t + 7))2
and at the optimum values of r and m, we get
F(r,m) = 0.
To start the estimation I choose a day when the numbers of cases and deaths are
non-zero for most days, and estimate single rates, r(t) and m(t) up to that day. In
the very early stages the numbers of new cases are very erratic, and the numbers of
new deaths are often zero for a week or two after the numbers of new cases cease to
be zero, and a comparison of actual and expected is poor.
Apart from the initial period, this process produces quite good values for r(t)
for the whole period, and the expected numbers of cases for each individual day are
fairly close to the actual number. In the initial period of the epidemic, during the
“first wave” this method also gave quite good comparisons for deaths, but as time
went by the comparison of deaths became poor, so I developed Model 2 described
below. Results for Model 1 are shown later along with those for Model 2.
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3.7 Estimating Parameters Model 2
Since my Model 1 did not give a good correspondence between actual and expected
daily deaths, I changed the model a little. Instead of keeping the mortality varying by
duration, but not by time, I allow the rates to vary by time, so that each day, t , has a
basic mortality rate,m(t), and there are fixed ratios that vary by duration, d, denoted
pm(d) so that the mortality rate at duration d at time t is m(t, d) = m(t).pm(d).
This is a very similar pattern to the rate of infection, with daily rate r(t), and intensity
on day d of pr(d).
I fix the values of pm(d), to be zero except for days 6–15 inclusive, when they
have value 1.0. This is the same pattern as described for Model 1. This can be
accommodated in an Excel spreadsheet, with more columns, to show the values of
m(t, d), and of p(d), the surviving infected, which now also vary with time t , as do
T , U and S.
I then use almost the same estimation procedure for fitting the values of r(t) and
m(t), except that instead of making m the same for all past days in one calculation,
it varies like m(t). I show the results in Figs. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, using the ECDC data
for the U.K. data up to 14 December 2020, and adding data from Office of National
Statistics (2021) up to 28 February 2021.
The inception rates for Models 1 and 2 are almost identical, so only one set is
shown.
Fig. 3.1 Actual and expected daily reported new cases of COVID-19, U.K., Models 1 and 2
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Fig. 3.2 Actual and expected daily reported deaths of COVID-19, U.K., Models 1 and 2
Fig. 3.3 Estimated values of infection rates, R0(t) and Rg(t), U.K., Models 1 and 2
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Fig. 3.4 Estimated values of mortality rates, m(t), U.K., Models 1 and 2
3.8 Comments on Results of Models 1 and 2
We can see from Fig. 3.1 that the numbers of actual new cases reported each day
are very erratic, nothing like consistent with the expected numbers with a binomial,
Poisson or normal probability model. From Fig. 3.2 we see that the numbers of
reported deaths are evenmore erratic.We have assumed uniformity in our population,
and the true position is very far from this, so some variation would be expected as
with any actuarial model. However, the gross irregularities shown are more likely
because of great irregularities in reporting.
Bothmodels show almost the same quite smooth curve for expected cases reported
and fit the centre of the irregular actual events quite well. We see the smaller first
wave of March and April 2020, reduced by the first lockdown. After a comparatively
mild summer the second and third waves appear in late 2020 and early 2021, with
far more reported cases than in the first wave, and more deaths, but with a smaller
proportionate increase. We continue the model to mid-May 2021 and we comment
on these results below.
In Fig. 3.2 we see that the actual numbers of deaths reported each day and the
numbers expected by both models are fairly different from each other. The reported
numbers are also very irregular, but the expected numbers with Model 2 are reason-
ably good, whereas Model 1 fits rather badly.
In Fig. 3.3 we see the estimated values of the infection rates, both the “gross”
R0(t) described earlier, and the “net” Rg(t). In the early stages of the epidemic,
these are quite close because very few of those that are not currently infectious have
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been infected already. But as more of the population becomes infected, the more
those who are infectious are in contact with those who have already been infected,
and population immunity grows.
I explained above that I had initially assumed, on the basis of casual press com-
ments, that only 10% of those infected were sufficiently ill to report their infection,
and so have their infection recorded. I assume that f (t) = 0.1 for all t. By the middle
of January 2021 some 3.4 million people had been reported as infected, which would
imply that some 34 million people in the U.K. had been infected, or about half the
population. So my estimate of g(t) is about 0.5, and the net infection rate is about
halved, going down from a gross rate of about 1.8 to about 0.9 and progressively
lower as the rest of the population becomes infected. At these levels the epidemic
quite rapidly dies out, and my “projections” of the numbers of new cases and deaths
reduce rapidly, as implied in Figs. 3.1 and 3.2.
This is a typical result for any infection that continues with a constant value of
r(t) such that R0(t) is greater than 1. The curves of expected cases and of deaths
rises exponentially initially, curve over at peak, and fall symmetrically on the way
down. On a vertical logarithmic scale the curve closely resembles a hyperbola, but is
not exactly equal to one. The maximum is when g(t) = 0.5, and the number of cases
so far is at half its total number, as are the numbers of deaths with perhaps some
time-lag. Figures3.1 and 3.2 show that the peaks of new cases and new deaths were
reached during January 2021, and by mid-April would be quite small. It assumes
that the present level of lockdown continues indefinitely so that the value of r(t)
is held constant. This seems at the time of writing a very optimistic scenario. My
assumption of half the population being infected seems wrong.
The increase in testing suggests that far more than 10% of cases of COVID-19
are being reported, but I see no indications of how many this would be. Indeed,
if many people experience the infection, but show no symptoms at all, it seems
difficult for anyone to estimate their numbers without either very extensive testing of
a population, or testing of a very carefully selected sample. I see noway of estimating
a variable f (t) from the published data, but it would be possible, by extending the
model, to insert an arbitrarily changing value of f (t), going up from say 10% at the
start to some much higher value, perhaps 70% at some later date.
Figure3.4 shows my estimates of the aggregate mortality rate m(t) on the two
models. It seems to have been quite high, about 2% in the first wave, but much
lower, below 1/2% by the end of the period. It is reported that treatment has greatly
improved, so this is not implausible. But the estimates are greatly affected by the
estimate of the proportion reported. If the observed deaths (all of which are included
in the reported cases) come from only 10% of those actually sick, then the population
“case fatality rate” is only one tenth of that observed among the reported cases, but if
the reported cases are half the total actual cases, then the observed deaths come from
a smaller total number of cases and the cases and the rates should just be halved. It is
possible that my observed reductions in mortality are in fact caused by the increase
in testing, and consequent changes in f (t).
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3.9 Further Extensions: Models 3 and 4
Taking account of these various considerations I add two more models. In Model 3
I vary f (t), starting as before at 10%, then increasing by 1/2% per day from 16 July
2020 to reach 70% by 12 November 2020 and leaving it at 70% thereafter. This is
rather arbitrary, but it does produce the result that by 31 December 2020, when the
number of reported cases exceeded 2.4 million, my estimate of the number of actual
cases is about 6.9 million or just over 10% of the total population of the U.K. (I
assume that this is 67.8 million). This accords with press reports of other estimates
made at that time.
In early 2021 vaccination on a large scale started in the U.K., and elsewhere. This
can easily be inserted into the model. One has an extra status, Vaccinated, with V (t)
persons in it. People are transferred from Healthy at so many per day depending
on available and estimated figures. They come into the denominator of g(t), but
are excluded from the numerator; it is assumed that the infectious can meet the
vaccinated, but not infect them. So with more vaccinations the value of g(t) is
reduced, and consequently the net infection rate reduces and the epidemic diminishes.
This can be fitted into my simple model.
In Model 4 I introduce vaccination. I simplify this greatly by assuming that only
one vaccination is necessary to give full immunity, with no delays. I use the published
figures for first vaccinations given, with a little estimation initially, starting on 26
December 2020with about 140,000 vaccinations per day, increasing to about 350,000
per day during February 2021, and I then assume 350,000 per day thereafter, until
all Healthy are vaccinated by about the middle of June. This is unrealistic in that I
assume that the first vaccination is wholly effective, and that all persons of all ages,
except for those who have been infected with COVID, are vaccinated, including
“antivaxers” and infants and children.
The results are shown in Figs. 3.5, 3.6, 3.7, 3.8 along with those for Model 2 (I now
discard Model 1).
3 Some Investigations with a Simple Actuarial Model 53
Fig. 3.5 Actual and expected daily reported new cases of COVID-19, U.K., Models 2–4
Fig. 3.6 Actual and expected daily reported deaths of COVID-19, U.K., Models 2–4
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Fig. 3.7 Estimated values of infection rates, R0(t) and Rg(t), U.K., Models 2–4
Fig. 3.8 Estimated values of mortality rates, m(t), U.K., Models 2–4
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3.10 Comments on Results of Models 3 and 4
We can see from Fig. 3.5, as in Fig. 3.1 that the numbers of actual daily new cases
have dropped during the latter part of January 2021. Presumably this is the result of
the most recent lockdown at that time. My estimated R0(t) drops to just below 1 for
Model 3, but is higher for Model 4. But the net rate, Rg(t), for Model 3 is below
1, at about 0.8, and for Model 4 is much lower. All three curves of expected new
cases in Fig. 3.5 show them declining quite rapidly, with the too optimistic Model 2
being lowest, Model 3, with variable f (t), the highest and Model 4, with vaccines,
intermediate. By September, the latest date shown here, the expected number of cases
in Model 3 is about 100 per day, with a handful of deaths. This Model assumes that
the latest estimated value of r(t) continues indefinitely, which is unlikely to be the
case if lockdown measures are relaxed as the cases reduce.
Fig. 3.6 shows the same patterns of results for expected deaths.
It is interesting, however, that with the assumptions of Model 3 the epidemic dies
out long before everyone has been infected. Continuing the model projections gives
ultimately about 10million infections, of which about half, or 5million, are reported,
and there are about 140,000 deaths in total. On these assumptions, population immu-
nity is not achieved, nor required. But perhaps a permanent lockdown is required
for this model to be valid, which would have other severe consequences, social and
economic, which I do not go into here.
With Model 4 the estimated r(t) rate when vaccinations start rises above that esti-
mated with Model 3. As many become vaccinated, one needs a higher transmission
rate to get the same number of expected cases, to match the actual numbers. But the
net rate Rg(t) falls well below that for Model 3 because of the vaccinations. On my
assumptions the entire uninfected population is vaccinated by later in June 2021, and
a few weeks before that the expected numbers of reported new cases and of deaths
have dropped to a handful. Within my homogeneous population I do not separate
out children, but very young children might well not be vaccinated at all; and also
there will be some people that decline to be vaccinated or have some medical reason
for not being vaccinated. I also assume no further imports of infection, so Model 4
is likely to prove too optimistic.
3.11 Projection Models
Using my estimation results as at the end of February 2021 it is possible to make
experimental projections of the numbers, on different, but arbitrary, assumptions. I
make four of these, called 5A, 5B, 5C and 5D and the projected numbers of new
reported cases and of deaths are shown in Figs. 3.9 and 3.10.
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Fig. 3.9 Expected daily reported new cases of COVID-19, U.K., Models 5A–5D
Fig. 3.10 Expected daily reported deaths of COVID-19, U.K., Models 5A–5D
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In Model 5A I continue Model 3, assuming that no vaccinations have happened
(or alternatively that vaccinations have no effect whatever), and then that on 8March
2021 most lockdown measures are relaxed, and the r(t) rate goes up immediately to
0.155, about the same as my highest estimated rate in the middle of December 2020,
but still well below my highest estimated rate in March 2020 of almost 0.23. The
result of this would be a rapid increase in both cases and deaths, with reported cases
in June and July exceeding 200,000 a day, and deaths exceeding 8,000 a day, both
far higher than in previous waves. These are a long way off the scale of the charts.
By the end of July this projection has g(t) falling to below 0.5, so half the popu-
lation would have been infected. The numbers of new cases and new deaths would
decline to a low level by the end of 2021, by which time total deaths would have
reached about 850,000 (compared with about 116,000 at the end of February 2021),
but g(t) would still be about 0.45, so not much more than half the population would
have been infected. I do not suggest this as a likely projection, but as a warning “what
if” one.
In Model 5B I continue Model 4, allowing for the vaccinations that have taken
place, but assuming that they stop entirely on 8 March 2021, at the same time as
the r(t) rate goes up to 0.155, as in Model 5A. The effect is quite different from
that of Model 5A. There is a small jump up in the expected numbers of cases with a
continuing fall thereafter, and a continuing fall in deaths. The number of vaccinations
is already enough to reduce Rg(t) to well below unity.
In Model 5C I modify Model 5B by assuming that vaccinations continue as in my
Model 4, until the whole population is vaccinated by later in June, but with the same
relaxation in lockdown as in Models 5A and 5B, rising to 0.155 on 8 March 2021.
The projected numbers of aces and of deaths is a bit lower than in Model 5B. and
they fall to zero once the whole population is vaccinated.
In Model 5D I follow the dates of what has already been announced by the U.K.
government (actually only in respect of England, but I make no distinction in my
model between the different nations in the U.K., and England accounts for much the
largest part of it). I assume roughly equal steps in increasing r(t), from an estimated
0.137 at the end of February to 0.140 on 8 March 2021, to 0.144 on 29 March, to
0.148 on 12 April, to 0.151 on 17 May and finally to 0.155 on 21 June. These dates
have been announced as the earliest dates of steps for unlocking, but I assume that
they are in fact realised. The results show projected new cases and deaths even lower
than in either of the two previous models.
These experiments suggest that vaccination is likely to do the required job, and
to allow certain amount of relaxation of lockdown. But my assumptions that the first
vaccine is 100% effective, that the whole population is vaccinated, that there are no
imported cases, and no nasty new variants of the virus, are all on the optimistic side.
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3.12 Problems and Unknowns
I have mentioned above some of the difficulties with this simple model. I make
many assumptions, and I do not know whether these are correct. I assume that those
infected show symptoms on day 6; this should perhaps be a distribution of different
days. I assume initially that only 10% of cases show bad enough symptoms to go to
hospital or even be tested, with this the proportion increasing with Models 3 and 4,
but even those assumptions may be wrong.
I assume that those infected are fully infections for five days, but only half as
infectious for the next ten days, and not at all thereafter. But many cases are reported
of people being sick for much longer than this, and perhaps for much less, so their
infectiousness may also vary. I assume equal mortality rates for days 6–15, but this is
arbitrary, and cases are reported of much longer periods before death has occurred.
I assume that after some days (15 so far), those infected cannot pass on the
disease and cannot themselves get it again. This latter seems in a few cases to have
been incorrect, and we cannot know how long any immunity might last, until a longer
period has passed. Nor for certain do we know what immunity vaccines will provide.
I assume a single homogenous population, but it is well known that mortality rates
vary greatly by the age of the individual and to a lesser extent the sex, and also to
some extent the ethnic status. The extent to which different individuals are able to
isolate themselves may vary very much by age, and perhaps by other factors. The
fit elderly may find it easy to be very isolated at home, and so run very little risk of
infection. The seriously ill elderly may be in a care home, and at high risk. So the
population available for infection may vary with time quite a lot, depending on what
people do and can do; go to work or work from home; live alone or with an extended
family; have children at school or not at school. In different stages of lockdown these
may have had very varying influence.
Elaborations that would be needed, or at least desirable, in a more comprehensive
modelwould be variation by age and sex, perhaps stratification into a smallish number
of discrete classes. This would require the attribution of a different mortality rate to
each class, perhaps calculated as an overall m(t) multiplied by a class-specific ratio,
to give a value for each class. One might be able to get such relative values from
published data. Then one would wish to have a square table of contacts between
members of each classwith eachother class, to vary the relative level of infectiousness
across classes; it might be very difficult to get estimates for this.
A further elaboration would be to model region or localities separately. It has been
clear that the disease has affected different areas differentially, some having high
rates and others low at the same time, but then perhaps then reversing; some having
increasing rates and others decreasing rates. Further, different levels of lockdown
have been imposed in the different parts of the U.K., both in the separate countries
and in separate areas within those countries. Allowing all the variability described
above for age classes, and the further complications of contacts between areas might
well magnify the model out of the realm of practicability.
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I have also assumed that, apart from a single imported infection at some starting
date, there has been no contact with other countries. This ismanifestly untrue. Almost
certainly there were several early imports from different places, and these have prob-
ably continued. It would also be the case that other countries have had imports from
the U.K. and elsewhere. To identify these cases would be very difficult, and it is not
obvious how one would model this feature, except by arbitrarily introducing a new
imported infection every so often.
3.13 Other Countries
It is possible to fit thesemodels to the daily data from other countries, but it is difficult
to interpret any results without local knowledge of the conditions in those countries.
The data may be collected by different regions within another country, and may be
defined differently; the reliability of reporting may differ; the social and economic
conditions of countries differ, and the various lockdown measures taken or not taken
by the relevant authorities may also differ very much. I do not show any results for
other countries here.
3.14 Conclusions
Experimenting with models such as I have described may give some insight into
features of an epidemic, and they can be made to fit past data tolerably well. But
they seem to be of less use in prediction. They can give “what if?” results, showing
what would happen if certain assumptions about a stationary, or a changing, future
were to occur, but less use in knowing what will actually happen. That depends very
much on the actions of governments, the responses of individuals to governments
and to the disease, on medical improvements in treating those affected, on whether
vaccines will be available and on their possible efficacy, and also on what the virus
itself does, with possible new mutations with different characteristics.
However, I hope that the experiments I have done shed some light on infection
models for those not previously familiar with them, and also show how experimental
projections might allow a better understanding of the effects of different government
actions. But I hope that the models used by those who advise governments are
considerably better than this very simple one.1
1 The author has placed specimenExcelworksheets, programmes, results, updates andothermaterial
on his website at: https://davidwilkieworks.wordpress.com/.
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Luca Regis and Petar Jevtić
Abstract After decades of worldwide steady improvements in life expectancy, the
COVID-19 pandemic produced a shock that had an extraordinary immediate impact
on mortality rates globally. This shock had largely heterogeneous effects across
cohorts, socio-economic groups, and nations. It represents a remarkable departure
from the secular trends that most of the mortality models have been constructed to
capture. Thus, this chapter aims to review the existing literature on stochastic mortal-
ity, discussing the features that these models should have in order to be able to incor-
porate the behaviour of mortality rates following shocks such as the one produced by
the COVID-19 pandemic. Multi-population models are needed to describe the het-
erogeneous impact of pandemic shocks across cohorts of individuals. However, very
few of them so far have included jumps. We contribute to the literature by describing
a general framework for multi-population models with jumps in continuous-time,
using affine jump-diffusive processes.
4.1 Stochastic Mortality Models and the COVID-19 Shock
The life expectancy of human individuals worldwide has been steadily increasing
since World War II. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop-
ment (OECD) estimates that life expectancy worldwide increased by more than
25 years in the last 70 years, moving from 45.7 years in 1950 to 72.6 in 2019.
Mortality rates have constantly been declining at all ages, spanning from infants to
the elderly. This phenomenon relies mainly on the economic progress of nations,
which improved people’s well-being, habits, nutrition, and healthcare consumption.
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Advances in medicine have allowed us to prevent and cure common and less com-
mon diseases. This progress, with different intensities, was shared by all regions and
countries in the world. Importantly, improvements in life expectancy and mortality
rates constantly exceeded the expectations. While being good news for humanity,
higher-than-expected mortality improvements generated unexpected increases in the
value of the liabilities of life insurance companies engaged in the annuity business,
of pension funds and public pension schemes. This fact led actuaries to focus on the
so-called longevity risk in the last thirty years, i.e., the risk of unexpected improve-
ments in the mortality of individuals. Modelling aims at capturing the uncertainty in
the changes of future mortality rates. Modelling longevity risk became crucial for
two reasons in particular: first, to assess the likelihood and impact of deviations from
expectations; second, to price and hedge longevity risk via risk mitigation techniques
such as the use of derivative contracts.
The seminal contribution by Lee and Carter (1992), who first described mortality
rates via stochastic processes, paved the way for extensive literature which tried to
capture the essential features observed in the mortality dynamics and project them in
future. Progressively, the literature moved from the modelling of mortality rates of
single populations to the joint modelling of the mortality of multiple socio-economic
groups and populations, which display interconnected and specific features at the
same time. Because the mortality improvements in the last 100 years in the vast
majority of countries (with some notable exceptions due to the effects of wars, as
for Italy and Germany during World War II) were following a substantially stable
trend, only a few of the proposed models considered adding jumps in the mortality
dynamics, and the application of such models has been limited. Nonetheless, the
COVID-19 pandemics in 2020 reminded us that sudden shocks to mortality rates
might occur, although with (hopefully) relatively low frequency. COVID-19 showed
us how epidemics in a highly interconnected world could spread rapidly across
continents, affecting people’s lives and health conditions. This chapter reviews the
literature on stochastic mortality models with jumps whose interest will likely surge
in the coming years. To ground our analysis, we first describe briefly in Sect. 4.2
the immediate impact that COVID-19 had on the mortality rates in 2020. This effort
helps us highlight that the 2020 shock had largely different effects:
• across countries, as some were better able to contain the spread of the virus than
others and/or because their health system was better prepared to respond to the
emergency;
• across ages and sexes, because the observed lethality of COVID-19 was higher for
males and older people;
• across socio-economic groups, especially in countries with mostly private health
systems, due to unequal wealth levels and health-care quality and consumption.
We also point out that it is, at present, unclear whether the shock to mortality rates
will have persistent effects or transitory effects only. Direct and lasting effects of
“long-COVID” and the impact that the strict lock-down measures adopted in many
countries are having on people’s habits, health, and economic situation will become
apparent in the future. Also, there were indirect effects due to the stress placed by
COVID-19 on the health systems, which had to limit to some extent non-COVID-
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related treatments of other diseases and screenings. Individuals who reduced health-
related consumption may have consequences that will become apparent after some
time.
With these aspects in mind, Sects. 4.3 and 4.4 review the stochastic mortal-
ity models that account for jumps in the dynamics of mortality rates, developed
either in discrete-time or in continuous-time set-ups. Section4.3 focuses on single-
population models, while Sect. 4.4 considers multi-population ones. We believe this
last stream of literature is particularly relevant in light of the heterogeneous effects
of the COVID-19 pandemic shock on mortality rates because it can account for
common sudden shocks, which may have different impacts across countries and/or
socio-economic groups. Recognizing a gap in the literature because, to our knowl-
edge, none of the continuous-time multi-population models proposed so far have
considered the presence of jumps, in Sect. 4.5 we generalise the continuous-time
multi-population framework in Jevtić and Regis (2019) to the case of jump-diffusive
affine processes. Section4.6 provides some concluding remarks.
4.2 The Impact of COVID-19 on Mortality Rates
Up to 2020 almost uninterrupted improvements in mortality rates were observed in
all countries since the end of World War II. Figure4.1 supports this statement, by
Fig. 4.1 Life expectancy at birth in UK, US and Italy from 1946 to 2019. SourceHumanMortality
Database
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Fig. 4.2 Improvements in annual death probabilities at ages 0–90 in Italy between 2015 and 1950.
Source Human Mortality Database
portraying the time-evolution of life expectancy at birth for Italy, theUnitedKingdom
and theUnited States from1946 to 2019.Nonetheless, the figure shows that the extent
of such improvements varied temporally and by country. Mortality decline has been
heterogeneous across ages and sexes as well, as testified by Fig. 4.2, which displays
the change in conditional yearly death probabilities by age and sex for Italy between
1950 and 2015.
The year 2020, however, brought a worldwide-shared setback to mortality rates’
decrease. In the absence of yearly official 2020 data, to describe the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on mortality rates of several countries, we use weekly data
from the STMF (Short-TermMortality Fluctuations) dataset provided by the Human
Mortality Database. First we consider the changes in the total death rates. Figure4.3
shows their 2020weekly series for 6OECD countries (Spain, Italy, France, Germany,
theUnitedKingdom and theUnited States) and compares their valuewith the average
of the previous 5 years. The figure displays remarkable deviations from the average
for all the countries, starting from the spread of the COVID-19 diseases in March.
It highlights also that the pandemic shock affected the mortality rates in different
countries differently, both in terms of timing and severity. As for timing, with the
exception of Germany, we see total death rates spike in coincidence with the first
wave of contagions in March. While during the summer death rates were in line with
the average of the previous 5 years in all countries, with the exception of the United
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Fig. 4.3 Weekly measured total death rate for 6 countries in 2020. Source SMTF Dataset
States, we see the effects of the second wave of contagions in the fall after week 40.
As for severity, total death rates, which have been steadily decreasing overtime in
the last decades,1 increased in 2020 by 18.6% in US, 18% in Spain, 15.9% in Italy,
12.2% in Great Britain, 9.89% in France, and 5.3% in Germany compared to their
2015–2019 averages. In Table4.1 we report the percentage increase in the death rate
for the six countries considered for the three age groups—65–74, 75–84 and 85+—
which displayed the highest lethality level to the disease.We also distinguish between
males and females. The table highlights that, with few exceptions, males death rates
for all age groups deteriorated more than females’. The evidence collected in this
section is material to our discussion on stochastic mortality models. Indeed, it allows
us to stress that the pandemic shock due to the spread of the COVID-19 disease
had heterogeneous severity on different countries and age groups. Andrasfay and
Goldman (2021) document the disproportionate impact of the shock on the hispanic
America and African America sub-populations in the US, for whom the estimated
drop in life expectancy in 2020 is far more severe than for the general population.
A very important aspect which cannot be ascertained from the data as of yet is to
1 The average annual change in death rates ranges between −1% and −2% for all age classes and
countries in the sample.
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Table 4.1 Percentage increase in the 2020 death rate versus 2015–2019 average. Source Authors’
elaboration from the SFTM Dataset
Males Females
Country 65–74 (%) 75–84 (%) 85+ (%) 65–74 (%) 75–84 (%) 85+ (%)
Spain 12.29 9.72 13.00 15.38 8.3 11.73
Italy 14.29 14.20 9.99 8.33 10.48 11.71
France 8.12 4.94 8.12 7.40 3.29 7.75
Germany 0.53 4.32 2.13 −0.83 3.42 0.5
Great
Britain
10.9 9.24 9.49 7.16 6.05 6.91
United
States
16.49 12.61 11.06 12.59 10.09 11.45
what extent the shock to mortality rates we observed in 2020 will cause long-lasting
effects, possibly producing a change in the observedmortality trend. Some countries,
including Germany and the United Kingdom, experienced the peak of contagions
in the first months of 2021, and hence the 2021 mortality figures are expected to be
affected by the pandemic shock as well as the 2020 one. How much of the shock
will affect mortality rates in future years is at present hard to predict. All in all,
the stylised facts and considerations presented in this section make the case for a
multi-population analysis and modelling of mortality when pandemic shocks are
specifically considered.
4.3 Stochastic Mortality Models and Pandemics:
Single-Population Models
The previous section describes the characteristics of the sudden worldwide shock to
mortality rates that occurred in 2020. This section reviews the stochastic mortality
models proposed in the literature to account for such features. We consider single-
populationmodels, distinguishing between contributions in whichmortality rates are
modelled in discrete-time and continuous-time.
4.3.1 Discrete-Time Single Population Models
The Lee-Carter (1992) model was among the first stochastic models proposed for
mortality, and today it is probably the most well-known. Mathematically can be
represented as follows:
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ln(mx,t ) = αx + βxkt + ex,t . (4.1)
In the equation above, the central death rate for age x in year t , mx,t , is a function
of a time-varying factor kt , called the mortality index, which is common across ages
but impacts them differently through the coefficients βx ∈ R. αx is a constant age-
dependent term which represents the baseline level of mortality for age x . Model
estimation, which is traditionally achieved by applying a two-stage procedure, cap-
tures sudden jumps in mortality through the changes in the kt values. However, at
least two considerations are in order. First, mortality changes captured through kt
affect the different ages through βx independently of the magnitude of the change.
This prevents the model from capturing the age-specificities of pandemic or war-
related shocks, as pointed out by Liu and Li (2015). Second, when forecasting, it is
necessary to select a model for the kt series. The modelling choice will obviously
impact how past observations shape the distributional properties of future mortality
rates. The standard solution is to employ a random walk with drift to model kt :
kt = μ + kt−1 + σ Zt , (4.2)
where μ is the drift term and Zt is a standard normal. This choice rules out the
presence of jumps and their occurrence in projections. Usually, in line with this rea-
soning, outliers, such as the 1918 Spanish flu-related spike, are either excluded by
the estimation process or they are dealt with using ad-hoc interventions (see Li and
Chan 2005). Someworks have generalised the Lee-Carter model and its most notable
extensions (such as the one proposed by Renshaw and Haberman (2006) accounting
for cohort effects) to specifically account for jumps in annual mortality rates. Milido-
nis et al. (2011) introduced a regime switching model, which can capture both jumps
and changes in the mortality volatility pattern via the different regime states. Wang
et al. (2013) extended the Renshaw and Haberman (2006) model, considering jump
processes for the error term. Chen and Cox (2009), building on the continuous-time
model proposed by Cox et al. (2006), modified the process kt in Eq. (4.2) to include
a jump component. They proposed two specifications, both based on the inclusion
of a jump occurring with probability p and producing a shock Yt ∼ N (m, s2). One
assumes that jumps generate permanent shifts to the mortality index, which is thus
modelled as:
kt = kt−1 + μ − pm + σ Zt + Yt Nt , (4.3)
where Nt is a Bernoulli distribution which takes value 1 with probability p and 0
otherwise. An alternative specification assumes that jumps have transitory effects,
lasting one period only:
kt = kt−1 + μ + σ Zt + Yt Nt − Yt−1Nt−1, (4.4)
The authors claimed that this second choice is more appropriate, because the most
severe shocks observed over the last century, such as the pandemic flu of 1918 and
the tsunami of 2004 had negligible permanent effects. Whether this will remain
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true for the COVID-19 pandemic shock is an open question. While epidemiological
similarities with the Spanish flu may suggest that development, the severe downturn
experiencedby the economiesworldwidemayproduce long-termconsequences jeop-
ardising the steady decrease in the mortality index that we have observed so far over
previous decades. From the modelling point of view, this may imply changes in the
mortality trends, as discussed by Sweeting (2011). The models proposed by Chen
and Cox (2009) can be estimated via Conditional Maximum Likelihood. If applied
to the US data from 1900 to 2003, the models estimate the probability of observing
a jump in kt to be around 4% under both specifications. When a jump occurs, in
the transitory-effect model, the sudden increase in kt it produces is 4 times greater
(in absolute value) than its annual negative drift. The importance of accounting for
jumps in the mortality index is confirmed by Özen and Şahin (2020), who improved
the model fit by allowing for a non-constant mean time between jump arrivals using
renewal processes. In theworkswe have reviewed so far, jumps affected themortality
index. Thus, jump-driven shocks do not have age-specific effects different from the
Brownian shock captured by the no-jump equivalent mortality index. To overcome
this issue, Liu and Li (2015) specify the model as follows:
lnmx,t = αx + βxkt + Nt Jx,t + ex,t , (4.5)
where Jx,t is a time-dependent response to the presence of a jump. Jx,t can then be
specified as being an age-dependent response to a common shock or as being fully
age-specific. The authors provide evidence that accounting for age-specific jump
responses is important to improve the model fit. Given the evidence of Sect. 4.2, such
a feature appears crucial when including the COVID-19 shock in the data.
4.3.2 Continuous-Time Single-Population Models
Before the Lee-Carter model was extended to account for jumps, jumps had already
been introduced in continuous-time mortality models. Indeed, although introduced
byMilevsky and Promislow (2001) almost 10 years later than Lee and Carter (1992),
continuous-time stochasticmortalitymodelswith jumpswere proposed just fewyears
later by Biffis (2005) and by Luciano and Vigna (2008). In the continuous-time
framework, the time to death of individuals is modelled as the first jump time of a
time-inhomogeneous Poisson process with stochastic intensity. The main advantage
of such a framework is that, if themortality intensity process is chosenwithin the class
of affine processes—as in Biffis (2005) and Luciano and Vigna (2008)—survival
probabilities are available in closed form. Moreover, the mortality model can be
coupled with standard financial risk models to obtain prices of fairly evaluated life
insurance policies and their hedges (see Luciano et al. 2012). More formally, a
mortality intensity μxt for an individual aged x at time 0 is affine if it is assumed to
be an affine function of a jump-diffusive affine process Xt such that:
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dXt = δ(t, Xt )dt + σ(t, Xt )dWxt + d J xt , (4.6)
where Wxt is a standard Brownian motion, J
x
t is a pure-jump process, and δ(·),
σ(·)σ T (·), and the jump-arrival intensity have an affine dependence on Xt . The
symbol T denotes matrix transposition. Within this set-up, the survival probability
up to time T , Sx (t, T ), under some technical conditions, can be obtained as:








= eα(t,T )+β(t,T )·Xt , (4.7)
where α(·) and β(·) solve a system of Ordinary Differential Equations (ODEs) which
depend on the model specification. These processes are very flexible and easy to cal-
ibrate. They have been extensively applied in the pricing (Wills and Sherris 2010),
hedging (Luciano et al. 2012) and portfolio choice (Menoncin and Regis 2020) con-
texts. Luciano and Vigna (2008) showed that for several generations, in the Italian
population, accounting for jumps improves the model fit, in particular when the
intensity follows a Gaussian process. However apart from the analysis in Luciano
and Vigna (2008), most of the literature restricts the application of the affine frame-
work to purely diffusive processes (Schrager 2006; Jevtić et al. 2013, for instance).
An exception is Luciano et al. (2008), where the dependent lives of couples are con-
sidered. Hainaut and Devolder (2008) took instead a different approach, based on
the use of pure-jump Lévy processes.
4.4 Stochastic Mortality Models and Pandemics:
Multi-population
Pandemic shocks have the crucial characteristic of manifesting themselves globally
in a short time frame, affecting themortality patterns ofmany populations (countries)
and sub-groups within populations. Capturing the heterogeneity and the dependence
of such impacts across different groups is a non-trivial task, which requires the use
of multi-population models.
Multi-population models have started emerging in the mid-2000s to capture the
joint evolution of mortality dynamics across countries and/or socio-economic groups
within the general population. In this section, we review the most prominent, high-
lighting that only two contributions, up to our knowledge, included jumps in a multi-
population setting.
4.4.1 Discrete-Time Models
Li and Lee (2005) applied the original Lee-Carter model to describe the mortality
rates of multiple countries jointly. The model they proposed assumes a common
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mortality index driving the mortality rates of different populations. Several papers
extended this set-up to account for issues such as (semi)-coherence (i.e. long-run con-
vergence of the mortality rates of several populations, see Li et al. 2017), Bayesian
estimation (see Antonio et al. 2015), cointegration (see Yang andWang 2013; Jarner
and Jallbjørn 2020), factor-based approaches (see Chen et al. 2015). To our knowl-
edge, only Zhou et al. (2013) and Özen and Şahin (2021) considered two-population
models with jumps in the discrete-time framework. Zhou et al. (2013) modelled
jointly the dynamics of two populations, assuming that:
lnm jx,t = α jx + β jx k jt , j = 1, 2, (4.8)
where m jx,t denotes the central death rate for the individual aged x at time t and
belonging to population j . They define
k jt = k̂ jt + N jt Y jt , (4.9)
where k̂ jt is the stochastic effect free of jumps, N
j
t is the counting process for jumps
at time t in themortality of population j , whose range is {0, 1} andwhose distribution
may be dependent across populations, and Y jt is the severity of a jump at time t for
the j-th population. Jumps have transitory (one-period only) effects. While imposing
a stationary AR(1) process on k̂(1)t − k̂(2)t , the framework allows for different—but
possibly dependent—jump times, frequencies and severities. The model, applied to
the populations of Sweden and Finland, is shown to fit the data well, better than the
corresponding no-jump process, because it is able to better capture the presence of
outliers, such as the 1918 spike due to the Spanish flu. Recently, Özen and Şahin
(2021) introduced jumps in a two-population model, modelling jumps in one of the
two populations through a renewal process and linking the other population using a
Common Age effect model.
4.4.2 Continuous-Time Models
In continuous-time, only a few papers have focused on two-population or multi-
population models. Recently, building on the seminal contribution by Dahl et al.
(2008), three papers have proposedmulti-population continuous-timemortalitymod-
els. De Rosa et al. (2021) proposed a two-population model that describes the
dependence structure among populations and cohorts within them. The stochas-
tic mortality intensities there follow a square-root process, which guarantees non-
negativity. Similarly, Sherris et al. (2020) introduced a model in which common and
idiosyncratic Gaussian factors drive the mortality surface of two populations. Jevtić
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and Regis (2019) described a general set-up for multi-population continuous-time
stochasticmortalitymodels using affine processes. All theseworks considered purely
diffusive processes. To our knowledge, no multi-population model in continuous-
time proposed so far includes jumps. In the next section, to fill this gap, we present
an extension of the general framework in Jevtić and Regis (2019) to jump-diffusive
affine processes.
4.5 A Continuous-Time Multi-population Model
with Jumps
We propose here a continuous-time multi-population model with jumps. Consider
the following setting. The mortality intensity of an individual aged x + t at time t
belonging to population j , with j = 1, ..., M , is defined as:
μ
j
x+t := g j0 (x + t, t, x) + g j1(x + t, t, x)X jt , (4.10)
where X jt is a stochastic process inRN , g
j
0 (x + t, t, x) is a base-line level ofmortality
for the individual and g j1(x + t, t, x) is the vector of responses of X jt . Here, X jt is
described by the following stochastic differential equation:
dX jt = A j (X jt , t)dt + (X jt , t)dWt + dZt , (4.11)
where W t is a vector of standard Brownian Motions and Zt is a pure-jump process.
Notice that Wt and Zt are in principle the same across populations. In Jevtić and
Regis (2019) the different populations j and ages within them are modelled jointly
by assuming that they respond differently to a set of common Brownian noises. To
that setting, we add a jump component. Notice that the age-specific and population-
specific responses g j1 allow for a very rich description of the heterogeneous effects
of Brownian and jump shocks. If functions A j (·), T (·) and the jump intensity
λ(X jt ) of process Zt have an affine dependence on X
j
t , the survival probabilities
S jx (t, T ) can be computed analytically. Suppressing time-dependence for notational
convenience, we assume that:
• A j = K0 + K1 · X j ;
• (T )i j = (H0)i j + (H1)i j · X j ;
• λ = l0 + l1 · X j ;
• θ(·) defines the “jump transform” that determines the jump-size distribution.
Then, following Duffie et al. (2000), the survival probability of an individual aged
x at time t can be computed analytically as:






= eα(t,T )+β(t,T )·X jt , (4.12)
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where α(t, T ) and β(t, T ) solve the following system of ODEs:
β̇(t) = g j1(x + t, t, x) − KT1 β(t) −
1
2
β(t)T H1β(t) − l0(θ(β(t)) − 1) (4.13)
α̇(t) = g j0 (x + t, t, x) − K0 · β(t) −
1
2
β(t)T H0β(t) − l1(θ(β(t)) − 1). (4.14)
The solution to this system of equations depends on the specification taken by
Eqs. (4.10) and (4.11). Under particular conditions, the solution is available in closed
form. For instance, this applies to multi-cohort extensions of the jump processes
proposed in Luciano and Vigna (2008) for the single-cohort case. Indeed, when the
continuous part of (4.11) follows a multi-dimensional Ornstein-Uhlenbeck-process
or a Feller-process and jumps are compound Poisson with constant intensity l and
exponentially distributed size, g j0 = 0 and g j1 = 1, the system of equations above
has an analytical solution. More generally, such a solution may be approximated
analytically. A pure-jump factor through (4.11) may be considered, in particular, to
allow for population-specific and age-specific responses to sudden shocks, which
may not otherwise be well captured by purely-diffusive model specifications.
4.6 Conclusions
This chapter reviewed the literature on stochasticmortalitymodels featuringmultiple
populations and jumps, which can better capture the effects of pandemic shocks and
their heterogeneous intensity across countries, cohorts, socio-economic groups. On
top of that, the chapter proposes a modelling framework based on continuous-time
jump-diffusive processes. The framework is flexible and rich enough to describe
the observed differential mortality across groups and capture the cohort-specific and
population-specific effects of jumps. It has the advantage of providing closed-form
expressions for the survival probabilities of ages within sub-populations. Addition-
ally, it can be coupled with standard financial risk models to provide valuation and
management tools for insurance and reinsurance products affected by mortality risk.
However, the affine framework may be restrictive when it comes to the jump com-
ponent modeling relative to pure-jump specifications, such as the one proposed by
Hainaut and Devolder (2008). Also, model estimation, depending on the model spec-
ification, may require particular care. We postpone it to further research and future
data availability.
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Chapter 5
A Mortality Model for Pandemics
and Other Contagion Events
Gary Venter
Abstract The crisis caused by COVID-19 has had various impacts on the mortality
of different sexes, age groups, ethnic and socio-economic backgrounds and requires
improved mortality models. Here a very simple model extension is proposed: add
a proportional jump to mortality rates that is a constant percent increase across the
ages and cohorts but which varies by year. Thus all groups are affected, but the
higher-mortality groups get the biggest increases in number dying. Every year gets
a jump factor, but these can be vanishingly small for the normal years. Statistical
analysis reveals that even before considering pandemic effects, mortality models are
often missing systemic risk elements which could capture unusual or even extreme
population events. Adding a provision for annual jumps, stochastically dispersed
enough to include both tiny and pandemic risks, improves the results and incorpo-
rates the systemic risk in projection distributions. Here the mortality curves across
the age, cohort, and time parameters are fitted using regularised smoothing splines,
and cross-validation criteria are used for fit quality. In this way, we get more parsimo-
nious models with better predictive properties. Performance of the proposed model
is compared to standard mortality models existing in the literature.
5.1 Introduction
Probabilistic mortality models usually assume that deaths are independent, identi-
cally distributed Yes/No events, which makes the number of Yes events in a period
binomially distributed. For low-probability events such as deaths in a year, binomial
distributions are very close to Poisson, which is more convenient for modelling. It is
common, however, for heavier-tailed distributions, such as negative binomial, to give
better fits, which suggests that there are unmodelled correlated effects. Population
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events, such as disease outbreaks, extreme weather and natural disasters produce
year-to-year jumps and contribute to such effects on mortality rates. This is likely
to be a reason the mortality models have heavier-tailed residuals. Including model
provisions for such population events can improve the fit of the theoretically appropri-
ate Poisson models, while also providing enough flexibility to account for pandemic
experience.
In this chapter, a simple model with mortality jumps every year, which are neg-
ligible in ordinary years, is proposed: a single factor, drawn annually from a fixed
distribution, increases all the modelled mortality means proportionally. In the exam-
ple, the jump distribution fit to historical data improves on typical models, and also
gives reasonable probabilities for events like the COVID-19 pandemic. The other
model parameters are fit to smoothing splines, which have several advantages enu-
merated below.
A few related papers on pandemic mortality rates have appeared recently. For
example, Özen and Şahin (2020) postulate occasional population jump events to bet-
ter predict themarket behaviour ofmortality catastrophe bonds. Chen andCox (2009)
use a similar idea for mortality securities in general. Zhou et al. (2013) generalise this
to two-population modelling, which they point out is often used for mortality securi-
ties. Alijean and Narsoo (2018) test a number of mortality models over an extended
period for quality of fit, and find that a jump model like these works better than the
well-known continuousmodels, particularly in that it is able to account for the effects
of the Spanish flu epidemic around 1918. Barigou et al. (2021) fit smoothed surfaces
tomortality rates,with andwithout pandemic effects, usingmethodology very similar
to the smoothing splines used here. Cairns et al. (2020) model COVID-19 mortality
in greater demographic detail. O’hare and Li (2017) test several standard mortality
models of log rates for normality of residuals, and find they almost universally fail
their tests. This is actually to be expected from Poisson-distributed mortality rates,
and the models here use log links to fit the actual mortality counts. They also find evi-
dence of correlation of residuals, which does indicate the type of systematic effects
that the jump model here is aiming to avoid.
Section 5.2 provides a summary of themethodology and findings. Section 5.3 lays
out methodology to do parametric regression by fitting smoothing splines across all
of the age, period, and cohort variables in MCMC, using Bayesian shrinkage for the
smoothing, and discusses the predictive advantages of such smoothing. This is done
for both cubic and linear splines, optimising the degree of smoothing by conditional
expectations instead of the typical cross-validation methods. Details of the mortality
models used and the fitting process are given in Sect. 5.4. Section 5.5 contains the
results, as well as a discussion of possible generalisations of the models. Section 5.6
concludes, and some computer code is in the Appendix.
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5.2 Highlights of Methodology and Findings
5.2.1 Summary of Methodology
The approach is to apply smoothing splines to fit standard mortality models to the
French data, using both Poisson and negative binomial residuals. For the best models
tried, the negative binomial fit better for both male and female populations. The
models were extended to add an annual mortality multiplier factor drawn from a
stochastic process, while using only Poisson residuals.
Mortality data generally comes in annual blocks by calendar age at death, and
year of death minus age approximates the year of birth cohort. One class of models
has factors for age, period (i.e., year), and cohort. If these factors simply multiply,
this is called an APC model. These are usually estimated in log form, so the model
is additive, and it can be fit by regression. More complicated models multiply the
period log factors by an age modifier, to reflect the fact that medical advances, etc.,
affect some ages more than others. The Lee and Carter (1992) model has age effects
and age-modified period effects. Renshaw and Haberman (2006) add cohorts, and
this is called the RH model below. The ages that trend faster can change, however,
especially for models over wide age and period ranges. Developing economies, for
instance, can initially have sharp improvements in pre-teen mortality, then later shift
to the more usual pattern from improved treatments for diseases affecting older
people. Hunt and Blake (2014) allow multiple trends over various periods, each with
its own age modifiers. Venter and Şahin (2018) used this for US males, and found an
additional trend for HIV-related mortality in the 1980s and 1990s for young adults,
and another complex trend for ages in the 40s, perhaps related to substance abuse.
Parametric curves are often used across the age, period, and cohort log factors.
For instance, Perks (1932) introduces a four-parameter mortality curve that fits pretty
well across ages. However the parameters do change from time to time. Xu et al.
(2019) use curves from multifactor bond-yield models to fit mortality by age for
individual cohorts or cohort groups. These come with automatic projections to older
ages, which are like long bond yields in these models.
Cubic splines are often fit across the factors instead of using parametric curves.
They are smoother and use fewer parameters than models with parameters at every
age, period, and cohort. A recent refinement is to use smoothing splines, which
typically are cubic splines with a penalty included to constrain the average second
derivative across the curve. Linear splines have generally been considered too jagged
for such modelling, but Barnett and Zehnwirth (2000) introduce a form of linear
smoothing splines that constrain second differences, which is analogous to how
smoothing is done for cubic splines, and these can be fairly smooth as well. Using
smoothing splines across regression variables is called semiparametric regression. A
detailed source is Harezlak et al. (2018), and Venter and Şahin (2021) apply it to an
actuarial model.
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5.2.2 Summary of Findings
For the female population, adding the annual jump factors made this Poisson model
better than the best previous (negative binomial) model. For the males, doing this
was almost as good, but the contagion was not captured completely. More complex
possible population event models are discussed in Sect. 5.5.
Figure 5.1 shows the fitted mortality multipliers for both populations. These are
estimated in logs as additive terms. Themale and female factors are generally similar.
Their peaks are at 2003, a year with about 14,000 extra deaths from an extreme heat
wave. 2018 also has high factors, and it also had a bad heat wave, but preparations for
it were better, so it is not quite as high. The 2020 COVID-19 pandemic had about 5
times asmany deaths as in 2003.Under the estimated distribution of factors, formales
2003 was about a 1 in 9 year event and 2020 about 1 in 50 years. As such population
events can occur over adjacent years, these frequencies are not unreasonable.
Fig. 5.1 Fitted mortality multipliers
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5.3 Semiparametric Regression in MCMC
MCMC is an effective tool for fitting shrinkage splines. In this section, first the
theoretical background for this is presented, with Bayesian and frequentist interpre-
tations. Then the design matrices for estimating splines by regression are specified,
followed by the hows and whys of parameter shrinkage, including some history.
Cross validation is used in semiparametric regression to compare the goodness of fit
of models from a predictive viewpoint, and this is relatively simple to do in MCMC.
Cross validation is also widely used to estimate the best degree of shrinkage for a
model, but this is problematic. A better alternative is available when using MCMC
estimation.
5.3.1 MCMC Parameter Shrinkage
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) is a method for estimating probability distri-
butions through stochastic sampling. “Markov chain” means that when generating
a sequence of samples, each one uses the previous one, without reference to earlier
history. It was developed by physicists in the late 1940s as an efficient numerical inte-
gration method to model distributions of particle interactions. After enough samples,
it has distributional stability—new samples will all be from the same distribution.
In Bayesian statistics, MCMC is used to sample parameter sets from the joint
distribution of the parameters and the data. This can be computed as the product
of the prior distribution of the parameters and the conditional distribution of the
data given the parameters. The latter is the likelihood, so the product is called the
joint likelihood. By the definition of conditional distribution, it is also the product
of the conditional distribution of the parameters given the data with the probability
of the data. The latter is not known, but it is a constant. Thus the joint likelihood
is proportional to the conditional distribution of the parameters given the data, and
sampling from itwithMCMCwill provide an estimate of that conditional distribution.
The same thing can be donewith random effects. In classical statistics, parameters
are unknown constants which do not have distributions. Random effects are like
parameters, but they have distributions. These are not subjective distributions but
are part of the model specification, just like residual distributions are. They can
be evaluated based on the fit and revised as necessary. Random-effects estimation
typically just computes the mode of the joint likelihood, but it could estimate the
conditional distribution of the effects given the data by MCMC like Bayesians do.
Many contemporary Bayesians are abandoning subjective probabilities and consider
the priors to be specified distributions that can be revised as needed, just like is done
in random effects.
The terminology used here is somewhat intermediate. In the models used, there
are no parameters in the frequentist sense, just random effects. But that is not a widely
understood term, so it is simpler to just call them parameters. As their postulated
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distributions are not subjective, the terms “prior” and “posterior” can be misleading.
Modern Bayesians insist that these terms do not imply subjective probabilities, but
their subjective use is so ingrained in the vocabulary that trying to define them out
can lead to confusion.
Smoothing splines involve constraints that limit the second derivatives or second
differences of the curves. This can be done inMCMC for each parameter individually
by postulating shrinkage distributions. Here, a shrinkage distribution is any distribu-
tion with mode at or asymptotic to zero. They give more weight to parameters closer
to zero, so favour such parameters. Examples include the standard normal distribution
and double-exponential distributions, which mirror the exponential on the negative
reals. Gamma distributions with shape parameter less than 1 have mode asymptotic
to zero, and are used here for the distribution of the annual event frequency jumps.
The purpose of parameter shrinkage is not just tomake smoother curves. It actually
can improve the predictive accuracy of models. This will be easier to discuss once
the models are formally specified.
5.3.2 Spline Regressions
The APC models are a good place to start, as in log form they are purely linear
models. The log model value at any data point is just the sum of the age, period, and
cohort parameters for that point.
Mortality data for the illustration is taken fromHumanMortality Database (2019).
Deaths are in a column listed by year then age within year. In this case this is French
female and male data for years 1979–2018 and ages 50–84. These are from 74 year-
of-birth cohorts, 1929 to 1968, each with 1–35 ages. The column of death counts
is the dependent variable for each model. Also the population exposure for each
observation is provided as another column.
A design matrix is then constructed giving dummy variable values in columns for
each age, period, and cohort for each observation. For specificity, the first age, period,
and cohort variables are not included. There is also a constant term in the model that
the code computes outside of the design matrix. The ages, periods, and cohorts are
not independent of each other and further constraints are needed, as discussed later.
The design matrix thus has 34 columns for age variables, 39 for period variables, and
73 for cohort variables. To fill out the design matrix, reference columns are created
for each data observation to specify the age, period, and cohort it comes from.
For a straight regression APC model, the variables are 0,1 dummies. Age i has
value 1 in just those rows for which the observation is from age i , and similarly for
the period and cohort variables. For linear splines, an alternate regression could be
done where all the variables are for the slopes of the line segments connecting the log
factors, which are the first differences of the log factors. The age i variable for this
would still be 0 for observations from ages less than i and 1 for observations at age i .
Later observations would add the later slopes to the existing log factors before those
points, so the age i variable would also be included in them. Thus the age i variable
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would be 1 for observations from ages i and greater, and the same for periods and
cohorts.
For the linear splines here, the variables are the second differences of the final age,
period, and cohort parameters. Then the variable for age i is still 1 for observations
with age i , and 0 for earlier observations. Its value increases the final log factor at
ages k ≥ i and so is in all those points, just like the slope parameters were. But it also
increases the slope (first difference) at i , and so is in all the later first differences as
well. Thus it gets added in an additional time for each subsequent point. This means
that for a cell from age k, the dummy for age i is (1 + k − i)+. The same is true for
periods and cohorts.
Cubic splines have similar designmatrices. To define these, consider one direction
of variables, like age, with spline-segment variables f1 to fn . Then the design matrix
value fi (z) for an observation at age z is a function defined for any real 0 ≤ z ≤ n
so the curves can be interpolated. They are: f1(z) = 1, f2(z) = z, and for i > 2,
fi (z) = (z − (i − 2))3+ − (n − (i − 2))(z − (n − 1))3+. The second term is nonzero
only for z > n − 1. The design matrix just has values for integer k. For a cell from
age k, the value for the variable for age i is fi (k). These basis functions, from Hastie
et al. (2017),1 assume that the splines are linear outside of 1 < z < n. Here they
are modified by constant factors by column that change the fitted coefficients but
simplify the formulas and put the fitted coefficients more on the same scale.
The average second derivative of the spline is a complicated but closed-form
function of the parameters. A smoothing spline minimises the NLL plus a selected
constant λ times the average second derivative. This is a penalised regression similar
to ridge regression and lasso. It can be readily estimated with a nonlinear optimiser
for any given λ. Some experimentation with this found that increasing λ usually
shrinks all the spline parameters to a similar degree. This suggests an alternative
way to define cubic smoothing splines in MCMC: use shrinkage distributions on
the spline parameters to penalise large segment parameters. This also reduces the
average second derivative very similarly to the usual smoothing splines, but does not
map exactly to a specific shrinkage λ. It does make the splines estimable in MCMC,
which has advantages discussed below.
5.3.3 Why Shrinkage?
With these design matrices, the spline models are just regression. Without parameter
shrinkage they would give the same fits as the regular 0,1 dummy variables. The
reason for shrinkage is based in reduced error variances. This traces back to the Stein
(1956) paper, which showed that when estimating three or more means, the error
variance is reduced by shrinking the estimates all towards the overall mean to some
degree. Actuaries have been doing this heuristically with credibility weighting since
1 A derivation is at https://stats.stackexchange.com/questions/172217/why-are-the-basis-
functions-for-natural-cubic-splines-expressed-as-they-are-es.
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Mowbray (1914). The same thing was extended to regression in Hoerl and Kennard
(1970) with ridge regression. That minimises the negative loglikelihood NLL plus a





They showed that there is always some positive λ that reduces the error variance
from that of maximum likelihood estimation. They also called their method “reg-
ularisation” as it was derived from a slightly more general method from Tikhonov
(1943) which is often translated from the Russian using that non-descriptive term.
Ridge regression is actually a form of shrinking the fittedmeans towards the grand
mean. In practice, all the variables are standardised to have mean zero, variance one
before going into the design matrix. Then each fitted value is the constant plus
terms of mean zero, so shrinking the parameters shrinks the fitted values towards
the overall mean. Just like in credibility, this biases the estimated means towards the
overall mean while improving estimation accuracy. The problem is in selecting λ. In
practice this is usually done by cross validation. The data is divided into a number
of smaller subsets, and the model is estimated by fitting the data many times for
different values of λ with each of the subsets excluded separately. Then the NLL
can be computed for each subset using the models that excluded it, and the results
compared among the different λs.
Ridge regression eventually led to lasso—least absolute shrinkage and selection
operator, following Santosa and Symes (1986) and Tibshirani (1996). This replaces




Lasso shrinks some parameters to exactly zero—more as λ increases—which is
why it is both a shrinkage and a variable selection operator. There is good software
available, e.g., in R, for this, and it quickly does extensive cross validation as well.
That is why lasso has become more popular than ridge regression.
Ridge regression and lasso constraints are summed over the parameters but can
be approximated in MCMC by postulating shrinkage distributions for the parame-
ters individually. For instance, if β is normal in 0 and σ , its log density, ignoring
constants, is:
− log(σ ) − 0.5(β/σ)2
Then minimising the joint negative loglikelihood would mean minimising NLL +
log(σ ) + 0.5β2/σ 2. For any fixed σ , the log(σ ) term is a constant, so this reduces
to ridge regression with λ = 0.5/σ 2.
If β is Laplace (double exponential) distributed in 0 and s, its log density is:
− log(2s) − |β|/s
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For a fixed s, then, minimising the negative joint loglikelihood comes down to min-
imising NLL + |β|/s, so is lasso with λ = 1/s.
There is a problem with parameter shrinkage for APC models, however. Each
parameter represents the effect of a given age, period, or cohort. These can rarely be
taken out of the model, which would effectively happen if they were shrunk toomuch
towards zero. That is where the splines become useful. Shrinking a slope change or
cubic segment parameter to zero just extends the existing curve one step further at
that point. Thus with shrinkage the smoothing splines become more compressed and
do not skip any age, period, or cohort effect. The points where the curves change
are called knots, and shrinkage simultaneously optimises which knots to use as well
as the fitted accuracy. These are separate steps in non-MCMC spline fitting and are
often not coordinated enough to optimise both simultaneously.
5.3.4 Cross Validation in MCMC
The usual way of measuring goodness-of-fit of models is penalised loglikelihood.
The likelihood is penalised because of sample bias—bias in the likelihood arising
from measuring it on the sample that the parameters were fit to. A bias penalty is
calculated, usually as a functionof number of parameters and sample size. Subtracting
the penalty from the loglikelihoodgives themeasure. These are attempting to estimate
what the loglikelihood would be on a new, independent sample. The penalty from the
small sample AIC, AICc, for instance, has been shown to give an unbiased estimate
of the sample bias. Of course there is still some error in such estimates.
Models with shrinkage, like ridge regression, lasso, and smoothing splines, do
not have parameter counts that are appropriate for these measures. Due to shrinkage,
the parameters do not use up the same degrees of freedom as they do in other mod-
els. Cross-validation is a way to estimate the sample bias when there are not good
parameter counts available. The sample is divided up into subsamples and the likeli-
hood measured on each subsample with the parameters fit without it, and the results
are compared for various values of the shrinkage parameter. Thus cross validation
produces a penalised likelihood. How many subsamples and how they are selected
influence this process, and it also has estimation error for the sample bias.
MCMC can efficiently produce an estimate of the unbiased loglikelihood, using
an approach called leave-one-out cross validation, or loo. Each sample point is taken
as an omitted subsample in computing the cross-validation likelihood. Because there
are many parameter sets generated in MCMC estimation, the likelihood of the point
can be computed under each one of those. Gelfand (1996) showed that a weighted
average of those likelihoods, with more weight given to the worse values, gives an
unbiased but noisy estimate of the likelihood of a left-out point. The sum of those
estimates is the loo likelihood, and as a sum it has a lower average estimation error.
This method is called importance sampling, and in fact the weights are inversely
proportional to the likelihood. Thus the loo estimate for a point is the harmonic
mean of its likelihoods across the parameter sets.
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This produces an unbiased estimate of the sample bias, but unfortunately it has
turned out to have a high estimation error. Recently, Vehtari et al. (2019) improved
upon it, with something akin to extreme value theory. They fit a Pareto to the tail of
the distribution of likelihoods for a point, and for the 20% most extreme likelihoods
use the Pareto fit instead of the actual likelihood. The sumof these over the data points
gives a more accurate estimate of the likelihood for the model excluding sample bias.
After the MCMC estimate is finished, this can be done quickly in an R application
itself called loo.
The shrinkage parameter can then be estimated by running MCMC several times
with various trial shrinkage values, and picking the one with the highest loo. This
is how cross validation is used to select the shrinkage parameter in other forms of
estimation as well. As with any estimation based on optimising penalised likeli-
hood, this runs the risk of actually choosing the parameter that produces the greatest
understatement of the sample bias instead of the most predictive λ.
There is an alternative approach under MCMC: also postulate a distribution for
the shrinkage parameter, so it too becomes a random effect. This is called the fully
Bayesianmethod, as now there are no parameters in themodel in the frequentist sense
of being an unknown constant. Usually you would want to use a distribution for this
that has minimal impact on the conditional mean of this parameter. The estimates
below were done with the Stan MCMC package. That assumes an initial distribution
for a parameter, unless otherwise specified, as uniform on ±1.7977e+308, which
is the range of real numbers in the double-precision system most computers use.
That could be postulated for the log of the shrinkage parameter, as assuming a wide
range for a positive parameter usually biases it upwards. I usually find that ±8 is
wide enough for that log. MCMC would of course produce a range of values for the
parameter, and the whole sample would be used in risk analysis. The conditional
mean is usually presented as the estimate. This is easier than cross validation in that
you do not need runs for several different trial values, and it is better in that it does
not have the problem of favouring shrinkage parameters with understated sample
bias. MCMC sample distributions of parameters represent possible parameter sets
that could have generated the data along with the distribution of those sample sets.
The mean of this gives the most accurate estimate for each parameter.
5.4 Model Details
The models above were fit using semiparametric regression for Poisson and negative
binomial residuals and with and without the gamma-distributed jumps. The Poisson
distribution is very tight for large means, which forces those fits to emphasise the
larger cells. But this is the distribution that independent deaths should follow. Com-
paring fits to the negative binomial thus provides an indicator of missing systematic
effects in the model.
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5.4.1 Formulas
The formof the negative binomial used is the one inGeneral LinearModels. Themean
is μ and the variance is μ + μ2/φ. An indicator of how much spread a distribution
can have is stdv./mean or its square, variance/mean2. For the Poisson, that is 1/μ,
and that can get small for large cells, which forces the model to fit very well at those
cells. For the negative binomial, it is 1/μ + 1/φ, which puts aminimum on that ratio,
and increases model flexibility. Still, if there are no contagion effects, the Poisson
should work well.
A gamma distribution is used for the annual mortality multipliers. The gamma in
a, b has mean ab and variance ab2. The density at zero is asymptotic to infinity for
a < 1. The models here assume a = 0.1. For females, b is estimated to be close to
0.4. That gamma then has mean 0.04, and its standard deviation is about 0.125. A
large part of this distribution is close to zero, with the median at 0.00024. The largest
log factor for this sample, at 2003, is about 0.1, which is at the 90th percentile of the
distribution. Probably for the 2020 pandemic year the log factor will be more like
0.5, which is close to the 98.5th percentile, which seems plausible.
All the parameters except the constant and the annual log factors are assumed
to be Laplace (double exponential) distributed, with mean zero and the same scale
parameter s. The Laplace variance is 2s2, so the smaller s is, the tighter is the range
around zero, so the more shrinkage it produces. Also logs is assumed to be uniform
on ±6. For males, sampled values of it range from −3 to 1.5, and for females they
are in a tight range around−5. The constant term, which is eventually exponentiated,
is assumed uniform on ±8. it ends up near 0.5 for females and 2.5 for males.
For theAPCmodel, let y be the columnof death counts, x be thedesignmatrix,v be
column of parameters, c be the constant term, which here is not in the design matrix,
and q the column of exposures. Using “×” for pointwise vector multiplication, the
Poisson or negative binomial mean μ is:
μ = q × exp(c + xv)
This is more complicated for models with age modifiers on the period trend, as these
are not purely linear. For this, first let z be x with just the age and cohort variables,
and let t be the design matrix with the period variables. Let A be a spline design
matrix for all the age variables, including the first age. Now v is the vector of just the
age and cohort parameters. Let u be the corresponding column of period parameters,
so tu is the vector of period factors by observation, and let w be another column
of age parameters for the age weights. Then set r = Aw, the raw age weights on
trend for each observation. These need another constraint for identifiability, so let
m = max(r) and set p = exp(r − m). These are the final age weights on trend for
each observation, and are positive with a maximum of 1. With all of this, the mean
is now:
μ = q × exp(p × tu + c + xv).
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For the contagionmodel, withmortalitymultipliers by year, another designmatrix
B is needed with 0,1 variables for each year, including the first year, to pick out the
year each observation is from. This is multiplied by the column h of log age weights
selected from the gamma distribution, and then added to the log mortality. Then:
μ = q × exp(Bh + p × tu + c + xv)
5.4.2 Fitting Process
The overlaps among the three directions in APC models require additional con-
straints. In parameter shrinkage, some parameters are shrunk to zero, which takes
those variables out of the model, and this is enough of a constraint to keep the design
matrix from being singular. The parameters then are not readily interpretable as to
what the period and cohort trends mean individually, but since they come from find-
ing the most predictive model, it sometimes could be reasonable to take them at
face value. That would be a place for actuarial judgement. Some argue that since the
trends are not separately identifiable without constraints, there are no real individual
effects. But there are drivers of the trends in other data. For instance, health-related
behaviours, like diet, smoking, and exercise, tend to be more cohort effects than
period effects. Change in demographic mix can also affect mortality, and this can
have both period and cohort effects driven by immigration and demographic differ-
ences in family size.
The models in he example use linear splines, but most of the fitting procedures
below work for cubic splines as well. Limited experience suggests that more param-
eters go to zero with cubic splines, making those models somewhat more parsimo-
nious. That could lead to better or worse loo fit measures.
MCMC sample sets rarely have any parameters that are zero in every sample, but
it can simplify the model and improve loo a bit by eliminating some of the small
ones. Setting parameters to zero is like setting variables with low t-statistics to zero in
regressionmodels. That is done in regression to eliminate parameters that have a good
chance of actually being zero. But in spline models, nearby parameters can be highly
negatively correlated, and can have opposite signs and move simultaneously. So a
parameter having zero in its sample range could still be contributing to themodel. The
rule followed in the fitting here was to eliminate parameters with absolute values of
0.001 or less, as long as they had ranges approximately symmetric around zero. But
if that reduced the loo fit measurement, they were put back in. Sometimes offsetting
adjacent parameters were both eliminated in this way.
MCMC can have difficulties in finding good parameter sets when there is a large
number of highly negatively-correlated variables. This can be shortcut by first using
lasso with minimal shrinkage to eliminate the least-needed variables, with the rest
used in MCMC. Generally the fitting procedure above will eliminate more of these.
The glmnet R package for lasso is very efficient, and includes a cross-validation
routine that can indicate the minimal reasonable degree of shrinkage. Glmnet has
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some difficulties with the cubic spline designmatrix, andmay look too parsimonious.
If so, lasso can easily be fit for still lower selected values ofλ by a nonlinear optimiser.
Glmnet has a Poisson option that uses a log regression and exposure multipliers.
The approach taken was to first use this just on age and period variables. After
eliminating some of those, the cohort variables were added in lasso to give an APC
model. It is not possible to input all the APC variables initially, as the design matrix
is singular until some variables are eliminated. From the initial set of 146 age, period,
and cohort variables, 50 made it into the female model, with 45 for the male model.
Then the APC models were fit in MCMC.
The RH model was fit with the surviving variables from the APC fit, along with
all the age variables for the age weights. Poisson and negative binomial versions of
the RH model were fit to both populations. The negative binomial fit better for both,
and had 65 variables in the female model and 48 in the male. But due to shrinkage,
the female model had fewer effective parameters, according to the loo penalty. Those
parameters were then used in the contagion model, with 40 additional annual jump
variables, some ending up negligible.
The individual-year log jump factors in the contagion model combined can pick
up some of the overall trend. Steps were taken here to inhibit that, so that they could
be interpreted as jumps with no trend in them. For instance, using a low gamma a
parameter pushes the jumps more towards zero, which makes it less likely that they
would pick up larger trends. Also the period variable for age 1was put into themodel.
It had been left out initially for identifiability reasons, but with other parameters no
longer in the model, that was not necessary. Even with higher values of the gamma
a, if a trend appears in the jump parameters, the jumps could still be displayed as
residuals to a line fit through them. The interaction of this with the other trends could
produce an overall better model in some cases, but that would have to be tested by
trying different values of the gamma a, Also these parameters together could interact
with the constant term. The gamma shrinkage here was enough to prevent that, but
one of them could be left out as well to prevent such overlap. That could not be any
of them, though, as they all are positive, with some close to zero and some large. The
year with the lowest residuals to the RH model would be a logical choice to leave
out in this situation.
5.5 Results
Table 5.1 summarises the fit statistics, and Fig. 5.2 graphs the resulting parameter
curves for the event jumpmodel. Loo is a penalised loglikelihood, so higher is better.
It comes with a degree-of-freedom type penalty. In a good model, the penalty will be
not too different from the parameter count, and ideally will be less, due to parameter
shrinkage. Being much higher is an indication that the model is not working well.
Probably some sample parameter sets work well for some of the observations and
other sets for other observations. This would make the loo measure worse.
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Table 5.1 Fit summary statistics
Female Male
Loo Penalty Parameters Loo Penalty Parameters
APC Poisson −9420 155 42 −9998 133 37
RH Poisson −9053 181 78 −10029 142 73
APC NB −8328 24 33 −8830 25 33
RH NB −8191 34 32 −8750 29 50
Event jump Poisson −7912 103 106 −8818 125 95
Fig. 5.2 Fitted parameter curves
ThePoissonAPCandRHmodels do not fitwell for either population. The negative
binomial versions havemuch better loomeasures. The standard deviation/mean gives
an indication of how much variability from the data is allowed for the model means.
With this data, for the Poisson that can be as small as 1% for the largest cells. This
widens to about 2.5% for the negative binomial fitted model. It is more like 3% for
both distributions for the smaller cells. This forces the Poisson models to fit very
tightly at the largest cells.
The models all fit better in the female population. For the males, the APC model
fits better than the RH model for Poisson residuals. The event jump model is clearly
the best fit for the female data, even though it uses quite a few more parameters.
For the males, it is by far the best Poisson model, but it is not quite as good as the
negative binomial RH model. Thus there are still some systematic elements that this
model is not picking up. The trend is small for the male population, and it does not
affect most ages, as seen in the top two graphs in Fig. 5.2. Leaving out the trend and
trend weight variables might seem to save parameters without hurting the fit much.
This turns out not to be the case. The trend and weight variables actually do not
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use many parameters. The entire trend for males shows up in the cohort parameters
and so does not apply to the older ages. For females, the time trend is similar to the
male cohort trend, but is somewhat offset by an increase for cohorts after 1940. The
journal NIUSSP has done various related studies.2 They find higher smoking rates in
France than in most countries, and this increased substantially for females in recent
generations, particularly for those with lower education levels. It has come down a
bit for males.
5.5.1 Extensions: Generalisation, Projections and R Coding
The event-jump model here is very simple. All the ages get the same proportional
increase in mortality. A generalisation would be to have the excess deaths follow a
parametric age curve, like Gompertz or others, as in Perks (1932). This would have
2–4 parameters. These parameters could even be put on semiparametric curves and
allowed to evolve over time. As they are positive, their logs could be postulated to
follow such curves. They might be slowly evolving, not using many change param-
eters, with occasional larger shifts. The population events themselves tend to extend
for a few years, perhaps due to weather conditions or diseases. It might be more effi-
cient to put the logs of the jump parameters on semiparametric curves to fit this kind
of jump correlation and to save parameters. The gamma distribution for jumps has
heavier-tailed options still with mode zero, such as even lower a, or heavier-tailed
distributions like the log-logistic or its generalisation, the Burr.
Projected futuremortality risk scenarioswould include the event jumpparameters.
Each simulation would draw a jump for each year from the gamma distribution.
MCMC program output is good for the parameter risk part of the simulation, as all
the sampled parameter scenarios are available. These come with built-in dependence
among the different parameters. Future projections of the trend and cohort parameters
can be generated from the double-exponential distributions for the slope changes.
This should use the correlation matrix of the parameters, which can be computed
from the scenario output. The normal copula would be a convenient way to simulate
these parameters. Also, putting the jumps on semiparametric curves would give the
simulations groups of years that are fairly high simultaneously, which would be
more realistic if simulated losses in nearby years is a risk of concern. Compared to
other jump models, an advantage of this one is that the low-median high-mean jump
distribution produced reasonable probabilities for extreme outcomes even though it
did not have extreme events in the historical data used.
R uses the command “fit_ss = extract(fit, permuted = FALSE)” to get the samples
from a Stan run with an output called “fit,” and put them into an object called “fit_ss.”
MCMC produces samples that are serially correlated, so some users prefer to per-
mute them before using them. This does not help with most analyses, however. The
non-permuted option in the extract command gives a convenient three-dimensional
2 E.g., see https://www.niussp.org/category/article/?postyear=2017.
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output: sample parameters by variable for each chain. These can be output to disk
by “write.csv(fit_ss, file=”samples_fit.csv“).” It is often more convenient to do this
one chain at a time to preserve the variable headings. Some sample code is included
in the Appendix.
5.6 Conclusions
This chapter introduced a mortality model with a jump term for contagion to fit
pandemic mortality experience as well as smaller population-mortality events. It was
estimated by fitting Poisson and negative binomial distributions to mortality counts
with known exposures, using a log link function, andwas found to be an improvement
to standard continuous mortality models. The models were all fit by semiparametric
regression in MCMC, with shrinkage distributions for each parameter.
The number of deaths for a homogeneous group will be binomially distributed
if they are independent. This can be closely approximated by a Poisson. If model
residuals are heavier-tailed, like negative binomially, some systematic drivers are
missing in the model. This was found to be the case for French female and male
populations. One reason could be populationmortality events in some periods. These
were added to the models as gamma-distributed annual mortality jumps that affect
mortality for all ages proportionally. This made the female Poisson model better
than the previous negative binomial model, and improved the male Poisson models
but there were apparently some mortality drivers still missing for males. Possible
extensionswere discussed. Thegammadistribution used for the jumps iswide enough
to capture pandemic effects such as COVID-19 in 2020.
Semiparametric regression with linear smoothing splines is a way to improve
models by reducing overfitting. This worked well here, and gave simple parameter
curves across all the variable dimensions. An advantage of including the event jumps
is that simulated risk scenarios can include their probabilities. It is possible that using
mortality trend without shrinkage could pick up all the historical jumps, but that
would lose the advantages of shrinkage and could be more difficult to project in a
way that would keep this risk element.
Appendix
First is R code for running Stan for the RH model plus the event jumps, followed by
the Stan code. Simpler models would use only some of these lines.
The R code starts by loading in the needed packages, and then the data. This
includes columns for the deaths and exposures, and then the various design matrices.
The data is combined in a list file to pass to Stan, then Stan is run. Loo is run on the
output, and parameters printed and sent out to disk.









#scan turns a column file into a vector
x = as.matrix(read_excel("Le_AC_nb.xlsx"))
#age and cohort only
x = x[,-c(4,5,10,14,22)]

















# this is to send input data to MCMC model
# now run model
set.seed(77)
Sys.time()
fit = stan(file = ’rh_mort_pois_double.stan’,data=dx,
verbose = FALSE, chains = 3, iter = 20000, warmup =






#show parameters and write means to disk
print(fit, pars=c("cn","b", "v","w", "d","s","m2"),probs=c(.025,
0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.975), digits_summary = 3)
out <- get_posterior_mean(fit)
write.csv(out, file="out.csv")
Now the Stan code. This is translated into C++ then compiled for more efficient
execution. Most of it is just defining the variable types and dimensions for C++.
It comes in required code blocks. The means are computed in the transformed-
parameters block, and the model block gives the distributions assumed for the data
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and the parameters. The last block computes the log likelihoods for use in the loo
code later.
data {
int N; // number of obs
int U; // number of age+cohort variables
vector[N] expo;
int y[N];
matrix[N,U] x; //age and cohort matrix
int n; //number of trend params
int u; //number of wghts params
int t;
matrix[N,n] trendmat; //trendmat design matrix
matrix[N,u] wghtm; //age wght dsgn mat
matrix[N,t] yearm; //year 0,1 dummy dsgn mat
}
parameters { // all except v will get default uniform prior
real<lower=-8, upper=8> cn; //constant, in assumed range
real<lower=-6, upper = 6> logs; //log of s, related to lambda
real logb; //log of gamma b parameter
vector[U] v; //age and cohort parameters
vector[u] w; //trend-wghts parameters
vector[n] d; //trend parameters
vector<lower=0, upper = 1>[t] m2; //factor by age
}
transformed parameters {
real s; // shrinkage parameter
vector[N] mu;
real m; // max weight






mean2nd = yearm*m2; // 2nd mean by observation
colwghts = wghtm*w;
m = max(colwghts);
colwghts = exp(colwghts-m); //makes max = 1, all >0
trend = trendmat * d;
for (j in 1:N) trend[j] = trend[j]*colwghts[j];
mu = exp(trend+x*v+cn+mean2nd);
for (j in 1:N) mu[j]=mu[j]*expo[j];
}
model { // gives priors for those not assumed uniform.
Choose this one for lasso.
for (i in 1:U) v[i] ˜ double_exponential(0, s); //
more weight to close to 0
for (i in 1:u) w[i] ˜ double_exponential(0, s);
for (i in 1:u) w[i] ˜ double_exponential(0, s);
for (i in 1:t) m2[i] ˜ gamma(0.1, b);
y ˜ poisson(mu);
}
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generated quantities { //outputs log likelihood for
testing purposes vector[N] log_lik;
for (j in 1:N) log_lik[j] = poisson_lpmf(y[j] | mu[j]);
}
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Chapter 6
Risk-Sharing and Contingent Premia in
the Presence of Systematic Risk: The
Case Study of the UK COVID-19
Economic Losses
Hirbod Assa and Tim J. Boonen
Abstract Motivated by macroeconomic risks, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, we
consider different risk management setups and study efficient insurance schemes in
the presence of low probability shock events that trigger losses for all participants.
More precisely, we consider three platforms: the risk-sharing, insurance and market
platform. First, we show that under a non-discriminatory insurance assumption, it is
optimal for everybody to equally share all risk in the market. This gives rise to a new
concept of a contingent premium which collects the premia ex-post after the losses
are realised. Insurance is then a mechanism to redistribute wealth, and we call this
a risk-sharing solution. Second, we show that in an insurance platform, where the
insurance is regulated, the tail events are not shared, but borne by the government.
Third, in a competitive market we see how a classical solution can raise the risk of
insolvency.Moreover, in a decentralisedmarket, the equilibrium cannot be reached if
there is adequate sensitivity to the common shock events. In addition,we have applied
our theory to a case where the losses are calibrated based on the UK Coronavirus
Job Retention Scheme.
6.1 Introduction
The recent COVID-19 crisis increased the collective need for risk management tools
for financial institutions, and such tools require themanagement of systematic losses,
illiquidity, default, and the need for financial aid by the government.Most of the credit
by borrowing became uncertain, and there is an imminent demand by the clients and
the regulator to manage and mitigate the credit risk.
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Motivated by the large economic loss due to the recent COVID-19 pandemic, the
management of themacroeconomic risk has become the subject of new research. The
economic impact of COVID-19 not only emphasises the need for risk management
tools to dealwith the economic losses for each single country, but it has also shown the
need for the global measures to overcome the economic impact. In this paper we look
at this problem from an insurance perspective. We consider three risk management
platforms, namely, risk-sharing, insurance and the market platform.
In the risk-sharing platform we consider a machinery that redistributes the wealth
of the policyholders. We will see that among the three platforms, the risk-sharing
platform is the only one that can give the perfect pooling solution, which is the most
optimal solution. This means that everybody’s wealth is the average of the society’s
(or insurance cohort’s) wealth. Furthermore, this solution gives rise to the concept
of a contingent premium, which means that the premium cannot be collected ex-ante
but ex-post. As a wealth distribution mechanism, this platform is to some extent
resembling the state fiscal and monetary policies, which will be discussed in the next
section.
In the second platform we consider a regulated insurance company that offers
insurance policies. The optimal solution in this platform is a partial pooling that
shares the wealth in the non-extreme events. In this platform, the policyholders do
not pay for the extreme events which necessitates the existence of a protection to the
policyholder by providing a bail-out plan.
In the third platform, we consider two different markets: a competitive and a
decentralised market. In the competitive market, the optimal premium is the mean
of the losses that is identical to classical solutions. However, as we will discuss, this
platform significantly increases the insolvency risk. In the decentralised market, the
main objective is to reach the market equilibrium. We will see that if the systematic
event is not a tail event,1 which means that large losses occur with sufficiently large
probability, then the market equilibrium does not exist despite avoiding the risk of
insolvency. On the contrary, if the systematic event is a tail event, despite of rising
the insolvency risk, there exists an equilibrium in the market.
To study the implications of our paper, we have constructed an example based on
the economic impact of COVID-19 in the UK and particularly we use a calibration
arising from the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (UK furlough scheme during
the COVID-19 pandemic). In this way we can measure several things, for instance
the magnitude of the insolvency risk in a competitive market or the magnitude of
the pricing gaps in a decentralised market due to a difference in the market demand
and supply prices. We have made some observations; given the magnitude of the
economic risk generated during the COVID-19 pandemic in the UK, traditional
insurance products with ex-ante premia are not sufficient to cope with such huge
financial losses. Therefore, a new paradigm needs to be adopted where a contingent
premium can readily be incorporated to deal with substantial systematic events.
1 In this paper, the tail event and the systematic event are not necessarily identical, however, they
usually can overlap. See also footnote 2.
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This paper is organised as follows. In Sect. 6.2 we discuss five risk levels in
insurance and introduce the concept of systematic risk. In Sect. 6.3 we introduce
the mathematical setup, the preliminaries, and a classical insurance platform. In
Sect. 6.4 we define three platforms: the risk-sharing, insurance, and market platform.
In this section we obtain the optimal solution in each platform and discuss some
policy implications. In Sect. 6.5 we study the three platforms in the presence of three
common shock models and study the results of particular examples. Especially, we
construct our examples for a case that is calibrated based on the UK Coronavirus Job
Retention Scheme. In Sect. 6.6 we conclude.
6.2 Risk Levels and Systematic Risk in Insurance
The general idea in risk management is to dilute the risk by splitting it into smaller
risks, sharing, and spanning it over time. This can be called ‘smoothing’ and risk
management ‘tools’ help to do this. We can identify two approaches to risk man-
agement: diversification and risk-sharing. Diversification means that the risk of a
portfolio of assets is less than the sum of the risks of the single assets. In math-
ematical terms this can be formulated as follows: any convex combination of two
assets carries lower risk than single ones. Despite all the controversies about the
definition of diversification, and that it always can reduce the risk, the majority has
widely accepted this approach. On the aggregate risk, financial institutions need to
hold capital to be allowed to bear any remaining risk.
On the other hand, the underlying idea of risk-sharing is to exchange risk with
counterparties such as an insurer, reinsurer, or viamarket securitisation. Risk-sharing
with expected utility by maximising the agents preferences has been studied exten-
sively in actuarial science and economics, see for instance Borch (1962) and Wilson
(1968). The most popular concept of efficiency is Pareto optimality. A risk-sharing
contract is called Pareto optimal if there does not exist another feasible contract that
is better for all agents and strictly better for at least one agent. For instance, if agents
are endowedwith exponential utilities, then it is Pareto optimal to share the aggregate
risk in the market in a proportional way. On the other hand, if coherent distortion risk
measures, such as the well-known Expected Shortfall, are used, it is Pareto optimal to
share the aggregate risk in the market via tranches (Boonen 2015). Risk-sharing can
be related to the concept of hedging or reinsurance. This is closely related to market
principles, like Arrow-Debreu equilibria, no-arbitrage, and no-good-deal principles
(Assa and Karai 2012). This also has been discussed by Albrecht (1991), and prac-
tical considerations as pricing principle are discussed by Wang et al. (1997), where
an axiomatic characterisation of the insurance prices is shown.
To see how the two approaches can be used in the real application we need to
know about the risk levels. We have identified different levels of risks by the risk
trading markets as we assume the existence of a market is the main indication of the
willingness to introduce a risk management product. As such we can identify five
different levels.
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• The retail-level: At this level individuals usually share their risk with another
entity; for example, they can buy insurance policies for sharing the risk (a risk
transfer). The insurance retail market is where the risk is managed.
• The corporate level: At this level companies use a combination of diversification
and risk-sharing approaches to manage the risk e.g., an insurance company pools
the risk of its client while at the same time buys reinsurance. The (re)insurance
market is where the risk is managed.
• The catastrophic level: The main characteristic of catastrophic risk is that their
impact is in most cases independent of the pool size, and therefore cannot be
managed easily in insurance markets. Natural disasters or cyber risks are among
the most known examples of catastrophic risks. The usual ways of managing
such risks include introducing a risk transfer platform to share the risk with the
financial markets, through for example CAT bonds; or in general to introduce
Alternative Risk Transfers (ART) (Banks 2004; Olivieri and Pitacco 2011). These
arrangements can transfer the risk of systematic events and can help the managing
of the catastrophe risk by lowering the cost of reinsurance, and or the need for
capital allocation. Cyber risk includes the costs involved in the event of a data
breach or ransomware (Eling 2020).
• The systemic level: The risk of system failure is endogenous, and a result of system
failure due to the connectedness of insurers’ or banks’ lending relations. At the
theoretical level there have been some discussions how to manage the systemic
risk by Merton (1990) and Shiller (2007).
• The macro-level: The examples can include world wars and pandemics where
no market for trading risk can be considered even at the theoretical level. The
underlying probability distribution and the corresponding losses are exogenous
and hard to accurately predict. In a macro-level risk, the challenge is that since
the insurance market is not feasible even at a theoretical level, it seems there is
no efficient way for risk management. From the insurance perspective, we need to
have a deeper understanding of insurance principles as well as the time direction
of an insurance’s risk management.
At all five levels, systematic risk may exist, which can be interpreted as a market
risk factor that affects the risk variables in the same direction. Systematic risk is
usually attributed to a common shock. Examples of systematic risk include financial
market indices, but also the aging population, and epidemics. Given the magnitude
and the systematic nature, there are lots of discussions on how and in which market
to manage the risk of systematic events.
• Bilateral GDP income swaps byMerton (1990) or GDP linked securities by Shiller
(2007) are among the major “theoretical” solutions. The idea here is to introduce
some securities that can share the risk among the countries in the world. These
solutions without a doubt need international collaboration to runmarkets that trade
such instruments.
• Another way of managing the systematic risks is risk-sharing, which is claimed
to be happening by globalisation (Flood et al. 2012) and peer-to-peer insurance
(Denuit 2020; Feng et al. 2020).
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• Another option is to run a deficit and essentially transfer the systematic risk to the
same society that needs to bear the risk. This is an example of market failure as
society would not be willing to take a rather expensive and uncertain product. But
the state, including the government and the central banks, have the authority and
tools to sell the risk by running state policies such as monetary and fiscal policies.
It seems that with the current risk management tools a systematic risk has been
considered manageable, at the practical or theoretical level, as long as it does not
belong to the category of macro risks. That also includes any insurance solution. So,
it is necessary to have a closer look into the insurance risk management mechanisms
and approaches to see the problem.
In insurance, a stronger approach than diversification is risk pooling, which under
the assumption of independence of losses implies the “insurance principle”. The
insurance principle is explained as follows by Albrecht (1991):
for a growing collective the relative (i.e. divided by the number of risks) safety loading and
the relative security capital required to maintain a certain security level of the insurance
company is decreasing.
Pooling means sharing losses by aggregating the accident costs and then split
this equally. However, if there is a risk of common shocks, it is no longer clear
that pooling can imply the principle of insurance. Common shock is modelled to
include systematic risk, and heavy losses on the common shock lead to heavy losses
of the insurers. Any ex-ante risk management approach needs to render a present
value that represents the risk. This is necessary to make a correct risk assessment.
This brings us to the concept of risk valuation. Pooling can help to make such an
assessment under the independence assumption of losses. However, as we relax the
independence assumption, which means there is a risk of common shocks, pooling
no longer will be able to easily render a deterministic value. The (wide) dependency
relation can properly be related to the concept of systematic risk. The meaning of
this is that under a systematic risk circumstance, pooling would not mitigate all
randomness and the remaining randomness needs to be measured for valuation.
In a historical context there have been two major risk management institutions
i.e., the insurance and the banking industry, with more than 300years of modern his-
tory. While insurance leverages against insurable risk by collecting premia ex-ante,
banking leverages against the credit risk by collecting interest ex-post. In the past
300years, the world has witnessed a handful number of macro risks, including pan-
demics, world wars, etc. However, insurance never was part of the solution whereas
(central) banking always has played a crucial role. By far, the most well-known
ways to encounter macro risk is to introduce fiscal and monetary policies, that can
be regarded as ex-post policies.
It seems at a macro level risk, insurance may not be sustainable solution. For
insurance, we are often using a future extreme loss as a benchmark (say “once in
100years”), whichmakes us rely on themodelling aspect of a quantitative risk assess-
ment. The modelling of rare systematic events usually result in a lack of robustness
and huge risk assessment errors. However, even with reliable models, the aggre-
gate nature of common shocks, that is one of the major characteristics of systematic
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events, is amajor challenge for introducing sound insurance solutions. The alternative
solutions include the monetary and fiscal policies that are implemented by the state
institutions like central banks and the governments. Given that in a macro-level event
the whole system will be impacted, the governments will need to borrow the risk
capital from the future generations and the contributions from the past (the buffer)
are generally insufficient. So, an important point here is to distinguish the differences
in the time direction of a sound risk management solution for macro risks. This will
be more discussed in the following which constitutes part of the main contribution
of this paper by introducing insurances with contingent premia as an ex-post rather
than ex-ante policies.
In this paper we model systematic events that have an impact on a large part of
the pool of policyholders. The closest concept in the literature to this is probably
the concept of common shocks. The idea is to introduce an independent random
variable (independent from losses), that represents the losses with a common cause.
This variable can either be summed up or multiplied to the other random variables
or it can change the severity and frequency of losses. Lindskog and McNeil (2003)
use the common Poisson shock processes to model dependent event frequencies and
examine these models in the context of insurance loss modelling. Meyers (2007)
discusses an approach where the common shock variable is a multiplier of a pool
of independent losses. In this paper, the author describes some more general models
involving common shocks to both the claim count and claim severity distributions.
Avanzi et al. (2018) consider a model where the common shock is additive with the
loss variables. For the estimation of diversification benefits, they develop a method-
ology for the construction of large correlation matrices to any dimension.
The concepts of macroeconomic risk and systematic risk have been thoroughly
studied in the literature. However, to the best of the authors knowledge they are not
covering the type of risk we discuss in this paper. In the literature, macroeconomic
risk is usually referred to as the risk generated bymacroeconomic factors and political
decisions which can include GDP, inflation, unemployment and central bank interest
rate. The main objective is to manage the risk of the macroeconomic factors on
financial stock returns or global investment. For instance, Majumder and Majumder
(2002) consider the volatility ofGDP as themost common problemworldwidewhose
risk can be shared through the trading of GDP growth rate-related bond, to obtain a
mutually preferable allocation of aggregate income.
On the other hand, systematic risk in the literature is usually known as a cause of
insurance failure, that is associated with many losses that are positively correlated.
Beyond the common shock model that we study in this paper, other popular ways to
model systematic risk is via vine copulas (Aas et al. 2009) or positive dependence
constraints (Bignozzi et al. 2015).
The focus in this paper is on systematic risk rather than on systemic risk. Systemic
risk involves the modelling of the potential collapse of a system and the correspond-
ing default events and is typically modelled via interbank lending networks (see,
e.g., Eisenberg and Noe 2001). Our focus is the modelling of common shocks in
(insurance) loss variables.
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6.3 Mathematical Setup
6.3.1 Probability Space
Let us consider a non-atomic probability space (,F , P), where  is the states
of the world, F is a sigma algebra and P is a probability measure. All random
variables are measurable with respect to F . We assume our probability space is rich
enough to introduce any sequence of i.i.d. random variables with a given distribution.
Consider a set of bounded losses X1, X2, . . . and assume that the losses are identically
distributed with a shared distribution Xi ∼ X . Let us assume that Xi is non-negative
and satisfies esssup(Xi ) = M . We also denote the cumulative distribution function
of random variable X by FX and the expectation is denoted by E . We consider a
framework with two time steps 0, 1.
Consider a set of policyholders {1, 2, . . . , n}. We assume that the policyholders
are homogeneous in that they have the same initial wealth w0 at time 0 and have loss
variable X1, X2, . . . , Xn that are identically distributed at time 1. The final wealth
of policyholder i at time 1 is given by Wi and is a measurable random variable.
In absence of purchasing insurance, the final wealth of each single policyholder i
is Wi = w0 − Xi . The policyholders are endowed with Von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected utility (see Varian 2019) functions denoted by ui , 1 = 1, 2, . . . , n, which
are assumed to be increasing and concave.
In the following, we consider a risk tolerance parameter η ∈ (0, 1), that is usually
very close to 0. This parameter will be used to measure the sensitivity against the
tail (usually unfavourable) events. This parameter specifies the tail events as events
A ∈ F such that P(A) ≤ η. This definition is motivated by Liu and Wang (2021).2
6.3.2 Insurance Preliminaries
We assume two major types of economic agents in our setup: policyholders (also
called insureds) and an insurer. The policyholders and the insurer have different atti-
tudes towards risk and insurance.
Policyholders. Policyholders are endowed with risk-averse preferences. To model
the behaviour of such agents we could consider suitable utility functions that are
applied to the agents’ final wealth, which is random. Alternatively, one can also
consider the policyholders as risk-neutral (expected profit maximising) agents; this
is often assumed in reinsurance where the reinsurance buyer is a firm itself or when
the insurance is traded as part of business risk management, for instance in a supply
2 This definition of the tail event in this paper must not be mistaken by the tail event that is
introduced in the probability theory which consists of events that can be determined if an arbitrarily
finite segment of the sequence is removed (like in Kolmogorov’s 0–1 theorem).
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chain (Assa et al. 2021). Risk aversion for expected utilitymaximising agents implies
that the utility function is concave. All policyholders maximise their own utility. A
choice is objective if all agents agree on the same choice regardless of the utility
functions they have. It is well known that a policy is objectively chosen i.e., it is
the best choice for all utility functions if and only if it is second-order stochastic
dominant. Considering two random variables X and Y , we say that X dominates Y
in second stochastic dominance if E(u(Y )) ≤ E(u(X)) for all increasing and convex
utility functions u, and this is denoted by
Y SSD X.
In some cases, one also assumes that all policyholders have the same utility function.
In this case, one also can appeal to the well-known concept of a representative agent.
The demand for insurance with alternative (not expected utility) preferences has
been extensively studied in the literature, see for instance Schlesinger (2000) for
an overview. An interesting type of utility that is very useful for investigating the
insurance demand is the one that is promoted by prospect theory of Kahneman and
Tversky (1979) or rank-dependent utility theory of Quiggin (1993). In our work we
consider insuring against low probability events, like events that are expected to hap-
pen only once in 100years, but that have a very large impact in the insurable losses
in the market. To better understand the aspects of the problem, note that from the
demand side we are dealing with policyholders. For a policyholder, 1% is an ultra-
low probability. It is known in the literature that prospect theory and rank-dependent
utility theory provide better assessment of the demand for this situation compared
with other measures, as the policyholder is expected to overweight the probability of
1% in their mental assessment of the risk. A good study about this subject is Schmidt
(2016), who explains empirical evidence that show that people are unwilling to insure
rare losses at subsidised premia. There is also a discussion around the importance
of risk aversion and loss aversion for assessing small-probability losses (Eeckhoudt
et al. 2018).
Insurer. The insurer is an entity that offers the risk management tool to the poli-
cyholders. The insurer can be a firm (e.g., an insurance company), government or a
(guarantee) fund. The insurer’s concern is either to maximise the expected profit or
to reach a particular business objective; for instance, to reach a targeted loss ratio.
If the insurer is a government, the objective of the insurer is given by a social wel-
fare function, and the insurer can bail-out the pool of policyholders with taxpayers’
money in case of high aggregate losses. The insurer is here modelled as a mutual
insurer or a stock insurer, and we assume that the insurers are concerned with the
welfare of the policyholders or with a non-negative expected profit condition per
policy. Moreover, we assume that the insurer does not “over-insure” a risky position.
In fact, a special case of over-insuring is double insurance, and this is generally not
legally allowed. There are different objectives for the insurer in our platforms that
can be seen later in (6.1), (6.2), (6.5) and (6.11).
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Risk management platforms. In this paper we use three risk platforms: (a) risk-
sharing, (b) insurance and (c) market platforms. In the risk-sharing platform the
policyholders share the risk by introducing a fund. There is no other entity like gov-
ernment or the insurance company. In insurance platform we consider there is an
insurance company that issues the insurances for the policyholders. The policyhold-
ers are making their decision by maximising their preferences and the insurance
company is concerned with the welfare of all policyholders. Finally, we consider
two market platforms, one that sets for a competitive market solution and another
one where in a decentralised market the equilibrium needs to be reached.
In all our platforms,we assume that the following assumption holds, whichwe denote
by NDI (non-discriminatory insurance).
Assumption NDI The insurance will treat all the policyholders equally so that
their final wealth has the same distribution.
NDI explicitly tells us that there are no claim hierarchies or priority claims, and all
policyholders are treated the same. Any re-labelling (also called permutation) of the
policyholder set {1, 2, . . . , n} leads to the same insurance contract. Under NDI, if all
policyholders use the same utility function, then the utility after purchasing insurance
is the same for every policyholder. This utility can then be interpreted as the utility of
a representative policyholder. However, as we will see we do not need to assume that
the policyholders have the same utility. In the literature, optimal insurance contracts
often satisfy NDI (see, e.g., Albrecht and Huggenberger 2017; Boonen 2019), but we
are the first to impose NDI ex-ante as a property for “desirable” insurance contracts.
In addition, from a technical point of view and unlike most of the literature, NDI is
not concerned about the joint distribution of the policyholders’ final wealth i.e., the
final wealth joint distributions of the same number of policyholders do not need to
be identical. In addition, we do not need to assume that the policyholders have the
same utility functions.
As an immediate implication of NDI, we have the following useful lemma.
Lemma 6.1 Consider a set of individual identically distributed wealth, W1, . . . ,Wn




Proof Let u be an increasing, concave function that is twice differentiable and let
W = ∑1≤i≤n Wi . We prove this for Wj , for a given j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Using Taylor’s
theorem, we get for some ζi ∈ [min {Wi ,W/n} ,max {Wi ,W/n}]:
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E(u(Wj )) = n × 1
n































































































By a simple approximation, the same is true if we consider that the function u is
concave and not necessarily two times differentiable. Since the function u has been
chosen arbitrarily it follows that Wj SSD Wn .
Definition 6.1 An insurance scheme s is a set of non-negative random variables,
s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn),
where λi is policyholder i’s liability to the insurer known as the premium and fi is
the insurer’s liability to policyholder i known as the insurance indemnity.
According to this definition, under the scheme s, the policyholder i final wealth
is given by
Wi = w0 − λi − Xi + fi .
If the premia are deterministic, then it is an ex-ante policy. However, in this paper
we also consider the case where both the insurance indemnity and the premium to
be random variables. For that reason, we may also use the term contingent premium
instead of premium.
An interesting example is the perfect pooling insurance scheme: we call the
insurance scheme s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn) a perfect pooling scheme if
λ1 = λ2 = · · · = λn =
∑
i Xi
n and fi = Xi for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. In that case, all risk
variables in the market are aggregated, and all policyholders bear an equal share of
the aggregated risk. Here, the premium is stochastic. We will show that if there is
infinitely many policyholders, then deterministic premia appear when the policy-
holders are endowed with i.i.d. loss variables.
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6.4 Risk Management Platforms
In this section, we study three different risk platforms. First, in Sect. 6.4.1, we pro-
pose a pure risk-sharing platform. In Sect. 6.4.2, we propose an insurance platform,
in which there is a mutual insurer that can opt to default and is protected by a govern-
ment. Finally, in Sect. 6.4.3, we propose amarket platform and consider a competitive
and a decentralised model.
6.4.1 Risk-Sharing Platform
In this part, we consider a risk-sharing platform where there is no role for the insurer,
but individuals share their risk directly with each other (for instance, via a peer-to-
peer network). Lemma 6.1 can be used to show that under NDI the best allocation
is the perfect pooling. As we have mentioned before, based on the individual’s final
wealth we can consider that the total wealth is given byW = nw0 − ∑i Xi . Suppose






i E (ui (w0 − λi − Xi + fi )) ,









i fi is a budget constraint that guarantees that the aggregate premia
are equal to the aggregate insurance indemnities. From Lemma 6.1 it follows that the
optimal allocation of total wealth is given by Wn = w0 −
∑
i Xi
n . Then, the final wealth
of individual j after risk-sharing is given byw0 − λ j − X j + f j = w0 −
∑
i Xi
n , j =
1, . . . , n, where λ j is the premium and f j is the coverage for policyholder j . This
risk exposure after risk-sharing is obtained by choosing full coverage of the losses,
f j = X j , and λ j = λ =
∑
i Xi
n . This is a general rule for the premium of insurance
with full risk coverage. So we have the following theorem.
Theorem 6.1 Consider a set of identically distributed risk variables, X1, X2, . . . ,
Xn, then the perfect pooling insurance scheme is a solution to the problem (6.1).
Note that with infinite number of policyholders if the losses are i.i.d then the
premium will converge to the mean, but in the case that we do not have the i.i.d
assumption this may no longer hold.
3 Under NDI, the objective of this problem and the other ones in the sequel can be replaced by only
a representative agent’s utility function.
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6.4.2 Insurance Platform
Another way of risk management is to introduce an insurance platform. We first
take the perspective of a mutual insurer. In mutual insurance, all policyholders share
the insurable risk with each other, and the insurer itself has no profit objective. For
a typical insurer, the major consideration is the risk of insolvency. This to some
extent hints for a different answer than the risk-sharing which is characterised in
the following theorem. But before that let us introduce the partial pooling insurance
scheme as an insurance scheme s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn) where










for some η ∈ (0, 1), and f j = X j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, where 1A is defined as the indi-
cator function of the event A ∈ F .
Theorem 6.2 Consider a set of identically distributed risk variables, X1, X2, . . . ,






i E (ui (w0 − λi − Xi + fi )) ,





) ≥ 1 − η,
NDI holds.
(6.2)
Proof Consider an insurance scheme s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn), where





) ≥ 1 − η andNDIholds i.e., (w0 − λ j − X j +
f j )( j=1,2,...,n) are identically distributed. Let λ
′
j = λ j + (X j − f j ). Observe that
w0 − λ j − X j + f j = w0 −
(
λ j + (X j − f j )
) − X j +
(
f j + (X j − f j )
)
= w0 − λ′j − X j + X j = w0 − λ
′
j .
First, by NDI this shows that λ
′






















Given the two points above, the insurance scheme s
′ = (λ′1, . . . , λ′n, X1, . . . , Xn)
respects the NDI assumption that has the same objective value as (6.2). So, we can
replace f j by X j and λ j by λ
′
j , and rewrite the problem as follows:
4 The participation condition of the insurer is here resembling the reduction of the ruin probability
that is often used in the literature on risk theory in a dynamic insurance framework.




















) ≥ 1 − η,
NDI holds.
(6.3)





n . Consider the insurance scheme s
′′ = (λ, λ, . . . , λ, X1, X2, . . . ,
Xn). It is clear that s
′′
satisfies NDI. On the other hand, based on Lemma 6.1, it holds
that
∑
i E(ui (w0 − λ′i )) ≤
∑









i λ we get that the solution must satisfy:
{
maxE (u(w0 − λ)) ,
P (X ≤ λ) ≥ 1 − η, (6.4)











where λ∗ is a solution to (6.4). As all




AC at 0. This means λ∗ =
∑
i Xi
n 1A. Now, let us look at A
C . Since a utility function
is increasing then the values of
∑
i Xi























)}. This proves the theorem.
There are a few points that need to be discussed. First, by NDI, the risk expo-
sure after purchasing the optimal insurance scheme does not depend on the individ-
ual policyholders. Second, by setting η = 0, meaning a perfect solvency condition∑
i fi ≤
∑
i λi , we get the perfect pooling solution, which is also optimal for the
risk-sharing platform. Third, if we moreover assume that the random losses are inde-
pendent, then for both the risk-sharing and the insurance platform, we get the same
solution in the limit: λ∗ → E(X), as n → ∞. However, the most important point is
the difference between the optimal value of the risk-sharing and the insurance plat-
form. In the insurance platform, part of the risk can be forgiven. More precisely, the





is not covered by the policyholders, and
the government provides protection to the policyholders. Note that such a so-called
bail-out happens with probability η, that is usually small. This is to some extent a
huge difference and is not at all desirable for the system. This is an important point to
observe that the existence of the government will shelter the agents against the part
of the risk that is the most harmful. However, at a large scale it seems the government
needs to borrow enough funds to manage the risk which indicates the necessity of
sponsorship. The sponsorship can either be in the form of a guarantee fund or can be
a social reinsurance.
Remark 6.1 With a similar proof, we get that if we assume that λ is deterministic






108 H. Assa and T. J. Boonen
Remark 6.2 In light of Theorem 6.2 one may consider the insurance scheme given
by s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn) where















i λi , then
∑




. This condition states that the gov-
ernment only covers losses beyond the deductible threshold, which is the threshold
for a bail-out.
Remark 6.3 In this paper, the insurance policies rely on the credit worthiness of
the policyholders. Doherty and Schlesinger (1990) and Cummins and Mahul (2004)
study insurance policies under conditions of default risk. In addition, Boonen (2019)
considers a limited liability framework where the multivariate risk of the policyhold-
ers is exchangeable and focuses on the optimal allocation of losses in default. An
interesting finding of this work is that a protection fund can be welfare-improving. A
protection fund charges levies to policyholders with low realised losses, and this is
used to compensate policyholders with high losses in case of a default of the insurer.
While limited liability in the existing literature is considered when the insurers can
default on their obligations, in this paper our focus is on a mutual insurer that can opt
to default only with a sufficiently small probability. In case of default, the insurance
claims will be covered by a government.
6.4.3 Market Platform
So far, we have discussed the risk-sharing and the insurance platforms. However,
let us look at the problem from a market perspective. We have chosen two different
market platforms; one where we consider a competitive market and another one
where we consider a decentralised market.
6.4.3.1 Competitive Market
In this part, we present a model in which a “classical” solution appears, and the
premium is deterministic. There is a competitive insurance market, in which the
policyholders seek optimal insurance contracts with a (stock) insurer that is faced
with the participation constraint to make a non-negative expected profit on each
insurance policy.
Theorem 6.3 Consider a set of identically distributed risk variables, X1, X2, . . . , Xn
then the insurance scheme s = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λn, f1, f2, . . . , fn) where λ1 = · · · =
λn = E(Xi ), and f j = X j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n solves






i E (ui (w0 − λi − Xi + fi )) ,
s.t. ∀ j, 0 ≤ f j ≤ X j , E(λ j ) ≥ E( f j ),
NDI holds.
(6.5)
Proof From NDI, it follows that (w0 − λ j − X j + f j ) j=1,2,...,n are identically dis-
tributed, and thuswe havew0 − λ j − X j + f j = w0 − λ′j for λ′j = λ j + (X j − f j ).
By NDI, it follows that λ
′
j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n have the same distribution. Moreover,
we have
E(λ j ) ≥ E( f j ) ⇔ E(λ j + (X j − f j )) ≥ E(X j ) ⇔ E(λ′j ) ≥ E(X j ).
Given the two points above, the insurance scheme s
′ = (λ′1, λ′2, . . . , λ′n, X1, X2, . . . ,
Xn) respects the NDI assumption and thus we have the same objective value as (6.5).
So, we can replace f j by X j and λ j by λ
′































2, . . . , λ
′′
n, X1, X2, . . . , Xn). It is clear that s
′′
satisfies NDI. On the other hand,




























i E (ui (w0 − λi )) ,
s.t. ∀ j, E(λ j ) ≥ E( f j ). (6.7)
Since the utility function is concave, it holds by Jensen’s inequality that E(ui (w0 −
E(λ̃))) ≥ E(ui (w0 − λ̃)). From this and the fact that the utility function is increasing,
(6.7) is solved by λ j = λ̃ = E(Xi ). This proves the theorem.
Theorem 6.3 describes a classic situation where deterministic premia are optimal.
The key assumption here is that the insurer is a separate firm that is able to pool
and manage risk in absence of a regulator. In absence of such an unregulated firm,
the policyholders can still decide to share risk via a variety of platforms, and then
stochastic premia may become optimal.
Since there is no regulator it is important to understand the risk associated with
such policies. We look at the probability of insolvency: P(
∑
i Xi > nλ̃). So, in the
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Now, let us compare the solutions of (6.1) and (6.5) in light of the criteria in
(6.8)–(6.10). Note that if we consider the case when the losses are independent, then
the contingent premium and the deterministic premium are equal if there is an infinite
number of policyholders, and the criteria in (6.8)–(6.10) will suggest the use of the
deterministic premium. The important issue is that in the presence of a common
shock or systematic risk the expected contingent premium λ̃ = E(λ) cannot truly be
representative of the real macro-level impact. We will show examples of this with
common shock models in Sect. 6.5.
6.4.3.2 Decentralised Market
In the decentralised market, our focus is on deterministic (ex-ante) premia, and we
solve the supply and the demand problem separately. Our main concern is to observe
if an equilibrium exists.
Let us first consider the supply side of the market. We use a very popular method
in the industry, by keeping the loss ratio below a targeted loss ratio. So, let consider
the insurance company, which is the supply side of the market, wants to keep the
loss ratio at a given level β ∈ (0, 1]. Based on Assa and Wang (2020) this value is
around 65 per cent for the industry. In the case that the only aim of the insurer is
the insurance solvency, we can consider β = 1. For instance, in the case that the
insurance is run as a state back scheme or when it is run based on a fund, we can
assume that β = 1. In this case the insurance is not supposed to make profit.
In what follows, we need to do the valuation of insurance products. We have
















is called the loss ratio.
6 Risk-Sharing in the Presence of Systematic Risk 111
Note that here we have considered the full coverage f j = X j to follow the results










On the other hand, we need to explore the market demand price. So, let us consider a
representative agent with a utility u. Using a utility indifference approach for losses
with identically distributes as X , we know that the premium for an insurance contract
with full coverage is given as follows:
u(w0 − λD) = E(u(w0 − X)),
or,
λD = w0 − u−1(E(u(w0 − X))),
where the inverse utility function u−1 exists because u is increasing.
We say that an equilibrium exists if λD ≥ λS , and an equilibrium price is given
by λ ∈ [λS, λD]. In the case that we have linear utility (i.e. risk-neutral agents) we
have that λDLin = E(X). On the other hand, by Jensen’s inequality we have:
λD = w0 − u−1(E(u(w0 − X))) ≥ E(X) = λDLin.
So as a sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium we can check the
following condition:
E(X) = λDLin ≥ λS.
















We claim that λD ≥ λDAve. To see this note that by using the Lemma 6.1 we have that









= u(w0 − λDAve),
and so λD ≥ λDAve. So, this can also be used to introduce the following sufficient
condition for the existence of an equilibrium:
λDAve ≥ λS.
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For instance, in the case that we are only concerned with the insurance solvency i.e.,
β = 1, then in the limit we can see that for i.i.d losses we get:
λDAve → E(X), and
λS → E(X), as n → ∞.
This readily justifies the existence of the insurancemarket for the assumptions above.
Remark 6.4 As one can see in all three platforms we studied above the indepen-
dence assumption with an infinite number of policyholders will result in the classical
solution. This explains why in many standard models when we are not facing the risk
of common shock a (non-contingent) actuarial premium can be the optimal answer.
This can be regarded from the so-called “principle of insurance” perspective, as it
was discussed in the introduction. It is not very difficult to see that by using the
central limit theorem we have that
ζ = P(Sn > n(E(Xi ) + zn)) = P
(
Sn














⇒ zn ≈ σ√
n
−1(1 − ζ ) → 0,
for any ζ ∈ (0, 1), where zn is the relative risk loading Sn = ∑ni=1 Xi , σ the standard
deviation of Xi , and  is the CDF of a standard normal distribution.
6.5 Systematic Risk Model and Common Shocks
In this section we focus on the common shock models and will study different risk
management framework in the presence of a common shock. For each framework,
we also consider specific examples to better understand the impact of the common
shocks on the risk management frameworks.
For simplicity, we have chosen the Bernoulli distribution for losses and the con-
stant absolute risk aversion (CARA, or exponential) utility function, i.e.,
u(x) = 1 − e
−ax
a
, for a > 0 and u(x) = x for a = 0.
Here, a is the risk aversion parameter. Advantages of using CARA utility are the
possibility of using negative wealth, the price invariance to the initial wealth and
also additivity w.r.t independent losses. A disadvantage of using the CARA utility
is that the risk aversion parameter a depends on the currency (a scaling problem),
which makes the calibration of the parameter a challenging. In the literature the risk
aversion parameter a is a number very close to 0. However, in very particular cases it
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can even reach values close to a = 1 (see, e.g., Babcock et al. 1993). In our numerical
assessment we consider a ∈ [0, 1].





In the market platform, we must essentially make sure that λS ≤ λD. With CARA
utility when the losses are i.i.d, based on what have been discussed with infinite
number of policyholders, we can verify this relation by the Jensen inequality for
a = 0 as follows:









The case a = 0 is obvious.
However, if the above condition does hold, we also want to see the degree of
violation of this condition. In a market setup, as mainly the demand is the driving
force of the market, we scale everything with the market demand prices and assess








This value shows how large the gap is between the supply and demand sides of the
market. Another benefit of using this quantity is that it is dimension free, so we do
not have problem with scales.
In terms of the tolerance probability of the insurance company, i.e., the parameter
η, we generally consider two cases, one where the probability of the common shock
event is greater and one where the common shock is less than the VaR-parameter.
In our case study, since we assume a probability of common shock γ to be equal
to 0.01, we consider η = 0.005 and η = 0.015. In this way we can see the impact
of the risk management by checking if the insurance risk tolerance parameter is
sensitive to common shock or not. We also consider the effect of the probability of
the non-systematic (alternatively called idiosyncratic) event which we denote by p.
In the following, in three sections we consider three different common shock
examples, including the additive, multiplicative and risk rate common shock models.
Then in each section we consider the risk-sharing, insurance, and market platforms.
We use the examples of the Bernoulli loss variables along with the CARA utility and
n → ∞. One of the benefits of using a Bernoulli distribution is that we can easily
associate the common shock to the systematic event. In the following, wewill specify
the systematic event in each case. It is very important to realise if the systematic event
is regarded as a tail event. More precisely, if the systematic event probability is less
than the parameter η, then it is also a tail event.
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For the common shocks, we focus on an example of a wide-spread pandemic
event like the Spanish flu and the recent COVID-19, which we assume to be a macro
event of roughly 1 per cent of probability (“once every 100years”). We also follow
the example of the UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme presented by Assa (2020)
as a case-study with systematic risk. The calibration in this paper helps us to set
suitable values for the parameters. For instance, for the idiosyncratic event we can
consider p = 0.06; so for completeness in this paper we can consider a wider range
of 0.05 ≤ p ≤ 0.1. We also consider γ = 0.01.
6.5.1 Additive Common Shock Model
Let us consider an i.i.d. sequence of risk variables Y j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n and another
non-negative random variable Z , independent from all Y j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let us
introduce the loss variables as X j = Y j + Z . We assume all random variables Yi
have the same distribution as Y . This additive common shock model is proposed
by Avanzi et al. (2018) and Boonen (2019) for the modelling of insurable losses. In
this setup the common shock is represented by the random loss Z . The systematic
event needs to be introduced for each case. However, in this framework a natural
suggestion is an event S ∈ σ(Z), where σ(Z) is the sigma-field generated by Z . In
our examples we consider Bernoulli distributions for Y and Z . Let us consider an
idiosyncratic loss variable Y = 1LY and a systematic loss variable Z = 1S , where
P(LY ) = p and P(S) = γ . So, naturally the systematic event that we consider is S.
1. Risk-sharing platform. As we have seen in Sect. 6.4.1, for risk-sharing we need
to be knowledgeable about the average. This is given by:
∑






+ Z → E(Y ) + Z .
This is the best allocation for a risk-sharing platform because of Lemma 6.1. As
one can see the average still includes the common shocks.
If we consider our example we can see the contingent premium to be given as
p + 1S . It is very interesting to compare this solution to the classical problem
we considered in (6.5), where the solution is just the average of the loss variable
which here is given by p + γ . So, there is a trade-off in the contingent premium,
while in the non-systematic event the contingent premium is less i.e., p < p + γ ,
but once the systemic event happens the contingent premium is much higher i.e.,
p + γ < p + 1. One can see that there is a chance of γ = 0.01 that a big loss
would hit all. This is generally not sufficient for any insurance scheme to be
considered sustainable.
2. Insurance platform. As we have seen in Sect. 6.4.1, for mutual insurance we








for n → ∞. This limit
is given by:









→ {E(Y ) + Z ≤ E(Y ) + VaR1−η(Z)}
= {Z ≤ VaR1−η(Z)},
and as a result, we get in limit that
λi = λ∗ → (E(Y ) + Z)1{Z≤VaR1−η(Z)},
for the solution {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} of Problem (6.2).
Now let us consider our special case of Bernoulli distributions. Here we have
two cases. First let us consider η = 0.005 < 0.01 = γ . In this case we have
VaR1−η(Z) = 1, and as a result we get {Z ≤ VaR1−η(Z)} = , and λ∗ =
E(Y ) + Z . This essentially means that in the case that the risk tolerance param-
eter is set at a value that is smaller than the probability of the systematic event,
which means that the systematic event is not perceived as a tail event, then, the
solution is identical to the one from the risk sharing platform. Second, let us
consider η = 0.015 > 0.01 = γ . In this case we have VaR1−η(Z) = 0, and then
we get {Z ≤ VaR1−η(Z)} = SC and λ∗ = E(Y )1SC . Thus, if the risk tolerance
parameter is larger than the probability of the systematic event, then we may end
up with a solution that will put a large burden on the government due to tail risk.
3. Marketplatform. In themarket platformweconsider the competitive anddecen-
tralised markets.
Competitive market. It is very easy to see that λ̃ = E(Y + Z). For the Bernoulli
example this is easily given by p + γ . In order to see the risk impact of the
policy we need to find out about the probability of default generated by (6.5), as
in (6.8) which is P (Z > E(Z)). For the Bernoulli model this value is equal to









= 1 − γ
γ + p .
If we consider the parameter values of our calibration based on the UK Coro-
navirus Job Retention Scheme, the average relative magnitude of the losses in
default is at least 1−0.010.01+0.1 = 9 = 900%, which is quite high.





in the limit to find the










VaR1−η(E(Y ) + Z) = 1
β
(E(Y ) + VaR1−η(Z)),
which holds true by continuity of the VaR risk measure (see Proposition 4.11 in
Marinacci and Montrucchio 2004). We also need the demand price
λD = w0 − u−1(E(u(w0 − Y − Z))).
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Our aim is to see when we can verify the market condition λS ≤ λD .










, a > 0,
and,
λD = E(Y ) + E(Z), a = 0.
Now, let us look at the pricing gaps:
λS − λD =
{







, a > 0,
VaR1−η(Z) − E(Z), a = 0.
Computing this gap is not an easy job in general. When we use the Bernoulli
loss distribution, we derive with our assumptions the following:
λS − λD =
{
p + 1γ>η −
(
log(1−p+pea )




, a > 0,
VaR1−η(Z) − E(Z), a = 0.
As explained in the beginning of this section motivated by the COVID-19 case
study, we use γ = 0.01. Next, we study the pricing gaps. In Fig. 6.1 we show
the relative pricing gaps for two cases, one when the risk assessment is sensitive
to the systematic risk (η < γ ), and one otherwise. As one can see that if the
systematic risk probability parameter γ is “captured” by the risk confidence
parameter η (η < γ ), then the relative price gaps in Fig. 6.1(left) are always
positive and greater than 5.5 (meaning 550%) and can become as large as 16
times (1600%) the demand price. On the other hand, one can see that if the risk
confidence parameter η is larger than the systematic risk parameter γ , then the
prices gap is negative which means that an equilibrium price exists. The VaR
may however not be an adequate measure to determine the riskiness of the loss
variable as the common shock is notmeasured. Themain problem is the common
shock that has a great impact on the valuation. Some side-observation includes
the reduction of the gap with the increase of the risk aversion parameter which
makes economic sense. However, the behaviour of the pricing gap is different
with respect to the changes in the non-systematic risk parameter p.
6.5.2 Multiplicative Common Shock Model
We consider a model, where the common shock is multiplicative, and the individ-
ual risks are given by: X j = ZY j , where Z ≥ 0, E(Z) > 0, and the risk variables
Y j , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, are i.i.d. and independent of Z . Similar to Sect. 6.5.1we consider
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Fig. 6.1 Relative pricing gap for additive common shocks
Bernoulli losses. Let us consider loss Y = 1LY and Z = 1 + z1S , where P(LY ) = p
and P(S) = γ and z > 0 is the magnitude of the systematic losses. For simplicity
we assume z = 2 and 4 for two different values of the common shock effect. We
again consider S as the systematic event.
Similar to Sect. 6.5.1, one can get that for the risk-sharing platform it holds that:











This is the best allocation for a risk-sharing platform because of Lemma 6.1. As
one can see the average still includes the common shock Z .
Now let us again consider Bernoulli distributions for the losses. We then get
that λ = ZE(Y ) = p + pz1S . Similar to the comparison we made in Sect. 6.5.1
with the solution λ̃ = E(Z)E(Y ) = p + pγ z in (6.5), one can realise the trade-
off between the two solutions. It is again important to note that the solution in
(6.5) cannot be truly representative of the real macro-level impact due to the
systematic risk.
2. Insurance platform. As we have seen in Sect. 6.4.2, for mutual insurance we


















→ {ZE(Y ) ≤ VaR1−η(Z)E(Y )}
= {Z ≤ VaR1−η(Z)},
and as a result, we get in the limit that
λi = λ∗ → E(Y )Z1{Z≤VaR1−η(Z)},
for the solution {λ1, λ2, . . . , λn} of Problem (6.2).
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Now let us consider the Bernoulli losses. Similarly to Sect. 6.5.1 we distinguish
two cases. One where the risk tolerance parameter is sensitive to the common
shock (i.e., systematic event does not belongs to the tail), in which case the
solution is identical to the risk-sharing solution; and one where the solution is
much less impactful for the policyholders and given by λ∗ = E(Y )z1SC .
3. Market platform. Like before, here we need to look at the following two mod-
els.
Competitive market. Very similar to the previous case we can see that the proba-
bility of insolvency in (6.5) is equal to P(S), and the average relative magnitude









= z(1 − γ )





For our case study on the UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme we see that
for γ = 0.01, we get 99100
z +1
≥ 1.94 = %194. This is very high value.
Decentralised market. Now we want to see if we can verify the market condition







, a > 0, and
λD = E(Y )E(Z), a = 0.
Let us consider the examplewith Bernoulli-distributed factors.With our assump-
tions we can see that for β = 1
λS = E(Y )VaR1−η(Z) = p1{γ>η}.
In addition, it holds that




ea(1+z) on S ∩ LY ,
ea on LY \S,
1 on LCY ,
which is equal to ⎧
⎨
⎩
ea(1+z) with prob. γ p,
ea with prob. (1 − γ )p,






a(1+z) + p(1 − γ )ea + (1 − p))
a
,
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and
λS − λD =
{
p(1 + z1γ>η) − log(pγ e
a(1+z)+p(1−γ )ea+(1−p))
a , a > 0,
p((1 + z1γ>η) − α), a = 0.
Like before, motivated by the UK COVID-19 case study we use the calibration
γ = 0.01. We next examine the pricing gaps.
The results in Fig. 6.2 are very similar to what we have observed in Fig. 6.1,
which means there is a trade-off between correctly covering the risk via a VaR
and the existence of the market equilibrium. This observation holds true almost
regardless of the values of the risk aversion parameter, the non-systematic risk
and even the value of z.
6.5.3 Risk Rate Common Shock Model
In this example we discuss different levels of the systematic risk in the market. As it
has been discussed in the beginning of the paper, risk management solutions emerge
to take care of different level of risk. Markets that deal with less risky aggregate
losses are more likely to form and the risk would more perfectly be managed. On
Fig. 6.2 Relative pricing gap for multiplicative common shocks
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the opposite side we have the markets that are dealing with larger aggregate losses,
which are much harder to create. Here, we use a very simple setup to demonstrate
the different levels of systematic risk while still focussing on identically distributed
individual loss variables. The major difference is the aggregate risk rather than the
individual risk. This differentiates this example from the other two examples where
the aggregate risk is not the essential differentiator.
Let us consider a partition 1, . . . , m of  where pk := P(k) for all k =
1, . . . ,m. The elements of the partition represent different layers of the risk man-
agement market. We assume that p1 > p2 > · · · > pm > 0, associating smaller
probabilities with events with larger impact. Let us consider a sequence of loss
variables {Xn}n∈N so that {Xn|k}n∈N is i.i.d. in the probability space (k, Pk ),
where Pk is the conditional probability on k for any k = 1, . . . ,m. Let us
assume that E(Xi |1) ≤ · · · ≤ E(Xi |m). This assumption can reflect the fact that
more harmful events cause larger expected losses. By assumption it is clear that
Ek = E(X1|k) = · · · = E(Xn|k), for k = 1, . . . ,m. It is also clear that the loss




pk FX |k .
To better understand the example, we also discuss a special case of this model by
assuming only a systematic and a non-systematic event. This means in a probabilistic
setup the probability space  can be partitioned into S and SC , for systematic and
non-systematic events, respectively. Let γ = P(S) be a positive number that is the
probability of the macro event (e.g., every 100years). We assume in the systematic
event the probability of the loss distribution will change. The same is assumed for
the complement set SC . Let Sys = {∅, S, SC ,}, be the sigma-field generated by
systematic event. Let us assume E(X j |S) = δM and E(X j |SC) = αM . We assume
that α > δ which is reflecting the fact that the magnitude of the losses during the
systematic event is larger than non-systematic event.
Using the calibration by Assa (2020) on the UK Coronavirus Job Retention
Scheme, we set α = 0.27 and δ = 0.06 and γ = 0.01. However, for completeness
we consider a range for δ ∈ [0.05, 0.1].
Now let us see what will happen to the optimal strategies given by the propositions
we have discussed.
1. Risk-sharing platform. By using the law of large numbers on each conditional

















Considering the special case of m = 2, we have that,
λ = E(X |SC)1SC + E(X |S)1S = δM1SC + αM1S = δM + (α − δ)M1S.
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Nowusing the example ofm = 2, we easily derive that if η = 0.005 < 0.01 = γ
then
λ∗ = E(X |SC)1SC + E(X |S)1S = δM1SC + αM1S,
and if η = 0.015 > 0.01 = γ we have
λ∗ = E(X |SC)1SC = δM1SC .
Hence, if the systematic risk is not a tail event then the solution is identical to
the risk-sharing solution. Otherwise, the systematic risk is fully borne by the
government, and the policyholders only pay a premium if the non-systematic
(idiosyncratic) risk is realized.
3. Market platform. Here we need to look at the following models.
Competitive market. One can realise the following trade-off between the model
(6.5) and (6.1) premium and the contingent premium:
δM ≤ λ̃ = (1 − γ )δM + γαM ≤ αM.
The probability of the insolvency is equal to p = P(S). We also find that the









= (1 − p)(α − δ)
δ(1 − p) + αp ≈
α
δ
− 1 ≥ 1.7.
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λD = w0 − u−1(E(u(w0 − X))).
Using the Bernoulli distributions for the conditional losses we can also find the
loss distribution. Let us consider the following model: for any j let X j |k =
1L jk , where L jk ⊆ k , and the sequence of the sets {L jk} j are independent in
(k, Pk ) and Pk (L jk) = Ek . So, if we consider a loss variable X with the same
joint distribution as the losses X j , it itself has a Bernoulli distribution given by
X = 1L, where P(L) = ∑k pk Ek . Using the exponential utility, we can find the










, a > 0,
and
λD = E(1L) =
∑
k
pk Ek, a = 0.
We display the relative pricing gap in Fig. 6.3. Now let us consider our example
of the UK Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme for β = 1. Interestingly, we can
see the same results as in Figs. 6.1 and 6.2, which means regardless of all other
parameters there is a trade-off between the existence of the market equilibrium
and correct risk coverage.
Fig. 6.3 Relative pricing gap for risk rate common shocks and γ = 0.01
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Remark 6.5 In all examples, we can observe an interesting fact that is that the
optimal risk-sharing approach in the limit for n → ∞ will result in the following
λ = E(X |Sys),
where Sys is the sigma-field representing the systematic events. More precisely, for
the examples with the risk-sharing and insurance platforms, it is Sys = σ(Z), and in
the example with the market platform, it is Sys = σ(1, . . . , n). The observation
that the average of infinitely many exchangeable random variables reduce to a condi-
tional expectation is not surprising to us, as it is related to De Finetti’s theorem with
exchangeable risk (see Kingman 1978, for more details on De Finetti’s theorem).
6.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered an insurance cohort with identically distributed loss vari-
ables, and this insurance cohort sought an insurance scheme that keeps everybody’s
final wealth distributionally the same. This was called the non-discriminatory insur-
ance (NDI) assumption. We have considered a very general setting where there is
no need for any dependency structure of the wealth variables; this essentially means
that we did not assume that losses, or the wealth distributions, are i.i.d or exchange-
able. This general setup is motivated by systematic loss events such as a widespread
pandemic (e.g., Spanish flu or COVID-19) with large macroeconomic loss impact.
The idea is to provide a platform where we can properly study the risk management
of macro-level losses.
We considered three different platforms: a risk-sharing, an insurance and amarket
platform. There are some general observations from studying these platforms. First,
we showed that under NDI the most efficient final wealth is nothing but the average
wealth; regardless of the dependency structure. Second, from the first observation
we realised that there are benefits of introducing a contingent, ex-post premium. This
essentially means that ex-post policies are shown to bemore efficient than the current
ex-ante insurance policies.
For any specificplatformwealsohavemadevery interestingobservations basedon
three common shock models, which include the additive, multiplicative and the risk
rating common shock model. First, the risk-sharing platform is an efficient platform
and any insurance scheme only acts as a wealth re-distributor ex-post. Second, in the
insurance platform as the insurance companies are regulated and need to be solvent
the optimal answer is a partial risk-sharing scheme. As a result, we observe that in
this platform the risk-sharing platform the policyholders do not bear the risk of the
tail events which necessitated the existence of a social scheme run by the state or
government to bear the tail event risk. Third, we studied the market platform. In
a competitive market, we see that we will come up with a deterministic premium,
which gives an ex-ante policy. However, we observe that this platform dramatically
increases the risk of insolvency. In the decentralisedmarket platform,we realised that
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there is a trade-off between the tail risk of the insurer (supply side) and the market
equilibrium. On one hand, if the common shock is not a tail event then we have
no market equilibrium. On the other hand, if the common shock is tail event, even
though a market equilibrium exists, there is substantial tail risk. Apparently if there
is no common shock then both absence of tail risk and insurance market equilibrium
can happen at the same time.
We have calibrated our models to the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (the
UK furlough scheme during the COVID-19 pandemic), and all the observations are
made on that basis. The results of the paper suggest new policy implications; the
most important of which is the consideration of ex-post (contingent) premia, where
the insurance premium is collected after the observation of the realised losses. Our
observation is that in the presence of common shock, the major issue would not be
the sophistication of the loss modelling or contracting, but it is the paradigm that may
need to be changed. The insurance market needs be sustainable for systematic shock
events,which for our case studymeans that unemployment insurancepremiabecomes
contingent to the occurrence of the systematic risks such as COVID-19. This means
that to reach the optimal allocation one adjusts the premium by directing wealth from
people who did not lose to the people who have lost. In short, such insurance plans
serve as a mechanism to diversify idiosyncratic risk and to share systematic risk. The
systematic risk caused by COVID-19 is hard to insure as discussed by Richter and
Wilson (2020).
The observation from the real world to a good extent confirms our conclusions.
First, there has been a dispute5 over the insurance coverage of the pandemic losses
in the UK which has emphasised the unwillingness (or inability) of the supply-side
(insurers) of the insurance market to settle the claims. Second, the government in
the UK has introduced a generous furlough scheme6 that ran for a few months to
cover a large portion of the workforce in the UK. This has been executed in different
means but the necessary capital will increase the government deficit and need to
be paid back either by direct taxes or inflation. That can be regarded as some kind
of contingent premia. Third, the UK government has supported businesses through
the Trade Credit Insurance (TCI) guarantee, which again seems to be more like
a contingency measure. 7 However, none of these solutions are carefully planned,
and they are all based on the short-term assessments. Finding an insurance solution
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Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic is affecting all countries. Since the World
Health Organization declared the COVID-19 outbreak a Public Health Emergency
of International Concern on 30 January 2021, governments across the world have
mobilised on a tremendous scale and put in place different policies to contain the
spread of the virus and its negative effects on society. International organisations have
supported these efforts through evidence-based policy recommendations and emer-
gency financing packages. This chapter presents a brief overview of the responses
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made by international organisations and European Union towards COVID-19. Spe-
cial attention is given to the guidance of these organisations on the changes in social
insurance and pension plans to protect the most vulnerable population groups.
7.1 Introduction
On New Year’s Eve 2019 the World Heath Organization’s (WHO) Country Office in
the People’s Republic of China picked up a media statement posted by the Wuhan
Municipal Health Commission from their website mentioning 27 cases of a new
“viral pneumonia” in Wuhan, People’s Republic of China, see WHO (2020a), Euro-
pean Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2021). The WHO officials at the
Country Office took immediate action and notified the International Health Regu-
lations (IHR)1 focal point in the WHO Western Pacific Regional Office about the
media statement of the pneumonia cases and provided a translation of it fromChinese
to enable further dissemination. WHO’s Epidemic Intelligence from Open Sources
(EIOS) platform also picked up a media report on ProMED (a programme of the
International Society for Infectious Diseases) about the same cluster of cases of
“pneumonia of unknown cause”, in Wuhan, China (ibid). This promoted a reaction
from several health authorities around the world and they, in turn, contacted the
WHO seeking additional information, see WHO (2020a). This was the first time
the world got to know the virus, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus-2
(SARS-CoV-2), that would be associated to cause the disease known as COVID-19
and the pandemic that it would cause.
On 30 January 2020 the WHODirector-General Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus2
declared the COVID-19 outbreak a Public Health Emergency of International Con-
cernWHO (2021a). This is theWHO’s highest level of alarm, and it is a rallying call
to all countries to immediately take notice and to act (ibid). As described in Chapter1,
many governments took drastic measures, such as lockdowns, to tackle COVID-19
and launched economic support package to protect the vulnerable groups. Every
country response to fight this pandemic has been different, as shown in Fig. 7.1, with
some implementing stricter measures earlier than others depending on the health and
financial concerns, and public willingness to comply with measures, amongst others.
However, in general, the measures taken by individual governments have proven to
be inadequate at safeguarding the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable groups.
1 The International Health Regulations (IHR) are a legally binding instrument of international law
that aims for international collaboration. The IHR is the international legal treaty which empowers
WHO to act as the main global surveillance system.
2 Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus is an Ethiopian biologist, public health researcher, and official.
He has since 2017 served as Director-General of WHO.
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Fig. 7.1 COVID-19: stringency index for selected countries
International organisations have taken an important initiative to provide a unified
guidance and raise awareness of the impact of the pandemic. This chapter aims to
give an overview on the roles of the international organisations and how these have
responded to COVID-19.With this in mind, the following section provides a descrip-
tion of the EU response together with the roles of the two main European institutions
in charge of the pandemic: the European Commission and the European Centre for
Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Section7.3 focuses on the actions of the
World Bank to COVID-19 pandemic and discusses the Pandemic Emergency Finan-
cial Facility created in 2017. Section7.4 presents the responses from other interna-
tional organisations: UnitedNations (UN),WHO, International Labour Organization
(ILO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Section7.5 describes the recommendations from international organisations with
respect to social insurance and pensions. The chapter concludes with a discussion of
the role of the international organisations to fight against the pandemic.
7.2 The EU Response to COVID-19
The European Union is a political and economic union of 27 democracies. There are
seven principal decision-making bodies of the EU, and they are listed in Article 13
of the Treaty on European Union, see Treaty on European Union (2010).
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On 24 January 2020 the first European case of COVID-19 was reported in France,
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2021). Since the onset of the
pandemic the EU has been at the centre of the response in Europe. The EU’s actions
taken towards the COVID-19 pandemic can be summed up in 10 main points, see
European Parliament (2020):
• Slowing the spread of the virus
To help limit the virus’s spread, the EU has closed its external borders to non-
essential travel, while ensuring essential goods keep moving across the EU. The
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control3 (ECDC), which provides
rapid risk assessments and epidemiological updates on the outbreak, has been
given additional resources.
• Providing medical equipment
TheEUmember states have taken action to procure life-savingmedical equipment,
such as ventilators and protective masks, under the Civil Protection Mechanism.
In addition, the EU has set up a huge international tender allowing member states
to make joint purchases of equipment and drugs etc. The EU has also organised an
online fundraiser for vaccines, medicines, and diagnostics to fight the coronavirus
worldwide.
• Promoting research
The EU research programme is funding 18 research projects, and 151 teams across
the EU to help find a vaccine against COVID-19 quickly.
• Boosting European solidarity
The European Parliament4 has supported new rules allowing member states to
request financial assistance from the EU Solidarity Fund to also cover health
emergencies. This allows for up to EUR 800 million to become available for
member states to fight the pandemic.
• Assuring the EU’s recovery
To help the EU to recover from the pandemic a new proposal for the EU’s long-
term budget for 2021–2027 has been agreed upon. This proposal also includes a
stimulus package (see the Recovery and Resilience Facility below).
• Supporting the economy, see European Council (2021).
On the 11th of February 2021 the European Council established the Recovery
and Resilience Facility, which will make EUR 672.5 billion in grants and loans
available for public investment and reforms in the 27 member states to help them
address the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The aim of the Facility is to
3 The ECDC is an EU agency whose mission is to strengthen Europe’s defences against infectious
diseases. See https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en for more details.
4 The European Parliament is one of three legislative branches of the EU and one of its seven
institutions. Together with the Council of the European Union, it adopts European legislation,
commonly on the proposal of the European Commission. The Parliament is composed of 705
democratically elected members.
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foster the green and digital transitions and to build resilient and inclusive societies.
Member states will receive support based on the national recovery and resilience
plans, which are under preparation in spring 2021.
• Protecting jobs
The European Commission has unlocked EUR 1 billion from the European Fund
for Strategic Investments in guarantees to encourage banks and other lenders to
provide up to EUR 8 billion of liquidity in support to some 100,000 European
businesses.
• Repatriating EU citizens
With the outbreak tens of thousands of Europeans became stranded around the
world but thanks to the EU Civil Protection mechanism they could be returned
home.
• Helping developed countries face the pandemic
The European Commission has unlocked EUR 20 billion to help non-EU countries
fight the crisis as part of an EU package for a coordinated global relief to tackle
the spread of COVID-19.
• Ensuring accurate information
The spread of disinformation about the coronavirus puts people’s health at risk.
Ensuring that everyone has access to accurate and verified information in their
own language has been called upon by members of the European Parliament, and
social media companies have been asked to tackle disinformation and hate speech.
In addition to the general EU response, there are two main European institutions in
charge of the pandemic, the European Commission and ECDC, whose roles towards
the pandemic are described in Sects. 7.2.1 and 7.2.2.
7.2.1 EU Commission Response
The European Commission is the EU’s politically independent executive arm and is
coordinating a commonEuropean response to the coronavirus outbreak, seeEuropean
Commission (2021a). The Commission is taking resolute action to reinforce the
public health sector andmitigate the socio-economic impact in theEU. It ismobilising
allmeans at its disposal to help theMember States coordinate their national responses
and are providing objective information about the spread of the virus and effective
efforts to contain it. The president of the European Commission Ursula von der
Leyen5 has established a Coronavirus response team at political level to coordinate
the Commission response to the pandemic. The European Commission has been
5 Ursula von der Leyen was born 8 October 1958 and is a German politician, prior to becoming
president of the Commission she served in the Cabinet of Germany between 2005 and 2019.
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negotiating intensely to build a diversified portfolio of vaccines for EU citizens at fair
prices and contracts have been concluded with several vaccine developers, securing
a portfolio of more than 2.6 billion doses, see European Commission (2021b).
7.2.2 The ECDC Response
TheECDC is an EU agencywhosemission is to strengthen Europe’s defences against
infectious diseases, as such it has a pivotal role in Europe. The ECDC produces the
risk assessments, technical reports, advice and information on a regular basis. Since
31December 2019when the events inWuhanwas first reported, the ECDCEpidemic
Intelligence has reported on this and started close surveillance of the COVID-19
related events. On 7 January 2020 the ECDC issued the Threat Assessment Brief—
assessing the risk for travellers, introduction and further spread into the EU, see
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (2021).
7.3 The World Bank Response to COVID-19
According to theWorld Bank (WB) the poorest andmost vulnerable countries will be
hit the hardest by the pandemic. Therefore, a fast response package is needed to save
lives and alleviate the consequences of COVID-19. In April 2020, the World Bank
approved financial emergency support for developing countries to protect lives and
support economic recovery.6 Through this COVID-19 fast-track facility, the World
Bank is making available up to $160 billion over the following 15 months. On April
2, the first group of projects—amounting to 1.9 billion—was released to assist 25
countries. In May 2020, the World Bank Group (WBG) announced its emergency
operations in fighting COVID-19 had reached 100 developing countries. The WBG
also designs and implements community-driven development (CDD) programmes
to respond to urgent needs including access to clean water, rural roads, schools and
health clinic constructions or support for micro-enterprises, amongst others.
Additional funding uses the COVID-19 Multiphase Programmatic Approach (MPA)
with the aim to support vaccination of 1 billion people globally, see World Bank
(2020b). Another financial instrument used by the WBG during the pandemic is
the development policy financing (DPF) that provides IBRD loans, IDA credit/grant
and guarantee budget support for governments to help achieving sustainable, shared
growth and poverty reduction. For three stages of crisis response—Relief, Restruc-
turing and Resilient Recovery, see World Bank (2020a).
6 See WHO (2020b) and Gentilini et al. (2020) for more details about the WHO’s response to
COVID-19.
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The World Bank operates across three stages of intervention, driven by the stages
of the crisis, and a four-pillar response to the pandemic crisis tailored to the specific
country. The relief stage involves emergency response to the health threat posed
by COVID-19 and its immediate social, economic, and financial impact. Once the
countries start to have the pandemic controlled and re-open their economies, the
restructuring stage focuses on strengthening health system for pandemic readiness,
restoring human capital, and restructuring of firms and sectors, amongst others. The
resilient recovery stage entails benefiting from new opportunities to build a more
sustainable, inclusive and resilient future world transformed by the pandemic.
The four pillars of crisis response comprise:
• Pillar 1: Bank emergency support for health interventions aimed at saving lives
threatened by the virus.
• Pillar 2: WBG social response for protecting poor and vulnerable people from the
impact of the economic and social crisis triggered by the pandemic.
• Pillar 3: WBG economic response for saving livelihoods, preserving jobs, and
ensuring more sustainable business growth and job creation.
• Pillar 4: Support for strengthening policies, institutions, and investments to achieve
a resilient, inclusive, and sustainable recovery.
Fig. 7.2 WBG COVID-19 crisis response. Source World Bank
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In Fig. 7.2 we can see the financial instruments that the WBG applies depending on
the pillars and the stage of the pandemic.
7.3.1 Pandemic Emergency Financial Facility (PEF)
In 2017, the Pandemic Emergency Financial Facility (PEF) was launched by the
World Bank, in consultation with the World Health Organisation, and the private
sector to financially help developing nations7 facing a serious outbreak of infectious
disease. In practice, the World Bank collects the premiums and issues bonds and
swaps to private investors in return for favourable interest rates (6.5–11.1% above
LIBOR). This will compensate investors for the risk that the bonds will need to make
pay-outs to fight pandemics under certain conditions. In this way, the PEF, which can
be seen as a type of catastrophe bond, is also known as pandemic bonds. It differs
from other funds because it draws money from capital markets rather than relying
solely on voluntary contributions.8
The coverage of PEF that was set up for an initial period of 3 years, from July 2017
to June 2020, has no cost for countries and the funds do not need to be repaid, World
Bank (2019). The PEF covers large-scale outbreaks for diseases identified as likely
to cause major pandemics.9 The risk of these large-scale outbreaks is modelled so
that the premium cost and coverage are calculated.
The objectives of the PEF are to: (i) make available essential surge financing
to respond to an outbreak with pandemic potential and to minimise its health and
economic consequences and (ii) help catalyse the creation of a global market for
pandemic insurance instruments by drawing on resources from insurance, bonds
and/or other private sector financial instruments.
The PEF shares some features of a parametric insurance contract in the sense
that there is an objective trigger (threshold) event and a pay-out scheme. Also, the
differences between the actual economic losses and the trigger creates basis risk.
An epidemic might not trigger a parametric pay-out—for example, if the infection
level10 does not reach a particular level agreed in the specifications of the contract—
but still can provoke some damages and losses.
7 All countries that qualify for credits from the Bank’s International Development Association
are eligible to access PEF funds. In addition, international organisations and non-governmental
organisations supporting response efforts in affected countries are also eligible to access PEF funds.
8 The two main funds, i.e., the UN’s Central Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) and the World Health
Organization’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) have struggled with the financing, see
Brim and Wenham (2019).
9 This group of diseases includes pandemic Influenza, Coronaviruses, Filoviruses (i.e., Ebola),
Crimean Congo haemorrhagic fever, Rift Valley fever, and Lassa fever.
10 Other triggers are number of deaths, number of cases in each country, percentage of confirmed
cases to total cases and the growth rate of cases, amongst others.
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PEF is an innovative solution and was designed to be the perfect complement to
traditional insurance to cover pandemic risks.However, the PEFwaswidely criticised
mainly due to the generous returns to investors and difficulty in accessing funding
during the early stages of the disease outbreaks when action is crucial, Jonas (2019).
Also, in the PEF, there are several activation criteria (i.e. the total infected cases,
total deaths, number of countries affected, outbreak growth and spread) that served
as a joint trigger and consequently were difficult to reach those simultaneously.
In the Kivu Ebola epidemic, the PEF only paid $31 million by the 13th month
of the outbreak while the premiums paid to bondholders reached a total of $75.5
million, Brim and Wenham (2019). On April 2020—four months after the start of
the outbreak—the first payment of $196 million for the PEF was triggered by the
COVID-19 pandemic.
In 2019, the World Bank indicated that they were planning to issue a new set of
bonds starting in May 2020. However, after facing significant criticism for delayed
payments to developing countries during the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank
has cancelled the launch of PEF 2.0.
7.4 Other International Responses to COVID-19
In this section, we describe the responses from the key international organisations
that have shaped the responses in the EU countries: the UN, the WHO, OECD and
ILO.
7.4.1 The UN Response
The UN is an intergovernmental organisation created in 1945 to maintain inter-
national peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations, to achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social,
cultural, or humanitarian character, and to be a centre for harmonizing action in the
attainment of these common ends.11
The UN regards the COVID-19 pandemic as more than a health crisis, and hence
it has triggered a UN Comprehensive Response to COVID-19 launched by the UN
Secretary General António Guterres.12 The response, which is ongoing, aims to, see
United Nations (2021):
• Deliver a global response that leaves no-one behind.
• Reduce the vulnerability to future pandemics.
11 Charter of theUnitedNations andStatue of the InternationalCourt of Justice, 1945, SanFrancisco.
12 António Manuel de Oliveira Guterres was born 30 April 1949 and is a Portuguese politician
serving as the ninth secretary-general of the United Nations since 2017.
136 M. C. Boado-Penas et al.
• Build resilience to future shocks.
• Overcome the severe and systematic inequalities exposed.
The UN response is divided into three pillars, see United Nations (2020). The
first pillar is a large-scale, coordinated, and comprehensive response by the WHO.
The second pillar includes a wide-ranging effort to safeguard lives and livelihoods
by addressing the devastating near-term socio-economic, humanitarian, and human
rights aspects of the crisis. The final pillar aims towards creating a transformative
recovery that leads to a better post-COVID-19 world.
7.4.2 The WHO Response
TheWHO is a specialised agency of theUN responsible for public health, and as such
it is at the heart of the world response towards the COVID-19 pandemic, see WHO
(2021a). According to the Constitution of the World Health Organization “Health
is a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the
absence of disease or infirmity”.13 The WHO has a broad mandate that enables the
organisation toworkwith universal health care, risksmonitoring, coordinating health
emergencies, and promoting health and well-being.
The WHO response is comprehensive, and it is beyond the scope of this chapter
to present it here. However, the WHO produces a Weekly Epidemiological Update
which provides an overview of the global, regional and country-level COVID-19
cases and deaths, highlighting key data and trends, in addition to other important epi-
demiological information concerning the COVID-19 pandemic, see WHO (2021b).
Furthermore, the COVID-19 Weekly Operational Update reports presents a weekly
update on the WHO and its partners’ actions in response to the pandemic (ibid).
7.4.3 The OECD Response
The OECD which is an international organisation that works to build better policies
for better lives, OECD (2021). The goal of the OECD is to shape policies that fos-
ter prosperity, equality, opportunity, and well-being for all (ibid). The OECD works
on establishing evidence-based international standards and finding solutions to a
range of social, economic, and environmental challenges. The organisation seeks
for improvement through knowledge from data and analysis, exchange of experi-
ences, best-practice sharing, and advice on public policies and international standard-
setting.TheOECDresponse has aimed at answeringquestions relating towhat impact
the coronavirus pandemic would be on individuals and societies. Furthermore, the
13 The Constitution was adopted by the International Health Conference held in New York from 19
June to 22 July 1946 and was signed on 22 July 1946 by the representatives of 61 States.
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OECD intends to find solutions to strengthen healthcare systems, secure businesses,
maintain jobs and education, and stabilise financial markets and economies.
7.4.4 The ILO Response
ILO has developed a four-pillar policy framework to tackle the economic and social
impact of the COVID-19 based on International Labour Standards, see ILO (2020b).
The policies emphasise the human dimension of the crisis caused by the pandemic
and urge the governments to address the challenges with a human-centred approach.
The pillars, listed below, form comprehensive and integrated recommendations on
the key areas of policy action.
• Pillar 1: Stimulating the economy and employment.
• Pillar 2: Supporting enterprises, jobs and incomes.
• Pillar 3: Protecting workers in the workplace.
• Pillar 4: Relaying on social dialogue for solutions.
It is not expected that the harmful effect of the pandemic is distributed equally. It
will be most damaging in the poorest countries and the poorest neighbourhoods.
Pandemic and its aftermath created its unique way of discrimination and disadvan-
taged mainly the people who are in the informal economy, people with disabilities,
migrant workers, indigenous people, women, and people living with HIV. The cri-
sis also gave rise to child labour, forced labour, and human trafficking particularly
women and girls. Due to the lack of access to social protection, these vulnerable
groups are more affected by income shocks, ILO (2020a). Enhancing and enforcing
the laws and policies on equality and non-discrimination are crucial to mitigate the
risks.
7.5 Consequences of COVID-19 Responses on Social
Security and Pensions
Elderly people and people with disabilities are particularly at risk of COVID-19.
Specific actions are needed to protect the lives and health of these groups, so that a
sufficient level of income is guaranteed, and they are better prepared for unexpected
health-related expenses caused by a pandemic. In theory, current pensioners should
not be economically affected by the pandemic as they are recipients of a regular
income. However, pension payments—for many the only source of income—can be
very low. According to ILO, support to pensioners should focus on protecting the
low-income category.
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Fig. 7.3 World map of the income support during the COVID-19 pandemic
Financial aid may take the form of additional support to those affected by the
infection or a general pension increase. In Egypt, for example, a general pension
increase has been implemented due to the pandemic while in Serbia one-off payment
was made to all pensioners. Other countries, such as Slovenia, Sri Lanka and Tunisia
have made selective top-ups in favour of the lower income pensioners and in Costa
Rica, Colombia, Kosovo, or Mexico have made advance pension payments.
However, this kind of financial aid comprises serious dangers. Many countries
had financially unsustainable pension systems already before COVID-19. Unex-
pected and considerable financial expenses, especially if the pension increases are
applied to large groups of pensioners for extended periods, worsen the viability of
the system even more in the long run. On the other hand, pandemics increase the
unemployment and consequently reduce the income from contributions into social
security programmes. In addition, some countries have even suspended, or reduced,
contributions made by employees and/or employers to provide an incentive to retain
workers.
During the first wave of the pandemic social security played a vital role to protect
the most vulnerable groups. COVID-19 caused a high incidence of partial unemploy-
ment. Some countries extended the eligibility of unemployment benefits to cover not
only full unemployment but also partial unemployment. Figure7.3 gives an overview
which countries provide a financial support to those who lose their jobs or cannot
work. Contemplating that the significant turmoil on financial markets due to COVID-
19 reduces returns on pension investments, the asset and the liability sides in pension
insurances gape far apart.
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Finally, loosening regulations on pensionwithdrawals, which some countries with
Defined Contribution (DC) schemes have allowed, will compromise the adequacy
of DC pensions in the future, if large sums have been withdrawn from individual
accounts, unless compensatory measures are set in place.
According to the WB, after a pandemic ends, some of the (highly unpopular)
measures to set in place post-crisis compensatory mechanisms and guide the system
back onto the road to long-term financial stability are
• Repayment of past unpaid contributions by employers and workers.
• Extending participants working life by raising retirement ages.
• Limiting or eliminating the access to early retirement.
7.6 The Need of a United Action Tactic
The present book chapter gives an overview on how some of the most famous inter-
national organisations have responded to COVID-19 as ofMarch 2021. The question
arises whether the help and guidance provided by international organisations have
been enough and timely.
Since the onset of the pandemic, a lot of critics has been expressed towards
international agencies: WHO would have “failed in its basic duty” or the EU would
lack consolidation and coordinated effort in responding the challenges of COVID-
19. Unfortunately, the question of failing and guilt may easily become a political
instrument and can repeatedly arise also in the future, see for instance the discussion
in Gasbarri (2020). Debre and Dijkstra (2021) harshly criticise the responses of 75
international organisations, accusing some of them of bureaucracy and of benefiting
from cross-border crises. On the other hand, Bill Gates, whose foundation is the
second-largest funder of the WHO, stated that
Halting funding for the World Health Organization during a world health crisis is as danger-
ous as it sounds. Their work is slowing the spread of COVID-19 and if that work is stopped
no other organization can replace them. The world needs WHO now more than ever.
In July 2020, the Pew research center (a nonpartisan American think tank based in
Washington, D.C.) conducted a survey across 14 countries about citizen’s perception
of the COVID-19 responses taken by both the countries’ own governments and
international organisations such asWHO and EU. The satisfaction scale ranged from
100 (totally satisfied) to 0 (not satisfied at all). Whilst countries such as Denmark
(95), Australia (94), Germany (88) or South Korea (86) were quite satisfied with
the measures taken by their own countries, the citizens from UK (46) or US (47),
where the governments’ response was not so harsh at the beginning of the pandemic,
did not find the actions taken adequate. The WHO’s score ranged between 74 in
Denmark and 19 in South Korea, the measures taken by the EU received even a
weaker recognition between 68 in Germany and 19 in South Korea, see Fig. 7.4. The
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Fig. 7.4 Survey on the citizen’s perception of the COVID-19 responses
survey also concluded that those countries with a favourable opinion of the UN were
more likely to value the WHO’s response to the pandemic positively.
Inside the EU there has been and, as of March 2021, still exists a big disparity in
the level of infections, of testing capacities and endowments in medical supplies, see
for instance The Guardian (2020). The lack of coordination by countries being close
neighbours unavoidably leads to a reinfection and to multiple epidemic waves as the
virus freely crosses the borders. Also, dealing with the aftermath of an economic
disaster will strongly differ between the EU member states. When the severity of
the COVID-19 pandemic, which is ongoing as of April 2021, ebbs away, it will be
important to draw a true and objective balance from what did and did not work in
the international and domestic responses.
The question about the next pandemic, the WHO answers with “not if, but when”.
In a report of the 30 March 2021, see WHO (2021c), the WHO claims that united
action is needed to create a resilient international pandemic response in the future.
Isolationism and nationalism cannot address the challenges of a global crisis, just
fighting together as a united front14 governments and international organisations can
prevent the repeat of a disaster like COVID-19.
14 A united front is a concept from the communistic vocabulary meaning building temporary coali-
tions for fighting concrete problems.
7 How International Organisations Respond to COVID-19 Pandemic 141
References
B. Brim, C. Wenham, Pandemic emergency financing facility: struggling to deliver on its innova-
tive promise. BMJ 367 (2019), https://www.bmj.com/content/367/bmj.l5719. ISSN 0959-8138.
10.1136/bmj.l5719
M.Debre, H.Dijkstra, Covid-19 and policy responses by international organizations: crisis of liberal
international order or window of opportunity? (2021). https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28978.
43203
European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control. Timeline of ECDC’s response to COVID-19,
2021, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/covid-19/timeline-ecdc-response
European Commission, Coronavirus response (2021a), https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-
eu/coronavirus-response_en
European Commission, Safe COVID-19 vaccines for Europeans (2021b), https://ec.europa.eu/info/
live-work-travel-eu/coronavirus-response/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans_en
European Council, EU recovery package: council adopts recovery and resilience facil-
ity (2021), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/02/11/eu-recovery-
package-council-adopts-recovery-and-resilience-facility/
European Parliament, 10 things the EU is doing to fight the coronavirus (2020), https://
www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/society/20200327STO76004/10-things-the-eu-is-
doing-to-fight-the-coronavirus
L. Gasbarri, Blog of the European Journal of International Law: the failure to pur-
sue the mandates of international organizations in the midst of the COVID-19 pan-
demic (2020). https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-failure-to-pursue-the-mandates-of-international-
organizations-in-the-midst-of-the-covid-19-pandemic/
U. Gentilini, M. Almenfi, P. Dale, Global database on social protection and jobs 19 (2020), http://
documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/590531592231143435/pdf/Social-Protection-and-Jobs-
Responses-to-COVID-19-A-Real-Time-Measures-June-12-2020.pdf. Living database, version
14
ILO, ILO policy brief: a policy framework for tackling the economic and social impact of the
COVID-19 crisis (2020a), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/
documents/briefingnote/wcms_745337.pdf
ILO, ILO presents its responses to COVID-19 at Geneva Environment Dialogues (2020b), https://
www.oecd.org/about/
O. Jonas, Pandemic bonds: designed to fail in Ebola. Nature 572(7769) (2019). https://doi.org/10.
1038/d41586-019-02415-9
OECD, About the OECD (2021), https://www.oecd.org/about/
The Guardian, Coronavirus has revealed the EU’s fatal flaw: the lack of solidarity
(2020), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/apr/28/eu-coronavirus-fund-share-
crisis-soul-european-parliament-fiscal
Treaty on European Union, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union/Title III:
Provisions on the Institutions—Wikisource, the free online library (2010), https://en.wikisource.
org/wiki/Consolidated_version_of_the_Treaty_on_European_Union/Title_III:_Provisions_on_
the_Institutions
United Nations, Comprehensive response to COVID-19 (2020), https://www.un.org/sites/un2.un.
org/files/un-comprehensive-response-to-covid-19.pdf
United Nations, COVID-19 response (2021), https://www.un.org/en/coronavirus/UN-response
WHO,A year without precedent:WHO’s COVID-19 response (2020a), https://www.who.int/news-
room/spotlight/a-year-without-precedent-who-s-covid-19-response/
WHO, World Bank COVID-19 response (2020b), https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/factsheet/
2020/10/14/world-bank-covid-19-response?cid=EXT_WBEmailShare_EXT
WHO, Timeline of WHO’s response to COVID-19 (2021a), https://www.who.int/emergencies/
diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/interactive-timeline
142 M. C. Boado-Penas et al.
WHO, Coronavirus disease (COVID-19) weekly epidemiological update and weekly operational
update (2021b), https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/situation-
reports
WHO, COVID-19 shows why united action is needed for more robust international health
architecture (2021c), https://www.who.int/news-room/commentaries/detail/op-ed---covid-19-
shows-why-united-action-is-needed-for-more-robust-international-health-architecture
World Bank, The pandemic emergency financing facility: operational brief for eligible countries
(2019)
World Bank, Saving lives, scaling-up impact and getting back on the track (2020a)
World Bank, COVID-19 strategic preparedness and response program (SPRP) using the multi-




Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 8
Changes in Behaviour Induced by
COVID-19: Obedience to the Introduced
Measures
Nuria Badenes-Plá
Abstract The pandemic of COVID-19 that has plagued our planet since the begin-
ning of 2020, has disrupted theway of life of society in general. As in other pandemics
suffered throughout history, isolation has been a crucial measure to avoid contagion,
causing effects beyond health, in many areas of life. How society obtains economic
resources, spends them, enjoys leisure, or simply interacts, is now different. The
political and economic context has changed, freedom of movements and expecta-
tions are also different. All this generates changes in the behaviour of society that
does not react uniformly in all countries. This chapter reviews some of the modi-
fications in behaviour caused by the present circumstances, as what will happen in
future pandemics is not predictable for sure. The emphasis is placed on obedience
observed in different contexts to imposed restrictions. Homes have become work-
places, consumption patterns have changed, and the derived effects are not always
beneficial or distributed equally across the social strata.
8.1 Introduction: Pandemics and Isolation
Since human beings created nuclei of coexistence, diseases have been present. The
first pandemics began to be documented when the disease spread and affected var-
ious regions of the planet. Several key characteristics must be considered to define
what is considered a pandemic according toMorens et al. (2009), such as geographic
extension, disease movement, high attack rates, minimal population immunity, nov-
elty, infectiousness, contagiousness, and severity. Pandemics have transformed the
societies in which they appeared and have decisively influenced the course of his-
tory. During the development of pandemics such as the bubonic plague, the death
toll exceeded the number of the living. With the fields unworked, the crops rotted,
there was a shortage of agricultural products, monopolised by those who could afford
them. Prices rose, and so did penalties for the less well off. Historians agree to point
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out also positive economic and social effects for survivors that do not mitigate or
compensate for the initial economic and social devastation and loss of life. In the case
of the bubonic plague, abundant land, higher wages due to the drop in the supply of
work, more job opportunities for women in guilds that had previously vetoed them.
Neither in the past nor our days the effects of epidemics are not evenly distributed in
the economy. Some sectors benefit from the exceptional demand for certain goods
and services, while others suffer disproportionately. Inequality is also reflected in
disease and mortality: in countries with lack public universal health care systems,
the level of income may be decisive.
Apart from the fact that once infected, the worst economically situated citizens
(and therefore with less probability of access to health coverage) have a higher risk
of dying, COVID-19 does not hit the poorest population with more virulence as has
happened with other pandemics in history. The most vulnerable groups in the face
of infection are the elderly, and therefore a fall in labour supply or productivity is
not expected as a consequence of the costs in terms of human lives. But it is the very
efforts to stop the spread of the virus that have contributed to a dramatic slowdown
of the global economy, which may affect the worst economically situated to a greater
extent, either in terms of the impossibility of confinement, loss of employment, or
difficulty to re-join the labour market.
As stated by the ILO1 the crisis has had a different impact on enterprises, on work-
ers, and on their families, though in each case deepening already existing disparities.
Special attention needs to be given to the following groups: women, informal econ-
omy workers, young workers, older workers, refugees, and migrant workers, micro-
entrepreneurs, and the self-employed. The greater impact of the crisis on workers
and micro-enterprises already in a vulnerable situation in the labour market could
well exacerbate existing-working poverty and inequalities. OXFAM2 concludes on
the same line, stating that “The coronavirus pandemic has exposed, fed off and exac-
erbated existing inequalities of wealth, gender and race. This crisis has laid bare
the problems with our flawed global economic system and other forms of structural
oppression that see a wealthy few thrive, while people in poverty, many women,
Black people, Afro-descendants, Indigenous Peoples, and historically marginalized
and oppressed communities around the world, struggle to survive”. Laborde et al.
(2020) estimate that globally, absent interventions, over 140 million people could
fall into extreme poverty due to COVID, an increase of 20% from present levels.
Throughout history, humanity has faced numerous pandemics that have generated
mortality figures even higher than those caused by COVID-19 that we suffer today.
The Antonine plague between 165 and 180A.D. caused the death of fivemillion peo-
ple. Four centuries later, the Justinian plague (first bubonic plague) claimed between
30 and 50 million lives in a single year. It is estimated that the Black Dead (sec-
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the deadliest pandemic known, and to have killed between 30 and 60% of Europe’s
population. Smallpox caused 56 million dead in 1520. Cocoliztli epidemic between
1545–1548 was a form of viral haemorrhagic fever that killed 15 million inhabitants
of Mexico and Central America. Six cholera outbreaks have killed a million people
between the 19th and 20th centuries. The Spanish flu was the deadliest virus of the
20th century, causing between 40 and 50 million deaths, while HIV has produced a
death toll of 35 million since 1981.
In recent times, and before the emergence of COVID-19 pandemic, the SARS
(Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) and MERS (Middle East Respiratory Syn-
drome) epidemics were experienced, although the impact on the population were of
a much smaller nature. The SARS epidemic originated in 2002 in China, spread to 26
countries, but the number of cases reached a total of 8,098 and 774 people lost their
lives. From 2012 to 2019, the total number of laboratory-confirmed MERS infection
cases that were reported toWHO globally was 2,468, of which 851 were fatal. China
was slow towarn of the emergence of the newSARSpathogen.Although the first case
was declared in November 2002, WHO was only informed in February 2003. There
was also no special transparency with the numbers of infections, deaths and spread
of the new virus, which by March 2003 had already been present in Hong Kong,
Vietnam, Canada and Singapore. Once the Chinese government changed its policy,
it developed an impressive control strategy involving the public which culminated
in containment as reported by Ahmad et al. (2009).
Having a significant number of lives lost and a high mortality rate in both cases,
past situations could not predict an incidence of the magnitude reached with COVID-
19, a pandemic that, until the first month of 2021, has infected more than 95 million
people and caused the death of 2 million worldwide. Comparing the three coron-
aviruses, the one that causes COVID-19 is the least lethal, but the one that is trans-
mitted more easily, and also the one in which patients do not present symptoms
before they become contagious.
The quarantine, a measure that has been applied for centuries, also constitutes
today a strategy to fight pandemics. The first sanitary cordon in history closed the
ports of Genoa and Venice in the fourteenth century in which 10 days of observation
were imposed. The origin of the quarantine dates from 1383 in Marseille. In the
18th century, all of Prussia was isolated for six consecutive weeks, and when the
plague reached Greece, its neighbouring states were isolated for five weeks. In 1722,
a military cordon separated Paris. And the threat of cholera isolated Russia between
1829 and 1832, establishing the death penalty if the border was crossed. In 1576
Milan was declared in quarantine because of the plague, and a single male member
of each family could go out to buy food once a day. The so-called Spanish flu spread
between 1918 and 1919 and despite its rapid expansion, isolation measures were
not taken in all places. In the USA, the example of two opposing decisions led
to very different results: St. Louis urged its population to remain confined, while
in Philadelphia the activity was maintained, suffering a mortality eight times higher
than that of St. Louis. Opting for isolation or quarantine has always been a decision of
great importance given the social need to prevent contagion. The isolation is actually a
strategy and away of life adopted by diverse indigenous peopleswho,when theywere
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related to external agents in the past, suffered massive deaths due to the contagion
of unknown diseases against which his immune system had not developed adequate
defences. This epidemiological behaviour is decisive in the prevention of contagion
in pandemics, although the most vulnerable groups cannot always comply with it
due to the need to continue the work activity that guarantees livelihood.
As Tognotti (2013) points out, quarantine has been an effective way of controlling
communicable disease outbreaks for centuries, although it has always been debated,
perceived as intrusive, and accompanied at all times and under all political regimes
by a current of suspicion, mistrust and riots. The historical perspective helps with
understanding the extent to which panic, connected with social stigma and prejudice,
frustrated public health efforts to control the spread of disease. Measures involving
isolation require vigilant attention to avoid causing prejudice and intolerance. Public
trust must be earned through regular, transparent communications that weigh the
risks and benefits of public health interventions. If public health measures in the
fight against pandemics imply restriction of freedoms and are not applied from a
public power in which the citizens’ trust, they may be frustrated.
This chapter shows evidence of how the COVID-19 pandemic has changed every-
day life behaviours. After this introduction, the second section reviews the factors
that explain the acceptance and compliance with the rules imposed to stop contagion.
The third section studies the changes related to consumption, bad habits, teleworking
and family relationships. The fourth section concludes.
8.2 Obedience to the Introduced Rules After COVID-19
Across Countries
In this section, research and reports from different countries are reviewed analysing
what has been the response and the degree of acceptance or compliance of citizens
with the government measures to stop the COVID-19 pandemic. These acceptance
and compliance depend on the particular characteristics of the citizens, the values
of the society in which they are inserted, the toughness and confidence in their
effectiveness, as well as the trust in the governments that impose them.
8.2.1 Citizens’ Demographic Characteristics
Clark et al. (2020) discovered from a large international sample, the importance of
believing that taking health precautions will be effective for avoiding COVID-19
and prioritizing one’s health, as predictors of voluntary compliance behaviours. In
contrast, age, perceived vulnerability to COVID-19, and perceived disruptiveness
of catching COVID-19 were not found significant predictors of health behaviours.
Better information might increase voluntary compliance with government rules and
8 Changes in Behaviour Induced by COVID-19 147
recommendations but warning individuals about their vulnerability, providing details
about the inconvenience of getting COVID-19, might not.
Roman et al. (2020) rely on the idea that the mass media often reproduce those
meanings that obey the dominant interests. Using a questionnaire from different
regions in Spain they conclude that gender and age are determining variables in
the legitimation and implementation of social control between peers and that there
is also a relationship between the way people perceive the role of media and their
predisposition to abide by and exercise social norms and control. Women answered
more affirmatively than men that the confinement was necessary and that the act of
recriminating inappropriate behaviour of the populationwas beneficial in fighting the
pandemic. Higher percentages were found in central age groups (26–55 years) with
regard to the perception of social norms. Young people present predictive behaviours
of risk because they perceive social norms in amore flexibleway. Focused on the obe-
dience during the first 10 days of confinement in Spain, Tabernero et al. (2020) anal-
yse the relationship among personal social values, self-efficacy for self-protection,
and the management of social isolation and beliefs in collective efficacy with the
development of certain specific behaviours. They show that maintaining beliefs both
in an individual capacity and in the ability of the community to carry out actions
that protect us from the virus exerts a direct positive influence on the development
of protective behaviours. Also, they conclude that Spanish citizens have greater con-
fidence in their own abilities to develop behaviours that help curb the virus than the
confidence they place in others. The variable of risk information seeking plays an
important role in explaining behaviour, because as citizens become more informed,
they develop a greater number of normative physical distancing behaviours.
Drawingon individual panel data fromFrance,Briscese et al. (2020) find that some
basic sociodemographic characteristics, as well as personality traits, are relevant pre-
dictors of compliance with health measures. In particular, age is positively associ-
ated with complying and women are more likely to have changed their behaviour
compared to men. Education is not associated with public compliance, and con-
scientiousness is positively associated with having changed behaviour in line with
the recommendations. Extraversion is negatively associated with having changed
one’s daily behaviours in the light of the pandemic. When considering ideology, the
results indicate that ideological extremity is associated with reduced adherence to
public health recommendations, and compliance increases when moving from the
left to the right end of the ideology scale. They find also strong empirical confir-
mation over the association between fear and compliance, which is consistent with
the study by Harper et al. (2020). Based on a large international community sample
to complete measures of self-perceived risk of contracting COVID-19, fear of the
virus, moral foundations, political orientation, and behaviour change in response to
the pandemic, they found that the only predictor of positive behaviour change (e.g.,
social distancing, improved hand hygiene) was fear of COVID-19.
Focused on the effect of age, Daoust (2020) uses a survey regarding global insights
on citizens’ perceptions and responses to the COVID-19 pandemic across 27 coun-
tries and concludes that elderly people-even being the most vulnerable population-,
are not systematically more responsive in terms of prospective self-isolation and
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willingness to isolate. Moreover, they are not more disciplined in terms of compli-
ance with preventive measures, especially wearing a face mask when outside their
home, which is surprising and quite troubling.
8.2.1.1 Trust in Government, Media and Health System
The conditions under which the COVID-19 pandemic will lead either to adherence
to measures put in place by authorities to control the pandemic or to resistance
and the emergence of open could be explained by three factors (Reicher and Stott
2020): the historical context of state-public relations, the nature of leadership during
the pandemic, and procedural justice in the development and operation of these
measures.
The unprecedented confinement situation offers an opportunity to analyse behavio
ur in such circumstances. Sibley et al. (2020) investigate the immediate effects of a
nationwide lockdown by comparing matched samples of New Zealanders assessed
before and during the first 18 days of lockdown. The study found that people in the
pandemic/lockdown group reported higher trust in science, politicians, and police,
higher levels of patriotism, and higher rates of mental distress compared to people in
the pre-lockdown pre-pandemic group. Results were confirmed in within-subjects’
analyses. The study highlights social connectedness, resilience, and vulnerability in
the face of adversity.
TheSpanishGovernment imposed a lockdownofmore than threemonths, thatwas
applied employing six fifteen-day extensions due to the high death rates achieved.
As the confinements are prolonged, their enforcement becomes more difficult. The
Spanish Sociological Research Centre conducted a survey asking 4,258 respondents
about their rating of the response to the situation and their ability to cope with further
extensions of the state of emergency. Fernandez-Prados et al. (2020) found that three
out of every four Spaniards would copewith extensions of self-isolation at home. The
variable of political inclination shows explanatory power in the responses: 40.6%
of people with political leanings to the right would not face an extension of the
blockade, while 87% of respondents with left leanings could face new extensions
to the confinement. The communication strategy, both of leadership and of political
measures, seems to be important in fostering social resilience. Other socio-economic
characteristics allow tracing the average profile of the citizenmost resilient or willing
to cope with the prolongation of the state of emergency and lockdown: a woman over
60 years old, living in a town of fewer than 10,000 inhabitants, with a primary level
of education, low social class, left-wing political leanings and no religious beliefs.
Van Rooij et al. (2020) attempt to identify the reasons why Americans come to
comply with the stay-at-home and social distancing measures using data from an
online survey, conducted on April 3, 2020, of 570 participants from 35 states. Their
results show that while perceptual deterrence was not associated with compliance,
people comply less when they fear the authorities. Instead, compliance operated
through two broad processes. First, compliance is shaped by people’s capacity to
obey the measures, their self-control, and their lack of opportunity to violate. As
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such, part of compliance is not shaped by people’s choice, but rather by their personal
abilities and the context in which they lived. And second, compliance is shaped
by people’s intrinsic motivations, which determined the choices they could make,
including substantive moral support, and social norms.
Al-Hasan et al. (2020) compare the responses of 482 citizens from the United
States, Kuwait, and South Korea, and they underline the fundamental role of the
government when adhering to measures to control the pandemic. Governments need
to enhance their efforts onpublicizing informationon the pandemic, aswell as employ
strategies for improved communicationmanagement to citizens through social media
as well as mainstream information sources. Their work uses web-based survey data
inMay 2020, and the results suggest that overall, perception of government response
efforts positively influenced self-adherence andothers’ adherence to social distancing
and sheltering, with some differences across countries, broadly the United States and
Kuwait had better effects than South Korea.
Compliance with regulations may be tormented by the influence of the media.
Simonov et al. (2020) found for the USA that a tenth increase in Fox News cable
viewership ends up in a 1.3 decimal point reduction within the propensity to stay-
at-home, while they fail to seek out conclusive effects of CNN viewership on social
distancing. Given that Fox News Channel has been widely described as providing
biased reporting in favour of conservative political positions, arises the question of
whether journalism broadcasts directly influence viewer beliefs or merely function
a platform to push the beliefs of political candidates
Misinformation can become a double-edged sword, as shown by Hameleers et al.
(2020). Using the responses from the US, UK, Netherlands, and Germany—which
experienced relatively high levels of misinformation and disinformation- they con-
clude that those citizens who experienced misinformation and were willing to seek
further information were also more compliant with official guidelines. On the other
hand, those individuals perceiving more disinformation and less willing to seek addi-
tional information were less compliant.
Briscese et al. (2020) test whether and how intentions to comply with social-
isolation restrictions respond to the duration of their possible extension in Italy at
three critical points in the COVID-19 pandemic. Italians reported being more likely
to reduce, and less likely to increase, their self-isolation effort if negatively surprised
by a given hypothetical extension, whereas positive surprises had no impact.
Referring to 38 Eurasian countries, Chan et al. (2020) carry out a study that tries to
determine to what extent trust in the health system influences behaviour in response
to the crisis. They conclude that societies with low levels of health care confidence
initially exhibit a faster response concerning staying home, a reaction that plateaus
sooner, and declines with greater magnitude than does the response from societies
with high health care confidence. What is more interesting is that they verify that
trust in the government prevails over the health system in behavioural decisions,
as regions with high trust in the government but low confidence in the health care
system dramatically reduces their mobility.
Confinement and restrictions maintained for a long period can lead to non-
compliance, not because of the irresponsibility of the population, but because of
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the inability to work from home. Many Latin American and Caribbean governments
implemented stringent lockdown measures, hoping to curb the spread. Despite this,
the virus has hit these Latin American Countries. Following the OxCGRT,3 14 coun-
tries have been under stringent stay-at-home orders for over 150 days. As stated by
UNDP,4 “while initial compliance was high, the amount of time that people spend
at home has been on a downward trend in all countries. In some cases, this corre-
sponds with a less stringent stay-at-home orders (i.e. Aruba, Barbados, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay). However, in other cases, people have started to spend less time
at home despite the fact that “stay-at-home” orders have remained equally strict (i.e.
Bolivia, Brazil Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru). Moreover,
it’s not always clear in which direction the policy change and behaviour change influ-
ence one another. For example, in some countries, people started staying at home
before strict measures were put in place (i.e. Belize, Costa Rica, Mexico); whereas
in others this change in behaviour seems to have taken place after the measures
were put in place (i.e. Honduras, Peru, Venezuela). The converse may also be true in
terms of easing restrictions—for example, less stringent policies in some countries
were instituted in the wake of already declining compliance (i.e. Aruba, Barbados,
Belize)”.
8.2.2 Cultural Tradition
In addition to analysing compliance with the restrictions imposed by governments,
cases can be offered in which the responsibility and good work of the population are
trusted. Japan, with a population of more than 120 million inhabitants, and a density
greater than 330 inhabitants per square kilometre, shows relatively low numbers of
infected and deceased (258,000 and 3,800 respectively in the first days of January
2021). One possible explanation would be that Japanese culture is inherently suited
for social distancing, and many Japanese wear face masks in the winter to avoid
transmission of respiratory infections. Besides, the country has not imposed con-
finement and the obligation to close a business as in other countries. Japan avoided
harsh measures, instead of issuing official requests for self-restraint and voluntary
business closures. Japan has taken advantage of the concept of “seken” the power
of peer pressure which reflects a particular power dynamic and order that appears
whenever Japanese people gather in a group.
A case similar to that of Japan, and also atypical compared to its neighbouring
countries is the Swedish. Sweden has taken a lighter-than-most approach to social
distancing for COVID-19, relying on people to monitor themselves for symptoms,
stay home when ill, practice good handwashing, and avoid crowds. This strategy
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has been designed by Anders Tegnell, an epidemiologist at Sweden’s Public Health
Agency, who has not been exempt from criticism.
The anticipated response of the population to the most severe or lax guidelines,
conditioned by cultural traditions, has not gone unnoticed as a determining ele-
ment of the policies to combat the pandemic. Yan et al. (2020) combine two basic
dimensions (centralisation of government and national cultural orientation) to anal-
yse the different strategies adopted by governments in the fight against the spread of
the virus in Japan, Sweden, China and France. These four countries are chosen as
stereotypes representing fundamental differences in institutional arrangements and
cultural values. Sweden is a country with a more decentralised regime and looser
culture, whereas China has a more centralized regime and tighter culture. On the
other opposing pair, France exhibits a more centralized regime but looser culture,
and Japan with a more decentralized regime but tighter culture. They conclude that
there is no one-size-fit-all strategy that can be used to combat COVID-19 on a global
scale. This confirms that despite COVID-19 spreads worldwide, the strategies to
defeat it cannot be designed outside of cultural values and political organisation.
In addition to checking the empirical evidence on behaviours, it is possible to
delve into the determinants of compliance with the rules using experiments. Fischer
et al. (2020) process the information provided by 3,102 individuals to show how to
achieve enhanced adherence to health regulations without coercion. The participants
were people residing in 77 different countries. They were asked to adhere to con-
straining behaviours, such as staying at home, keeping social distance, repeatedly
washing hands and avoiding meeting seniors. These constraints restrict the personal
freedom, but generate health benefits for both the individual and the entire popula-
tion. This scenario can be modelled as a Chicken game (that motivates the players
to cooperate, even when assuming the opponent does not). They find “that a cluster
of short interventions, such as elaboration on possible consequences, induction of
cognitive dissonance, addressing next of kin and similar others and receiving advice
following severity judgements, improve individuals’ health-preserving attitudes”.
8.3 Behavioural Changes Due to COVID-19
The invisible threat of COVID-19 has generated fear and mistrust towards people
and places that were traditionally considered safe. The isolation and distancing mea-
sures established to combat this threat have influenced elements such as work and
consumption,with the consequent economic impact. The perception and formof con-
sumption have also changed, as well as other more subjective issues, for example,
the conception of the home, concern for health, trust in authority, prioritisation of the
family. Citizens do not occupy their time in the sameway, neither those whowork not
those who study. Responsibilities for training and obtaining financial resources have
shifted from schools and usual places of work to the home. Teleworking and distance
training have spread throughout the world. This new situation that implies staying at
home longer, maybe accompanied by adverse effects, as coexistence problems, and a
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shift in some demands towards an increase in harmful habits. The following section
describes how the COVID-19 pandemic has been able to influence these changes.
8.3.1 Consumption Patterns
Consumption habits have been modified in the world as a result of the pandemic
and the subsequent mobility limitations imposed. Some essential products are still
in demand, while those related to leisure have experienced notable changes, and
prospects indicate declines in consumption. The products consumed have changed
because needs are different, but also the way of consuming, much more biased
towards buying online. Without being exhaustive, some examples can help raise
awareness of the magnitude of the change. In October 2020, online traffic in the
supermarket segment increasedby34.8%compared to the reference period in January
2020. Online visits in the tourism sector decreased by 43.7% during the same period,
as fashion decreases 10.3%.5 The UN World Tourism Organization estimates a loss
of US$300–450 billion in international tourism receipts.
People are staying at home much more going forward, and telecommuting will
presumably continue, which implies more home-linked consumption. Even when
restrictions are relaxed, it is foreseeable that leisure, travel and restaurant consump-
tion will not reach pre-pandemic levels immediately. On the other hand, consumers
have less disposable income due to the effect of unemployment, which will rein-
force the option of staying at home and will condition that many of the changes in
consumption are lasting over time.
McKinsey & Company (2020a) conducts a study focused on 13 core countries,
selected because of their economic significance and the impact that COVID-19 has
had on their populations. Following the results, consumers in China, India, and
Indonesia consistently report higher optimism than the rest of the world, while those
in Europe and Japan remain less optimistic about their countries’ economic condi-
tions after COVID-19. Except for Italy, optimism has declined throughout European
countries. China appears as the only exception to a global pattern of reducing holi-
day spending. McKinsey & Company (2020b) shows that some consumption trends
that had been taking place in the past have been accelerated by the pandemic. For
instance, online delivery has grown the same in eight weeks as in the previous ten
years, or online entertainment, in five months the same as the previous seven years.
Some changes are probably temporary as the reduction in international travel and
increase in domestic tourism, but the reduction in discretionary spending, the trading
down and price sensitivity seem more enduring behaviours. In terms of the shake-
up of preferences, the reduction in on-the-go consumption and the trends of larger
baskets and less frequency of purchase could be a temporary behaviour, while the
preference for health and hygiene products seems a permanent trend.
5 https://www.statista.com/statistics/1105486/coronavirus-traffic-impact-industry/.
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Parady et al. (2020) distinguish three periods (before the spread, after the spread
and before the emergency declaration, and after spread and after emergency dec-
laration) for analysing the decrease in frequency for most activities in Japan. They
observe a rebound in shopping activities after the emergency declaration, which
would corroborate that the changes in consumption patterns would not be perma-
nent. For activities like such as eating-out and leisure, the reductions in frequency
persisted after the emergency declaration. Changes in these patterns cannot be just
explained from the consumer side. They are also a result of changes in the supply
side which in turn are imposed or suggested by governments. No closure obligations
were imposed in Japan, but many eating-out and leisure establishments closed down
or shortened their business in contrast to most shopping facilities which provided
more essentials services.
In a study focused on 16 American cities, Yilmazkuday (2020) concludes that
consumption carried out within the home (grocery, pharmacy, home maintenance)
has increased by 56%, while that carried out outside the home (fuel, transportation,
personal care services, restaurants) has decreased up to 51%. Online shopping has
relatively increased up to 21%, while its expenditure share has relatively increased
by up to 16% compared to the pre-COVID-19 period.
Using data on household financial transactions, Baker et al. (2020) illustrate the
short-term responses of Americans’ spending to the increase in COVID cases. They
also analyse the responses to the policies implemented by municipal governments,
such as confinement.Household spendingwas radically altered by these events across
a wide range of categories, and the strength of the response depended in part on
the severity of the outbreak in the state. Demographic characteristics such as age
and family structure led to higher levels of heterogeneity in spending responses to
COVID-19,while incomedidnot. Furthermore, regardless of the political orientation,
an increase in spending before the epidemicwas observed and, at the same time, there
were some differences in the political orientation in some categories, indicative of
differential beliefs or risk exposure.
8.3.2 Unhealthy Consumption Habits
The confinement situation may have generated changes in unhealthy consumption
habits, such as alcohol, tobacco or drugs. Vanderbruggen et al. (2020) use a web-
based for Belgium where respondents reported consuming slightly more alcohol and
smoking marginally more cigarettes than before the COVID-19 pandemic, while no
significant changes in the consumption of cannabis were noted. The reasons for con-
suming more of the various substance were boredom, lack of social contacts, loss of
daily structure, reward after a hard-working day, loneliness, and conviviality. Koop-
mann et al. (2020) confirm that during the COVID-19 pandemic the total revenue in
alcoholic beverages in the German population increased significantly by 6.1% com-
pared to the mean of corresponding weeks in the past year. As it remained unclear,
whether this was due to stockpiling, or reflected real changes in alcohol drinking
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behaviour, they obtained responses via an anonymous online survey. A survey con-
ducted for the Polish population (Szajnoga et al. 2020) found that the vast majority of
respondents reduced the frequency of consumption of all types of alcohol. However,
particular groups are more vulnerable to alcohol misuse: higher frequency of alco-
hol consumption lockdown was most often found in the group of men, people aged
18–24 years, inhabitants of big cities, and remote workers. Contrary to the previous
references, Callinan et al. (2020) find a decrease in harmful alcohol consumption
for Australia compared to the pre-pandemic period. This effect is observed in young
adults in particular and explained by the closure of licensed premises, but there is
no reason to assume that these decreases will not reverse when licensed premises
re-open.
The modification of routines during confinement has also affected eating habits.
Ruíz-Roso et al. (2020) describe how the COVID-19 pandemic has modified dietary
trends of adolescents from Spain, Italy, Brazil, Colombia, and Chile. They conclude
that “Due to confinement, it appears that families had more time to cook and improve
eating habits by increasing legume, fruit, and vegetable intake, even though this did
not increase the overall diet quality. Further, adolescents also exhibited a higher
sweet food consumption, likely due to boredom and stress produced by COVID-19
confinement”.
Attempts to project the longer-term impacts of the current pandemic depend
on the extent to which changes in patterns become permanent once normality is
restored. Not much is known about the long-term mental and physical health effects
of lockdown and limitation of mobility, but the situation has led to adopt or rein-
force unhealthy behaviours (physical activity decrease, sedentary behaviour increase,
unhealthy nutritional habits). There is also a surge of addictive behaviours (imply-
ing substance use disorders) both new and relapse in this period. Depending on the
addictive component of the behaviours which can be modelled even in rational terms
(Becker and Murphy 1988), changes in current habits can pose a health problem in
the long term.
8.3.3 Teleworking
Before the COVID-19 outbreak, just 15% of the employed in the EU had ever tele-
worked, since then, working from home has been the way to continue the activity
for many workers. According to Eurofound (2020), almost 40% of those currently
working in the EUbegan to telework full-time as a result of the pandemic. Telework is
structurallymorewidespread in countrieswith larger shares of employment in knowl-
edge and ICT-intensive services. The presence of teleworking will be conditioned by
the rate of self-employment, flexibility, supervisory styles, and the organisation of
work, which vary across countries. Espinoza and Reznikova (2020) find that while
30% of workers could telework across the OECD, the likelihood decreases for work-
ers without tertiary education and with lower levels of numeracy and literacy. They
also find that while an average of 56%ofOECDworkers in the top 20%of the income
8 Changes in Behaviour Induced by COVID-19 155
distribution can telework, the share stands at only 14% for those in the bottom 20%.
López-Igual and Rodríguez-Modroño (2020) confirm that the most significant deter-
minants of telework are still self-employment, a higher educational level, while other
factors (age, living in urban areas, higher status, and better working conditions) are
losing. The maintenance or extension of telework in the future will depend to a large
extent on productivity under this work organisation. The evidence in the EU suggests
that in normal times telework can sustain, or even enhance workers while enjoying a
better work-life balance. Under the current exceptional circumstances, productivity
and/or working conditions may be deteriorating due to, lack of childcare, unsuitable
working spaces and ICT tools. The potential costs associated with teleworking such
as loss of productivity, job quality, workers’ work-life balance and mental health,
may not affect family workers in the same way, depending on the distribution of
household tasks that is established (Feng and Savani 2020). The reconciliation of
teleworking with family life and dedication to children is one of the main difficulties
encountered across countries, even in Portugal, where Tavares et al. (2020) check an
easy and very quick adaptation to teleworking. Katsabian (2020) points out that tele-
work has converted homes in hybrids spaces of work. Because of its hybrid nature,
it reproduces in the labour market the gendered traditional roles within the family
domain along with socioeconomic disparities among households concerning access
to technology and technological skills.
8.3.4 Gender and Family Violence
At the same time that the value of the family is recognised in a circumstance of
illness and risk of losing it, the “compulsory” coexistence for longer than usual can
unleash situations of violence at home. The confinement during the pandemic can
exacerbate the problem of domestic violence. Family members spend more time liv-
ing together, economic instability makes tension and stress more acute, and isolation
places victims in a more vulnerable position. The efforts to contain the virus are vital
to protect global health, but expose women, children and adolescents to an increased
risk of family violence. The rise in reports of domestic abuse and family violence
have increased around the world since social isolation and quarantine measures came
into force: 300% in China, 50% in Brazil, 30% in Cyprus, France, and New Zealand,
25% in the United Kingdom (UK), and 20% in Spain (Noman et al. 2021). Usher
et al. (2020) also review the evidence in an intimate partner, women, and children
violence due to isolation and quarantine in different countries, and highlights that
France began commissioning hotels as shelters for those fleeing abuse. This strat-
egy was followed also by the Italian government given the increasing number of
people fleeing abusive situations. Boxall et al. (2020) provide evidence of onset of
the frequency or severity of physical or sexual violence or coercive control for many
women in Australia. Silverio-Murillo et al. (2020) show empirical evidence forMex-
ico City, during the lockdown: while official domestic violence crime reports decline,
within-household violence continues during the pandemic. To reconcile this apparent
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contradiction, several causes are investigated, as the fact that confinement of victims
with their perpetrators prevents reporting, the changes in bargaining power within
the household, the alcohol consumption, or fear to be infected during reporting.
8.4 Discussion and Conclusions
Throughout history, humanity has faced numerous pandemics that have caused mor-
tality figures even higher than those generated by COVID-19 that we suffer today.
Although quarantine has been an effective way of controlling communicable dis-
ease outbreaks for centuries, it has always been debated, perceived as intrusive, and
accompanied at all times and under all political regimes by a current of suspicion,
mistrust and riots. When public health measures in the fight against pandemics imply
restriction of freedoms and are not applied from a public power in which the citi-
zens’ trust, they may be frustrated. The acceptance and compliance of measures to
stop the pandemic depend on the particular characteristics of the citizens, the val-
ues of the society in which they are inserted, the toughness and confidence in their
effectiveness, as well as the trust in the governments that impose them.
The literature review that covers a large number of countries and cultures, has
shown different determinants for explaining compliance and adherence with the
measures that governments have taken to appease the virus have been found. The
explanatory factors are studied both from the point of view of those who dictate
the measures (governments) and those who receive them (citizenship). Concerning
citizens, several characteristics appear to be explicative, including the perception of
own vulnerability, fear of the virus, age, gender, size of the city of residence, level of
education, social class, political leaning or moral and religious beliefs. Focusing on
the characteristics and feelings towards those who dictate or enforce the rules, some
circumstances seem relevant, such as being a feared authority, efforts on publicising
information or trust in government. Besides, there are other determinants of context,
such as the influence of the media, duration of confinements, opportunity to violate
the rules, trust in the health system, power of peer pressure, institutional arrangements
or cultural values.
How action measures are dictated to protect individuals from the pandemic is
relevant to the way citizens respond. Imposing is not always more effective than
informing. Planning, anticipating the duration of the measures and being transparent
with the public can be more effective than it seems. There is no one-size-fit-all
strategy that can be used to combat COVID-19 on a global scale, and the strategies
to defeat it cannot be designed outside of cultural values, political organisation, or
citizenship’s characteristics.
The pandemic COVID-19 has generated fear and mistrust towards people and
places that were traditionally considered safe. The isolation and distancing mea-
sures established to combat this threat have influenced elements such as work and
consumption, with the consequent economic impact. The products consumed have
changed because needs are different, with increases in products consumed within
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the home (grocery, pharmacy, home maintenance) and decrease in those carried out
outside the home (fuel, transportation, personal care services, restaurants). The way
of consuming is now much more biased towards buying online: online delivery has
grown the same in eight weeks as in the previous ten years, or online entertainment,
in five months the same as the previous seven years. Some changes are probably
temporary as the reduction in international travel and increase in domestic tourism,
but the reduction in discretionary spending, the trading down and price sensitivity
seem more enduring behaviours. The new situation that forces people to stay longer
at home, and the psychological effects created by confinement, may also lead to
increases in the consumption of harmful goods, or damage eating habits, which has
been proven to occur in some contexts.
Teleworking, spread throughout the world, has also been a way to reveal inequal-
ities: it is the richest countries with the most advanced technologies that used more
telework even before the pandemic, so they have been better able to adapt to the sit-
uation. The most significant determinants of telework are self-employment, a higher
educational level, and non-manual occupations, which once again places the most
disadvantaged workers in a worse situation by being forced to face-to-face work.
The maintenance or extension of telework in the future will depend to a large extent
on productivity under this work organisation. In normal times telework can sus-
tain, or even enhance workers while enjoying a better work-life balance. Under the
current exceptional circumstances, productivity and/or working conditions may be
deteriorating due to, lack of childcare, unsuitable working spaces and ICT tools.
The circumstances that accompany periods of confinement during the pandemic
can exacerbate the problem of domestic violence. Family members spend more time
living together, economic instability makes tension and stress more acute, and iso-
lation places victims in a more vulnerable position. There is evidence of a rise in
reports of domestic abuse and family violence around the world since social isolation
and quarantine measures came into force.
Thefight against a pandemic represents a challenge for governments of uncommon
magnitude. The new rules established by governments imply restriction of freedoms,
and the acceptance of them depends a lot on the social, cultural, political and personal
context. Distancing and staying at home have emerged as key elements in slowing the
spread of the virus. Getting citizens to comply with these mandates can be difficult,
and communication strategies, transparency of information and adaptation to the
particular characteristics are essential for success. Although the problem is global,
the countries are different, and for this reason it is not possible to find one-size-fit-all
strategy that can be used to combat COVID-19 in any situation. This confirms that
despite the virus spreads worldwide, the strategies to defeat it cannot be designed
outside of cultural values and political organisation.
The scale, intensity, and speed of the interventions against the pandemic have
diverged across territories. Many Asian countries promptly did extensive testing (not
only on symptomatic), tracing and isolating (at institutions rather than at home), and
surveillance systems were strengthened. These measures have been adopted much
less quickly in Europe (Han et al. 2020). The use of masks was also much more
widespread in Asia than in Europe and was adopted almost immediately in a massive
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way. Previous SARS and MERS epidemics have also prepared Asian health systems
much better to fight a pandemic, while in Europe austerity policies have weakened
public health infrastructure. Asian citizens are more predisposed to confront and
cooperate with measures that restrict freedom than Europeans. The experience of
past epidemics has made them aware of the convenience of renouncing individual
freedoms for thebenefit of the community.Experiences can certainly serve as learning
for the future, as they have been for Asia, but it is difficult to know if this process
of compliance by the population, preparation of the health system, and anticipation
of governments will be applicable to other countries. Having gone through the same
experience previously is not the only explanatory factor: economic, cultural and
social issues will be decisive in the learning process.
The costs in terms of human lives, health and the economy are immeasurable
quantitatively and qualitatively, but the pandemic has generated a new way of life
based on distance and isolation that generates derived effects in many other areas.
For this reason, the current challenges of governments are focused on dictating ade-
quate measures and trying to enforce them, but future challenges are completely
unpredictable.
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Chapter 9
COVID-19 and Optimal Lockdown
Strategies: The Effect of New and More
Virulent Strains
Jonathan P. Caulkins, Dieter Grass, Gustav Feichtinger, Richard F. Hartl,
Peter M. Kort, Alexia Prskawetz, Andrea Seidl, and Stefan Wrzaczek
Abstract Most nations have responded to the COVID-19 pandemic by locking
down parts of their economies starting in early 2020 to reduce the infectious spread.
The optimal timing of the beginning and end of the lockdown, together with its
intensity, is determined by the tradeoff between economic losses and improved health
outcomes. These choices can bemodelledwithin the framework of an optimal control
model that recognises the nonlinear dynamics of epidemic spread and the increased
risks when infection rates surge beyond the healthcare system’s capacity. Past work
has shown that within such a framework very different strategies may be optimal
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ranging from short to long and even multiple lockdowns, and small changes in the
valuation on preventing a premature death may lead to quite different strategies
becoming optimal. There even exist parameter constellations for which two or more
very different strategies can be optimal. Here we revisit those crucial questions with
revised parameters reflecting the greater infectivity of variants such as the “UK
variant” of the SARS-CoV-2 virus and describe how the new variant may affect
levels of mortality and other outcomes.
9.1 Introduction
To reduce social interactions and thereby also contagious transmission of the SARS-
CoV-2 virus, most countries have implemented one or several lockdowns of non-
essential parts of the economy. While lockdowns have succeeded to varying degrees
in reducing new infections, the effects on the economy (Fernández-Villaverde and
Jones 2020) can be substantial. The lockdowns can themselves harm health, either
directly (e.g.,whennon-essential healthcare is deferred) or indirectly (unemployment
and poverty can reduce life expectancy). The question therefore arises as to what is
the ideal duration and intensity of lockdowns. If lockdowns are relaxed too soon, the
epidemic may bounce back. If these measures are too severe or prolonged, needless
economic hardship may result.
9.1.1 The Challenge of New Virus Variants
Such questions have become even more pressing with the discovery of new, mutated
strains of the SARS-CoV-2 virus, notably one detected first in the UK and thus
referred to as “UK variant”. This strain appears to bemuchmore virulent, in the sense
of spreading more rapidly. In particular, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
had previously advised that epidemiological models use as a base case assumption
that the basic reproduction number (denoted by R0) of the SARS-CoV-2 virus was
2.5, but the new variant is thought to be about 60% more contagious, suggesting a
new R0 of 4.0.
The new variant is not more lethal, so far as is understood at at the time of this
writing; i.e., its infection fatality rate is not higher. So the consequences of COVID-
19 spreading through the majority of the population are roughly the same, apart
from greater mortality when cases are bunched up in time, swamping the healthcare
system, but the severity of lockdown necessary to prevent such spread is greater and
so more costly. In particular, lockdowns and other interventions that reduced social
interaction by 60%would have been sufficient to stall the spread of the original virus,
since 2.5 × (1 − 60%) = 1.0, butwith the newvirus, those same interventionswould
have each infection leading to 4.0 × (1 − 60%) = 1.6 new infections.
9 COVID-19 and Optimal Lockdown Strategies 165
Since the course of the typical infection plays out over roughly two weeks, that
would leave the number of new infections growing at a compound rate of about
1.62 − 1 = 150% per month. If it will take another six to nine months to achieve
herd immunity through mass vaccinations, that spread would be fast enough to infect
essentially everyone in a country that currently has an average rate of infections.
Hence, policies that were adequate or even optimal in the past may no longer be so
today.
This paper explores how this greater virulence may or may not alter conclusions
about what constitutes the ideal timing and duration of a lockdown. It also adjusts the
time horizon until an effective vaccine has been widely deployed to T = 1.5 years,
better reflecting the actual trajectory of vaccine development that has been observed.
9.1.2 Review of Past Findings
We begin here with a brief review of findings obtained from these lockdown models
using the older, lower basic reproduction number of R0 = 2.5. In Caulkins et al.
(2020)we analysed an epidemiologicalmodel of the pandemic overlainwith a simple
optimal control model that considers the optimal starting and ending times of a
lockdown that withdraws part of the population from the labour force. The objective
function balances economic costs (lost output) and health costs (COVID-19 related
deaths) while considering the limited capacity of intensive care units within the
health care system. The number of deaths is modelled as being proportional to the
number of infections plus an extra penalty for infections that happen when hospitals
are overwhelmed.
Even that rather simple model produces some complex behaviour. For instance,
sometimes starting a lockdown later might make it better to have a shorter, not a
longer lockdown. Most interestingly, we found the formal mathematical version of
the notion of “tipping points” that were popularised by Malcolm Gladwell’s famous
book of that name. In particular, for certain parameter values two very different
strategies (e.g., long versus short lockdown) can be optimal when starting at the
same initial condition, and slight deviations away from those starting points may
make either type of solution optimal. In optimal control models, such tipping points
with two or more alternative optimal solution trajectories have been called Skiba,
Sethi-Skiba, DNS, and DNSS points (Grass et al. 2008).
Characterising such points is important for two reasons. First, it may help explain
why different countries have pursued such different lockdown strategies despite hav-
ing similar interests in balancing economic andhealth considerations. Secondly, these
tipping points highlight the need to gather better information about the key parame-
ters that cause these different lockdown strategies to be optimal.
Caulkins et al. (2021) extended Caulkins et al. (2020) by allowing for multiple
lockdowns and also considering lockdowns of varying intensity, rather than treating
a lockdown as an all or nothing binary choice. In addition, the economic modelling
is richer in two respects. First, employment is represented by a state variable, and the
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policy maker’s choices, or “control variable”, adjusts that level of economic activity.
Underemployment is costly of course (foregone economic activity), but so too is
changes in that level; rapidly alternating between mild and severe lockdowns is more
costly than maintaining an intermediate lockdown because change is disruptive to
business. Furthermore, the adjustment costs are asymmetric to recognise that shutting
down businesses may be easier than re-starting them.
Second, since the public’s cooperation canwanewhen lockdowns are too intensive
and long, Caulkins et al. (2021) include “lockdown fatigue” as an additional state
variable which may undermine the efficiency of a lockdown.
Within this framework, the optimal lockdown strategies are quite diverse, rang-
ing from long and forceful lockdowns to (a couple of) short and rather soft lock-
downs. Again, the specific parameter values determine the optimal strategy. Similar
to Caulkins et al. (2020), there are parameter constellations for which two very dif-
ferent strategies are both optimal. In addition, we also found triple Skiba points at
which even three different strategies are optimal. The fact that such complex strate-
gies result from rather stylisedmodels hints at the complexity of designing lockdown
strategies in practice. While our models cannot specify/recommend any single opti-
mal lockdown strategy, our framework provides insight as to which are the most
important parameters that drive the decision about the start, duration and intensity
as well as the multiplicity of lockdowns.
Before investigating how the UK variant might affect these models and selected
results we give a brief summary of related papers in the literature.
9.1.3 Review of Other Related Literature
Several papers discuss the balancing of health and economic interests (see Layard
et al. 2020; Bloom et al. 2020; Scherbina 2020; Brodeur et al. 2020 for a careful
evaluation). However only a minority of these papers have investigated the opti-
mal timing, length and extent of the lockdown itself. These exceptions include e.g.
Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt (2020) who start from a simple SIR model and inves-
tigate the optimal lockdown intensity and duration taking into account the tradeoff
between health and economic consequences of the lockdown.
In Alvarez et al. (2020) the fraction of people going into lockdown is assumed to
be the control variable. The model is derived with and without testing as a control
variable where test availability implies that those who are recovered can be identified
and are not subject to lockdown. It is shown that absence of testing will increase the
economic costs of the lockdown and shorten its duration since the dynamics of the
epidemiology imply that an increasing share of recovered will decrease the efficiency
of the lockdown.
An optimal control model on reducing the transmission rate is presented in Abel
and Panageas (2020) that also allows for positive vital rates (births and non-COVID
deaths). They show that it is not optimal to eradicate the disease but to limit interac-
tions until a cure or vaccination becomes available. In Acemoglu et al. (2020) a het-
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erogeneous SIRmodel is applied that distinguishes between “young”, “middle-aged”
and “old”. It is shown that a stricter lockdown on the old is particularly important.
Compared to optimal uniform policies such targeted policies imply a considerable
reduction in mortality but may also reduce economic damage since the young and
middle-aged groups can be released from lockdown earlier. A similar argument is
presented in Gershon et al. (2020) who show that if ICU beds are in short supply,
partial quarantine of the most vulnerable group may be enough compared to a shut
down of the whole economy. Aspri et al. (2021) consider a SEIRD model, where the
population is divided into susceptibles, exposed but asymptomatic, infected, recov-
ered and deceased. Similar to other papers they model the optimal tradeoff between
reduction in fatalities and the loss in output. However, different to the literature so
far, they assume that containment policies are piece-wise linear functions represent-
ing a more realistic policy modelling. Based on the specific value assumed for a
statistical life they obtain multiple lockdowns as well as Skiba points. While the
previous models apply numerical solution methods, Rachel (2020) presents an ana-
lytical model of COVID-19 lockdowns. By differentiating between the individual
versus social optimal mitigation strategy it is shown that at the individual level too
much social distancing will result in equilibrium relative to the social optimum. This
result is explained by the fact that higher social distancing today will reduce infec-
tions and flatten out the curve, but raise infection rates later on. In contrast, a social
planner considers the cumulative infection risk and not just the infection risk today.
In Huberts and Thijssen (2020) a stochastic version of the SIR model is introduced.
Based on a continuous-time Markov chain model the optimal timing of interven-
tion and the option to end the intervention are studied. Federico and Ferrari (2021)
present a model on the optimal lockdown policy where not only the transmission
rate in the standard SIR model is stochastic, but also the time horizon is assumed
to be stochastic. Within their framework they show that the optimal policy is first
to let the epidemic evolve, followed by a pronounced containment policy and in the
last phase to reduce the strength of the containment again. Similar to our model the
limited capacity of health system is considered in Piguillem and Shi (2020). Testing
is an important strategy to accrue welfare gains in their paper.
The body of this paper now proceeds in two parts. Section9.2 explores a model in
which the policy maker only gets to decide the start and end times of a lockdown, but
the intensity of that lockdown is fixed. Section9.3 then examines the more general
situation when the lockdown intensity can be varied continuously over time, and
there can even be more than one lockdown.
9.2 The Optimal Start and Length of a Lockdown
This section updates the model presented in Caulkins et al. (2020) to address the
higher infectivity of the UK variant of the SARS-CoV-2 virus.
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9.2.1 The Model
The epidemiological model we apply is based on an open-population SLIR model
Kermack and McKendrick (1927) with a birth rate ν and extra mortality for individ-
uals who are infected (μI ) above and beyond that for those who are susceptible or
recovered (μ):
Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β S(t)I(I (t), L(t))
N (t)
− μS(t) (9.1a)
L̇(t) = β S(t)I(I (t), L(t))
N (t)
− (μ + ϕ)L(t) (9.1b)
İ (t) = ωϕL(t) − (α + μ + μI )I (t) (9.1c)
Ṙ(t) = (1 − ω)ϕL(t) + α I (t) − μR(t) (9.1d)
β := Reff(t, τ1, τ2)α (9.1e)
I(I, L) := I + f L (9.1f)
N (t) := S(t) + L(t) + I (t) + R(t). (9.1g)
The state variables S(t), L(t), I (t) and R(t) denote the number of individuals
respectively who are susceptible to infection, have a latent (asymptomatic and pre-
symptomatic) infection, are infected and symptomatic, and are recovered at time t .
The term “recovered” is standard in the literature even though it is a bit of amisnomer
because it includes not only those who have recovered from COVID-19 symptoms
(i.e., passed through the I state), but also those who previously had asymptomatic
infections (passed through the L state only). (CDC guidance is that about 40% of
those who become infected remain asymptomatic.)
The parameterβ is key to the epidemic dynamics. The term itmodifies inEq. (9.1a)
counts potential interactions between those who are susceptible to becoming infected
(those in the S state) and those are infected (those in the L and I states). The symbol
I denotes the weighted sum of people in the I and L states, weighting by the (lower)
relative likelihood of spreading the virus when in the L state. (As of this writing, the
CDC recommends assuming this weighting parameter f = 0.75.) β is essentially
a proportionality constant that converts social interactions into infections. Outside
of the lockdown it has one (higher) value; during the lockdown its value is lower,
e.g., because either the infected or susceptible person wears a mask, maintains social
distance, interacts only virtually if one or both work from home, or the interaction
simply does not occur because it has been banned by the lockdown.
Although lockdowns directly affect β, the effective reproduction number
Reff(t, τ1, τ2) is more readily interpretable, so we describe the lockdown phases in
terms of effects on Reff(t, τ1, τ2) and adjust β accordingly. (For a formal derivation
of the relationship between the basic reproduction number R0 and β, see Appendix 2
in Caulkins et al. (2020)). The start and end times of the lockdown are denoted by τ1
and τ2. They are chosen by the decision maker and—as we only allow one lockdown
in this setup—define three periods: before, during and after that one lockdown.
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Following CDC guidance, Caulkins et al. (2020) assumed that the basic reproduc-
tion number before the lockdown equals R10 = 2.5. The lockdown was assumed to
reduce that to R20 = 0.8 and not bounce back fully, as some behavioural adjustments
(such as not shaking hands) could be expected to continue even after people return
to work. The extent to which those behavioural changes persisted depends on the
duration of the lockdown. In particular, Caulkins et al. (2020) assumed that after the
lockdown there exists a gap between the realised and potential value of R30 = 2.0,
with the potential value being reached only with increasing length of the lockdown.
Here, we assume that the reproduction numbers before and after the lockdown
are 1.6 times larger (so R10 = 4.0 and R30 = 3.2) but continue to assume that during
the lockdown R20 = 0.8. I.e., we implicitly assume that the lockdown intensity is
increased sufficiently to push the reproduction number appreciably below 1.0 despite
the new variant’s greater infectivity.
We model COVID-19 deaths by focusing on those who require hospitalisation
and critical care. Some calculations (described in Caulkins et al. 2020) suggest that
about p = 2.31% of people who develop symptoms will need critical care, and 45%
of them will die prematurely as a result of COVID-19 even if they receive that
care. The parameter p converts the 2.31% into a daily rate by multiplying by α,
the reciprocal of the average duration of symptoms, which we take to be nine days.
Likewise, the death rate per person-day spent in the I state by people who need and
also receive critical care is μI = pξ1α.
In addition, there is an extra risk of death for people who need critical care but
do not receive it because hospitals are overwhelmed. That term is proportional to
max({0, pI − Hmax}) where Hmax is the number of critical care hospital beds avail-
able.1 In the U.S., there are about 0.176 critical care beds per 1,000 people. Overall
deaths are therefore represented by:
ξ1 pI + ξ2 max({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ),
where ξ1 is the death rate from COVID-19 of infected people who need and receive
critical care, and ξ2 is the additional, incremental death rate when such individuals
do not receive that care. One aim of the decision maker is to minimise these deaths.
It is of course very difficult to determine what value society should place on
averting a premature death generally, or in the case of COVID-19 in particular.
We represent that quantity by the parameter M , the cost per COVID-19 death, and
consider a very wide range of values for that parameter.
The literature has traditionally used values for M ranging at least from 20 times
GDP per capita (Alvarez et al. 2020) up to 150 times GDP per capita (Kniesner et al.
2012). Hammitt (2020) argues that lower values may be appropriate for COVID-19
deaths, so we consider a range from 10 to 150 times GDP per capita.
Economic activity is modelled as being proportional to the number of employed
people raised to a power, as in a classic Cobb-Douglas model, with that exponent set
1 In our numerical simulations we have replaced the max function that is not differentiable with a
smooth function (see Caulkins et al. 2020, Fig. 1).
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to σ = 2/3 (Acemoglu 2009). Since the time horizon is short, capital is presumed
to be fixed and subsumed into the objective function coefficient K for economic
activity. Susceptible, latent, and recovered individuals are eligible to work (symp-
tomatic individuals are assumed to be either too sick to work, or are in quarantine).
During a lockdown, only a proportion γ (t) of those eligible to work are employed.
We therefore assume that γ (t) = 1.0 before the lockdown, γ (t) = 0.25 during the
lockdown, and after lockdown it only partially recovers. The longer the lockdown,
the more jobs that are lost semi-permanently because firms go out of business. That
recovery is modelled as decaying exponentially in the length of the lockdown with
a time constant of 0.001 per day, so that if a lockdown ended after six months, 17%
of jobs suspended during the lockdown would not reappear, at least until a vaccine
became available.
These economic and mortality costs are summed up from time t = 0, when the
virus arrives, until time T = 1.5 years, when a vaccine has been developed and
widely deployed.
The objective function also includes a salvage value that reflects the reduction in
economic activity at time T relative to what it was at time 0 (see Caulkins et al. 2020
for further discussion of the salvage value). The summary of the full model and the
base case parameter values are given in Appendix 1 and Table9.4 Appendix 3.
9.2.2 Results
COVID-19 spread very fast in early 2020, so lockdown initiation was often a rushed
decision made so quickly that there was no time to build models or optimise them.
Hence, we start, in Fig. 9.1, by considering the simpler problem of when to end a
lockdown that has already started, answering that question for a wide range of start
times. In particular, the left hand panel of Fig. 9.1 shows with the solid blue line how
that optimal ending time (measured by the vertical axis, τ2) varies as a function of the
time the lockdown was started (given as the horizontal axis, τ1). The gap between the
blue line and the black line (45-degree line) indicates the duration of the lockdown.
For this model and these parameter values, if the lockdown starts promptly (so
on the left side of that panel) the lockdown should be maintained almost until the
time when the vaccine has been successfully deployed. That is assumed to happen
in 1.5years; since time is measured in days, that corresponds to 547.5 on the vertical
axis. That the blue line starts out at a level of about 500 days indicates maintaining
the lockdown until only a month or two before the vaccine has been successfully
deployed would minimise total costs, including both health and economic costs.
(Ending the lockdown before full deployment does not require an implausible degree
of forecasting ability; predicting how long it will take to invent an effective vaccine
is hard, but deployment takes approximately six months, so recognising when it is
within a couple months of wrapping up is not that hard.)
So the first conclusion is, if a nation starts to lock down early, it should keep that
lockdown in place more or less for the duration of the epidemic.
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Fig. 9.1 Panel a shows the solutions for a fixed initial lockdown time τ1 and optimally chosen time
τ2. In panel b the objective value is shown for the optimally chosen time τ2. For τ1 = 22.6, which is
indicated by the black dashed line, there exists a Skiba solution, i.e. there are two different solution
paths which deliver the same objective value. The red vertical line denotes the optimally chosen τ1.
The parameter values are those of Table9.4 in Appendix 3, with M = 60, 000 and R20 = 0.8
Now suppose the lockdown’s initiation was delayed a bit, meaning we slide a little
to the right along the horizontal axis of Fig. 9.1. Intuitively one might have expected
that getting a late start would imply one should maintain the lockdown longer to
compensate, but the opposite is true in this model. The fact that the blue line slopes
downward implies that the later one starts the lockdown, the sooner it should end.
The second surprising result is that the blue line does not decline smoothly; it
contains a discontinuous jump when the lockdown starts at τ1 = 22.6 days. As one
delays the start of the lockdown from τ1 from 0 up to 22.5days, the ideal ending
time τ2 decreases smoothly from about 500days (roughly a year and four months)
down to a little less than a year. Then suddenly, when the lockdown starts just a little
later, at τ1 = 22.7 days, it becomes optimal to end the lockdown fairly soon, at only
τ1 = 120 days, or after about three months.
What has happened at that point is that the epidemic has had a chance to spread
so widely in those first 22.7days that it is just too hard to rein the epidemic in for it to
be worthwhile. If a prolonged lockdown were going to spare most of the population
from getting infected it would be worth the cost; but if the lockdown hasn’t started
until τ1 = 22.7 days, it is just too late for it to be wise to pursue that strategy. One
should still lockdown, but only relatively briefly. That can “flatten the curve” a bit
and avoid totally swamping the limited capacity of the healthcare system.
In simple words, if the lockdown starts too late, then one should abandon the “long
lockdown” strategy that protects most people from infection, and instead employ a
much more limited “curve flattening” strategy.
The discontinuity in the blue line shows that if the lockdown starts at just exactly
τ1 = 22.6 days, then either the “long lockdown” or the “curve flattening” can be
followed with equal results.
This equivalency is illustrated more directly in the right-hand panel of Fig. 9.1,
which shows the so-called value function (V ) versus the lockdown initiation time τ1.
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The value function indicates the performance achieved when the optimal strategy is
followed. There is a kink in the value function right at τ1 = 22.6 days. To the left of
that kink it is optimal to follow the “long lockdown” strategy, but the plunging value
function shows that the “long lockdown” strategy performs less and less well as τ1
increases. Likewise, to the right of τ1 = 22.6 days it is optimal to follow the “curve
flattening” strategy, but as the lockdown start time decreases, approaching 22.6 from
the right, the “curve flattening” strategy does less and less well. And right at τ1 the
two strategies’ value functions cross.
The third surprising result pertains to where the blue line in the right- hand panel
of Fig. 9.1 peaks. It is not ideal to start the lockdown immediately at τ1 = 0. Instead,
the value function peaks at about τ1 = 8 days (a point in time indicated in the left
hand panel by a vertical red line). The reason is that every day of lockdown is
expensive, because people are out of work, but at the very beginning, when there
are very, very few infected people, there are also very, very few new infections to be
prevented. When the virus is very scarce, targeted approaches, such as testing and
contact tracing, may be preferred to shutting down the entire economy.
Figure9.1 illustrated two different strategies: a short “curve flattening” lockdown
and a long lockdown that starts after a short delay. For other parameter values, two
other strategies can be optimal: never locking down at all or a long lockdown that
begins immediately.
That raises the question of under what conditions it is optimal to pursue each
strategy. Figure9.2 answers that question with respect to two key parameters: (1) The
economic value placed on preventing a COVID-19 death, M , and (2) the epidemic’s
reproduction number during the lockdown, denoted by the parameter R20 . That figure,
called a bifurcation diagram, shows for each combination of those twokey parameters
which strategy is optimal.
The base case values for those parameters were R20 = 0.8, meaning the lockdown
could still drive the reproduction number below the critical threshold of 1.0, and
M = 60, 000, meaning that the cost of a premature death is set at about 150 times
GDP per capita. That point falls within the region labelled IIb, but for other values
of R20 and/or M different strategies may be optimal.
Not surprisingly, asM increases—meaningmoving from left to right in Fig. 9.2—
the optimal strategy changes to make greater and greater use of lockdowns. When M
is very small, it may be optimal not to lockdown at all. When M is sufficiently large,
then a long lockdown is best. For intermediate values of M , the “curve flattening”
strategy may be best.
The verticality of the Skiba curve separating the regions where no lockdown vs.
a short lockdown are optimal indicates that increasing the epidemic’s reproductive
number during the lockdown R20 has little effect on the relative merits of not locking
down versus using a short lockdown. Thatmakes sense precisely because in neither of
those strategies was the lockdown prolonged in any event. However, the Skiba curve
separating regions where a short lockdown (Region I) and a long lockdown (Regions
IIa and IIb) is preferred slopes up and to the right indicating that the larger R20 is, the
larger M must be in order to justify a long lockdown. That also makes sense. If the
new variant’s higher virulence sufficiently undermines the effectiveness of locking
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IIa: long lockdown starting immediately
IIb: long lockdown starting with delay
Fig. 9.2 Bifurcation diagram in the R20 − M space. The blue lines denote Skiba curves, separating
(discontinuously) regions with different optimality regimes. At the red curve the regimes change
continuously. The point ST corresponds to a triple Skiba point, where three optimal solutions exist.
At the red diamond the discontinuous Skiba solution changes into a continuous transition curve
down, then the value per life saved has to be greater to justify the imposition of a
long lockdown.
One of the interesting features of this model is that two Skiba curves intersect,
namely the curve separatingRegion I fromRegions IIa or IIb and the curve separating
Regions IIa and IIb. That intersection, which is denoted by the point ST , is a triple
Skiba point. If the parameters have exactly those values, then any of three distinct
strategies can be optimal. It is akin to Snow Dome Mountain in Canada’s Jasper
National Park, where a drop of water could equally well flow west through the
Columbia River system to the Pacific Ocean, east to Hudson’s Bay and the Atlantic
Ocean, or north via the Athabasca and McKenzie Rivers into the Arctic Ocean.
Except that instead of being indifferent between flowing to different oceans, at this
point a social planner is indifferent between starting a long lockdown immediately,
starting a long lockdown after a short delay, and employing only a short lockdown.
9.3 The Optimal Lockdown Intensity
The previous section updated results from a model based on Caulkins et al. (2020)
that sought to determine the optimal start and length of a lockdownwhen the intensity
of that lockdown was given exogenously. We next present an extension of the model
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as given in Caulkins et al. (2021) that allows the intensity of the lockdown to vary
continuously over time.
As in Caulkins et al. (2020), we define γ (t) to be the share of potential workers
who are employed at time t . However, now we model γ (t) as a state variable that
can be altered continuously via a control u(t):
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1,
Wesetγ (0) = 1.0because the planninghorizonbeginswhenCOVID-19first arrives,
and so before there is any lockdown. We include a state constraint γ (t) ≤ 1 for
0 ≤ t ≤ T , since employment cannot exceed 100%. This formulation allows for
multiple lockdowns, takes into account that employment takes time to adjust, and
it recognises that changing employment levels induces adjustment costs, which we
allow to be asymmetric, with it being harder to restart the economy than it is to shut
it down.
Since public approval of lockdowns may wane the longer a lockdown lasts, we
introduce a further state variable that models this “lockdown fatigue” z(t):
ż(t) = κ1 (1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t),
where κ1 governs the rate of accumulation of fatigue and κ2 measures its rate of
decay. Note that if the worst imaginable lockdown (γ (t) = 0) lasted forever then
z(t) would grow to its maximum possible value of zmax = κ1/κ2.
We use an epidemiological model based on an open-population SIR2 model with
a birth rate ν and extra mortality for individuals who are infected (μI ) above and
beyond that for those who are susceptible or recovered (μ). In addition, we allow a
backflow of recovered individuals back into the susceptible state at a rate φ. How
long immunity will last with SARS-CoV-2 virus is not known at the time of this
writing, but immunity to other corona viruses often lasts 3–5years, so we set φ to
0.001 per day in our base case, which corresponds to a mean duration of immunity
of 1000/365 = 2.74 years.
2 Since the qualitative dynamics in Caulkins et al. (2020) did not change if we excluded the latent
state, we opted for a more parsimonious model in our extensions Caulkins et al. (2021) and the
parameters have been adapted accordingly.
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The state dynamics in our extended model can then be written as
Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− μS(t) + φR(t)
İ (t) = β(γ (t), z(t))) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− (α + μ + μI )I (t)
Ṙ(t) = α I (t) − μR(t) − φR(t)
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1
ż(t) = κ1(1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t), z(0) = 0
γ (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
where N (t) = S(t) + I (t) + R(t) is the total population. As before, the factor
β(γ, z) captures the number of interactions and the likelihood that an interaction
produces an infection. It is assumed to depend on both the intensity of the lockdown
γ and the level of lockdown fatigue z in the following way:
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γ θ + f κ2
κ1
z(1 − γ θ )
)
This expression can be interpreted as follows. In the absence of lockdown fatigue,
we might model β(γ, 0) as some minimum level of infection risk β1 that is produced
just by essential activities plus an increment β2 that is proportional to γ raised to
an exponent θ > 1. Having θ greater than 1 is consistent with locking down first
the parts of the economy that generate the most infections per unit of economic
activity (perhaps concerts and live sporting events) and shutting down last industries
with high economic output per unit of social interaction (perhaps highly automate
manufacturing and mining).
The term (κ2/κ1)z is the lockdown fatigue expressed as a percentage of its max-
imum possible value. So if f = 1 and z reached its maximum value, then all of the
potential benefits of locking down would be negated. Lockdown fatigue will not
actually reach that maximum because the planning horizon is relatively short. Also,
we choose a relatively small value of f = 0.05, so this lockdown fatigue has only
a modest effect. Nonetheless, including this term at least acknowledges this human
dimension of the public’s response to lockdowns.
The objective function includes health costs (due to deaths from COVID- 19),
economic loss (due to locking down), and the adjustment costs of changing the
employment level γ . We assume these adjustment costs to be quadratic in the control
u and allow for them to be asymmetric with different constants for shutting down
businesses cl and reopening them cr , with an extra penalty for reopening after an
extended shut down so that
Vu(u, γ ) :=
{
clu2 u ≤ 0
cr (z + 1)u2 u > 0.
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The resulting optimal control model and the base case parameter values are sum-
marised in Appedix 2 and Table9.4 Appendix 3.
9.3.1 Results
9.3.1.1 The Effect of Increased Infectivity
Our main interest is in how a mutated strain that is more contagious alters what
strategies are optimal. That is perhaps best captured in Fig. 9.3, which has two panels.
The one on the left corresponds to the old reproduction number of R0 = 2.5; the one
on the right corresponds to the new, higher number of R0 = 4. Both are similar to
the right panel of Fig. 9.1 in that they show how the value function depends on the
parameter M describing the cost per premature death.
This value function can be thought of as the “score” that a social planner “earns”
when he or she follows the optimal strategy. Naturally in both panels the value
function slopes down. The greater the penalty the social planner “pays” for each
premature death, the lower the score. On the left side of each panel the value function
slopes down steeply because there isn’tmuch lockingdown so there are a lot of deaths;
thus, a given increment in the cost per death gets “paid” many times. On the right
side of each panel, the optimal strategy involves an extended lockdown, so there are
fewer deaths and the same increment in the cost per death reduces the social planner’s
score by less.
There are, though, two noteworthy differences between the value functions across
the two panels. First, the kink in the curve, indicating the point at which an extended

















Ia: one early light lockdown
Ib: one late strong lockdown
IIa: two light lockdowns
IIb: one early and one late strong lockdown
IIIa: one long lockdown no temporary relaxing
IIIb: one long lockdown with temporary relaxing
(a) 0 = 2.5











∗ IIa IbIa IIb IIIa
(b) 0 = 4
Fig. 9.3 Dependence of the value function on the social cost of a death M for the base case
parameters in Table9.4 Appendix 3 and lockdown fatigue f = 0. There are four main regimes (no
lockdown, I, II, III) which differ by the duration, intensity, and number of lockdowns of the optimal
solutions. For the value of M highlighted by solid vertical black lines two different solution paths
are optimal. The dashed vertical lines denote continuous transitions from one regime to the other
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lockdown becomes preferred, occurs at a larger value of M in the right-hand panel.
That is because when the reproduction number is larger, it takes a more determined
lockdown to pull off the extended lockdown strategy, making it more costly and
less appealing unless the penalty per premature death is larger. The difference is not
enormous though, with valuations equivalent to about (M = 11, 560) 32 times GDP
per capita in the right panel and (M = 10, 140) 28 times GDP per capita in the left
panel.
The second difference is that—at least with all other parameters at their base case
values—increasing R0 increased the number of different types of strategies that can
be optimal. With R0 = 4 there are five distinguishable types of lockdown strategies
that can be optimal, not just two.
Here is how to interpret the labels of the four regions Ia, Ib, IIa, and IIb. The
Roman numeral I or II refers to whether there are one or two lockdowns. The ‘b’
versus ‘a’ roughly indicates whether there is a substantial lockdown later in the
planning horizon to prevent a rebound epidemic. (A rebound may be possible after
an appreciable number of previously infected individuals have lost their immunity
and returned to the susceptible state S via the backflow.)
Figure9.4 shows example control trajectories for all five regions. The vertical
axis is γ , the proportion of workers who are allowed to work, so any dip below 1.0
indicates a lockdown. If the social planner places a very low value on preventing
COVID-19 deaths (e.g., M = 1500 in panel a), then there is only a small, short early
lockdown which does little except to take a bit of the edge off the initial spike in
infections. Such a small effort does not prevent many people from getting infected,
but it shifts a few infections to later, when hospitals are less overwhelmed. When
M is a little larger (specifically M = 3200 in panel c), then there is also a similarly
small lockdown later, to take a bit of the edge off of the rebound epidemic. But in
neither of those cases is there much locking down or much reduction in infections.
When M is still larger (M = 5000 in panel b) the later lockdown gets consider-
ably larger—large enough to essentially prevent the rebound epidemic. Curiously,
at this point the initial lockdown disappears, but it wasn’t very big to begin with,
so this qualitative change is not actually a very big difference substantively. When
M increases further (M = 11, 000) the initial lockdown reappears, albeit as a very
small blip.
Then rather abruptly when M crosses the Skiba curve separating type I and II
strategies from type III strategies it becomes optimal to use a very large and sustained
lockdown to reduce infections and deaths dramatically. Panel e shows the particular
optimal lockdown trajectory when M = 13, 000, which is equivalent to valuing a
premature death at 35 times GDP per capita. That sustained lockdown averts most of
the infections and deaths, but at the considerable cost of almost 50% unemployment
for about a year and a half.
Thus, when the lockdown intensity is allowed to vary continuously, many nuances
emerge, but the overall character still boils down to an almost binary choice. If M
is high enough, then use a sustained and forceful lockdown to largely preempt the
epidemic despite massive levels of economic dislocation. Otherwise, lockdowns are
too blunt and expensive to employ as the primary response to the epidemic. Thus,
the model prescribes an almost all-or-nothing approach to economic lockdowns.
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(a) Regime Ia ( = 1500)
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(c) Regime IIa ( = 3200)










(d) Regime IIb ( = 11000)










(e) Regime IIIa ( = 13000)
Fig. 9.4 Showing the time evolution of the optimal lockdown for the different regimes in Fig. 9.3b
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For certain combinations of parameter values (e.g., Fig. 9.4 panels b and d corre-
sponding to M = 5, 000 and M = 11, 000) it can be optimal to act fairly decisively
against the rebound epidemic even if all one does in response to the first epidemic is a
bit of curve flattening. It may seem odd to lock down more aggressively in response
to the second, smaller epidemic, but the reason is eminently practical. When the
reproduction number is high enough, it is very hard to prevent the epidemic from
exploding if everyone is susceptible. But there is already an appreciable degree of
herd immunity when the second, rebound epidemic threatens, so a less severe lock-
down can be sufficient to preempt it.
9.3.1.2 Interpreting the Types of Lockdown Strategies that Can be
Optimal
Table9.1 summarises the nature and performance of each of the strategies in the right-
hand panel of Fig. 9.3. Its columns merit some discussion. The lockdowns’ start and
end times are self-explanatory except to note that with strategies IIa and IIb, there are
two separate lockdowns, so there are two separate start and end times. The intensity
of the lockdown measures the amount of unemployment that the lockdown creates
on a scale where 365 corresponds to no one in the population working for an entire
year.
Table9.1 shows that even when lockdown intensity and duration are allowed to
vary continuously, there are basically only three sizes that emerge as optimal: very
small (less than 1.04), modest (around 30–35, or the equivalent of the economy
giving up one month of economic output), and large (around 360, or the equivalent
of the economy giving up a full year of economic output).
The levels of deaths also fall into basically three levels. High (around 2.9% of the
population) goes with small lockdowns. Medium-high deaths (around 2.4%) goes
with modest lockdowns. Small deaths (around 0.2%) goes with large lockdowns.
It would be nice to have a small number of deaths despite only imposing a small
lockdown, but that just isn’t possible.
In sum, there are basically three strategies: (1) Do very little locking down and
suffer deaths both from the initial epidemic and also the rebound epidemic as people
lose immunity, (2) Only do a bit of curve flattening during the first epidemic but use
a modest sized lockdown later on to prevent the rebound epidemic and so have a
medium-high number of deaths, or (3) Lockdown forcefully more or less throughout
the entire planning horizon in order to avert most of the deaths altogether.
Figure9.2 provides the corresponding information when R0 = 2.5. It shows that
when the virus is less contagious the large lockdown does not need to be quite as
large (size of 257 or about 8.5months of lost output, not a full year) in order to
hold the number of deaths down to low levels. Perhaps surprisingly, the minimalist
strategies (Ia) are less minimalist when R0 = 2.5; when R0 = 4.0 the epidemic is
just so powerful that it is not even worth doing as much curve flattening as it is when
R0 = 2.5.
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Table 9.1 R0 = 4: Data characterising the optimal solutions for the different regimes of Fig. 9.4.
The size of the lockdown is defined as
∫ τe
τs
(1 − γ (t))dt, where τs is the starting and τe the exit time
of the lockdown





24.8 77.4 52.6 0.5 2.9 1500
Lockdown:
Ib
412.8 730.0 317.2 32.8 2.4 5000
Lockdown:
IIa
1 21.4 81.3 59.9 0.8 – –
2 659.5 713.8 54.2 0.1 – –
Total – – 114.1 0.9 2.9 3200
Lockdown:
IIb
1 3.2 30.9 27.7 0.0 – –
2 388.1 730.0 341.9 35.8 – –
Total − − 369.6 35.8 2.3 11,000
Lockdown:
IIIa
0.0 730.0 730.0 360.8 0.2 13,000
Table 9.2 R0 = 2.5. The optimal solutions for R0 = 2.5 evaluated at the same M values as for
R0 = 4





– – – 0 2.1 1500
Lockdown:
Ib
35.2 145.8 110.6 4.8 2.0 5000
Lockdown:
IIa
44.3 122.2 77.9 1.3 2.1 3200
Lockdown:
IIb
0.0 730.0 730.0 257.6 0.2 11,000
Lockdown:
IIIa
0.0 730.0 730.0 258.8 0.2 13,000
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9.3.1.3 The Effects of Lockdown Fatigue
One feature of the current model is its recognition of lockdown fatigue. Recall that
fatiguemeans that the infection-preventing benefits of an economic lockdownmay be
eroded over time by the public becoming less compliant, e.g., because the economic
suffering produces pushback. The results above used parameter values that meant the
power of that fatigue was fairly modest. In this subsection we explore how greater
tendencies to fatigue can influence what strategy is optimal.
The tool again is a bifurcation diagram with the horizontal axis denoting M , the
value the social planner places on preventing a premature death. (See Fig. 9.5.) Now,
though, the vertical axis measures the strength of the fatigue effect, running from
0 (no effect) up to 1.0. The units of this fatigue effect are difficult to interpret, but
roughly speaking, over the time horizons contemplated here, if f = 1.0 then when
employing the sustained lockdown strategies, the lockdowns lose about half of their
effectiveness by the time they are relaxed.
Figure9.5 shows the results. When that fatigue parameter is small (lower parts of
Fig. 9.5), the march across the various strategies with increasing M is the same as
that depicted in Fig. 9.3. With large values (top of Fig. 9.5), there are two differences.
First, Region Ib disappears but Region IIb remains, meaning if it is ever optimal to
use a moderately strong lockdown to forestall a rebound epidemic, then one also
does at least something in response to the first epidemic. Second, Region IIIa gives
way to Region IIIb in which some degree of lockdown is maintained for an extended
time, but it is relaxed somewhat between the first and rebound epidemics in order to
let levels of fatigue dissipate somewhat.
The still more important lesson though pertains to the curve separating regions
where some major lockdown is optimal (whether that is of type IIIa or IIIb) and
regions where only small or moderate sized lockdowns are optimal (Regions Ia, Ib,
IIa, or IIb). That boundary slopes upward and to the right, meaning that the greater
the tendency of the public to fatigue, the higher the cost per premature death (M)
has to be in order for a very strong and sustained lockdown to be optimal. That
makes sense. If fatigue will undermine part of the effectiveness of a large lockdown,
then the valuation of the lockdown’s benefits has to be greater in order to justify its
considerable costs.
This suggests that those advocating for very long lockdowns might want to think
about whether there are ways of making that lockdown more palatable in order to
minimise fatigue. For example, some Canadian provinces tempered their policies
limiting social interaction to people within a household bubble so that people living
alone were permitted to meet with up to two other people, to avoid the mental health
harms of total isolation.
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Fig. 9.5 This figure shows the different regions in the M − f space. The green lines denote
continuous transitions from region region I to II (R0 = 4). The blue curve is a Skiba curve, where
the transition from region II to III is discontinuous and at the Skiba curve two optimal solutions exist.
The Skiba curve switch to a continuous transition curve (red) at the red diamond. In Regime IIIb
the lockdown is relaxed in between and then tightened again, whereas in Regime IIIa the lockdown
is steadily increased and then steadily relaxed
9.3.1.4 Illustrating Skiba Trajectories
One key finding here is that for certain sets of parameter values, two—or sometimes
even three—very different strategies can produce exactly the same net value for the
social planner. We close by illustrating this phenomenon in greater detail.
Returning to Fig. 9.3b, with the higher level of infectivity believed to pertain
for the UK variant of the virus, as the valuation placed on preventing a premature
death (M) increases, one crosses two Skiba thresholds, one at M = 3395 separating
Regions IIa and Ib and another at M = 11, 560 separating Regions IIb and IIIa.
These thresholds are denoted in Fig. 9.3b by solid vertical lines. They can also be
seen in Fig. 9.5 by moving left to right at the bottom level ( f = 0).
Figure9.6 shows the two alternate strategies, in terms of γ , the proportion of
employees who are allowed to work. The left panel shows the two equally good
strategies when M = 3395; the right-hand panel shows the two strategies that are
equally good when M = 11, 560.We have already discussed their nature. On the left
side one is choosing between two very small lockdowns and one moderately large
lockdown later. On the right side one is choosing between a pair of lockdowns (very
small early and moderately large later) and one very deep and sustained lockdown.
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Table 9.3 Data on costs for Skiba point at M = 11, 560
Uncontrolled Flattening long and sustained
lockdown
Health costs 335.67 271.42 25.33
Economy 18.27 36.77 270.13
Adjustment costs 0 0.91 13.64
Total costs 353.94 309.10 309.10
Deaths (%) 2.9 2.3 0.2
The observation to stress for present purposes is just how different the trajectories
are in each pairing. When one crosses a Skiba threshold, what is optimal can change
quite radically. Likewise, when one is standing exactly at that Skiba threshold, one
has two equally good options, but those options are radically different.
That means that when two people advocate very different lockdown strategies
in response to COVID-19, one cannot presume that they have very different under-
standings of the science or very different value systems. They might actually share
very similar or indeed even identical worldviews, but still favour radically different
policies.
Table9.3 illustrates how this can be so. Its first column summarises the outcomes
(costs) when there is no control. Health costs are enormous because more or less
everyone gets infected and 2.9% of the population dies; the numbers are on a scale
such that 365 is one year’s GDP, so the health cost of 335.7 is almost as bad as losing
an entire year’s economic output. There are also some economic losses from losing
the productivity of those who die prematurely, producing a total cost of 353.9.
The second column shows that modest deployment of lockdowns only reduces
health costs by 20%, to 271.4, whereas a severe and sustained lockdown reduces
them by 92.5%, to 25.3. However, the severe and sustained lockdown multiplies
costs of lost labor fifteenfold, to 270.1, and creates an additional cost equivalent to
13.6 days of output from forcing businesses to adjust to changing lockdown policies.
Summing across all three types of costs produces the same total of 309.1 for both
types of lockdown strategies.
Thus the two lockdown strategies produce the same aggregate performance
(309.1), but with very different compositions. The moderate lockdown strategy cre-
ates smaller economic costs but only reduces health costs by 20%. The severe and
sustained lockdown eliminates most of the healthcare costs but creates very large
economic dislocation.
What is quite sobering is that either optimal policy only reduces total social cost
by 13%, from 353.9 to 309.14. The COVID-19 pandemic is truly horrible; at least
within this model, even responding to it optimally alleviates only a modest share
of the suffering. Lockdowns can convert health harms to economic harms, but they
cannot do much to reduce the total amount of harm.
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Fig. 9.6 Optimal time paths for the Skiba solutions for M = 3395, 11560 in Fig. 9.3b
9.4 Discussion
This paper investigated implications of theSARS-CoV-2virus beingmore contagious
than has previously been understood, e.g., because of a mutation or variant strain. In
particular, it investigates implications for economic lockdown strategies within an
optimal control model that balances health and economic considerations. A number
of results were confirmed that had been obtained earlier with parameters reflecting
the earlier understanding of the epidemic’s reproduction number. In particular, we
continue to find that:
• Very different lockdown policies can be optimal—ranging from very little to long
and sustained lockdowns—depending on the value of parameters that are difficult
to pin down, notably including the valuation placed on averting a premature death.
• For certain parameter constellations, the nature of the optimal policy can change
radically even with quite small changes in these parameters.
• There are even situations inwhich two very different policies can both yield exactly
the same aggregate performance, with one strategy’s better performance at reduc-
ing deaths being exactly offset by its worse performance in other respects.
• As we have discussed previously in Caulkins et al. (2020), these results suggest
a degree of humility is in order when advocating for one policy over another.
Another person who favours a very different policy might actually share a very
similar scientific understanding of the disease dynamics and even hold similar
values, and yet still reasonably reach quite different conclusions.
There are, though, differences here. One is that a greater variety of strategies emerged
as candidates. Some concerned how to address a potential rebound epidemic among
people who were previously infected but then flowed back from the recovered to
the susceptible state as their immunity wore off. For some parameter values, if the
virus is sufficiently contagious and the time until a vaccine arrives long enough, it
may be prohibitively difficult to substantially avoid the initial wave of infection, but
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nonetheless be desirable to use a moderately aggressive lockdown to avert a rebound
epidemic, for two reasons. First, it is easier to deal with the rebound epidemic because
there will still be some degree of herd immunity at that time, in contrast to the
situation when the virus first arrives. Second, the time until a vaccine’s arrival is
obviously shorter when addressing a rebound as opposed to the initial epidemic, so
any lockdowns do not need to be sustained as long.
Indeed, whereas in the past the multiplicity of strategies basically fell into two
camps, either a fairly modest lockdown that served only to flatten the curve and a
much more intensive and sustained lockdown that largely protected the population
from infection, now there is a third category of strategies. It might be thought of as
flattening the first wave and eliminating the second.
Wealso investigatedmore thoroughly thanbefore the potential effects of lockdown
fatigue. The primary results are perhaps as expected. The greater the tendency for
fatigue to undermine the effectiveness of a lockdown, the higher one must value the
benefits created by a lockdown in order for a large and sustained lockdown to be
optimal. That suggests that those wishing to impose long and deep lockdowns might
want to think about ways of reducing resistance to those measures.
In sum, when lockdown intensity is allowed to vary continuously, many nuances
emerge, but the overall character still boils down to an almost binary choice, one
made perhaps even more stark if the virus becomes more contagious. If the value
placed on preventing a premature death is high enough, then a social planner should
use a sustained and forceful lockdown to preempt the epidemic despite incurring
massive economic dislocation. Otherwise, lockdowns are too blunt and expensive
to employ as the primary response to the epidemic. Thus, the model prescribes an
almost all-or-nothing approach to economic lockdowns.
That finding does not mean that modulated approaches to what might be termed
social lockdowns do not have a role. It may be entirely possible for a government
to ramp up or down when and where it requires masks and social distancing outside
the workplace, or to do the same with travel restrictions and quarantines. Our model
is looking only at economic lockdowns.
Here is one way to think about this conclusion. We credited policy makers with
a degree of common sense that could have made intermediate levels of economic
lockdowns appealing. In particular, we assumed that the benefits in terms of reduced
infection were a concave function of the amount of the economy that is shut down.
In plain language, we presumed policy makers would shut down first the economic
activities that had the greatest ratio of infection risk to economic value (e.g., in-
person concerts and other crowd gatherings) and shut down last those that produce
a lot of economic value per unit of infection risk (e.g., mining and highly automated
manufacturing). If the virus’ behaviour were linear, that might be expected to favour
lockdowns of intermediate intensity. However, the contagious spread of a virus is
highly nonlinear, involving very powerful positive feedback loops that produce expo-
nential growth. To speak informally, if the virus gets its nose into the tent and locking
down is the only policy response, then the virus will rip through the population if the
lockdown is anything other than very strong.
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The good news is that policy makers do have other tools besides lockdowns.
For example, rapid, intense testing and contact tracing might be able to hold down
infections when there are relatively few people getting infected. But if the virus
spreads beyond the ability of such targeted measures, and the only remaining tool is
broad-based economic lockdowns, the analysis here suggests being decisive;waffling
efforts may produce the worst of both worlds, with substantial economic losses and
still high rates of infection.
We close with a caveat. Despite its apparent complexity, this model explored
here is of course vastly simplified compared to the real world, and there is much
that remains unknown and uncertain about optimal economic response to pandemic
threats. We hope we have usefully provoked thinking and advanced understanding,
but hope even more fervently that society will invest heavily in much more such
analysis, so that we can all be better prepared the next time the world confronts a
novel pandemic.
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Appendix 1
The decision variables are τ1 and τ2, the times when the lockdown begins and ends,
and the full model can be written as:




Vl(W (t), τ1, τ2) − Vh(I (t))
)
dt
− (T + )KW (0)σ γ (0, τ1, τ2)σ
+ KW (T )σ γ (T, τ1, τ2)σ
V ∗(X0) := max
τ1,τ2




SLIR1(X (t), τ1, τ2) 0 ≤ t < τ1
SLIR2(X (t), τ1, τ2), τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
SLIR3(X (t), τ1, τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
X (0) = X0 ≥ 0
γ (t, τ1, τ2) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
γ1 0 ≤ t < τ1
γ2 τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
γ3(τ1, τ2) := γ2 + (γ1 − γ2)eκ2(τ1−τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
Reff(t, τ1, τ2) :=
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
R10 0 ≤ t < τ1
R20 τ1 ≤ t ≤ τ2
R30(τ1, τ2) := R̄30 + (R10 − R̄30)eκ1(τ1−τ2) τ2 < t ≤ T
with R20 ≤ R̄30 ≤ R10 .
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We specify the health care term and the economic (labor) term in the objective as
Vh(I ) := M (ξ1 pI + ξ2 max({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ))
Vl(W, τ1, τ2) := Kγ (t, τ1, τ2)σW (t)σ .
The derivation of the necessary optimality conditions can be found in the Appendix 1
in Caulkins et al. (2020). The Matlab toolbox OCMat is used for the numerical
calculations (see http://orcos.tuwien.ac.at/research/ocmat_software).
Appendix 2




Vl(W (t), γ (t)) − Vh(I (t)) − Vu(u(t), z(t))
)
dt
− (T + )KW (0)σ γ (0)σ
+ KW (T )σ γ (T )σ
V ∗(X0) := max
u(·)
V (X0, u(·))
X (t) := (S(t), I (t), R(t), γ (t), z(t)), W (t) := S(t) + R(t)
N (t) := S(t) + I (t) + R(t).
s.t. Ṡ(t) = νN (t) − β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− μS(t) + φR(t)
İ (t) = β(γ (t), z(t)) S(t)I (t)
N (t)
− (α + μ + μI )I (t)
Ṙ(t) = α I (t) − μR(t) − φR(t)
γ̇ (t) = u(t), γ (0) = 1
ż(t) = κ1(1 − γ (t)) − κ2z(t), z(0) = 0
γ (t) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ T
β(γ, z) := β1 + β2
(
γ θ + f κ2
κ1
z(1 − γ θ )
)
Vl(W, γ ) := Kγ σW σ
Vh(I ) := M (ξ1 pI + ξ2 maxs({0, pI − Hmax}, ζ ))
Vu(u, z) :=
{
clu2 u ≤ 0
cr (z + 1)u2 u > 0
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Appendix 3
Table 9.4 Base case parameter values and initial state variable values. The ∗ denotes a free param-
eter and is specified in the figures
Variable Model Model Description
Sect. 9.2 Sect. 9.3
α 1/9 1/15 Reciprocal of average duration of the infection
R1,2,30 4, ∗, 3.2 – Level of infection risk
γ
1,2,3
0 1, 0.25, 0.75 – Level of lockdown intensity
β1 – 0 Minimum level of infection risk
β2 – 0.2 Increment in the level of infection risk
Hmax 1.76 × 10−4 2 × 10−4 Capacity of intensive care units
p 2.311 × 10−2 2.25 × 10−2 Probability that infected person needs critical care
M ∗ ∗ Social cost of a premature death due to COVID-19
K 1 1 Coefficient on economic activity
 365 365 Reflects time required to return to full employment
f 0.75 – Likelihood of spreading the virus when in the L state
f – ∗ Impact of lockdown fatigue on infection risk
κ1 2 × 10−3 – Rate of decay for lockdown intensity
κ1 – 0.15 Rate of accumulation of fatigue
κ2 10
−3 – Rate of decay for reproduction number
κ2 – 0.2 Rate of exponential decay of fatigue
ω 0.6 – Proportion of infections that become symptomatic
ϕ 1/7.2 – Reciprocal of average duration of the latency
σ 2/3 2/3 Labor elasticity in Cobb-Douglas production function
ν 0.01/365 0 Birth rate
μ 0.01/365 0 Death rate (not caused by COVID-19)
μI 13/10800 0 COVID-19 death rate
ζ 5000 5000 Parameter in the approximation of the max-function
ξ1 0.05 0.03 Death rate of infected individual in critical care
ξ2 0.55/9 0.55/15 Incremental death rate if IC capacity is exceeded
φ – 0.001 Rate by which recovered get susceptible again
cl – 1000 Parameter in business shutting down costs
cr – 5000 Parameter in business reopening costs
θ 2 2 Exponent in the proportionality function β(t)
S(0) 0.999 0.999 Initial susceptible population
L(0) 0.001 – Initial latent population
I (0) 0 0.001 Initial infected population
R(0) 0 0 Initial recovered population
γ (0) – 1 Initial employment level
z(0) – 0 Initial lockdown fatigue
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Chapter 10
Diagnostic Tests and Procedures During
the COVID-19 Pandemic
Sherry A. Dunbar and Yi-Wei Tang
Abstract Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has brought a huge impact on
global health and the economy. Early and accurate diagnosis of severe acute respira-
tory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections is essential for clinical inter-
vention and pandemic control. This book chapter addresses the evolving approach to
the laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19 covering preanalytical, analytical, and post-
analytical steps. The rapidly changing dynamics of the COVID-19 pandemic serve
as an example which will be important for laboratories to plan for future pandemics.
With the quick identification of the causative pathogen and availability of the genome
sequence, it will be possible to develop and implement diagnostic tests within weeks
of an outbreak. Laboratories will need to be flexible to continuously adapt to chang-
ing testing needs and burdens on the healthcare system, plan mitigation strategies
for bottlenecks in testing and workflow due to limitations on resources and supplies,
and prepare back-up plans now in order to be better prepared for future pandemics.
10.1 Introduction
In December 2019, a respiratory illness caused by a novel coronavirus was detected
in Wuhan City, Hubei Province, China and rapidly evolved into the global pan-
demic known as COVID-19, see Lu et al. (2020a), Zhu et al. (2020). Coronaviruses
are enveloped viruses comprised of a single stranded positive-sense RNA genome.
Virions are spherical, with a spike glycoprotein (S) embedded in the envelope and
additional structural proteins, including envelope (E), matrix (M), and nucleocapsid
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(N). This novel coronavirus, designated SARS-CoV-2, has been shown by genomic
sequencing to be approximately 85-88% identical to bat SARS-like coronaviruses
and 96.2% related to the bat coronavirus RaTG13, but distinct from SARS-CoV-1
with approximately 80% similarity, see Zhu et al. (2020), Lu et al. (2020c), Yan et al.
(2020).
The binding of SARS-CoV-2 and entry into the host cell is mediated by the S
protein where the S1 subunit contains the receptor binding domain (RBD) that binds
to the peptidase domain of angiotensin-converting enzyme 2 (ACE 2), Cevik et al.
(2020). The primarymechanismof transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is by infected respi-
ratory droplets, through direct or indirect contact with nasal, conjunctival, and/or oral
mucosa, Hui et al. (2020). The target host receptors are found mainly in the epithe-
lium of the human respiratory tract in the oropharynx and upper airway; however,
the conjunctiva and gastrointestinal tract are also susceptible.
In the respiratory tract, peak viral loads are observed at the time of symptom onset,
typically in the first week of illness, with subsequent decline thereafter, Cevik et al.
(2021). Quantitative reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (qRT-PCR) can
detect SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the upper respiratory tract for 17 days (on average)
after symptom onset, although viral RNA detection may not equate to infectivity.
Viral culture from PCR-positive upper respiratory tract samples is primarily negative
beyond eight to nine days of illness, see Wölfel et al. (2020), Bullard et al. (2020).
Active replication and release of the virus in the cells of the lungs leads to non-
specific symptoms such as fever,myalgia, headache, and other respiratory symptoms.
A lymphocytic endotheliitis has been observed postmortem upon examination of
lung, heart, kidney, and liver, indicating that the virus directly affects many organs,
Varga et al. (2020). Clinical outcomes of infection are influenced by host factors such
as older age, underlying medical conditions, and host-immune response, as well as
the viral load.
By March 2021, more than 116 million cases of COVID-19 had been reported
globally, leading to more than 2.5 million deaths, World Health Organization (2021).
Individuals of all ages are at risk for infection and severe disease, but themost serious
disease occurs in people aged 60 and older, residents of nursing homes and long-term
care facilities, and those with immunosuppression and chronic medical conditions.
In a study of more than 1.3million cases in the U.S., a significantly higher percentage
of hospitalisations, intensive care unit admissions, and deaths occurred in patients
with chronic medical conditions and in individuals >70 years of age, Stokes et al.
(2020), Guan et al. (2020), Wu et al. (2020).
As two main processes are thought to direct the pathogenesis of COVID-19,
different therapeutic approaches may be employed in different stages of infection.
Early in infection, the disease is driven by replication of the virus, whereas later in
the course of infection, the disease is driven by an overactive immune/inflammatory
response. Therefore, antiviral therapies should have the greatest effect early in the
course of disease, while immunosuppressive and anti-inflammatory therapies are
likely to be more beneficial in the later stages.
Several antiviral therapies continue to be investigated for the treatment of COVID-
19. These drugs inhibit viral entry, viral membrane fusion and endocytosis, or the
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activity of SARS-CoV-2 protease (3CLpro) and RNA-dependent RNA polymerase,
Sanders et al. (2020). Remdesivir, an antiviral agent that inhibits viral replication,
is recommended for use in hospitalised patients, especially those who require sup-
plemental oxygen, Beigel et al. (2020). Dexamethasone, a corticosteroid, has been
found to improve survival in hospitalised patients who require supplemental oxygen,
with the greatest effect observed in patients who require mechanical ventilation and
is strongly recommended in this clinical setting, Horby et al. (2021).
In the earliest stages of infection and before the patient has mounted an effec-
tive immune response, anti-SARS-CoV-2 antibody-based therapies would have the
greatest likelihood of having an impact. Preliminary data suggests that outpatients
may benefit from receiving anti-SARS-CoV-2 monoclonal antibodies early in the
course of infection, Ju et al. (2020), Wang et al. (2020). Several anti-SARS-CoV-2
monoclonal antibodies have been authorised for the treatment of outpatients with
mild to moderate COVID-19, Chen et al. (2021), Weinreich et al. (2021).
Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is thought to mainly occur through direct contact
with an infected person or fomite, Cai et al. (2020). The second mode is via respira-
tory droplets transmitted by exhalation from an infectious person to others, generally
within about six feet, Alsved et al. (2020). Less commonly, airborne transmission
of small droplets and particles of SARS-CoV-2 can occur at distances greater than
six feet, particularly in enclosed spaces, prolonged time of exposure, and inadequate
ventilation or air handling, Li et al. (2007, 2020b), Lu and Yang (2020). The risk
of SARS-CoV-2 transmission can be reduced by covering coughs and sneezes and
maintaining a distance of at least six feet from others. When consistent distancing
is not possible, face coverings may further reduce the spread of infectious droplets
from individuals with SARS-CoV-2 infection to others. Frequent handwashing also
effectively reduces the risk of infection, Centers for Disease Control and Preven-
tion (2020b). Healthcare providers should follow institutional recommendations for
infection control and appropriate use of personal protective equipment (PPE).
As more vaccines become available to prevent COVID-19, the pandemic may be
alleviated through high vaccine effectiveness, effectiveness to new variants as they
arise, and if a sufficient proportion becomes vaccinated to achieve herd immunity. As
of February 2021, at least seven different vaccines across three platforms (inactivated
virus, nucleic acid/mRNA, and recombinant viral vector-based) have become avail-
able with vulnerable populations at the highest priority for vaccination,World Health
Organization (2020b). It is not currently known how long SARS-CoV-2 vaccine pro-
tective effect will last, whether they prevent asymptomatic infection or transmission,
or whether they will prevent infection by all current or emergent strains of SARS-
CoV-2. Clinical data continue to be collected and clinical trials for other SARS-CoV-
2 vaccine candidates are ongoing. As of March 2021, in large, placebo-controlled
trials, these vaccines were 80–95% effective in preventing SARS-CoV-2 infection
or serious/severe COVID-19 disease after participants completed all doses. In this
chapter, we describe the laboratory diagnosis of COVID-19 in terms of pre-analytical
(specimen and biosafety), analytical (tests and platforms), and post-analytical (result
interpretation) considerations.
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10.2 Laboratory Diagnosis: Pre-analytical Issues
10.2.1 Specimen Types and Specimen Collection
Regardless of the sensitivity (ability to designate an individual with a disease as pos-
itive) and specificity (ability to designate an individual without a disease as negative)
of available laboratory tests, the diagnosis of viral pneumonias, such as that caused
by SARS-CoV-2, is dependent on collecting the correct specimen from the patient at
the correct time. Within 5–6 days from onset of symptoms, patients with COVID-19
have demonstrated high viral loads in upper and lower respiratory tracts,Wölfel et al.
(2020), Pan et al. (2020), Zou et al. (2020). As viral pneumonias do not typically
result in the production of a purulent sputum, nasopharyngeal specimens, such as a
nasopharyngeal swab are recommended, but nasal and oropharyngeal swabs are also
acceptable specimen types, Zou et al. (2020), Kim et al. (2011), National Institutes
of Health (2021), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020c). However,
nasopharyngeal specimens may not detect early infection and a lower respiratory
tract specimen may be needed. Lower respiratory tract samples have a higher diag-
nostic yield than those from the upper tract but these specimens are usually not
obtained because of potential risk of virus aerosolisation during sample collection,
National Institutes of Health (2021). Therefore, bronchoalveolar lavage and sputum
induction should only be performed after careful consideration of the risk of expos-
ing staff to infectious aerosols. Endotracheal aspiration appears to carry a lower risk
of aerosol generation than bronchoalveolar lavage (BAL), and some experts con-
sider the sensitivity and specificity of endotracheal aspirates and BAL specimens
comparable in detecting SARS-CoV-2. Repeated testing over time may increase the
likelihood of detecting SARS-CoV-2 present in the nasopharynx. Upper respiratory
specimens are collected using synthetic fiber swabs with thin plastic or wire shafts
that have been designed for sampling the nasopharyngeal mucosa which are then
placed into a transport tube for transportation to the laboratory. If both nasopharyn-
geal and oropharyngeal specimens are collected, it is recommended they be combined
in a single transport media tube to maximise test sensitivity and limit use of testing
resources, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020c). Several studies have
shown saliva as suitable specimen for SARS-CoV-2 testing, To et al. (2020), Wyllie
et al. (2020).
Some tests that have received Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) from the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) may be performed on saliva specimens and
some allow for self-collection of saliva which is then sent to a laboratory for testing.
Self-collection of saliva samples eliminates direct interaction between healthcare
workers and patients, which may present a risk for spread, increases the demand for
supplies, and can be a bottleneck for testing workflows. Saliva (1–5 mL) is collected
in a sterile, leakproof container and does not require preservative for transportation
to the laboratory, which also facilitates self-collection by the patient.
Studies have also shown that a significant proportion of COVID-19 patients carry
SARS-CoV-2 in the intestinal tract. Ameta-analysis of 17 studies showed that SARS-
10 Diagnostic Tests and Procedures During the COVID-19 Pandemic 195
CoV-2 RNA was detected in 33.7% of specimens and 43.7% of patients, Wong et al.
(2020). A subsequent report analysed the results from 79 studies and found that the
mean duration of viral RNA shedding was 17.2 days in stool with a maximum of
126 days; however no live virus was detected beyond 9 days of illness, Cevik et al.
(2021). Stool is an attractive specimen type since it can be self-collected and has the
potential to improve case identification in the community.
10.2.2 Biosafety Considerations
Patients with confirmed or possible SARS-CoV-2 infection should wear a facemask
when being evaluated medically and healthcare personnel should adhere to stan-
dard and transmission-based precautions when caring for patients with SARS-CoV-2
infection, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2021). Precautions should be
taken in handling specimens that are suspected or confirmed for SARS-CoV-2. All
laboratories should identify and mitigate risks depending on the procedures they per-
form and the associated hazards, including the competency level of the individuals
performing the procedures and the facility, equipment, and resources available, Cen-
ters for Disease Control and Prevention (2020d). Laboratory personnel should follow
standard precautions when handling clinical specimens which may contain poten-
tially infectious materials and follow routine laboratory practices and procedures for
decontamination of work surfaces and management of laboratory waste.
Processing of respiratory specimens should be done in a class II biological safety
cabinet (BSL-2), including procedures using automated instruments and analyzers,
molecular analysis of extracted nucleic acid preparations, packaging of specimens
for transport to other diagnostic laboratories for additional testing, and procedures
using inactivated specimens (i.e., such as specimens in nucleic acid extraction buffer),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020d), Chu et al. (2020). Lysis buffer
for nucleic acid extraction should contain a guanidinium-based inactivating agent
as well as a nondenaturing detergent. Buffers that are used with most commercial
extraction platforms contain guanidium and detergents and are able to inactivate
viable coronavirus, Blow et al. (2004), Kumar et al. (2015), Welch et al. (2020).
Self-enclosed sample-to-answer systems which integrate nucleic acid extraction,
amplification, and detection such as ID NOW (Abbott, San Diego, CA) Nie et al.
(2014), Wang et al. (2018), cobas Liat (Roche Molecular Systems, Pleasanton, CA),
ARIES (Luminex Corporation, Austin, TX), and GeneXpert (Cepheid, Sunnyvale,
CA) Ling et al. (2018), meet local regulatory requirements for SARS-CoV-2 test-
ing. Once the specimen in viral transport medium is added into the cartridge in a
BSL-2 biosafety cabinet, the cartridge is sealed. Many of the sealed, random access
testing devices are suitable for point-of-care testing for hospitals and clinics without
biosafety cabinets; however, staff collecting the specimen should use appropriate
PPE and avoid spills of transport solution during specimen transfer to the cartridge.
If any spills occur, decontamination should be performed as appropriate.
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10.3 Laboratory Diagnosis: Analytical Issues
Traditional testingmethodologies for diagnosis of respiratory viral infections, includ-
ing cell culture, antigen- and antibody-based immunoassays, and nucleic acids tests
have all been applied to the detection of SARS-CoV-2, Carter et al. (2020). However,
diagnosis of acute infection with SARS-CoV-2 should be performed using nucleic
acid amplification tests (NAAT) with a sample collected from the upper respiratory
tract, National Institutes of Health (2021). Real-time reverse transcription-PCR (RT-
PCR) assays are preferred, with immunoassay methods being used as supplementary
tests and for epidemiological purposes and to detect past infection, Tang et al. (2020).
Table 10.1 shows the various laboratory diagnostic platforms available for SARS-
CoV-2 detection. These testing methods and platforms, as well as specific use cases,
are described in the following sections.
10.3.1 Non-molecular Methods
Viral isolation in cell culture is important for characterisation of SARS-CoV-2, to
recover isolates and strains, to identify neutralizing antibodies, and to support devel-
opment of therapeutic agents and vaccines. However, cell culture for human coron-
aviruses is not routinely performed for diagnostic purposes and is not recommended
for diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2. In addition to biosafety concerns, viral culture gen-
erally has a long turnaround time, is labor-intensive, and requires specific expertise
to interpret the results, Loeffelholz and Tang (2020).
Viral antigen immunoassays are less sensitive than RT-PCR-based tests but
demonstrate similar high specificity. Antigen tests for SARS-CoV-2 perform best
early in the course of symptomatic infection when the viral load is at its highest
but there is concern that due to variability of viral loads in COVID-19 patients,
antigen detection may miss cases due to low virus burden or sampling variability,
Tang et al. (2020). The advantages of antigen-based tests are primarily low cost and
fast turnaround time. Antigen tests may be used for screening purposes, to exclude
SARS-CoV-2 infection in asymptomatic persons, or to determine whether a previ-
ously infected person is still contagious. Based on available data, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed an antigen testing algorithm
for these specific use cases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020e).
Serologic or antibody tests measure the host response to infection and can detect
recent or past infection and therefore is an indirectmeasure of infection that should be
used retrospectively, or in combination with other tests, Zhang et al. (2020). Several
serologic assays have received EUAs from the U.S. FDA for detection of antibodies
that bind to SARS-CoV-2 antigens, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021a).
These tests are primarily recommended for epidemiology and public health use, to
estimate the proportion of the population exposed to SARS-CoV-2, or clinically, as a
supplementary test for patients who are strongly suspected of having SARS-CoV-2
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Table 10.1 Current lab diagnostic platforms: antigen, serology, culture, and different molecular
methods
Method Characteristics Test time Application References
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Modified from Loeffelholz and Tang (2020) and updated in March 2021
Abbreviations: EIA enzyme; IFA immunofluorescent assay; NAAT nucleic acid amplification test;
CLIA Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act
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infection but have tested negative by NAAT or antigen-based tests, Kucirka et al.
(2020), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020f). The rapid point-of-care
immunoassays are generally lateral flow assays, but high-throughput automated ver-
sions are also available for population-level screening. Serologic assays may detect
total antibody, IgM, IgG, IgA, or in various combinations although assays that detect
IgG and total antibodies may have higher specificity to detect past infection, National
Institutes of Health (2021).
Serologic tests could play a role in treatment for COVID-19 by helping to iden-
tify individuals who have developed an immune response to SARS-CoV-2 and may
donate convalescent plasma. At the time of writing, it is not yet known if the presence
of antibodies conveys an immunity to prevent or reduce the severity of re-infection,
nor how long antibodies persist after infection, or the duration for which immunity
lasts. As more vaccines become available and more individuals become vaccinated,
serologic tests may be used to differentiate natural infection from vaccine-induced
antibody responses to the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein antigen. Because the SARS-
CoV-2 nucleocapsid protein is not part of the current vaccines, serologic tests that
detect antibodies to the nucleocapsid protein can be used to distinguish natural infec-
tion from vaccine-induced antibody responses.
10.3.2 Molecular Methods
Commonlyusedmolecular detectionmethods forSARS-CoV-2 includeRT-PCR/real-
time RT-PCR, next generation sequencing (NGS), isothermal amplification, Clus-
tered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR), and some tests
are available for use at the point-of-care (POC or POCT). As of March 5, 2021,
there are 220 molecular diagnostic tests that have received EUA for detection of
SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021b). Molecu-
lar platforms that are capable of automating sample extraction, amplification, and
detection in a closed system with rapid turnaround time are particularly attractive
as they are considered to be moderately complex and can be deployed in more lab-
oratories than high complexity methods. Several of the current molecular methods
are available for POCT and some are even authorised for home use. Table 10.2 lists
the rapid, sample-to-answer molecular diagnostic tests that have received EUA for
detection of SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid as of March 5, 2021.
A real-time RT-PCR method is recommended for molecular testing, Tang et al.
(2020), Loeffelholz and Tang (2020). Amajor advantage of real-time RT-PCR assays
is that amplification and detection are done simultaneously in a closed system to
minimise the risk of false-positive results associated with amplicon contamination.
Several RT-PCR protocols targeting multiple genes/regions of SARS-CoV-2 were
developed and quickly published which allowed laboratories to develop and validate
their own tests until commercial assays became available, see Corman et al. (2020),
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2020g,h). Corman et al. (2020) targeted
the E gene as a screening test, followed by theRdRp gene as a confirmatory test, while
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the U.S. CDC assay targets two nucleocapsid targets, N1 andN3, Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (2020g,h). The University of Hong Kong used the N gene
as the screening assay with an Orf1ab assay for confirmation, To et al. (2020), Chan
et al. (2020), National Institute for Viral Disease Control and Prevention (2020).
Targeting multiple genes can help avoid cross-reactivity with endemic coron-
aviruses as well as mitigate false negative results due to genetic drift of SARS-CoV-2
and variation in emerging SARS-CoV-2 strains. Shortly thereafter, commercial man-
ufacturers began the release of a multitude of real-time RT-PCR assays for SARS-
CoV-2 which have received EUAs from the U.S. FDA. These tests are available in a
variety of formats to accommodate POC testing, testing single or few specimens at a
time, high-throughput fully automated systems that are typically performed in large
reference laboratories, and everything in between. Furthermore, assays which can
be performed in a closed device within an automated, sample-to-answer system are
extremely useful in a pandemic setting as they require very minimal handling, which
reduces the risk of exposure for staff and risk of incorrect results due to contamina-
tion or user error. As of March 5, 2021, more than a dozen rapid, sample-to-answer
tests using real-time RT-PCR were available for emergency use (Table 10.2).
Metagenomic next-generation sequencing methods and random amplification
deep-sequencing methods played a key role in the identification of SARS CoV-
2, Chen et al. (2020), Zhou et al. (2020). Next-generation sequencing methods will
continue to be important to identify mutations in SARS-CoV-2 and for epidemio-
logical assessment of new variants but are generally not practical for diagnostics. In
one technique, amplicon-based sequencing and metagenomics sequencing are both
used to identify SARS-CoV-2 and to assess the background microbiome of infected
individuals, Carter et al. (2020), Moore et al. (2020). This method allows for identi-
fication of SARS-CoV-2 and other pathogens that may be contributing to secondary
infections in COVID-19 patients and has potential for contact tracing, epidemiology,
and to check for mutations, sequence divergence, and viral evolution.
Isothermal nucleic acid amplification allows amplification at a constant temper-
ature, eliminating the need for a thermal cycler and thus are well-suited for low-
resource settings, field applications, and POCT. Isothermal detection techniques are
rapid with minimal sample preparation requirements, the results are typically avail-
able in minutes, and tend to be highly sensitive, detecting down to hundreds or fewer
copies/ml, Khan et al. (2020). Data generated by isothermal amplification can be
provided in a variety of formats, such as fluorescence, change in pH, colorimeteric,
or luminometric, making them easy to use andwidely accessible in various locations.
Several isothermal techniques have been applied to SARS-CoV-2 diagnostics with
several assays commercially available for laboratory, POCT, and even home use.
One of themostwell-known commercial isothermal SARS-CoV-2 assays is the ID
NOWCOVID-19 POCT assay (Abbott Diagnostics, Scarborough, ME, USA) which
is based on NEAR (nicking enzyme amplification reaction) technology. NEAR uses
two primers, a nicking enzyme, and a DNA polymerase to amplify short 20-30
nucleotide products 108- to 1010-fold in less than 10 min, Van Ness et al. (2003).
The ID NOW COVID-19 test amplifies a target in the RdRp gene with a 5–13-min
reaction time. Available reports on performance as compared to RT-PCR published
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in July and August 2020 have been mixed, with >90% positive agreement observed
in some studies, Rhoads et al. (2020), but only ∼55–74% in others, see Basu et al.
(2020), Smithgall et al. (2020). This is possibly due to different sample types used
(dry nasal swab vs. nasopharyngeal swab in viral transport media) and/or low viral
loads in some samples.
RT-LAMP (loop-mediated isothermal amplification) technology uses a strand-
displacingDNApolymerasewith 4 to 6 primers in a single step amplification reaction
to rapidly amplify target sequences with high specificity, Notomi et al. (2000), Wong
et al. (2018). RT-LAMP has been developed for SARS-CoV-2 detection in multiple
research applications using fluorescence and colorimetric detectionmethods andwas
shown to be able to detect SARS-CoV-2 nucleic acid in standards and in a variety
of contrived respiratory specimens down to 3–1000 copies per reaction in about
30–40 min, see Khan et al. (2020), Lamb et al. (2020), Lu et al. (2020d), Yu et al.
(2020). The Lucira COVID-19 All-In-One Test kit (Lucira Health, Emeryville, CA)
is available for POCT and for at home testing (by prescription) and uses RT-LAMP
with a colorimetric (pH change) readout to detect down to 900 copies/ml in 30 min,
U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021b).
Helicase-dependent amplification (HDA) is an isothermal amplification chem-
istry that relies on the complementary strand displacing ability of DNA helicase,
Dunbar and Das (2019), Vincent et al. (2004). As with other isothermal amplifica-
tion methods, HDA assays are rapid, sensitive, inexpensive, and can be performed
without sophisticated instrumentation, Huang et al. (2013). The Solana SARS-CoV-
2 assay uses RT-HDA targeting the pp1ab region for detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA
through fluorescent detection and demonstrated a limit of detection (LoD) of 11,600
copies/ml.
Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats (CRISPR) are a fam-
ily of nucleic acid sequences found in prokaryotes which are recognised and cleaved
by a set of bacterial enzymes (e.g., Cas9, Cas12, andCas13), Carter et al. (2020). Spe-
cific enzymes within the Cas12 Rusk (2019) and Cas13 Freije et al. (2019) families
can be programmed to target and cut viral RNA sequences. CRISPR-based methods
use the specificity of the amplification primers and the guide RNA reporter detection,
enhancing specificity to the single nucleotide level, Khan et al. (2020). TwoCRISPR-
based assays have been developed which have received EUA for detection of SARS-
CoV-2 RNA in respiratory specimens, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021b).
Both assays are considered high complexity tests and require nucleic acid extrac-
tion. The Sherlock CRISPR SARS-CoV-2 assay (Sherlock Biosciences, Boston,
MA, USA) uses RT-LAMP followed by Cas13 cleavage of an activated CRISPR
complex within the amplified SARS-CoV-2 ORF1ab and N targets. Fluorophore-
labelled reporter RNA sequences are released, and the fluorescence is measured on
a plate reader. The test takes approximately 1 h (post-extraction) and has a reported
LoD of 6750 copies/ml. The second assay, the SARS-CoV-2 DETECTR Reagent
Kit (Mammoth Biosciences, San Francisco, CA, USA) relies on isothermal RT-
LAMP amplification of a SARS-CoV-2 N gene target, followed by Cas12 cleavage
of reporter RNA, resulting in a fluorescent readout. This assay has a reported LoD
of 20,000 copies/ml and takes approximately 45 min (post-extraction) to complete.
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10.3.3 Point-of-Care and Home Sample Collection
and Testing
As of March 5, 2021, eleven of the molecular EUA tests are Clinical Laboratory
Improvement Act (CLIA)-waived and available for use as POCTs and two of the
isothermal amplification assays are available for at home testing either over the
counter (Cue COVID-19 Test for Home and Over The Counter (OTC) Use) or by
prescription (LuciraCOVID-19All-In-OneTestKit).Additionally, dozens of devices
for home collection of nasal swab or saliva specimens are available for SARS-CoV-
2 molecular testing, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021b). POCTs, speci-
men self-collection, and at-home testing helps alleviate the burden on the healthcare
system and laboratory to accommodate the demand for testing under constrained
resources. Self-collection of specimens also eliminates direct interaction between
healthcare workers and patients, which may reduce the risk of exposure and spread.
10.3.4 Assay Selection
Which diagnostic test or tests that should be implemented for SARS-CoV-2 detec-
tion depends on a variety of factors, including the size of the population being served
and the prevalence of COVID-19 within that population, the capability of the testing
laboratory (i.e., high or moderate complexity testing), the required turnaround time
for results, and the availability of resources (reagents, consumables, and labor). Hav-
ing timely and accurate SARS-CoV-2 test results is crucial for reducing COVID-19
transmission and reducing the associated public health, economic, and social effects,
World Health Organization (2020a). Multiple strategies may be required to meet
the demand for testing and deliver results in a timely manner, such as a combina-
tion of high-throughput tests for high sample volumes and rapid sample-to-answer
systems to use between runs as more samples arrive. Supply chain issues with com-
mercial manufacturers may require implementation of multiple testing platforms to
mitigate backorder issues and have a sufficient supply of tests. Because availability
of COVID-19 diagnostic testing may be limited, the Infectious Diseases Society of
America (IDSA) developed a four-tiered testing algorithm to help clinicians priori-
tise COVID-19 diagnostic testing, Infectious Diseases Society of America (2020).
These recommendations are summarised in Table 10.3.
During the early phase of the COVID-19 pandemic, the immediate need for diag-
nostic tests led to the rapid design and development of hundreds of molecular and
immunoassay tests by many test manufacturers, Vandenberg et al. (2021). Most,
but not all, of these tests are standalone SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic assays targeting
one or more genes or proteins of the virus. As we move past one year since the
virus was first identified, and anticipate the need for long-term, routine testing, many
manufacturers have or are in the process of incorporating the SARS-CoV-2 target
into multi-analyte respiratory panels. This may better accommodate seasonal testing
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Table 10.3 IDSA four-tiered approach to COVID-19 diagnostic testing
Tier level Population
1 • Critically ill patients receiving ICU level care with unexplained viral pneumoniae
or respiratory failure, regardless of travel history or close contact with suspected or
confirmed COVID-1 patients
• Any person, including health care workers, with fever or signs/symptoms of a
lower respiratory tract illness and close contact with a laboratory-confirmed
COVID-19 patient within 14 days of symptom onset (including all residents at a
long-term care facility that has a laboratory-confirmed COVID-19 case)
• Any person, including health care workers, with fever or signs/symptoms of a
lower respiratory tract illness and a history of travel within 14 days of symptom onset
to geographical regions where sustained community transmission has been
identified; (iv) Individuals with fever or signs/symptoms of a lower respiratory tract
illness who are also immunosuppressed (including patients with HIV), elderly, or
have underlying chronic health conditions
• Individuals with fever or signs/symptoms of a lower respiratory tract illness who
are critical to pandemic response, including health care workers, public health
officials and other essential leaders
2 • Hospitalized (non-ICU) patients and long-term care residents with unexplained
fever and signs/symptoms of a lower respiratory tract illness. The number of
confirmed COVID-19 cases in the community should be considered. As testing
becomes more widely available, routine testing of hospitalized patients may be
important for infection prevention and management of discharge
3 • Patients in outpatient settings who meet the criteria for influenza testing. This
includes individuals with co-morbid conditions including diabetes, COPD,
congestive heart failure, age >50, immunocompromised hosts among others. Given
limited available data, testing of pregnant women and symptomatic children with
similar risk factors for complications is encouraged. The number of confirmed
COVID-19 cases in the community should be considered
4 • For community surveillance as directed by public health and/or infectious diseases
authorities
Modified from Lu et al. (2020b) and updated in March 2021
when there is overlap with other pathogens, such as influenza and RSV, and identify
SARS-CoV-2 as the causative agent in future waves or regional outbreaks.
10.3.5 Pooled Screen Testing
Apooled specimen testing strategy to expand diagnostic or screening testing capacity
can be useful to preserve resources in settings where the prevalence is low, Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (2020a). A 10:1 pooled test strategy on-site at
an airport of China was pursued, resulting in increased test throughput, limited use
of reagents, and increased testing efficiency without loss of sensitivity. This testing
approach has the potential to reduce the need for contact tracing when the results are
delivered first time, Li et al. (2020a). When a pooled test result is negative, all spec-
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imens in the pool can be presumed negative and further testing is not required. But,
when the pool test result is positive or indeterminant, all specimens in the pool must
be retested individually. This strategy can help preserve testing resources, reduce the
time to result, and lower the overall testing cost. Three of the EUA SARS-CoV-2
molecular tests have been approved for pooled sample testing (5–8 specimens/pool)
in high complexity laboratories (Table 10.2). Pooled testing is discussed in detail
in the following chapter, “Pooled testing in the COVID-19 Pandemic” by Matthew
Aldridge and David Ellis.
10.3.6 Viral Load Testing
Several studies have shown a correlation between SARS-CoV-2 viral load, days
from symptom onset, and COVID-19 disease severity, suggesting that viral load
might be used for risk stratification of COVID-19 patients, Cevik et al. (2021), Pan
et al. (2020), To et al. (2020), Fajnzylber et al. (2020). Real-time RT-PCR cycle
threshold (Ct) values represent the number of amplification cycles required for the
target amplicon to exceed a threshold level and are thus inversely related to viral
load. While Ct values can provide an indirect measure of the viral load in the sample,
it is also influenced by the amplification efficiency of the specific assay, the quality
of the specimen, and the sample matrix, Bustin and Mueller (2005). Ct cutoff values
are established by the test manufacturer during validation and are then verified by the
implementing laboratory for their specific laboratory setting. The current real-time
RT-PCR assays for SARS-CoV-2 are qualitative but some have advocated for the
reporting of the Ct and reference ranges (low, medium, high) with the result, Tom
and Mina (2020), and some states in the U.S. are requiring laboratories to report
the Ct values, Florida Department of Health (2020). However, it’s unclear how Ct
values should be applied in clinical settings with no standardisation across platforms,
nor clinical studies validating use of Ct to guide management of COVID-19 cases,
American Association for Clinical Chemistry (2020).
10.4 Laboratory Diagnosis: Post-analytical Issues
In the post-analytical stage, test results should be carefully interpreted using both
molecular and serological findings. Test result interpretation is summarised in Table
10.4.
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Table 10.4 General molecular and serology test result interpretation in COVID-19
RNA IgM IgG Interpretation
+ – – Patient in the two-week period prior to immune response
+ + – Patient in early infection
+ – + Patient in mid to late infection; confirmation if IgG titer in
convalescence is 4 times higher than acute phase
+ + + Patient in active infection with decent immune response
– + – Patient has active infection with a false-negative RNA assay
– – + Patient with previous infection; virus has been cleared
– + + Patient with recent infection and in convalescence; virus has
been cleared; active infection with false-negative RNA assay
Modified from Lu et al. (2020b) and updated in March 2021
10.5 Interpretation of Serology Results
As previouslymentioned, many serologic assays have received emergency authorisa-
tion for the detection of antibodies (IgM, IgG, Total) produced during SARS-CoV-2
infection, U.S. Food and Drug Administration (2021b). These tests are available
in a variety of formats, from simple lateral flow immunoassay to ELISA, chemilu-
minescent immunoassays, and even T-cell receptor beta NGS to detect an adaptive
T-cell immune response to SARS-CoV-2. Serological test results, in combination
with SARS-CoV-2 RNA test results, can be helpful in determining at what stage in
the course of infection the patient is in. For example, a positive RNA result with
no antibody present would indicate an early infection, prior to development of an
immune response. Positive RNA with positive IgM, IgG, or both can differentiate
an early, mid to late, or active infection with a high immune response, respectively.
Negative RNA with positive antibody can indicate a recent or previous infection, or
a false negative RNA test result.
Several studies have shown that most individuals produce antibodies by day 5-8 of
symptom onset and that an immune response can also be measured in asymptomatic
individuals with positive or negative RNA test results, Zhang et al. (2020), Hung et al.
(2020). Therefore, serological tests can be valuable for confirming the diagnosis of
COVID-19 and will play an important role in the epidemiology of COVID-19 and
determining the immune status of asymptomatic patients, but are unlikely to be
useful for screening or diagnosis of early infections, Tang et al. (2020), Zhang et al.
(2020). However, a combination of RT-PCR and serology could be implemented for
case finding and contact tracing to expedite early diagnosis, isolation for infection
control, and treatment, Hung et al. (2020). As more individuals are vaccinated for
COVID-19, serological assays that measure antibody responses to multiple antigens,
such as S/RBD and N, will be useful for differentiating past infection from vaccine
response.
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10.5.1 Interpretation of Molecular Results
Molecular assays for detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA are the most used and most
reliable test for COVID-19 diagnosis. Detection is unlikely early in infection, before
symptom onset, but likely detected in the first 4 weeks after symptom onset, Sethu-
raman et al. (2020). However, viral RNA but may persist longer in lower respiratory
tract samples and may continue to be shed in stool. It is important to recognise that
a positive RNA test result does not indicate viability or infectivity of SARS-CoV-2.
False-negative test results may occur primarily due to inappropriate timing of sample
collection and/or inadequate sampling technique. False-positive results are typically
due to technical errors and or contamination. Most of the molecular assays have a
specificity of 100%because the primer design is specific to the SARS-CoV-2 genome
sequence but should be monitored by in silico analysis as new variants are identified
and sequenced.
A systematic review of the literature found that 89% of nasopharyngeal samples
were RT-PCR positive at 0–4 days post-symptom onset while 81% were positive at
0–4 days post-hospitalisation, but dropped to 54% at 10–14 days post-symptoms and
45% at 10–14 days post-admission, Mallett et al. (2020). Intermittent false negative
results occurred when the level of virus is close to the limit of detection of the
assay. Several studies have investigated the relationship between the viral load and
pathogenesis, disease progression, and mortality, Fajnzylber et al. (2020), Pujadas
et al. (2020). Some published reports support the conversion of qualitative RT-PCR
testing to quantitative viral load measurements, to assist with early risk stratification
in COVID-19; however, more work is needed to assess the correlation of viral load
with other disease biomarkers and clinical features to possibly develop algorithms
to predict infectivity and risk.
10.5.2 Tests Beyond Detection and Diagnosis
In addition to disease diagnosis, laboratory testing and the measurement of appro-
priate biomarkers play a critical role in managing patients with COVID-19. Multi-
plicity of pathologic features can be used to characterise severe disease in patients
with COVID-19. These include the cytokine release syndrome, downregulation of
adaptive cellular immunity, increased thrombotic risk, lung and acute kidney dys-
function, and cardiomyocyte injury. Several types of biomarkers have been described
for monitoring progression, prognostication, prediction of treatment response, and
risk stratification, Weidmann et al. (2021). One good example is to use biomarkers
to identify patients who potentially respond to a particular therapy, such as IL-6 for
tocilizumab, Harwood et al. (2021).
Improving patient outcomes will require earlier detection of these issues, targeted
treatments, and appropriate triage of patients, particularly those who are susceptible
to the most severe course of this disease. Monitoring patients with resolution of
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COVID-19 pneumonia may also be important in terms of when they should be
discharged from the hospital. Two consecutive negative RT-PCR tests to cease self-
quarantine/return to work has been suggested, but this has not been recommended
by the U.S. CDC, Tang et al. (2020). Random-access, integrated devices available
at the point of care with scalable capacities will facilitate the rapid diagnosis and
monitoring of SARS-CoV-2 infection status and control the spread of the virus as
test of infectivity/isolation, Lu et al. (2020b).
10.6 Concluding Remarks
Researchers are focusing on developing rapid and efficient methods for laboratory
diagnosis and monitoring of SARS-CoV2 infections. In the preanalytical stage, col-
lecting the proper respiratory tract specimen at the right time from the right anatomic
site is essential for a prompt and accurate molecular diagnosis of COVID-19. Appro-
priate measures are required to keep laboratory staff safe while producing reliable
test results. In the analytic stage, while real-time RT-PCR assays remain the test of
choice for the etiologic diagnosis of SARS-CoV-2 infection, several new platforms
using isothermal amplification and CRISPR detection are gradually becoming avail-
able. In the postanalytical stage, testing results should be carefully interpreted using
bothmolecular and serological findings. Finally, in addition to disease diagnosis, lab-
oratory testing and the measurement of appropriate biomarkers play a critical role
in managing patients with COVID-19, including monitoring disease progression,
prognostication, prediction of treatment response, and risk stratification.
In preparation for future pandemics, the rapid identification, isolation, and
genomic sequencing of the causative pathogen is critical for fast development and
implementation of diagnostic tests in the clinical laboratory, as well as for the devel-
opment of vaccines, particularly recombinant and nucleic acid-based vaccines. In
addition to diagnostic tests, tests for epidemiology and surveillance and immune
monitoring are critically important for following the progression of a pandemic in
real-time and determining the efficacy of public healthmeasures to prevent the spread
and bring the pandemic under control. Understanding the immune response and the
variation in immune response to the pathogen is also vital to help develop appro-
priate treatments and therapeutic agents to alleviate the symptoms, pathology, and
long-term effects of the disease.
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Chapter 11
Pooled Testing and Its Applications in the
COVID-19 Pandemic
Matthew Aldridge and David Ellis
Abstract When testing for a disease such as COVID-19, the standard method is
individual testing: we take a sample from each individual and test these samples
separately. An alternative is pooled testing (or ‘group testing’), where samples are
mixed together in different pools, and those pooled samples are tested. When the
prevalence of the disease is low and the accuracy of the test is fairly high, pooled
testing strategies can be more efficient than individual testing. In this chapter, we
discuss themathematics of pooled testing and its uses during pandemics, in particular
the COVID-19 pandemic. We analyse some one- and two-stage pooling strategies
under perfect and imperfect tests, and consider the practical issues in the application
of such protocols.
11.1 Introduction
When testing for a disease such as COVID-19, the standardmethod is individual test-
ing: we take a sample from each individual and test these samples separately. Under
the convenient mathematical model of perfect testing, a sample from an infected
individual always gives a positive result, while a sample from a noninfected individ-
ual always gives a negative result. For N individuals, this requires N tests, and we
can accurately classify all the individuals as infected or noninfected. The infected
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individuals can be advised to self-isolate and their contacts can be traced, while the
noninfected individuals are reassured that they are free of the disease.
An alternative to individual testing is pooled testing, also called group testing.
Instead of testing individual samples, we can instead pool samples together and
test that pooled sample. Again under the convenient model of perfect testing, a
pool consisting entirely of uninfected samples gives a negative result, while a pool
containing one ormore infected samples gives a positive result. Thus a negative result
demonstrates that every individual in the pool is noninfected, while a positive result
requires further information to work out which individuals in the pools are infected.
As we shall see in this chapter, when the prevalence of a disease is low enough and
the accuracyof a test is high enough, pooled testing can accurately classify individuals
as infected or noninfected in fewer than N tests. This can be more efficient—and
often much more efficient—than individual testing.
This chapter is structured as follows. In the remainder of this section, we introduce
background material. In Sect. 11.2, we analyse some algorithms for pooled testing
under an idealised model of perfect tests. In Sect. 11.3, we adapt this analysis to
more realistic models of testing with errors. In Sect. 11.4, we discuss some practical
issues/problems with the application of pooled testing for COVID-19. In Sect. 11.5,
we survey some uses of pooled testing during the pandemic, so far. In Sect. 11.6,
we conclude, and give some of our own views on potential applications of pooled
testing for COVID-19.
11.1.1 Testing for COVID-19
As well as discussing the general theory of pooled testing, much of this chapter
concerns applications of pooled testing in the COVID-19 pandemic, so we proceed
to give some background on the existing tests for detecting current SARS-CoV-2
infection.
In the real world, testing is not perfect. We distinguish between two types of test
errors:
• False positive test errors, where a sample (individual or pool) that does not contain
any infection wrongly gives a positive result. The probability that an infection-free
sample correctly gives a negative result is called the specificity.
• False negative test errors, where a sample (individual or pool) that does contain
infection wrongly gives a negative result. The probability that an infected sample
correctly gives a positive result is called the sensitivity.
The most commonly used test for current SARS-CoV-2 infection is the RT-PCR
test (reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction test, or just ‘PCR test’ for short).
A PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 infection typically works as follows. First, a swab is
taken from the nose or upper throat of the individual to be tested. The swab is then
sent to a laboratory, where material from the swab analysed to find out whether it
contains genetic material from the SARS-CoV-2 virus. We refer the reader to the
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previous chapter of this book, by Dunbar and Tang, for more details. The process
typically takes from four to six hours from the receipt of the swab until the output of
the result, depending on the laboratory (Mahase 2020).
The PCR test is very highly specific, with specificity estimated at ranging from
97.4 to 99.98% (Skitrall et al. 2021), meaning that false positive test errors are
extremely rare. (The tests used in the UK’s ONS Coronavirus Infection Survey, for
example, have a specificity of more than 99.92%; see Office for National Statistics
(2020).) On the other hand, the PCR test is onlymoderately sensitive, with sensitivity
in the range 70–90% being typical (Böger et al. 2021; Woloshin et al. 2020). The
sensitivity depends on the laboratory protocol being used, and can be affected by
shortages of reagent or improper procedures. Another significant source of insen-
sitivity is improperly taken swabs; this can depend on the level of training of the
person taking the swabs, so sensitivity can be lower in community settings than in
healthcare settings (Watson andWhiting 2020). Sensitivity for a given individual also
depends on the viral load and the how long after illness onset the swab was taken.
The mathematical lesson from all this is that a negative test does not definitively rule
out the individual being infected.
Another test for SARS-CoV-2 infection is the RT-LAMP (reverse transcription
loop-mediated isothermal reaction) test. Pooled testing can certainly be used with
RT-LAMP tests; however, they are not yet widely available, so we will focus our
attention here on PCR tests when discussing COVID-related applications of pooled
testing.
A third test is the lateral flow test, which at the time of writing is being used in the
UK for mass-testing in certain areas (such as areas where there is high prevalence, or
where certain new variants of SARS-CoV-2 have been detected), and for the regular
screening of secondary-school pupils (with pupils being asked to self-test twice per
week, at home, from theweek beginning 15March 2021). Lateral flow testing kits are
cheap, easily portable, require little training to use, and produce a result in around 30
min; on the flip side, they have much lower sensitivity than PCR tests. For example,
in a large pilot study in the city of Liverpool, the sensitivity of community-based
lateral flow testing was estimated at 48.9% (95% CI: 33.7–64.2%) (García-Fiñana
et al. 2020). We believe that pooled testing is unlikely to be compatible with the
lateral flow testing programme in the UK, in view of the low sensitivity of the test,
the level of training of those administering the tests, and the premium placed on rapid
turnaround time.
Much of our analysis in this chapter is applicable to testing for other pandemic
diseases, such as pandemic influenza, sometimes with adjustments to the assumed
sensitivities and specificities of the tests being used. In particular, the mathematical
models used are independent of the disease in question, though the assumptions may
bemore or less appropriate in the case of other diseases. For example, if very accurate
and rapid tests are available for a certain pandemic disease, then pooled testing
algorithms with more than two sequential stages may be well worth considering, as
they can yield even greater resource-savings than pooled testing algorithms with one
or two stages.
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11.1.2 Stages of a Pooled Testing Algorithm
Pooled testing was first proposed in 1943 by Dorfman (1943) for the detection of
cases of syphilis in those called up for US army service during the Second World
War. (The textbook of Du and Hwang (2020, Chap. 1) gives more information about
the early history of pooled testing.) Dorfman’s algorithm is perhaps the simplest of
all pooled testing algorithms, and has also been the most widely-used one in disease
control, both prior to and during the COVID-19 pandemic. It proceeds as follows.
We assume for the moment that tests are perfectly accurate, with 100% sensitivity
and 100% specificity.
Suppose we have N individuals, and we wish to identify who among those N
individuals is infected.
1. We choose a pool size s, and we divide the N individuals into N/s disjoint groups
of size s each. (We assume, for simplicity, that N is an exact multiple of s.) We
take a sample from each of the N individuals, and then, for each of the N/s
groups, we pool the samples from that group into a single pooled sample. We
then run a test on each of the N/s pooled samples.
2. a. If a pool tests negative, we know all the individuals in the corresponding group
are noninfected.
b. If a pool tests positive, we then follow up by individually test all the individ-
uals in the corresponding group. These individual tests discover which of the
samples in the pool were infected or noninfected.
At the endof this process, under our perfect testingmodel,wehave correctly classified
all the individuals as infected or noninfected. This is illustrated in Fig. 11.1, in the
case N = 15 and s = 5.
Fig. 11.1 Schematic illustration of the use ofDorfman’s algorithm (under perfect testing) to identify
all the infected individuals in a group of 15, using pools of size 5. In the above case, there are two
infected individuals, and only eight tests are required to identify them. If the two infected individuals
had been in different pools at the first step, then 13 tests would have been required
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We shall see later that:
• Under perfect testing, if the prevalence is lower than 30%, then Dorfman’s algo-
rithm uses fewer than N tests on average, so is more efficient than individual
testing. (See Sect. 11.2.3.)
• Under perfect testing, the optimal pool size s is easy to calculate, and is approxi-
mately s = 1/√p, where p is the prevalence of the disease. (See Sect. 11.2.1 for
the formal definition of prevalence.)
• Even under imperfect noisy testing, Dorfman’s algorithm can be more efficient
than individual testing for sufficiently low prevalence. (See Sect. 11.3.2.)
• For even lower prevalence and higher accuracy, other pooled testing algorithms
cannot only outperform individual testing but outperform Dorfman’s algorithm as
well. (See Sects. 11.2.4, 11.2.5, and 11.3.2.)
Note that individual testing is a one-stage or nonadaptive algorithm, in that all the
tests are designed in advance andcanbe carriedout in parallel.Meanwhile,Dorfman’s
algorithm is a two-stage algorithm: the first stage of pooled tests is designed in
advance and carried out in parallel, but then the results must be analysed before
designing and carrying out the follow-up individual tests in a second stage. There
are also pooled testing algorithms with more than two stages. There is typically a
tradeoff between the number of stages and the efficiency of the algorithm—more
stages allows one to use fewer tests, but more stages take more laboratory time.
It is estimated that approximately 70% (95% CI: 52–90%) of the transmission
of COVID-19 typically takes place either before symptom onset or in the first 48 h
after symptom onset (see He et al. (2020), and the very slight correction in Ashcroft
et al. (2020)). Hence, a fast turnaround time is an important factor to consider when
choosing which protocol to use for case detection. If the tests were to have a very
rapid processing time, it might be possible to use algorithms with many stages.
However, as stated above, PCR tests for COVID-19 typically have a processing-time
of four to six hours. It is likely that many laboratories worldwide will be able to
perform two sequential stages in a 24-h period (for logistical reasons, a turnaround
time of less than 24 h from swabbing to result announcement is often hard to achieve
anyway), but adding more sequential stages may increase turnaround time too much.
Moreover, laboratories under pressure may struggle to keep track of samples over
more than two sequential stages. For these reasons, we focus our attention in this
chapter on pooled testing algorithms with at most two sequential stages. For the state
of the art in fully adaptive algorithms, with no limit on the number of stages, see
Aldridge (2019), as surveyed in Aldridge (2019, Sect. 5.5).
For a more comprehensive (but pre-pandemic) surveys of the mathematics of
pooled testing, we refer the reader to Aldridge et al. (2019), Du and Hwang (2020).
In this chapter, we only consider pooled testing where each test-result is simply
either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’. A different form of pooled testing is where an attempt
is made to measure how much viral RNA is present in each pooled sample, and to
make use of this information; this is known as quantitative pooled testing, or quanti-
tative group testing, and it is a special case of the well-studied ‘compressed sensing’
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problem. For a comprehensive introduction to the mathematics of compressed sens-
ing, with emphasis on algorithms, the reader is referred to Foucart andRauhut (2013).
For an account of a protocol for using quantitative pooled testing for COVID-19 case
identification, the reader is referred to Ghosh et al. (2020).
11.1.3 Who and Why to Test
There are two different potential applications of pooled testing for a pandemic dis-
eases such as COVID-19. The first application, which we have discussed so far, is
for case identification, where it is desired to identify which members of a group are
infected, for the purposes of infection-control. There is also a second application,
for surveillance, where the goal is only to estimate the infection prevalence, without
necessarily identifying which individuals are those infected.
In this chapter, we focus mainly on the first application, for case identification, as
we believe this is where the most useful applications of pooled testing for COVID-
19 are most likely to be found. Briefly, we believe that in the UK, for example, the
utility of pooled testing for surveillance on a national scale may be limited in the
medium term, because, first, the UK already has a well-developed and extensive
national surveillance programmes based on individual testing using random popu-
lation sampling, such as the ONS Coronavirus Infection Survey, and second, using
pooled testing for surveillance only yields large efficiency gains over individual test-
ing when prevalence is lower than it has often been in the UK since the start of
the pandemic. Pooled testing for surveillance does, however, still have some poten-
tial utility—for example, if prevalence in the UK becomes sufficiently low and it is
desired to reduce the resource requirements of the ONS Infection Survey while still
monitoring the prevalence of infection. It is also quite possible that pooled testing
could be useful for the surveillance of new variants of the coronavirus, which is
important in view of the risks posed by the latter to the effectiveness of vaccination
programmes. We return to these issues in Sect. 11.6.
We also draw a distinction between testing symptomatic people, among whom
the prevalence is likely to be high, and testing asymptomatic people, where the
prevalence is likely to be lower. As we shall argue in Sect. 11.6, we believe that
pooled testing for case identification is most likely to be useful for the screening of
asymptomatic people—and possibly for the testing of contacts of confirmed cases,
provided the prevalence of infection among the group to be tested is thought to be
sufficiently low. On the other hand, we believe that pooled testing is unlikely to be
useful for the testing of symptomatic people, because the prevalence of COVID-
19 infection among those presenting symptoms is usually sufficiently high that the
resource savings of pooled testing would be modest compared to individual testing,
and are arguably outweighed by the down-sides of pooled testing, such as increased
turnaround time compared to individual testing.
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11.2 Pooled Testing Algorithms for Perfect Tests
11.2.1 Outline and Model
In this section, we look at some algorithms for pooled testing for a disease, and
assess their performance under the mathematically convenient model of perfect test
results. (Later, in Sect. 11.3, we look at the performance of these algorithms in the
more realistic model of tests that are highly-but-imperfectly specific and moderately
sensitive.)
Unsurprisingly, a key quantity in our model is the prevalence of the disease,
denoted by p: this is the fraction of individuals in the population in question, who
are infected with the disease, at the time when testing is being done. Equivalently,
it is the probability that an individual selected at random from the population, is
infected.
Weassume that N individuals are being tested, and that these individuals are drawn
from a large population. Each member of the population is assumed to be infected
with probability p (where p is the prevalence, as defined above), independently of all
othermembers of the population. (This independence assumption is not quite realistic
in many settings, since some of the individuals being tested will often be contacts of
one another, so clustering can occur. However, as we shall see, clustering actually
makes pooled testing algorithms more efficient than if clustering is not present.)
Assuming that tests are perfect, we usually aim to correctly classify all N individ-
uals as infected or noninfected. We often summarise the performance of algorithms
through the expected tests per individual. If an algorithm uses a (possibly random)
number of tests T to classify N individuals as either ‘infected’ or ‘non-infected’, then
the expected tests per individual is (ET )/N , where ET denotes the expectation (or
mean, or average) of the random variable T . Clearly, it is desirable for the expected
tests per individual to be as small as possible. Note that individual testing clearly
has (ET )/N = N/N = 1. The expected tests per individual is useful for comparing
how much better (or worse) an algorithm is than individual testing.
A standard information-theoretic bound called the counting bound (see, for exam-
ple, Aldridge (2019), Aldridge et al. (2019), Baldassini et al. (2013)) states that, for





Here, p is the prevalence of the disease, and H(p) is the binary entropy function,
defined by
H(p) = p log2
1
p
+ (1 − p) log2
1
1 − p .
The bound (11.1) immediately implies that, when the prevalence is high enough,
pooled testing cannot significantly outperform individual testing (under the model of
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perfect tests). For example, when the prevalence of infection in the population being
tested is 20% (p = 0.2), we have H(0.2) ≈ 0.72, and therefore no pooled testing
algorithm can use less than 72% of the number of tests per individual required by
individual testing, at this prevalence level (under the model of perfect tests). In fact,
a deeper mathematical result of Fischer et al. (1999) states that (under the model
of perfect tests), individual testing is optimal among all pooled testing algorithms
whenever the prevalence is at most 38.2% (p ≤ 0.382).
It is useful to consider, for different pooled testing algorithms, how close their
‘expected tests per individual’ is to the counting bound (11.1), at different prevalence
levels, under the model of perfect tests, and this is what we shall do in this section.
In this section, we study the following four classes of pooled testing algorithms:
• individual testing;
• Dorfman’s algorithm, where each individual’s sample appears in exactly one pool,
in the first stage;
• grid-based designs, where each individual’s sample appears in exactly two pools,
in the first stage;
• (r, s)-regular designs, where each individual’s sample appears in exactly r pools
in the first stage, each pool containing s samples.
Figure 11.2 shows the performance of these algorithms (with the grid and (r, s)-
regular methods algorithms in what we will later call their ‘conservative two-stage’
variants—see Sect. 11.2.4.1). The top subfigure shows the expected tests per item,
and indicates the potential benefit of using pooled testing (compared to individual
testing) when the prevalence is below 20%.
However, this top subfigure does not sufficiently convey the difference between







The rate measures how close an algorithm gets to the counting bound (11.1)—
higher rates are better. (We remark that the rate can also be interpreted information-
theoretically, as the number of bits of information learned per test. See for example
Aldridge et al. (2019), Baldassini et al. (2013).) The rate illustrates better the com-
parison between the different pooling methods, and shows the advantage of the
(r, s)-regular design at very low prevalences (e.g., below 2%).
11.2.2 Individual Testing
Clearly, the individual testing of N individuals requires T = N tests, yielding an
expected number of tests per individual equal to T/N = N/N = 1.
An obvious advantage of individual testing is that one does not need an estimate of
the prevalence. It is a one-stage algorithm, so has the fastest possible turnaround time.
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Fig. 11.2 Performance of one- and two-stage group testing algorithms under perfect testing, as
measured by a the expected tests per item, and b the rate. ‘Grid’ and ‘(r, s)-regular’ refer to the
conservative two-stage variants. At all but the lowest prevalences, the (r, s) regular design has
optimal parameter r = 1, so is equivalent to Dorfman’s algorithm, or r = 2, and is equivalent to
the grid algorithm
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It is also the simplest testing algorithm to implement. However, we will see that other
algorithms yield huge resource savings over individual testing, at low prevalence-
levels, and are therefore well worth considering, when prevalence is fairly low and
testing capacity is constrained.
11.2.3 Dorfman’s Algorithm
In Sect. 11.1.2, we introduced Dorfman’s original two-stage algorithm. In this
section, we discuss it in more detail.
Suppose we receive samples from N individuals in a large population where the
prevalence of infection is p, and we run Dorfman’s algorithm on these N individuals,
using pools of size s ≥ 2, where N is assumed to be a multiple of s. Clearly, one test
for each pool is always used at the first pooled testing stage. A pool will also require
an extra s individual tests in the second stage if the pooled test was positive. The
pooled test will be positive unless all s items are noninfected, so the probability it
will test positive is 1 − (1 − p)s . So for each of the N/s pools we definitely have 1
pooled test, thenwith probability 1 − (1 − p)s another s individual tests are required,








+ 1 − (1 − p)s
)
N .





+ 1 − (1 − p)s .
It is easy to check that s = 2 is never the best choice of pool size s, but that s = 3
improves on individual testing for p < 1 − (1/3)1/3 = 0.307. That is, Dorfman’s
algorithm improves on individual testing for prevalences below roughly 30%.
If the prevalence p is known accurately beforehand, we should choose the pool
size s so as to minimise the quantity 1/s + 1 − (1 − p)s , and thereby minimise the
expected number of tests required. For fixed p, the function s → 1/s + 1 − (1 −
p)s is very well-behaved, and it is very easy to numerically find the integer s that




+ 1 − (1 − p)s ≈ 1
s
+ 1 − (1 − ps) = 1
s
+ ps,
which is minimised over the reals at s = 1/√p. This gives an expected tests per
individual of approximately 2
√
p. More formally, choosing s = 1/√p	 yields that
the expected number of tests per individual is 1/s + 1 − (1 − p)s = 2√p + O(p),
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Table 11.1 Resource requirements of using Dorfman’s algorithm to test N individuals, at different
prevalence levels, with tests of perfect sensitivity and specificity
Prevalence p (%) Dorfman’s algorithm







where the error term O(p) is small compared to
√
p when p is small. Hence, when
p is small, a good estimate for p is known beforehand, and the pool-size s is chosen
sensibly, our model predicts that Dorfman’s algorithm uses, on average, approxi-
mately 2
√
pN tests to identify all the infected individuals among a population of
size N .
Table 11.1 shows the predicted resource requirements (under the simple model
above, i.e., perfect tests), of using Dorfman’s algorithm to test N individuals, at dif-
ferent prevalence levels, when the prevalence level is known accurately beforehand,
and the pool-size s is chosen optimally.
There are shortcomings in this analysis. We mention three here. Firstly, tests used
in the real world do not have perfect sensitivity or perfect specificity; we will refine
the model to take this into account, in the following section.
Secondly, an accurate estimate for the prevalence may not be known beforehand,
so it may not be possible to choose the pool size s optimally beforehand. We return
to this issue in Sect. 11.4.
Thirdly, the independence assumption may fail because infections of different
individuals being tested by the laboratory are unlikely to be truly independent. But if
the overall prevalence remains the same, then Dorfman’s algorithm will not perform
any worse than the above analysis predicts. In fact, it is advantageous in terms of
resource requirements if there is a ‘clustering’ of infected individuals in the same
pool. In terms of resource use, the worst case for Dorfman’s algorithm is when
infected individuals are spread betweenmany pool, and the best-case iswhen infected
individuals are concentrated in few pools.
11.2.4 Grid Algorithms
In Dorfman’s algorithm, each individual was tested once in the first stage. In a family
of algorithms called grid algorithms, each item is tested twice in the first stage. One
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variant attempts to classify samples as infected or noninfected just from this single
stage, while other variants follow up with a second stage of individual testing.
11.2.4.1 Variants of Grid Algorithms
The grid algorithms always begin as follows. Suppose we have N individuals to test.
We split these into N/s2 groups each of s2. (We assume for simplicity that N is a
multiple of s2.) Let us concentrate on a single group. Each of the s2 individuals is
swabbed, and the sample from each swab is divided in two, so it can later be a part of
two different sample pools. We now picture the s2 individuals as laid out on a s × s
grid. In the first stage we conduct 2s pooled tests: we make one pool from each of
the s rows of the grid, and one pool from each of the s columns. A PCR test is run
on each of these sample pools.
We assume, again, that tests are perfectly accurate. What can we learn from these
results of these pooled tests?
Case 0: If none of the s2 individuals are infected, then all 2s tests will be negative.
We can confidently state that all the samples are noninfected.
Case 1: If exactly one out of the s2 individuals is infected, then exactly one row
test and one column test will be positive. We can confidently state that the
individual at the intersection of that row and column in the grid is infected
and that all the other individuals are noninfected.
Case 2: If two or more of the s2 individuals are infected, then the test results may
be ambiguous. If we are lucky, it could be that all the infected individuals
are in the same row or the same column of the grid, in which case they can
be identified with complete confidence—we call this Case 2A—but more
often we cannot be certain exactly which individuals are infected—we call
this Case 2B.
What should one do after receiving the pooled test results? Here, we briefly look
at three possible choices, leading to three different variants of the grid algorithm:
• One-stage grid algorithm: In the one-stage variant, we do not perform any follow-
up tests. Any individual that was in at least one negative-testing pool is confidently
declared to be noninfected. In Cases 0, 1 or 2A, the remaining individuals (i.e.,
those who appeared in two positive-testing pools) can be confidently declared to
be infected, whereas in Case 2B, the remaining individuals are declared to have
unclear results. Running just one single stage has the benefit that a laboratory can
quickly process the results, but the downside of sometimes producing inconclusive
results.
• Standard two-stage grid algorithm: In this variant, we can run a second stage of
individual testing, to clear up ambiguous results, if there are any. That is, in Cases
0, 1 or 2A, the algorithm is exactly the same as the one-stage grid algorithm above,
but in Case 2B, all individuals who were not in at least one negative-testing pool,
are given an individual test in the second stage; those who test negative are then
declared negative, and those who test positive are declared positive.
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Table 11.2 Resource requirements of using two variants of the grid algorithm at different preva-
lence levels, with tests of perfect sensitivity and specificity. In the one-stage variant, parameters are
chosen such that each grid of s2 individuals is correctly classified with probability at least 0.99. A
dash—means that the method is worse than individual testing
Prevalence p (%) One-stage grid algorithm Conservative two-stage grid algorithm
Optimal s Tests per ind. Optimal s Exp. tests per ind.
5 – – 9 0.38
2 – – 16 0.21
1 3 0.67 25 0.14
0.5 5 0.40 38 0.086
0.2 8 0.25 68 0.047
0.1 11 0.18 106 0.030
• Conservative two-stage grid algorithm: Alternatively, we can run a second stage
where all individuals that appeared in two positive-testing pools are given an
individual test—even in Case 1 or Case 2A, where the infected individuals can
be logically determined after the first stage. This has the advantage that every
infected individual can be definitely confirmed as infected by the ‘gold standard’
of an individual (non-pooled) PCR test, which might be personally reassuring for
the individual or their employer, beneficial when tests are imperfect, or required
by regulators. Two-stage algorithms where infection must be confirmed with an
individual test are often known in the literature as trivial two-stage algorithms,
but in this chapter we will use the term conservative two-stage algorithm, as it
is more descriptive. Conservative two-stage algorithms can be easier to analyse
mathematically, than the standard two-stage ones.)
In real-life situations, when using the one-stage variant of the grid algorithm, one
must make a decision on what to do with individuals with an inconclusive result.
One option would be to inform all those individuals they should self-isolate as a
precaution; another option would be to individually re-test each of them at a later
date (effectively running a two-stage algorithmwith a delayed second stage); another
optionwould be to restart the testing from scratchwith different grids; amore reckless
option would be to inform all the individuals being tested that the test results were
inconclusive and that they should continue their lives as if they had tested negative.
Which option the laboratory or the regulatory authorities choose may depend on the
impact of letting an infection go undetected: if the individual in question is a school
pupil or amember of the general community in amass-testing programme, the impact
is likely to be much less than if the individual is a healthcare worker working with
highly vulnerable patients or a resident-facing social care worker, for example.
In the next subsection, we give a brief analysis of the conservative two-stage
variant of the grid algorithm, under our convenient assumption that the tests are
perfectly accurate. We summarise these results in Table 11.2.
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11.2.4.2 An Analysis of the Conservative Two-Stage Grid Algorithm
Recall that in the conservative two-stage variant of the grid algorithm, every indi-
vidual in two positive pooled tests receives an individual test. Our analysis here is
similar to that in Aldridge (2020), Broder and Kumar (2020).
For each of the N/s2 grids of s2 individuals, there are 2s pooled tests in the first
stage. An individual can then receive an individual test for one of two reasons. One is
that the individual is infected, which occurs with probability p. The second is that the
individual is uninfected (which occurs with probability q = 1 − p), and that further,
its row contains an infected individual (this happens with probability 1 − qs−1), and
its column also contains an infected individual (this also happens with probability
1 − qs−1).








+ p + q(1 − qs−1)2
)
,
and the expected tests per individual is (ET )/N = 2s + p + q(1 − qs−1)2.
As before, given the prevalence p, this is a well-behaved function of s, so it is easy
to numerically choose the optimal s. Results were shown in Table 11.2 above, and
far outperform the one-stage variant when a second stage is available. Comparing
with Table 11.1, we see that the conservative two-stage grid algorithm also outper-
forms Dorfman’s algorithm for the values of p under consideration, though not by
more than a factor of approximately two, for these values of p. We note, however,
that the optimal choice of s (the pool-size in the conservative two-stage grid algo-
rithm) for p = 0.1%, is 106, and large pool-sizes do have practical down-sides (usu-
ally requiring automation, reducing sensitivity, and posing regulatory problems—see
Sect. 11.4).
From a more mathematical perspective, a similar approximation to that for Dorf-
man’s algorithm shows that, for small p, the optimal s is of the order 1/p2/3; this
yields an expected number of tests per individual of the order p2/3. For p sufficiently
small, this is an improvement on Dorfman’s algorithm (where the expected number
of tests per individual is of the order p1/2).
11.2.5 Pooling Algorithms Based on (r, s)-Regular Designs
The (r, s)-regular designs are a family of algorithms that generalise the algorithmswe
have seen so far. These algorithms have a first stage where each individual’s sample
appears in exactly r different pools, and each pool contains samples from exactly
s individuals. The second stage (if there is a second stage) consists of individual
testing—aswith the grid algorithmdiscussed in the previous section, in the ‘standard’
variant, an individual is given an individual test at the second stage only when their
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infection status cannot be determined from the first stage, whereas in the ‘trivial’
variant, an individual is given an individual test at the second stage whenever all the
pools they appear in test positive at the first stage.
Individual testing is a special case of an (r, s)-regular design, with r = 1, s = 1
and a single stage. Dorfman’s algorithm is a special case with r = 1, s > 1, with two
stages. The grid algorithms we discussed above are special cases with r = 2.
There are a number of ways to construct a pooling design that is (r, s) regular.
• Randomly: Given a number of individuals N , a testing procedure that tests each
individual in r pools with each pool consisting of s samples can be chosen uni-
formly at random from all such procedures. This is easy to do computationally,
and convenient for proving mathematical statements. However, the random choice
means that rare bad designs are possible, and the lack of structure canmake it awk-
ward to carry out in a laboratory setting.
• Hypercube: This method generalises the grid algorithm to higher dimensions. It
is required that s = ar−1 for some positive integer a. Assume that N is a mul-
tiple of ar . We split the N individuals into groups of size ar , and we focus our
attention on just one group. Imagine that those ar individuals are placed on an
r -dimensional a × a × · · · × a hypercube. Each pool corresponds to an (r − 1)-
dimensional slice of this hypercube, containing ar−1 = s individuals. Note that
each individual is sampled in r pools, one for each of the r slice directions. Tak-
ing r = 2, we obtain the grid algorithm. The structure of the hypercube can be
convenient for implementation, although automation is usually required for pool-
ing the samples, and for r ≥ 3, the conditions give a somewhat restricted set of
possibilities for s.
• Code-based: A classical construction of Kautz and Singleton shows how to con-
struct an (r, s)-regular design from an error-correcting linear codewith appropriate
parameters. We point readers to Aldridge et al. (2019, Sect. 5.7) or Kautz and Sin-
gleton’s original work (Kautz and Singleton 1964) for further details. The extra
structure often gives good performance when N is small, although for some values
of r and s it is not possible to find a code with appropriate parameters.
We note that, by counting the number of times a sample appears in a pool in two
different ways, the number of pooled tests T1 used by the first stage of an (r, s)-
regular design satisfies Nr = T1s, and therefore the number of tests per individual
used by the first-stage of an (r, s)-regular design is T1/N = r/s.
As stated above, an (r, s)-regular pooled testing algorithm can be used in the form
of a one-stage, a ‘standard’ two-stage, or a conservative two-stage algorithm, just as
with the grid algorithm.
We briefly present a summary of an analysis of the conservative two-stage vari-
ant, following Aldridge (2020), Broder and Kumar (2020). With this variant, any
individual whose r stage-one pooled tests are all positive receives and individual
test in the second stage. For large N , the expected tests per individual in the random
(r, s)-design (described above) satisfies the following with high probability:
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Table 11.3 Resource requirements of using an (r, s)-regular design in a conservative two-stage
algorithm to test N individuals, at different prevalence levels, with tests of perfect sensitivity and
specificity
Prevalence p (%) Conservative two-stage (r, s)-regular algorithm
Optimal parameters (r, s) Expected tests per individual
5 (3, 13) 0.37
2 (4, 31) 0.19
1 (5, 63) 0.11
0.5 (7, 147) 0.063
0.2 (8, 351) 0.029





+ p + q(1 − qs−1)r , (11.2)
where p is the prevalence and q = 1 − p. Here, r/s is the number of tests per
individual in the first stage. An individual requires retesting in the second stage either
if it is infected, with probability p, or if it is noninfected, with probability q, but all
r of its tests are positive, each of which happens with probability 1 − qs−1. Thus if
the results of the tests containing a given noninfected individual were independent,
then (11.2) would hold exactly. It turns out that a randomly sampled (r, s)-design
satisfies this independence condition for most individuals (with high probability); in
fact, with positive probability, it satisfies the condition for all individuals.
Further, a lower bound is given in Aldridge (2020), which shows that, among
all conservative two-stage algorithms, the random (r, s)-regular design is extremely
close to optimal for all p < 0.3.
Table 11.3 shows the performance of the (r, s)-regular design according to (11.2)
with an optimal choice of r and s. We note that the (r, s)-regular algorithm outper-
forms individual testing, Dorfman’s algorithm, and the grid algorithms for all values
of p in the table.
Table 11.3 shows results with the mathematically optimal choice of (r, s), but as
the prevalence gets small, these parameter choices can get quite large. This could
be unwieldy or even infeasible for a laboratory to carry out, and large values of s
(the pool-size) provoke worries about sensitivity (with imperfectly sensitive tests).
However, typically r can be reduced somewhat and s reduced quite a lot with only
a marginal reduction in performance. For example, at p = 0.5%, the optimal choice
is r = 7, s = 147, giving an expected tests per individual of 0.063. But reducing the
parameters to the much more manageable r = 3, s = 62 still gives an expected tests
per individual of 0.072, which is only slightly worse. The practically best choice
of parameters will depend on a laboratory’s capability for carrying out complicated
procedures, and worries about the impact of dilution on test sensitivity (see Sect.
11.4).
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11.3 Pooled Testing Algorithms for Imperfect Tests
11.3.1 The Model
In this section, we refine themodel of the previous section to take into account the fact
that the tests we are dealingwith do not always give the correct answer. Recall that the
PCR test has very high sensitivity, typically higher than 99%, meaning false positive
test results are extremely rare, and has moderate sensitivity, typically between 70
and 90%, meaning that false negative results are not uncommon.
Here, we use a very simplemodel for such tests.We assume that each test on a pool
containing at least one infected sample has a fixed probability u of correctly returning
apositive result, and that each test on apool of entirely noninfected samples has afixed
probability v of correctly returning a negative result, independently of the outcomes
of all other tests (including of tests on overlapping pools), and independently of the
size of the pool (that is, with no ‘dilution’ effect).
Whether or not this is a realistic model will depend upon the main sources of false
negatives and of false positives, and therefore on the precise protocol being used
and the practical situation. If the main source of insensitivity or nonspecificity is a
shortage of reagents, faulty equipment, or faulty lab-procedures, then it is probably
quite realistic. If individuals are frequently swabbed incorrectly (as can happen when
individuals are asked to self-swab), then incorrectly taken swabs will be an important
source of insensitivity, and in this case, unless individuals are re-swabbed at each
successive stage of a group-testing algorithm and there are no overlapping pools
at any single step, the independence assumption will not be valid. Moreover, the
assumption that dilution (where a small number of positive samples are diluted by a
large number of negative samples), does not affect sensitivity, is likely to be fairly
realistic with pool-sizes of 10 or less and with typical viral loads, but will be less
realistic with pool-sizes of 100 or more. See Sect. 11.4 for a further discussion of
this issue.
In the rest of this section, we look at some results regarding two-stage and one-
stage algorithms, under this model for noisy tests.
11.3.2 Analysis of Individual Testing and Dorfman’s
Algorithm
For a given algorithm, there are (at least) three things we want to know: First, how
many tests do we expect to use? Second, how many false negative declarations do
we expect to make? Third, how many false positive declarations do we expect to
make? A useful quantity for comparing algorithms is the expected number of tests
per isolated individual (ETI): that is, the expected number of tests used, divided by
the expected number of infected individuals correctly discovered and instructed to
isolate. Since the isolation of infected individuals is the main public-health goal of
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a screening programme, ETI is a good measure of how much benefit we are getting
per test used (though it does not take into account turnaround time).
Let us start with individual testing. To test N individuals, this requires exactly N
tests. There are pN infected individuals on average, and we find each one if its test
correctly gives a positive result, which happens with probability u. So on average we
correctly find upN infected individuals but falsely miss (1 − u)pN of them; so the
ETI is up. Similarly, also on average, of the (1 − p)N noninfected individuals, we
correctly identify v(1 − p)N of them, but falsely declare (1 − v)(1 − p)N of them
to be infected.
Now consider using Dorfman’s algorithm to test N individuals with pools of size
s, with N a multiple of s, and suppose we use the protocol of declaring an individual
to be infected only if both their pooled test and their individual test are positive. (If
a pool tests positive in the first stage but all the corresponding individual tests in the
second stage are negative, the pooled test is assumed to be a false positive.)
First, an individual will make it through to the second stage if either the pool
is infected, and correctly gives a positive result; or if the pool is noninfected, but





+ u(1 − qs) + (1 − v)qs,
where q = 1 − p. Here, 1/s represents the requirements of the first stage (i.e., the
pooled tests), u(1 − qs) represents the requirements of the second stage in the case of
a true positive pool result, and (1 − v)qs represents the requirements of the second
stage in the case of a false positive pool result. For small p, it turns out that an
essentially optimal choice for minimising this quantity is s = 1/√up	; this can be
shown in a similar way to in the previous section. This yields an expected number
of tests per individual which is approximately 2
√
up + (1 − v), compared to 1 for
individual testing. For p = 0.02, u = 0.8, v = 0.995, we get an improvement from
1 test per individual to 0.25 tests per individual.
Second, the expected number of infected individuals found is u2 pN , as there are
pN infected individuals on average, and they are found if both their pooled test
and their individual test are correctly positive. The other (on average) (1 − u2)pN
infected individuals get false negative declarations. Compared to individual testing,
where the total expected number of false negatives is simply (1 − u)pN , we have
(1 − u2)pN
(1 − u)pN = 1 + u ≤ 2,
and therefore the expected number of false negatives under Dorfman’s algorithm can
never be more than twice that when individual testing is used.
Third, a noninfected individual is falsely declared infected if both their pooled test
is positive—either due to a false positive test or the presence of an infected individual
and a true positive test—and their individual test is a false positive. This event has
probability
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Table 11.4 Expected resource requirements and impact of using individual testing or Dorfman’s
algorithm to test N individuals, at different prevalence levels, with tests of sensitivity 80% and
specificity 99.5%
Prevalence p (%) Individual testing Dorfman’s algorithm








5 N 0.01N 0.005N 6 0.38N 0.02N 0.0009N
2 N 0.004N 0.005N 9 0.25N 0.007N 0.0006N
1 N 0.002N 0.005N 12 0.18N 0.004N 0.0004N
0.5 N 0.001N 0.005N 17 0.13N 0.002N 0.0003N
0.2 N 0.0004N 0.005N 26 0.08N 0.0007N 0.0002N
0.1 N 0.0002N 0.005N 36 0.06N 0.0004N 0.0002N
(
(1 − qs−1)u + qs−1(1 − v))(1 − v).
Hence, the expected number of false positives is
(
(1 − qs−1)u + qs−1(1 − v))(1 − v)qN .
Again, for small p with s = 1/√up	, this is approximately (√pu + 1 − v)(1 −
v)qN . Compared to the expected number of false positives under individual testing,
which is (1 − v)qN , Dorfman gives an improvement by a factor of√up + 1 − v. For
p = 0.02, u = 0.8, v = 0.995, Dorfman gives an expected number of false positives
which is approximately 0.12 times its value under individual testing. Thus Dorfman
produces far fewer false positives than individual testing, a feature which is common
to many other pooled testing algorithms.
Under the assumption that the sensitivity u of each test is 0.8 and the specificity v
of each test is 0.995, Table 11.4 summarises, for different prevalences, the expected
number of tests, false negatives, and false positives for individual testing and for
Dorfman’s algorithm.Note that, compared to individual testing,Dorfman’s algorithm
dramatically decreases the number of tests required and the number of false positives,
but roughly doubles the number of false negatives.
The ETI of Dorfman’s algorithm (used in the way above), is (1/s + u(1 − qs) +
(1 − v)qs)/(u2 p); if p is small and we choose s = 1/√up	, as described above,
then this is approximately (2
√
up + 1 − v)/(u2 p).
11.3.3 One-Stage Testing
We now briefly consider general one-stage (nonadaptive) pooling algorithms, under
our simple model of imperfect tests. Here, we see the results of the tests, and we
must try to come up with a ‘best guess’, from those results, as to which individuals
236 M. Aldridge and D. Ellis
were infected. The precise meaning of ‘best guess’ depends (for example) on the
down-sides of missing infected cases (false negatives), and of false positives. This
kind of problem is known as an inference problem.
We suppose the pooling design is chosen according to a pooling matrix A =
(ati ) ∈ {0, 1}T×N , a matrix of zeros and ones, where ati = 1 if the sample from
individual i is included in the t th pooled test, and ati = 0 otherwise. The T rows
of the matrix A represent the T pooled tests, and the N columns represent the N
individuals being tested.
Some further notation is useful. Let x = (xi ) ∈ {0, 1}N be the vector of zeros and
ones where xi = 1 if individual i is infected, and xi = 0 if individual i is uninfected;
the vector x represents which individuals are truly infected and which are not, and it
is what we really want to guess; we refer to it as the ‘infection vector’.
We write y = (yt ) ∈ {0, 1}T for the actual outcomes of the tests, i.e., yt = 1 if
the t th pool tests positive, and yt = 0 otherwise. Finally, we write ỹ = ỹ(A, x) for
what the T outcomes of the pooled tests on the infection vector x would be, under
perfect testing, i.e., ỹt = 1 if the t th pool would test positive under perfect testing,
and ỹt = 0 otherwise. Explicitly, ỹt = 1 if (Ax)t ≥ 1, and ỹt = 0 if (Ax)t = 0.
Given y andA, wemust come upwith an estimate x̂ for x. If we are only interested
in estimating the most likely set of infected individuals (i.e., we do not want to err
on the side of caution when we report to the individuals whether they are infected or
not), then it makes sense to report a maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimate (though
there are other reasonable alternatives, e.g. minimising the expected number of false
positives plus false negatives). It can be shown using the standard techniques that the
MAP choice for x̂ is one where ỹ(A, x̂) is chosen to minimize the ‘penalty function’
f (x̂) = a × #{i : x̂i = 1} + b × #{t : yt = 1, ỹt = 0} + c × #{t : yt = 0, ỹt = 1},
for some constants a, b, c ≥ 0—these constants depend on the assumed prevalence,
and the assumed sensitivity/specificity of the (pooled) tests. As a simple example,
the P-BEST algorithm (see Sect. 11.5.2) minimises the penalty function with a = 0
and b = c = 1. We note that, if the estimated cost of declaring an infected person
uninfected is much greater than the estimated cost of declaring an uninfected person
infected, then the estimate with minimum expected cost may be different from the
MAP estimate, and the penalty function to be minimized, should be changed, but
Bayesian analysis can still be applied. We do not here get into the question of how
to efficiently perform such an analysis.
11.4 Practical Challenges for Pooled Testing
The practical challenges and the downsides of implementing a pooled testing algo-
rithm for COVID-19 testing—either as part of a national or local testing programme
or within an autonomous institution or company—depend to some extent on the
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algorithm in question. A cost-benefit analysis is of course desirable, in each setting
where pooled testing may be considered.
Small benefit at highprevalence. Asmentioned earlier,when prevalence is greater
than 38.2%, no pooled testing algorithm can outperform individual testing (Fischer
et al. 1999) (under the assumption of perfect tests). Even when prevalence is signifi-
cantly less than 38.2%, it will often be judged that the down-sides of pooled testing
outweigh the advantage of resource-savings. For example, pooled testing has been
approved in India only for use in areas where the population prevalence is 2% or less
(see Sect. 11.5.4).
Increased turnaround time. As mentioned above, a single PCR test can typically
be performed in four to six hours. If pooling can be automated, using e.g. a pipet-
ting robot, then one-stage (non-adaptive) pooled testing algorithms will not have a
significantly longer turnaround time than individual testing. For multistage pooled
testing algorithms, such as Dorfman’s algorithm, conservative two-stage pooled test-
ing algorithms based on (r, s)-regular designs, or the multistage algorithm piloted in
Rwanda (see Sect. 11.5.3), the increase in turnaround time (relative to individual test-
ing) will depend partly on the laboratory set-up. The impact of increased turnaround
times clearly depends upon the damage done by letting infections go undetected for
longer; in the case of screening healthcare workers or social care workers, who work
with individuals highly vulnerable to severe illness if exposed to SARS-CoV-2, this
impact is likely to be much greater than in the case of screening university students
or factory workers (for example).
Laboratory infrastructure. Dorfman’s algorithm does not require any sophisti-
cated equipment to implement: the pooling of the samples can be done by hand. The
pooling of the samples can even be done, as at the University of Cambridge (see
Sect. 11.5.1), by the individuals to be tested, thus imposing no extra workload on
laboratory staff. It only requires the laboratory to keep track of which individuals cor-
respond to which pooled samples, and a capability to perform individual follow-up
tests on the individuals whose pools test positive (or alternatively, for part-samples
from each individual to be kept back during the first step, in case follow-up testing
is needed on that individual in the second step). Some laboratories, e.g., those suf-
fering from a shortage of well-trained personnel, or of equipment, would struggle
to implement even Dorfman’s algorithm (the simplest to implement): even keeping
track of which samples belong to which individuals, once these have been divided
in half, may prove challenging under conditions of extreme pressure and consequent
disorganisation.
The grid-algorithm ismost efficiently implemented using a pipetting robot with an
arm that can move in two dimensions; this piece of equipment, while commercially
available,may be too expensive for organisations operatingwith a lowbudget, and for
poorer countries. An alternative is to do the pooling manually, if sufficient manpower
is available.
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The impact of dilution on test sensitivity. When one infected sample is pooled
with several others that are uninfected, the viral RNA is diluted, and this dilution
leads to a decrease in the sensitivity of the PCR test on the pooled sample. The
precise impact on sensitivity depends upon the laboratory protocol used, and also
upon the distribution of viral loads in the samples being tested (which, in turn,
depends upon the stage of the illness in the individuals being tested, as well as on
individual biological factors). The following, however, gives a rough idea of the
impact of dilution on sensitivity. Using a common protocol, and a set of 838 SARS-
CoV-2 positive specimens, Bateman et al. (2021) found that dilution by a factor of
five led (on average) to a 7% reduction in sensitivity, dilution by a factor of ten led
(on average) to a 9% reduction in sensitivity, and dilution by a factor of 50 led (on
average) to a 19% reduction in sensitivity. By contrast, a systematic review of the
accuracy of individual PCR tests found false negative rates ranging from 2 to 29%,
using repeated PCR-testing as the gold standard (for true positivity). Using repeated
PCR testing as the gold standard for positivity is likely to underestimate the true rate
of false negatives.
More importantly, for tests taken in the field, is the fact that swabs are sometimes
taken incorrectly (see the previous chapter of this book, by Dunbar and Tang, for
further discussion of this issue). One community-based study of close contacts of
confirmed COVID-19 cases in China, found an overall sensitivity of 71% for upper-
throat swabbing (by trained medical personnel) followed by an individual PCR test,
using repeated PCR tests as the gold standard (for true positivity). When individuals
self-swab, sensitivity is likely to be lower, unless the individuals themselves are
appropriately trained (e.g., healthcare workers). Compared to these factors, overall,
the impact of dilution on sensitivity, is relatively minor.
In the theoretical results we have described here, the number of samples per test
s can get extremely large when the prevalence p is very small. In real applications,
laboratories would be unwilling (due to dilution concerns) or unable (due to equip-
ment capacity) to pool together very high numbers of samples. Thus for extremely
low prevalences, the gains of pooled testing are unlikely to be as high as the theory
suggests.
How to deal with inconsistent test results. When the sensitivity or the specificity
of the tests being used is less than 100%, a pooled testing algorithm can yield incon-
sistent results. For example, when Dorfman’s algorithm is implemented, a particular
pool can test positive due to the presence of one infected individual (a true positive),
but then in the second stage of follow-up (individual) testing, all the individuals in
that pool can test negative, due to the infected individual testing negative (a false
negative). In this case, the testing authorities are faced with a dilemma: they could
assume (wrongly, in this case), that the first (pooled test) was a false positive and
that the follow-up tests were true negatives, or they could simply choose to declare
the individuals in question free from infection (to avoid having to recall them for
further testing), but they could also decide to repeat the second round of individual
tests on that group (pool) of individuals, to hedge against the possibility that there
was a false negative in the second round of individual tests. This could be regarded
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as a third, ‘confirmatory’, testing-step in the algorithm. (If extra samples cannot be
taken from the individuals in question, a third, confirmatory, testing-step may in fact
be impossible.)
Which option the authorities choose, may depend on the impact of letting an
infection go undetected; if the individual in question is a school pupil or a member of
the general community (in a mass-testing programme), the impact will be less than
if the individual is a healthcare worker working with patients highly vulnerable to
severe illness or death in the case of COVID-19 infection, or if the individual is a
resident-facing social care worker. The extra resource-requirements, and the delay,
of a third (confirmatory) round of testing, should it be judged necessary, would have
to be taken into account when deciding whether to adopt the pooled testing strategy.
Prior prevalence estimates. In situations where surveillance is poor, or infection
levels are changing very rapidly, a laboratory may have very little idea of the preva-
lence of infection in an incoming batch of samples to be tested for SARS-CoV-2
infection. In such circumstances, a suboptimal choice of the parameters in a pooled
testing algorithm algorithm (due to an underestimate of the prevalence) can lead to
an inefficient second step—less efficient, in fact, than individual testing. For exam-
ple, if the prevalence is 25%, then using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size 10
requires on average approximately 1.04 tests per individual, which is slightly worse
than individual testing (in addition to having a longer turnaround time). However, if
an upper bound on the prevalence is knownwith a reasonably high degree of certainty
(and this upper bound is not too high), then the parameters in a pooled testing algo-
rithm can still be chosen so as to achieve a significant resource-saving over individual
testing, even though the parameters cannot be fined-tuned to the exact prevalence.
For example, the number of tests per individual for Dorfman’s algorithm with fixed
pool size s, is increasing in p, so the ‘worst case’ is when p is maximal. Hence, if
the prevalence is known to be at most 1%, then Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of
size 10, will require at most 110 + 1 − (1 − p)10 ≤ 110 + 1 − (1 − 0.01)10 ≈ 0.196
tests per individual (on average). Thus we get at least a five-fold improvement on
individual testing, as long as the prevalence does not rise above 1%.
Regulatory approval. All of the issues listed above may be obstacles to regulatory
approval. An additional obstacle to regulatory approval is the complexity of pooled
testing algorithms, compared to individual testing. Often, policymakers will need to
give their approval, bearing in mind public opinion, and a procedure which cannot
be understood by a large percentage of the public (or by policymakers without the
requisite quantitative training), may be less likely to gain such approval. On the other
hand, the simpler pooled testing algorithms, such as Dorfman’s algorithm and the
grid algorithm, almost certainly can be explained in such a way that policymakers
(and the majority of the public) can understand them—and this may well be part of
the reason why these two algorithms have seen the widest use, of all pooled testing
algorithms, during the COVID-19 pandemic so far.
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11.5 Uses of Pooled Testing in the COVID-19 Pandemic
Hitherto in theCOVID-19 pandemic,Dorfman’s algorithmhas been themostwidely-
used pooled testing strategy. This is almost certainly because it is (i) easy to imple-
ment without necessarily needing large changes in laboratory equipment or infras-
tructure, (ii) relatively robust to changes in prevalence, (iii) simple and transparent
enough for non-scientific decision makers or the public to understand and for regula-
tors to approve, and (iv) of easily predictable and controllable sensitivity. At the same
time, it can yield large efficiency gains over individual testing, as outlined above. In
this section, we give some examples of places where pooled testing has been applied
during the COVID-19 pandemic, focussing on examples where detailed information
is available.
11.5.1 Dorfman’s Algorithm at the University of Cambridge
During Autumn Term of 2020 (6 October–4 December 2020), University of Cam-
bridge students in college accommodation were asked to participate in the Uni-
versity’s asymptomatic COVID-19 screening programme (University of Cambridge
2020).
Students were divided into ‘bubbles’ of average size 8 and maximum size 10,
with each bubble consisting of students sharing facilities (e.g., a bathroom, kitchen
or living room). In a typical week, half of the students in each ‘bubble’were requested
to provide nasal swabs, which were then collected together into a single container by
one of the students. This container was then sent to a local laboratory, where a pooled
PCR test was performed on the pooled samples. If a pooled sample tested positive,
each student in the corresponding bubble was informed, and instructed to take an
individual PCR test at one of the National Testing sites. A simple rota determined
which students were asked to provide swabs on which weeks; on average, a student
was asked to provide a swab approximately once per fortnight. Students who were
symptomatic did not take part on weeks when they were symptomatic, as all students
experiencing symptoms were instructed to seek an individual test. Students who had
recently tested PCR-positive did not take part either. Participation was voluntary, but
consent rates were high, starting at 75% of all 15,479 eligible students during the
first week of term, and steadily increasing to 82% of all 15,310 eligible students in
the last week.
Students were requested not to socialise outside their bubbles. Assuming a high
level of compliance, this would mean that positive cases were more likely to cluster
within bubbles, leading to a resource-saving at the second stage (of follow-up indi-
vidual testing): this is the ‘best case’ inDorfman’s algorithm, in terms of resource-use
at the second step, when the infected individuals are distributed among as few pools
as possible. In the sixth week of term, for example, 80 students individually tested
positive across 59 positive-testing pools (Warne 2020), giving an average of approx-
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imately 1.3 infected students per positive testing pool. Had the infected individuals
beenmore evenly distributed, therewould have been only one positive-testing student
per positive-testing pool.
11.5.2 The Grid and P-BEST Algorithms in Israel
In August 2020, Israel’s Ministry of Health approved two single-step pooled testing
protocols for use in clinical laboratories in the country: one based upon the ‘grid
algorithm’, and one based upon the ‘P-BEST’ algorithm of Shental et al. (2020). The
grid algorithm has been described earlier.
P-BEST uses an (r = 6, s = 48)-regular design with a code-based construction.
This deals with N = 384 individuals in T = Nr/s = 48 pooled tests. A ‘best guess’
for the identifies of the infected individuals (from the results of the pooled tests), is
obtained using the method described in Sect. 11.3.3, above.
It should be noted that the P-BEST algorithmdoes require software and computing
resources to implement, in addition to a pipetting robot with an arm that can move
in two dimensions. However, this equipment is affordable by most countries.
In trials where at most 5 out of 384 individuals are PCR-positive under individual
PCR testing (corresponding to a prevalence of 1.3% or lower), the P-BEST algorithm
usually correctly identified all infected anduninfected individuals. Problems can arise
when a batch of samples is received with a much higher prevalence than 1.3%; in
this case, even if there are no false positive and or false negative test results, it is
often not possible to use P-BEST to determine which individuals are infected and
which are not.
In Israel, in clinical laboratories where P-BEST (or the grid algorithm) has been
employed, data analysis and machine-learning has been employed also, to predict
which batches of samples are likely to have much higher prevalence rates than the
national average (based on origin); such batches were typically dealt with using
individual testing.
11.5.3 A Multi-stage (r, s)-Regular Algorithm in Rwanda
Starting in August 2020, a multi-stage algorithm was piloted in Rwanda, where
infection prevalence was low but the supply of PCR tests was limited (Mutesa et al.
2021).
The stages are as follows. It is required to pick two integer parameters, a and r2.
1. A Dorfman-like stage with r1 = 1 pooled test for each individual and s1 = ar2
samples in each test.Anegative result shows that all s1 individuals are noninfected;
individuals in a positive pool go through to stage two.
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2. An (r2, s2 = ar2−1)-regular design, with a hypercube construction (see Sect.
11.2.5).
3. If the hypercube contains zero or one infected individuals, they can be identified.
Otherwise, further stages of testing are used to disambiguate the results; we don’t
go into details here.
The parameters are chosen to be as efficient as possible while still ensuring that
the chance of more than two stages being required is very small. One common choice
is a = 3, r2 = 3, so that the first stage is a (1, 81)-regular Dorfman-like design, and
the second stage is a (3, 9)-regular hypercube design of 9 tests for 81 individuals.
11.5.4 Other Uses of Pooled Testing
Here is a brief (and far from exhaustive) list of some other examples of the use of
pooled testing in the COVID-19 pandemic.
• PCR testing using Dorfman’s algorithm inWuhan, China (Fan 2020). Between 12
May and 1 June 2020, 9.9 million Wuhan residents were tested; the vast majority
were asymptomatic. Dorfman’s algorithm was reportedly used for approximately
25% of this testing, with pools of sizes between 5 and 10. Only 300 positive cases
were identified.
• Screening of students on University campuses, using Dorfman’s algorithm or the
grid algorithm, during theAutumn/Fall termof 2020:Université deLiège, Belgium
(saliva samples using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size 8) (Université de
Liège 2020); Duke University, USA (saliva samples using Dorfman’s algorithm
with pools of size between 5 and 10; participation mandatory for students on
campus) (Denny et al. 2020); Michigan State University, USA (saliva samples
using a grid algorithm) (Michigan State University 2020); Syracuse University,
USA (saliva samples using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size between 20
and 25) (Syracuse University 2020); ShenandoahUniversity, (saliva samples using
Dorfman’s algorithmwith pools of size 4or 5)USA(ShenandoahUniversity 2020).
• PCR testing using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size up to 20, by Fundación
BiomédicaGalicia Sur,Galicia, Spain, to screen asymptomatic healthcareworkers,
social care workers, industrial workers and port workers in the province of Galicia
from September 2020 onwards, raising screening-capacity to 100,000 screenings
per month (with health and social care workers being screened twice per week).
Pipetting robots have been used (La Voz de Galicia 2020).
• PCR testing using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size up to 30, by Saarland
University Hospital, Germany, for the regular screening of asymptomatic hospi-
tal patients and hospital staff, and care home residents in Saarland, from March
2020 onwards. Approximately 22,000 people screened (Universität des Saarlandes
2020).
• PCR testing using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size 10, by Noguchi Memo-
rial Institute for Medical Research, Ghana, to test contacts of confirmed cases.
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Initially 10,000 people tested per day, from April 2020 onwards (World Health
Organization 2020).
• PCR testing using Dorfman’s algorithm with pools of size 5, by the states of Uttar
Pradesh (Sharda 2020) and West Bengal (Yengkhom 2020), India, in areas with
estimated prevalence of 2% or lower.
11.6 Applications of Pooled Testing for COVID-19: Some
Conclusions
In this section, we conclude, by drawing some of the above analysis together and
discussing our ownpersonal perspective on the practical settingswhere pooled testing
for COVID-19 is likely to be useful, or at least may merit serious consideration.
11.6.1 Pooled Testing for Asymptomatic Subpopulations
As stated in the introduction, we believe that pooled testing is most likely to be
useful for the screening of asymptomatic people, for surveillance, and possibly for
the testing of contacts of confirmed cases, provided the prevalence of infection among
the group to be tested is sufficiently low. On the other hand, we believe that in most
countries, pooled testing is unlikely to be useful for the testing of symptomatic people.
(Here,weuse the term ‘asymptomatic’ to denote someonewho is not experiencing the
recognised symptoms at the time of their test. This includes ‘true asymptomatics’,
who never experience symptoms, and ‘pre-symptomatics’, who go on to develop
symptoms after their test.)
There are two main reasons why we believe that, in most countries, pooled testing
will be of limited use for the testing of symptomatic people. First, the prevalence
of COVID-19 infection among those presenting symptoms is usually sufficiently
high that the resource savings of pooled testing are modest compared to individ-
ual testing, and may be outweighed by the down-sides of pooled testing, such as
increased turnaround time. Among those presenting COVID-like symptoms, preva-
lences of between 4 and 33% are realistic, depending upon the setting, the location,
the symptoms used in the definition of ‘symptomatic’, and the prevalence of other
respiratory viruses (which in turn depends on the time of year) (Menni 2020; Pueyo
2020). Second, many countries already have well-established testing programmes
using individual testing for those presenting symptoms. In many countries, includ-
ing the UK, an individual test on symptomatic people is mandated by the regulatory
authorities to confirm infection, even if they can be proved positive solely via pooled
tests.
On the other hand, in many countries, the prevalence of COVID-19 infection
among the general population has for quite long periods been at levels lowenough that
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pooled testing of asymptomatic people can yield large efficiency gains over individual
testing. For example, the estimated prevalence of current SARS-CoV-2 infection in
the general community in England, as estimated by the ONS Infection Survey (Office
for National Statistics 2021), has ranged from 0.026% in early July, to 2.1% in early
January (and 3.6% in London in early January). Hence, for the prevalence among
asymptomatics in England, values of p between 0.02 and 1.6% are good estimates.
Countries that have adopted more stringent non-pharmaceutical interventions (such
as stricter lockdowns or strongly enforced quarantines for international arrivals) have
experienced lower prevalence rates; for example, New Zealand probably eliminated
COVID-19 infections in the general community between early May and mid-August
2020, except for international arrivals, who were quarantined (Baker et al. 2020).
It is often desirable to screen subpopulations where the prevalence of infection is
likely to be significantly higher than in the general population: for example, patient-
facing healthcareworkers, resident-facing social careworkers, and factoryworkers in
high-risk environments such as meat-processing plants. But it may also be desirable
to screen subpopulations where the prevalence of infection is likely to be similar to
the general population: see some of the examples below.
We list here some of the settings where we believe pooled testing for COVID-19
is most likely to be useful. Of course, a careful cost-benefit analysis should be carried
out for each potential application, with the decision to adopt or not depending on
certain factors, including the prevalence level, laboratory resources and capabilities,
the impact of increasing the turnaround time, and regulatory constraints.
• University students. As may be apparent from the relatively large number of
examples of this in Sect. 11.5, screening of asymptomatic university students is
one of the less controversial applications of pooled testing. Severe illness is very
rare among those of student age, so the impact on students of an increase in the
turnaround time associated with pooled testing is slight. If a significant amount of
in-person teaching is taking place, there are higher risks to older members of staff
in the event that they are infected, so the impact on them of increased turnaround
time should be taken into account.
• Keyworkers—for example factory workers, warehouse workers and port workers
(but excluding patient-facing healthcare workers and resident-facing social care
workers) provided the prevalence is not too high among the workers in question.
We recall from Sect. 11.5.4 that pooled testing has been used in Galicia for the
screening of factory and port workers.
• School pupils and staff. The logistical challenges of the regular screening of
asymptomatic school pupils are greater than in the case of university students
(who can, if necessary, organise much of the process themselves; see Sect. 11.5.1).
Schoolchildren—particularly younger schoolchildren—cannot do this, so the addi-
tional organisational burden is placed on schools, who are already overstretched.
A further problem is that there is little incentive for low-income families to agree
for their children to participate in regular screening, since if they test positive and
this is reported, the parents are likely to have to take time off work. (Financial
compensation for this may help.) Another concern is that school-aged children—
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particularly primary-school aged children—may not tolerate regular swabbing,
although saliva tests would not have this problem.
• Members of sports teams. Screening of asymptomatic members of sports teams
is suggested in Mutesa et al. (2021).
• Airline passengers. This is also suggested in Mutesa et al. (2021).
• Non-household contacts of confirmed cases, provided the estimated prevalence
among these is sufficiently low.We recall from Sect. 11.5.4 that this has been done
in Ghana.
One potential application of pooled testing that many authors are circumspect
about is the screening of asymptomatic healthcare workers and social care workers.
Given the major risks to vulnerable patients and social care residents associated with
any additional delay in finding positive cases among these workers, screening using
individual testing is often thought to be preferable, if there are sufficient resources.
Even in the presence of very severe resource constraints, a careful cost-benefit anal-
ysis should be performed to compare the impact of screening based on individual
testingwith that based on pooled testing, taking into account the increased turnaround
time. Even Mutesa et al. (2021), who are in general strong advocates of the use of
pooled testing for COVID-19, state explicitly that they do not advocate its use for
the screening of healthcare workers. We do note, however, that pooled testing was
used by Saarland University Hospital for this purpose (see Sect. 11.5.4).
11.6.2 Pooled Testing and Vaccination Programmes
At the time of writing (March 2021), vaccination programmes are proceeding rapidly
in many developed countries and are having a large effect in reducing the number of
COVID-19 cases (Aran 2021). It might be thought that, in such countries, there will
soon be no need to consider pooled testing. We believe that such an assumption may
be premature at this stage, mainly because we do not yet have reliable data on the
extent to which the vaccines currently being distributed reduce the number of cases
(symptomatic and asymptomatic) of new variants of COVID-19, particularly the
South African and Brazilian variants (Mahase 2021). (See Aldridge and Ellis (2021)
for a discussion of the evidence base on this to date.) Bearing inmind this uncertainty,
and the risk of further new variants arising that are resistant to available vaccines,
we believe it would be wise for decision-makers to bear in mind the possibility that
it may be desirable to rapidly increase testing-capacity using pooled testing in the
medium term. In poorer countries, vaccination programmes are likely to be long
delayed. In such countries, pooled testing may still be a valuable tool to consider for
the foreseeable future.
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11.6.3 Pooled Testing for Surveillance
At low prevalence levels, pooled testing has the potential for very large resource-
saving in national COVID-19 surveillance programmes. In some countries with a
very large testing capacity, this may not be necessary—for example, the UK’s ONS
( Coronavirus) Infection Survey currently tests a random sample of approximately
400,000members of the community population in England, once per fortnight, using
individual testing (Office for National Statistics 2020); compared to the UK’s Pil-
lar II testing capacity of more than 200,000 tests per day, this is not too great a
resource requirement. However, if it is desired to reduce the resource requirements
of a nationwide surveillance programme, pooled testing provides a way of doing so.
Using pools of size up to 100, the hypercube-based algorithm piloted in Rwanda by
Mutesa et al. (2021) can estimate the prevalence fairly accurately, while achieving
an approximately 100-fold reduction in number the tests used when the prevalence
level is at 0.05%. The main concern here is the reduction in sensitivity caused by
dilution, but Mutesa et al. (2021) report proof-of-concept experiments which suggest
that, using an appropriate protocol, sensitivities of 98% or 92% (depending on the
gene targeted), can be achieved at a 100-fold level of dilution. This suggests that
their scheme can be used reliably to monitor prevalence. The extra turnaround time
compared to individual testing is likely to be much less of an issue with surveillance
than with case identification, particularly at low prevalence levels.
It is also plausible that pooled testing could be used to monitor the prevalence
of new variants. This may become particularly important if new variants begin to
seriously hinder the success of vaccination programmes. A new PCR-testing method
(involving only a minor update to existing PCR tests) that can detect which variant
of SARS-CoV-2 a patient is carrying is currently undergoing clinical trials by the
biotechnology firm Novozymes (Merrifield 2021).
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Chapter 12
Outlier Detection for Pandemic-Related
Data Using Compositional Functional
Data Analysis
Christopher Rieser and Peter Filzmoser
Abstract With accurate data, governments can make the most informed decisions
to keep people safer through pandemics such as the COVID-19 coronavirus. In such
events, data reliability is crucial and therefore outlier detection is an important and
even unavoidable issue. Outliers are often considered as the most interesting obser-
vations, because the fact that they differ from the data majority may lead to relevant
findings in the subject area. Outlier detection has also been addressed in the context
ofmultivariate functional data, thus smooth functions of several characteristics, often
derived from measurements at different time points (Hubert et al. in Stat Methods
Appl 24(2):177–202, 2015b). Here the underlying data are regarded as compositions,
with the compositional parts forming the multivariate information, and thus only rel-
ative information in terms of log-ratios between these parts is considered as relevant
for the analysis. The multivariate functional data thus have to be derived as smooth
functions by utilising this relative information. Subsequently, already established
multivariate functional outlier detection procedures can be used, but for interpre-
tation purposes, the functional data need to be presented in an appropriate space.
The methodology is illustrated with publicly available data around the COVID-19
pandemic to find countries displaying outlying trends.
12.1 Introduction
The crisis caused by COVID-19 in almost all areas of life has also revealed that an
accurate data collection is a challenge that cannot be easily resolved due to political
or logistic problems. However, the availability of clean and reliable data is a key
step in fighting a pandemic. On the one hand, knowing the real number of tested,
newly infected and dead people allows to investigate the causes of the observed
C. Rieser · P. Filzmoser (B)
Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, TU Wien, Wiedner Hauptstr.




© The Author(s) 2022
M. C. Boado-Penas et al. (eds.), Pandemics: Insurance and Social Protection,
Springer Actuarial, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-78334-1_12
251
252 C. Rieser and P. Filzmoser
developments and to take appropriate measures to stop the spread of an infection.
On the other hand, insurance companies offering a protection linked to some specific
events during a pandemic would like to have reliable data to avoid the possibility of
moral hazard.
Many countries report the number of cases, deaths, tests, and further parameters
(variables) related to the COVID-19 pandemic regularly over time, and the data are
accessible in public data repositories. Rather than treating the data with tools from
time series analysis, it is common to consider them as functional data, so that the
measurements are represented by smooth functions over time.One could then analyse
themultivariate information contained in the functions for the different variables, and
compare the countries with respect to this information. Thus, countries for which
the multivariate information differs from the main trend given by the majority of the
countries are possible outliers. Instead of directly considering the reported number
(represented by the functions), one could also focus on analysing relative information.
This can be done by taking (log-)ratios between the variables. Thus, the source of
information for the analysis would not consist in the number of cases, death, tests,
etc., for a particular day in a particular country, but in the (log-)ratios between these
numbers. This is what is done in compositional data analysis, and outlier detection
in this context will focus on atypical behaviour in the multivariate information of
such (log-)ratios. For example, if the development of the number of cases over time
is similar in some countries, but in one country the number of deaths develops more
rapidly, this could be much better visible in a (log-ratio) than in the reported values.
Thus, treating COVID-19 data as compositional data and analysing relative rather
than absolute information can be very beneficial for outlier detection.
In this paper we consider a newmethod for the detection of outliers in the compo-
sitional functional data setting. The detection of outliers in the p-dimensional mul-
tivariate data case has been intensively investigated throughout the years and many
methods have been developed. Denote by xk ∈ Rp, for k = 1, ..., K , the observed
samples. A popular approach considers an outlier of these samples as a point xk0 for
which the robustified version of the Mahalanobis distance,
√
(xk0−m)′C−1(xk0−m),
wherem respectivelyC are robust estimators for themean and the covariancematrix,
is above a certain threshold and thus far away from the centre m with respect to the
covariance structureC; see Rousseeuw (1985), Rousseeuw and Driessen (1999) and
Hubert and Debruyne (2010). The idea of defining an outlier as a point being far
away from the centre has been extended to more general measures related to statis-
tical depth, see Tukey (1975), Serfling (2006) and Mosler (2012).
In recent years, many methods of multivariate statistics have been generalised
to Functional Data Analysis (FDA). In FDA one considers data points to be whole
functions, i.e. in the notation above, data points xk : I → Rp are multivariate func-
tions; for an overview of FDA we refer to Ramsay (2004), Ferraty and Vieu (2006)
or Kokoszka and Reimherr (2017). Accordingly, the concept of outliers has been
extended from the multivariate to the FDA setting, see Fraiman and Muniz (2001),
Febrero et al. (2008), Sun and Genton (2011) and Hubert et al. (2015b).
In this paper we consider extending the ideas of outlyingness to functional data
with image in the compositional data space. Thus, Sects. 12.1.1 and 12.1.2 provide
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a short introduction to the concepts of compositional data analysis and functional
data, respectively. Further, in Sect. 12.2 we consider smoothing for functional data
with image in the compositional space. In Sect. 12.3 we look at how one can detect
outliers for the latter setting. That is, we extend themethods of detecting outliers from
the non-compositional FDA case to the compositional one. Furthermore, Sect. 12.4
contains an application of themethod presented. The data is comprised of COVID-19
data of different countries over time. Each country represents a functional data point.
We finish in Sect. 12.5 with a summary and some conclusions.
12.1.1 Compositional Data Analysis Concepts
Assume we have given a D-dimensional random vector x for which each entry is
strictly positive, i.e. x ∈ RD+ , where RD+ denotes the D-dimensional real number
space with strictly positive entries. In the framework of compositional data analysis
(CODA) it is assumed that the ratios x jxk , for any j, k ∈ {1, ..., D}, j = k, carry the
relevant information, and thus only relative information is essential. As ratios do not
change when multiplying xwith a strictly positive scalar λ > 0, it holds that λx =: y
carries the same information as x. This motivates defining the equivalence relation
x ∼ y ⇐⇒ ∃λ > 0 λx = y for any x, y ∈ RD+
which partitions the space RD+ into equivalence classes. Choosing for each equiva-
lence class the representative x = (x1, ..., xD)′ satisfying ∑Dj=1 x j = 1, leads to the
set of equivalence classes called the D-part simplex
SD :=
{
x = (x1, ..., xD)′ ∈ RD+,
D∑
j=1
x j = 1
}
.
The spaceSD is turned into aHilbert space—called theAitchison geometry on the
simplex, see Aitchison (1982)—by defining addition (perturbation), multiplication
with a scalar (powering), an inner product and a norm for x = (x1, ..., xD)′, y =
(y1, ..., yD)′ ∈ SD and α ∈ R:
• Perturbation: x ⊕ y := (x1y1, ..., xD yD)′


















• Norm: ‖x‖A :=
√〈x, x〉A.
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Furthermore, the Aitchison geometry is (bijectively) isometric to RD−1. To show
this, firstly define the centred log-ratio (clr)

















which satisfies the properties of being invariant under the above operations and the
norm, i.e.
clr(x ⊕ y) = clr(x) + clr(y) (12.2)
clr(α  x) = α clr(x) (12.3)
〈x, y〉A = 〈clr(x), clr(y)〉E , (12.4)
see Filzmoser et al. (2018). However, as for any x ∈ SD , the entries of clr(x) sum
up to zero,
∑D
i=1 clr(x)i = 0, it follows that the clr mapping does not satisfy the
property of being one-to-one ontoRD . To obtain a bijectivemapping, choose a D − 1
dimensional basisV = (v1, ..., vD−1), where v j ∈ RD , for j = 1, . . . , D − 1, are clr
coefficients, and define the isometric log-ratio (ilr) mapping as
ilrV : SD → RD−1, ilrV(x) := V′ clr(x). (12.5)
The latter is a one-to-one mapping fulfilling (12.2), (12.3) and (12.4), see Filz-
moser et al. (2018). As there are infinitely many possibilities to choose a basis V, ilr
coefficients are frequently considered to express all relative information of a composi-
tion appropriately in the usual Euclidean geometry, for which the common statistical
tools have been designed. If an interpretation is desirable, the relative information
is often re-expressed in terms of clr coefficients by clr(x) = V ilrV(x), because they
relate to the original compositional parts in terms of relative information of the part
to an “average” (geometric mean), see (12.1).
12.1.2 Functional Data
In FDA we consider observations to be multivariate smooth functions f : [t1, tN ] →
R
D . In practice, such observations often originate as time series, measured at certain
time points ti , with i = 1, . . . , N , and thus they are not necessarily forming smooth
functions. In this case, a preprocessing step is needed to find an estimate f̂ for f
given (ti , yi ), with yi ∈ RD, i = 1, . . . , N , being noisy samples of f(ti ). We assume
in the following Gaussian centred uncorrelated noise with equal variance. Although
many methods exist to recover smooth functions, it is common that f̂ is estimated by
smoothing spline methods. The literature on spline methods is vast and we refer to
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Reinsch (1967), Wood (2017) and Yee (2015) for a good overview. The main idea is
that given multivariate data (ti , yi ) we find an estimate f̂ which is, on the one hand,
sufficiently smooth but, on the other, also a good approximation to the data. It is











where λ > 0 is a fixed smoothing parameter, and ‖·‖E denotes the Euclidean norm.
The idea is that with increasing λ, the second derivative f ′′ is forced to zero,
i.e. towards a linear function. From Problem (12.6) it can be deduced that the solution
is of the form f(t) := ∑Ni=1 ai bi (t), see Yee (2015), with bi being basis functions of
the cubic spline space, and ai being fixed vectors in RD . Plugging this basis expan-
sion into (12.6) shows that the penalty function acts as regularisation penalty on ai
restraining the flexibility of the latter. In reality, one never uses the full basis expan-
sion as given above, but rather a different and equally flexible expansion with less
basis functions to save coefficients and avoid unnecessary computation in the case
of a lot of data, for example a B-spline basis. Plugging in a specific basis expansion
f(t) := ∑Ni=1 ai bi (t) we can see that the problem is a convex problem, and solving
this vector valued problem is discussed in Yee (2015).
12.2 Smoothing for CODA Time Series
In this section we consider functional observations with image in SD , i.e. functions
u : [t1, tN ] → SD . As before, we assume that only a set of discrete samples (ti , xi )
is given, with i = 1, . . . , N and xi ∈ SD , where xi is a sample of u(ti ). To construct
a smooth estimate û of u, we firstly define derivatives and smoothing splines in a
compositional context. For a function u : [t1, tN ] → SD , its derivative at a time point





 u(t + h)  u(t). (12.7)
Accordingly, one can define higher order derivatives inductively, e.g. u′′(t) :=
(u′)′(t). For a reference on compositional calculus we refer to Pawlowsky-Glahn










where λ > 0 is again a fixed smoothing parameter controlling the smoothness.
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ilrV(u(t + h)) − ilrV(u(t))
h
= ilrV(u)′(t)
holds. With the same arguments, the equation ilrV(u′′)(t) = ilrV(u)′′(t) follows.
Therefore, defining f := ilrV(u), Problem (12.8) can be reformulated using the





























The latter is a vector valued smoothing problem in RD−1 for the data (ti , ilrV(xi )),
see Problem (12.6), and it can be solved accordingly.
Given a solution f̂ to (12.11), a solution to (12.8) is then û = ilr−1V (f̂) per definition
of f . In the case that different solutions to (12.11) exist, e.g. f̂1 and f̂2, we know from
the equivalence chain before and from the fact that ilrV is isometric, that also ilr
−1
V (f̂1)
and ilr−1V (f̂2) are different solutions to Problem (12.8). Equally, having two different
solution of (12.8) leads to different solutions of (12.11). This means that if (12.11)
is uniquely solvable for a chosen V, we get that û is also uniquely determined.
Therefore, the choice of V is irrelevant. With the exception of some very degenerate
settings, Problem (12.11) is uniquely solvable in most applications.
12.3 Outlier Detection in Compositional FDA
In the univariate case we can think of outliers as observations being very far away
from the main mass of the data set, thus far away from the data centre with respect
to the scale (Maronna et al. 2006).
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The outlyingness of a multivariate observation x ∼ PX, where PX denotes the
distribution of a p-dimensional random vector X and x a realisation, can be built
on the univariate case by means of projection onto a line defined by r ∈ Rp, with
‖r‖ = 1, thus r′X. As discussed in Donoho et al. (1992), the outlyingness of an




where “mad” denotes the median absolute deviation, i.e. the median of |X −
median(X)|. Taking the supremum of (12.12) over all r with ‖r‖ = 1 yields a mea-
sure of outlyingness for any x independent of the direction r. Adjusting (12.12) for
skewness—see Hubert and Vandervieren (2008) for adjusted boxplots of skewed
















if r′x ≤ median(r′X),
where w1 and w2 are functions that allow to adjust for the skewness of the univariate
distributions, see Hubert et al. (2015b) for an exact definition of these two functions.
To obtain a measure of outlyingness in the FDA case, e.g. for the data (f :
[t1, tN ] → Rp) ∼ PF, Hubert et al. (2015b) propose to use the functional adjusted




AO( f (t), PF(t))dt,
where Pf (t) denotes the marginal distribution of F for fixed t .
In a compositional functional data context, where the compositions are functions
of the form u : [t1, tN ] → SD , with distribution PU, we propose to define the com-
positional functional adjusted outlyingness as




For Definition (12.13) to be a valid measure of outlyingness it needs to be checked
that it is well defined, i.e., this measure needs to be independent of the choice
of the basis matrix V. As V ilrV(x) = clr(x) holds by definition for a matrix
with orthonormal columns V, we have for a different matrix Ṽ with orthonormal
columns ilrV(x) = V′ clr(x) = V′Ṽ ilrṼ(x), seeFilzmoser et al. (2018).As thematrix
V′Ṽ ∈ R(D−1)×(D−1) is of full rank D − 1, we get, for any fixed t
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AO(ilrV(u(t)), PilrV(U (t))) = AO(V′Ṽ ilrṼ(u(t)), PV′Ṽ ilrṼ(U (t))) (12.14)
= AO((V′Ṽ)(ilrṼ(u(t))), P(V′Ṽ)(ilrṼ(U (t)))) (12.15)
= AO(ilrṼ(u(t)), PilrṼ(U (t))) (12.16)
where the last equality follows from the affine invariance property of AO, see Hubert
and Van der Veeken (2008); affine invariance means that AO(x, PX) = AO(Ax +
b, PAX+b) holds for any regular matrix A ∈ Rp×p and b ∈ Rp for x ∈ Rp with x ∼
PX. As CFAO is defined as an integral over (12.16) it follows that the latter is equally
invariant and thus well defined.
To visually find outliers in the FDA setting, Hubert et al. (2015a) introduced a
functional outlier map (FOM). Assume that the evaluation of K multivariate func-
tional data points f1, . . . , fK is given at time points t1, . . . , tn , and denote PK the
sample distribution of the functional data points, and Pti the sample distribution of
the evaluations at time point ti . The FOM is defined as a two dimensional graph,
plotting FAO(fk, PK ) on the horizontal axis against
σi=1,...,N ((AO(fk(ti ), Pti ))i )
(1 + FAO(fk, PK )) (12.17)
on the vertical axis, for k = 1, . . . , K , where σ denotes the standard deviation. The
motivation behind this map is that when a data point fk is a shift outlier, its according
point in the FOM plot will be higher on the horizontal axis. If a data point fk displays
an outlying high variability in time, this will result in a high value on the vertical axis
in the FOM plot. The denominator in (12.17) is necessary to correct for the effect
that when a data point is shifted further, this is reflected in the standard deviation
accordingly, see Hubert et al. (2015a).
Given the evaluation of the compositional functional data u1, . . . ,uK , k =
1, . . . , K , at time points t1, . . . , tN , we suggest equivalently to plot CFAO(uk, PK )
on the horizontal axis, against
σi=1,...,N ((AO(ilrV(uk(ti )), Pti ))i )
(1 + CFAO(uk, PK )) (12.18)
on the vertical axis. Again, the latter is independent of the choice ofV, because AO as
well as CFAO are affine invariant, see the reasoning for (12.16) and its conclusion.
12.4 Application to COVID-19 Data
In this section we use data from https://covid.ourworldindata.org,
which are publicly available. This page contains for most countries of the world
daily information related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Here we focus on European
countries only, and on the following information:












































































Fig. 12.1 COVID-19 data from Austria in the period April 1 until December 31, 2020. The plots
show daily data for the 5 variables used for the analysis
• Total number of COVID-19 infections per million inhabitants.
• Total number of COVID-19 deaths per million inhabitants.
• Total number of COVID-19 tests per million inhabitants.
• Positive rate, i.e. share of total COVID-19 tests that were positive.
• Reproduction rate, referring to the expected number of cases directly generated
by one case.
We select the time period from April 1 until December 31, 2020, because from April
onwards the information was consistently collected in the data base. However, for
some of the European countries the information on some of the variables was not
available, so that finally only 35 European countries could be used. Still, for some
countries there were missing values (or shorter time periods with missings), which
have been imputed by a weighted moving average imputation method, implemented
as function na_ma() in the R package imputeTS (Moritz and Bartz-Beielstein
2017).
As an example, Fig. 12.1 shows the data for Austria, and the data structure is
similar in many of the other countries. Still, there might be countries with deviations
in the multivariate data structure, and the task is to identify such countries. The focus
here is on relative information in terms of log-ratios between the different variables.
Figure12.1 reveals that the total number of cases starts to grow quickly in October
2020, and the same is true for the total number of deaths (per million). The number of
tests grows steadily over the time period. The positive rate decreases at the beginning
of this selected time period, but it increases drastically in October, followed by
a decline in November/December. The reproduction rate fluctuates more, and has
higher values than one in the summer and fall.
Multivariate functional outlier detection is here first applied to the data expressed
in relative information, i.e. as ilr coordinates. In a second stage we also compare
with an analysis based on absolute information, as reported in Fig. 12.1 for Austria.
Naturally, the different treatment of the data will very likely lead to different results.
As an example for relative versus absolute information, we may consider just the
number of cases and the number of deaths (per million). For most countries, an
increase of cases also implies an increase of deaths, probably with a different time
delay. If one looks at relative information in terms of a log-ratio, however, differences
between the countries might get more clearly pronounced. We will come back to this
issue later.
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Fig. 12.2 Ilr coordinates of the data from Austria, together with the lines after smoothing. The
smoothed lines (for every country) are the input for compositional functional outlier detection
For every country, the data are first ilr-transformed, resulting in time series of the
ilr coordinates. Since the specific choice of the ilr coordinates is not relevant here,
we use so-called pivot coordinates, where the first coordinate expresses all relative
information of the first part to the remaining parts in the composition, see Filzmoser
et al. (2018). Figure12.2 shows the resulting ilr coordinates for the Austrian data;
since there are 5 variables available, see Fig. 12.1, we end up with 4 ilr coordinates.
Figure12.2 also shows the lines after smoothing the data in ilr coordinates, thus
after solving Problem (12.11). The information of these lines form the compositional
functional data as they are used formultivariate outlier detection. Since we used pivot
coordinates, only the first coordinate (denoted here by z1) has a clear interpretation
in terms of all relative information of the total cases to the remaining variables. This
coordinate is in fact proportional to the first clr coefficient (Filzmoser et al. 2018).
We will show and discuss the corresponding clr coefficients later in Fig. 12.5.
Once the smooth functions are estimated for every country, compositional func-
tional outlier detection can be performed. Figure12.3 shows the compositional func-
tional outlier map (CFOM). Every point in the plot corresponds to a country, and the
line indicates the outlier cutoff. It can be seen that one (red) point (Iceland) slightly
exceeds the cutoff, and another point (Belarus) is just below the cutoff. The sorted
compositional functional adjusted outlyingness is again shown in Fig. 12.4 (left),
with the corresponding country names added. The values for Iceland and Belarus
clearly stick out, and the next biggest value originates from the data from Luxem-
bourg. These countries are not particularly outlying in their variability in time, since
their values in Fig. 12.4 (right) are not unusual.
Figure12.5 is an attempt to identify the reason for outlyingness. The plots show
the smoothed functional data in clr coefficients, which are simply obtained by a
transformation from the functions in ilr coordinates, see Eq. (12.5). The function for
Iceland is shown in red, and that for Belarus in blue. For example, the clr coefficients
for the total cases (left plot) mainly show a strongly increasing trend at the beginning,
and again at the end of the considered time period. This means that the cases have
grown rapidly, relative to the remaining variables (on average). The function for
Belarus (blue) shows a quite different behaviour, with very high values especially
around May. This means that the total cases are very much dominating over the
values of the other variables. The reason for this is not because of high values of














































Fig. 12.3 Compositional functional outlier map: the points represent the countries, and the line is















































































































































0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
σ(AO(ilr))\(1+CFAO)
Fig. 12.4 Sorted compositional functional adjusted outlyingness (left), and sorted values from the
vertical axis in Fig. 12.3 (right)
cases, but because of exceptionally low (reported) values of the remaining variables.
Also the values for Iceland (red curves) are seen as atypical. For example, the clr
coefficients of the total cases started to be the lowest in April, but then increased to
be the highest in August. In a ratio, it can either be the change in the numerator or in
the denominator, or in both, to get this behaviour, but in any case it turns out to be
quite different compared to the other countries.
As a comparison, the following analysis is based on absolute information. Thus,
the smoothed curves are directly estimated from the raw input data without any trans-





















































































Fig. 12.5 Functional data represented in clr coefficients. Every function represents the time series













































Fig. 12.6 Functional outlier map (FOM) as a result of using the untransformed absolute data
information
formation, see Eq. (12.6). Then multivariate functional outlier detection is applied,
which results in the functional outlier map presented in Fig. 12.6. Here, one point
clearly exceeds the outlier cutoff value, and this point is Luxembourg.
Details are presented in Fig. 12.7, where the left plot are the sorted values from
the horizontal axis, and the right plot the sorted values of the vertical axis from the
FOM of Fig. 12.6. Indeed, Luxembourg appears with an exceptionally high value of
FAO, and neither Iceland nor Belarus are atypical in any of these plots.
Finally, Fig. 12.8 shows the raw functional data. The outlier Luxembourg is shown
by green curves, Iceland in red, and Belarus in blue. Luxembourg shows a very
clear difference in the total tests, which might be the reason for the multivariate
outlyingness. The countries Iceland and Belarus, which were clearly different in the
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σ(AO)\(1+FAO)
Fig. 12.7 Horizontal axis (left) and vertical axis (right) from Fig. 12.6 for functional outlier detec-









































































Fig. 12.8 Smoothed curves for the untransformed (absolute) data, with Luxembourg in green,
Iceland in red, and Belarus in blue
compositional analysis, follow the main data structure well and do no longer appear
as atypical. This shows that both types of analysis indeed focus on different data
aspects, and it will be based on the task and research question to determine which of
the analysis is more appropriate.
12.5 Summary and Conclusions
Outlier detection has been a relevant task in data analysis already since the beginning
of data collection, and it continues being important also for more complex data
structures. The identified outliers may point at atypical events, and depending on the
context even at possible cases of fraud; see, e.g., van Capelleveen et al. (2016) or
Nian et al. (2016). Outlier detection methods are also useful for pandemic-related
data, as they may guide policy makers to draw appropriate conclusions.
Here we have used publicly available time series data related to COVID-19, as
they are reported from different countries. The multivariate information, here in
terms of the number of cases, deaths, tests, the positive rate, and the reproduction
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rate, has been treated as compositional data, where relative rather than absolute
values are processed in the analysis. Absolute values would refer to the data as they
are reported, while relative information refers to the log-ratios between the values
of the different variables. An outlier detection method which makes use of relative
information thus will focus more on the differences of the developments over time
between the variables, and not necessarily on extreme values in single variables. In
fact, if there is a peak in one variable in a certain time period, and the peak also
appears in another variable in the same period, the log-ratio would not show up as
unusual. A temporal shift of the peaks, however, creates big log-ratios, and if the
position ormagnitude is different for one country compared to the others, this country
will appear as a potential outlier.
The time trends of the COVID-19 data have been treated here as functional data.
Functional data which are processed with tools from compositional data analysis
commonly have a constant sum constraint, such as probability density functions or
particle-size curves, see van den Boogaart et al. (2014) or Menafoglio et al. (2014).
Here we considered the single variables of the multivariate data information as parts
of a composition, and since the information is derived continuously over a domain
(here time), such data are regarded as multivariate compositional functional data.
As functional data are supposed to be smooth functions, the concepts from com-
positional data analysis already need to be taken into account when generating the
compositional functional data. Thus, the original data information, which usually
needs to be smoothed in order to represent functions, has to be presented in the
appropriate geometry. Since we deal with multivariate information, smoothing also
needs to be done in a multivariate context. Here we have used isometric log-ratio
coordinates to move the data from the simplex to the standard Euclidean geometry,
and we have shown that the specific choice of these coordinates is not relevant for
obtaining the smooth functions.
Once themultivariate compositional functional data are available and expressed in
the appropriate geometry, standard tools for multivariate functional outlier detection
can be used. The application of the methodology to the COVID-19 data revealed
that the outlyingness values for the two countries Iceland and Belarus were clearly
higher compared to the other investigated countries. Diagnostics in clr coefficients,
again referring to relative information, has shown that some of the functions for
these countries indeed deviated clearly, at least in certain time periods. Because clr
coefficients refer to log-ratios of a specific variable to the geometric mean, deviations
can be caused either by atypical values of this variable, or by atypical values of the
geometric mean, representing an “average behaviour” of all analysed variables. The
analyst would then have to compare this information to that from the other countries,
or even go back to the original data source for such a comparison. There could be
many reasons for outlyingness: data reporting is done differently (probably only for
some of the variables), the policy of the restrictions in the context of the pandemic is
very different, the behaviour of the people to deal with the pandemic is very different,
etc.
Wehave also compared such an analysiswithmultivariate functional outlier detec-
tion using the absolute information, where outliers are, for example, countries with
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extreme values of a function in a certain time period. This analysis led to different
outliers, and it finally will depend on the underlying task and research questionwhich
type of analysis is most appropriate.
There are many further methodological challenges, which are revealed when con-
sidering real data applications as, for instance, the full COVID-19 data set provided
from the source mentioned in the paper: zero values, missings, poor data quality,
some countries do not provide information for some of the characteristics, etc. These
issues are relevant already for estimating the multivariate smooth functions, and
subsequently also for the purpose of outlier detection. Our future research will be
devoted to such tasks.
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Chapter 13
The Legal Challenges of Insuring Against
a Pandemic
Rachel Hillier
Abstract COVID-19 has raised, and continues to raise, questions about the tra-
ditional approach to insurance cover. For instance, business interruption insurance
covering “pandemics” under all risks insurance policies are likely to be a thing of
the past. With tensions between businesses and the insurance industry on the rise,
what can be done to offer businesses some protection at a premium they can afford,
without emptying insurers’ reserves? In this chapter we talk about legal challenges
related to traditional insurance against the risk of losses caused by a pandemic, and
whether parametric insurance is the solution.
13.1 Introduction
The insurance industry has always been adept at developing insurance products
to meet the changing needs of society, from the development of death benefit and
personal injury insurance during the Industrial Revolution tomotor vehicle insurance
in the late 1890s,1 to aircraft insurance in the 1920s, to drone insurance in the 2010s.
The ability to adapt insurance to meet new perils arising from changing human
activity is a common thread in the history of insurance.
The COVID-19 pandemic as a new peril is no different. Living with the risk of
loss associated with COVID-19 has become a reality and the insurance industry is
working to provide financial protection to those affected. However, some of our most
established and oldest types of insurance policies have been found wanting during
the pandemic, particularly in relation to small businesses hit hard by financial losses
during repeated lockdowns and trading restrictions imposed across the world in an
attempt to curb the spread of the virus. This chapter looks at the weaknesses and
strengths of the legal structure of traditional insurance policies, and how parametric
1The first motor policies in the UKwere written around the time of the original London-to-Brighton
car run, which took place on 14th November 1896.
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insurance, with the aid of new technologies could assist in providing new insurance
to meet the needs of a COVID-19 world.
As a lawyer trained and qualified in England and Wales, I have concentrated
in this chapter on challenges to the legal system in England and Wales. However,
many other jurisdictions have the same or a similar insurance contracts and therefore
similar challenges.
13.2 Summary of the Traditional Approach to Insurance
13.2.1 The Origins of Insurance
Fire insurance was the start of commercial business insurance in England and can
be traced directly to the Great Fire of London in 1666. A company called the “Fire
Office” was set up byNicholas Barbon (a building entrepreneur whomade his money
rebuilding London after The Great Fire). From 1680, the Fire Office also had a “com-
pany of men” to put out the fires. By the 17th Century, marine and life insurance
policies were commonly purchased. By this time, the English courts were regu-
larly hearing cases involving insurance disputes. The legal construct of an insurance
contract has in many cases not changed significantly since the 17th Century and is
predominantly based on the indemnity principle.
13.2.2 The Insurance Indemnity Principle
A definition for a “contract of insurance” is conspicuously missing from the central
piece of legislation that regulates the insurance industry in the United Kingdom, the
Financial Services andMarkets Act 2000 (commonly known as FSMA). This allows
the industry to adapt and develop new models of insurance to meet new types of
risk. In this section, we will explore why the indemnity principle has become so
entrenched in insurance law and why, in many cases, it is not fit for purpose in a
pandemic.
Modern insurance has been defined in broad terms by the English courts as “an
agreement to confer upon the insured a contractual right which, prima facie, comes
into existence immediately when loss is suffered by the happening of an event insured
against, to be put by the insurer into the same position in which the insured would
have been had the event not occurred, but in no better position”.2 This definition
includes the principle of “indemnity”—that payment under an insurance contract
puts the policyholder back in the position they would have been had the event not
occurred, but in no better position.
2 Callaghan v. Dominian Insurance Co. [1997]2 Lloyds Rep. 541 per Sir Peter Webster.
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The indemnity principle has served the insurance industry well for many years.
It is a good tool to ensure that insurers pay only the value of what is lost, so that an
insurance policy is not gambling, or merely a security entered into for the purpose
of profit.
The fundamental purpose of insurance is to mitigate risk. Risk can be mitigated
in many ways. For example, doing business through a limited company can limit the
risk of its shareholders to the nominal value of shares owned. Another example is
the presence of fire proof doors and smoke alarms in a building to reduce the risk of
damage by fire. Mitigation of risk through insurance is achieved through the transfer
of risk to another (to insurers and reinsurers). The insurance company ensures it has
sufficient reserves from premiums collected from many insureds to protect the few
who suffer a loss, so that those few have their losses reinstated, at the expense of all
the insureds who paid the insurer their premiums. Thus, risk is transferred to insurers.
If the insurer has not collected sufficient premiums to cover the insured losses, it is
the insurer that must pay the difference. The insurer must therefore calculate not only
the likelihood of a claim occurring, but the likely value of each claim. The indemnity
principle provides a good method for insurers to learn from its previous claims as
well as to collect information about insured property to build sophisticated models to
work out how much each insured is likely to lose on average on an indemnity basis,
whilst ensuring at the same time that it does not pay out more than it needs to.
Whilst often convenient to insurers, in the UK, there is no statutory requirement
for the indemnity principle to be the basis on which claims are valued, as long as a
policyholder has an “insurable interest” in what is being protected. That is, an insured
must “benefit by the safety or due arrival of insurable property, or may be prejudiced
by its loss, or by damage thereto, or by the detention thereof, or may incur liability
in respect thereof ”.3
Non-indemnity insurance (including parametric insurance) does exist (and has
existed for some years), but such policies are small inlets compared to an ocean of
indemnity policies. Section27(3) of the Marine Insurance Act 1906 provides that an
insurance policy may be “valued or unvalued” and that where it is valued, “Subject
to the provisions of this Act [...], and in the absence of fraud, the value fixed by the
policy is, as between the insurer and assured, conclusive of the insurable value of
the subject intended to be insured, whether the loss be total or partial.” An example
of such insurance is income protection insurance. The amount the insured will be
able to claim each month if they are unable to work is fixed in advance, usually with
reference to the insured’s income at the time the insurance is taken out. There may be
some indexed rise in that fixed amount built into the policy, but the agreed payment
will be made whether the income actually lost is less or more than the pre-agreed
fixed amount.
In the face of new threats to the modern world, such as cyber-crime, climate
change and COVID-19, alongside the ability of modern computing power, machine
learning and artificial intelligence to provide more accurate model future risks, the
3 Marine Insurance Act 1906, Section5.
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indemnity principle, if not obsolete, may start to lose favour as the primary measure
of claims payments in the insurance industry.
13.3 The Effect of COVID-19 on the Insurance Industry
On 10th January 2020, the World Health Organization reported that Chinese author-
ities had determined that an outbreak of a pneumonia type disease, first reported in
December in the Wuhan province, was caused by a novel coronavirus, see WHO
(2020). The virus spread rapidly into and across Europe. On 23rd March 2020, the
UK prime minister, Boris Johnson, announced that people in the United Kingdom
must “stay at home” and that non-essential businesses must close.
The closure ofmanufacturing plants, bars, restaurants, retail establishments, enter-
tainment venues and other places of business resulted in significant business inter-
ruption losses and an influx of claims under commercial business insurance policies.
But it was not all bad news for insurers. People used their cars less and accidents on
the roads reduced significantly, reducing claims under vehicle insurance.Meanwhile,
deaths due to COVID-19 spiralled (in June 2020, more than 1,000 deaths a day were
recorded due to Coronavirus for 22 consecutive days). The majority of deaths were
older people, and many were above the age range for life insurance cover. Yet, the
population as a whole was faced with its own mortality, and uptake of life insurance
for those who were within normal age ranges for life insurance soared.
13.3.1 The Effect of COVID-19 on Business Interruption
Insurance Policyholders
WhenCoronavirus hit, those businesses that hadpurchased specialist pandemic insur-
ance, for example, the All England Lawn Tennis Club (host of the world famous
Wimbledon Tennis Championship) who had learned from the SARS epidemic and
taken out specialist pandemic insurance in 2013, did receive payments under insur-
ance policies. However, as they were indemnity based policies, calculating loss was
a long and complicated process. Richard Lewis, Chief Executive of the All England
Lawn Tennis Club said “It’s a wide-ranging policy but part of the reason it takes so
long to work through is that everything is looked at, so there’s no blanket payout.”,
Gangcuangco (2020). A Daily Mail report quoted Lewis as explaining “It’s looked
at line by line quite literally, every cost, expenditure, bit of income, revenue, whether
it has to be repaid, all that sort of thing”.
Many small and medium sized businesses (SMEs) thought they were covered
under their all risks commercial business insurance policies. However, most insurers
believed that these policies were not designed to cover a pandemic and there was no
cover under them. This dichotomy of understanding between insured and insurer and
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the resulting court cases that ensued across the world have often been in the press
during 2020/21. The insurance industry has not covered itself in glory by refusing
to pay claims under these policies and taking claims through to the bitter end of the
court process in many countries.
In the UK, SMEs complained to the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) that
insurers were refusing the vast majority of claims under all risk business insurance
policies. This led to the FCA seeking permission from the UK courts to submit test
cases relating to common policy wordings, following widespread concern over the
lack of clarity and certainty for businesses. The FCA hoped to obtain some cer-
tainty for hard pressed SMEs. The Supreme Court heard the case. It considered a
representative sample of 21 types of policy wordings from eight different insurers
as test cases. The FCA applied to the court for a decision as to whether the busi-
ness interruption sections of each policy covered losses due to business interruption
flowing from COVID-19 closures. The Court’s decisions were broadly in favour of
business owners. However, despite that decision, insurers continue to decline claims
as policy wordings are often slightly different to those wordings considered by the
court. Similar test cases have been considered by courts in other countries across the
globe—France,4 Germany,5 Ireland,6 Australia.7
Even where insurers have accepted a policy covers economic loss due to the
disease, many policy terms have exclusions and conditions that mean claims were
legitimately rejected. For example, many policies only cover losses flowing from
closure due to the presence of disease on the premises. During the first wave of the
pandemic “test and trace” in the UK was not in place, and in the second wave was
found to be wanting. Insureds therefore often have difficulty proving that COVID-19
was actually present on the premises and claims were rejected. Even where liability
has been accepted, in many cases payments have not been made. Assessment of loss
under the indemnity principle is leading to long delays in payment, because not only
does the policy wording have to cover the loss event, and causation have to be proved,
but loss must also be proved. Seven weeks after the Supreme Court judgement, the
UK regulator reported that Hiscox (whose policy wording was considered by the
court) had paid just 151 of its customers affected and was still deciding more than
4,500.
Insurers are vilified in the press, but as Hiscox said in response to criticism,
“These are complicated claims that require comprehensive financial information and
discussions with customers in order to settle them fairly.”, see BBC News (2021).
Quantifying economic loss on an indemnity basis is a time-consuming, administra-
4 On 22 May 2020, for example, Paris’s commercial court ordered Axa SA unit Axa France IARD
S.A. to pay e45,000 to restaurant group Maison Rostang SAS over the closure of one of its restau-
rants.
5 On 1 October 2020 the Munich regional court ordered insurer Versicherungskammer Bayern to
pay e1.01 million to the operator of the Augustinerkeller beer garden.
6 In October 2020, the Irish High Court heard business interruption cases between insurer FBD
Holdings PLC and four pubs.
7 On 18 November 2020, the NSW Court of Appeal handed down its much-anticipated decision in
HDI Global Specialty SE v Wonkana No. 3 Pty Ltd [2020] NSWCA 296 (“HDI Global”).
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tively burdensome and costly task, particularly when a once in a life time constantly
evolving world-wide pandemic, waxes and wanes, and the same businesses go in and
out of lockdown in response pandemic waves (more on the difficulties of quantifying
economic loss below). Expecting SMEs to provide detailed evidence of loss in an
ever-changing environment of Government led opening and forced closure, whilst
they tackle additional and evolving requirements for COVID safe environments and
ongoing staff absence due to COVID-19 illness or being required to self-isolate,
is creating even further stress on business owners. Many businesses are becoming
insolvent and failing before they can prove their losses, even when they have a valid
claim.
Ongoing delays and disputes concerning claims for business interruption losses
resulting fromCOVID-19 are happening across theworld. For example, in theUnited
States, by August 2020 over 1,000 COVID-19-related insurance coverage lawsuits
had reportedly been filed with early outcomes suggesting different judicial interpre-
tations of key issues and limited potential for any consolidation of proceedings, see
Covington (2020).
Meanwhile, ongoing loss to SMEs and increased premiums at renewal (as insurers
adjust premiums to recoup claims paid and ensure adequate reserves) means many
businesses are now finding themselves unable to afford increased premiums without
agreeing to large deductibles. Those that can afford cover are often unable to procure
insurance against future COVID-19 related losses due to policy terms offered.
13.3.2 The Effect of COVID-19 on Insurers
For insurers (and reinsurers),COVID-relatedbusiness interruption claimshavemeant
many potential losses and uncertainty as towhether policies are valid, affecting levels
of reserves required. As of March 2021, publicly available data puts an estimate of
total losses due to the pandemic worldwide at $34.523 billion, reported in Reinsur-
ance News (2021). However, the use of the indemnity principle as a measure to pay
claims means that this figure is an estimate, and the true figures will take years to
be known as evidence of economic loss claims is painstakingly gathered and claims
are slowly paid. Greater uncertainty as to both liability and quantum means greater
uncertainty in traditional claims modelling, resulting in insurers having to hold more
cash to top up the reduction in the value of assets held, tomeet reserves and regulatory
capital requirements.
In my view, the legal costs, and the costs of payments of claims is nothing com-
pared to the reputational damage the insurance industry has suffered as a result of
high-profile court cases across the world. Many SMEs have paid substantial premi-
ums for many years, never making a claim, and now feel let down by their insurers in
their time of need. This has led to a worldwide loss of faith in the insurance industry
by the small business community. Insurance is built on trust, and that trust has been
seriously diminished.
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We are now starting to see that many insurers are adding wide ranging exclusions
to their all risks business insurance so that SMEs have no cover against further waves
of COVID-19. It remains to be seen what the appetite of businesses for renewal of
these policies will be, particularly where premiums are increased from the previous
year as insurers seek to recover loss.
13.4 Life Insurance Versus Business Interruption
Insurance
2020 brought an interesting comparison between the fortunes of non-investment life
insurance providers and business interruption insurers.
Whilst insurers of business interruption policies have become embroiled in expen-
sive litigation, claims payments have been slow, renewal prices have increased and
many insurers have withdrawn from insuring the risk, in comparison, life insurers
have been largely unaffected by the pandemic, despite the unprecedented loss of
life in 2020. There is no evidence of insurers withdrawing from the life insurance
market. Despite high numbers of claims, insurers have not sought to exclude death
due to COVID-19, premiums have remained fairly static, many claims have been
paid swiftly and life insurance remains a relatively cheap insurance.
Why is that? We all know of the devastating number of deaths due to COVID
during 2020. The demographics of those deaths in the UK, according to the Office
of National Statistics, is as follows, see Office for National Statistics (2021):






The majority of UK life insurance policies are purchased when individuals take
a mortgage and are designed to expire upon mortgage repayment. Although the
age at which people repay their mortgages is increasing and of course there are
life insurance products available for those in their 80s, the majority of people have
repaid their mortgage and their life insurance policies have ended by the time they
reach 80years. This means the demographics of the COVID-19 death rates have been
kind to the life insurance industry. Also, whilst there is no doubt that the number of
claims under life insurance has increased, at the same time, life insurers have seen
a significant increase in the sale of life insurance, which has meant healthy cash
reserves to set off against claims.
There is also a stark difference in the mechanics of life insurance products com-
pared to all risks commercial business insurance. Life insurance is a relatively simple
product, not based on the indemnity principle. Policyholders decide at the outset of
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the policy what the payment should be upon the event that is insured—their death.
The trigger for payment is simple and easily proved by production of a death cer-
tificate. Whilst claims may be investigated where fraud is expected and death due to
pre-existing conditions are often excluded, payments are usually made quickly on
production of a death certificate. There is nowhere near the administrative burden
relating to claims payments, which also keeps premiums lower. There is no ongoing
loss—there is either a death, or not a death.
13.5 Why Existing Indemnity Based Pandemic Insurance
Products Are Not Working
Advances in epidemic risk analytics, including monitoring andmodelling tools, have
helped insurers better understand their risks and improve response strategies for
indemnity based claims. Technology has enabled better risk measurement, moni-
toring, mitigation and claims management. There are innovative Insurtechs offering
tech-based solutions in several areas of indemnity based insurance (UKexamples are,
Distribind which provides an automated bordereaux system, and Concirrus which
uses onboard sensors to provide real time analytics of marine shipping risk). But
technology cannot entirely mitigate the time it takes to predict and evidence loss for
a new indemnity based risk.
Specialist pandemic insurance was available to businesses prior to COVID-19. In
2018, Marsh McClennan launched a specialist pandemic insurance which provided
indemnity based cover, using triggers such as mortality or infections in a defined
area.8 The policy could be tailored to the policyholder to provide coverage for specific
expenses, geographies, types of disease, or portions of a calendar year, but until
COVID-19 it reportedly had very little uptake, see Collins (2020). I suspect that the
slow uptake was due to the perceived gap in the cost of the insurance compared to
the risk of suffering losses due to a pandemic. Hindsight is a wonderful thing, and
it must be remembered that the last global pandemic was the influenza pandemic
of 1918. Whilst Ebola and SARS were modern epidemics, they were seen in the
Western World as foreign diseases of little relevance or risk to communities in the
West.
Even for specialist pandemic insurance using the latest technology, the method-
ology used to determine future loss was not well developed. Insurers had some
knowledge of epidemics such as SARs and Ebola, but both were different to each
other and each was different to COVID-19. The unpredictability of epidemiology
meant that actuaries considering risk models for pandemic insurance were involved
inmore art than science. Furthermore, modelling of the economic input was based on
sparse evidence and on economic simulations rather than empirical data. Unlike nat-
ural catastrophes and other crises, pandemics and epidemics typically do not cause
8 https://www.marsh.com/ca/en/press-centre/marsh-to-help-businesses-minimize-financial-loss-
from-pandemics.html.
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immediate physical damage, and so they are difficult tomodel because every business
will have bespoke economic loss, dependent on their circumstances at the time.
Then there is the challengeof anticipatingbehaviour of both governments (severity
of lockdowns, enforcement of restrictions, availability of vaccines) and of individuals
(super spreaders, mask wearing, social distancing, ability and willingness to work
from home).
Most businesses did not hold specialist pandemic insurance, but did hold all risks
commercial business insurance which covers any peril in relation to a particular
category of risk, unless excluded in the policy. To give an example, an all risks
business insurance policy may cover any loss arising from theft, but exclude theft
by way of deception, so a break-in would be covered, but fraud would not. This
approach to insurance has led to long and complicated insurance policies with many
exclusions9 and there is often a mismatch of understanding between insured and
insurer as to what these policies cover.
Insurers viewed commercial business insurance policies as protection against
losses flowing from physical damage to insured premises, subject to restrictions and
limitations and that only very few of such policies covered economic loss flowing
from COVID-19. For policyholders, they read their commercial business policies
as including cover for economic losses relating to closure of their business due to
disease and had the expectation that, having paid insurance premiums for years, they
would be covered for losses to their businesses flowing from COVID-19.
This mis-match of expectations stems from the nature of all risks insurance poli-
cies which started life as simple insurance cover against physical damage to property
resulting from fire. Many additions of cover and exclusions over time mean these
policies are often repetitive and inconsistent. Add to the mix some unfortunate poor
drafting, and it is unsurprising that these types of insurance policies have become a
hot bed for litigation in the last year.
Looking at some common policy wordings, you can see why commercial business
insurance policyholders had the expectation that theywere covered for economic loss
flowing from COVID-19:
We shall indemnify you in respect of . . .
– interruption of or interference with the business arising from any notifiable disease
– any occurrence of a notifiable disease within a radius of 25 m from the premises
– the discovery of an organism at the premises which is likely to give rise to the occurrence
of a notifiable disease
– in respect of interruption of or interference with the business arising from any infectious
disease
– loss resulting from prevention of access to the premises due to the actions or advice of
a government or local authority due to an emergency which is likely to endanger life or
property
9 For example, the RSA business combined policy is 72 pages long.
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– loss of income arising from the closure or restriction in use of the premises by a competent
local authority due to defects in the drains or other sanitary arrangements or discovery of
vermin or pests at the premises
– damage to Property or premises within one mile of the boundary of Your Premises which
causes a loss of Income directly due to a reduction in customers visiting the area.”
Reading the extracts above, you could be forgiven for siding entirely with the pol-
icyholders making claims for losses during the COVID-19 pandemic. But all-risks
policies will also have exclusions, for example,
• Any pandemic coronavirus or strain identified by the World Health Organization.
• Any loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by or contributed to by or arising
from contamination.
One of the biggest areas of dispute in COVID-19-related business interruption claims
is whether COVID-19 has caused damage to business properties from which eco-
nomic loss flows. This is because most indemnity based business insurance policies
have, at their core, the principle that the insurance covers loss flowing from phys-
ical damage. However, over time additional cover against economic loss has been
added, such as economic loss due to closure by a local authority and in amongst the
list, often loss arising from interruption of trade due to closure of the premises on
the occurrence of disease, either on or near the premises. Policyholders argue that
COVID-19 has damaged their business and their premises and so they are covered
when they have to close as a result.
Where claims were made on the basis that COVID-19 had physically damaged
the premises, the insurers’ arguments against this were varied and included:
• The presence of invisible microbes on surfaces or objects, however, potentially
injurious to human health do not amount to physical damage to the property, and
the policy only covers loss flowing from such physical damage.
• COVID-19 microbes cannot be said to alter the physical state or condition of
surfaces or objectives whether at surface level or molecular level, so there cannot
be physical damage.
• Even if COVID-19 were to be held to be physical damage, it can be removed by
deep cleaning, and even if left individual microbes dissipate after between 18 and
100h, so it is not permanent.
• A deposit of something on property (i.e. the COVID-19 virus) which causes no
physical alteration to the property itself does not equate to damage to that property.
Where the words “physical damage” are used, insurers felt they had a strong case
and this has been born out in recent case law.10 However, some policies refer only to
10 TKC London Limited v Allianz Insurance plc [2020] EWHC 2710 (Comm).
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“damage”, and so the argument then is, whether COVID-19 has caused “damage” to
the business.
Where policies clearly and separately include cover for loss flowing from business
interruption due to closure because of disease, insurers have argued as to themeaning
of “disease”, “notifiable disease”, and “human disease”. Many wordings refer to
“notifiable disease”, but it is often not defined. Medical practitioners must report
“notifiable diseases” to the government under statutory duties in the Public Health
(Control of Disease) Act 1984 and the Health Protection (Notification) Regulations
2010, and on 5 March 2020, COVID-19 was added to the list of notifiable diseases.
Where notifiable disease is not defined, is that what was meant? Some policies are
even more vague—referring only to “human disease” or just “diseases”, particularly
with reference to local authorities shutting businesses down.
Cover often includes losses due to “closure by an authority” because of disease.
Insurers have argued that an “authority” relates to a local authority, and it was the UK
Government, Welsh Government and Scottish Government that initially “advised”
and then required businesses to close, so there is no cover.
For good measure, where policies do not specifically exclude loss due to a pan-
demic, insurers argue that commercial business insurance simply is not designed to
cover pandemics and that policyholders must have realised that when they purchased
the insurance, because of the price of the premium. Whilst the concept of applying a
construction of a policy that makes commercial sense for both parties is established
law, in my view raising such arguments both in court and in the press, does nothing
but harm the reputation of the insurance industry.
Where primary liability is proved by the insured, under the indemnity princi-
ple, policyholders then have to prove causation between the insured event that has
occurred and the economic loss suffered. This principle has led to further disputes
between the insurer and the insured, particularly in relation to economic damage
suffered by SMEs during lockdown due to the presence of COVID-19 on or near
the insured premises. Insurers have argued that in many cases, the economic loss
of businesses has been caused by a national lockdown and an economic downturn,
not by the presence of COVID-19 on the premises. Insurers have required evidence
from their insureds of COVID-19 physically being present on the premises, which,
particularly during the first wave of COVID-19 is impossible for most as testing was
not widely available and there was no means of tracing where infected people had
been. Even where COVID-19 on the premises could be proved, policyholders had to
show that this caused the closure of the premises and that such a closure would not
have happened irrespective of the COVID-19 instance on their premises. In many
cases this is an impossible hurdle to climb.
A perfect storm has brewed between insurers and their policyholders. It is not that
the insurers are the corporate bad guys, and nor do the policyholders have unrealistic
expectations of cheap property based insurance. The problem is the structure of the
indemnity policy, which does not meet the fundamental needs of risk transfer in a
pandemic. It is little wonder that insurers are choosing to change policy wordings on
renewal to remove all cover for losses related to disease, COVID-19 or otherwise.
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This is not a UK only issue. Businesses across the world have been hit by the
pandemic. In the United States, Charles Chamness, president of the US insurer’s
trade association, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC)
has been quoted as saying “Pandemics simply are not insurable risks; they are too
widespread, too severe and too unpredictable for the insurance industry to under-
write”, see Insurance Journal (2020).
13.6 Proposals Across the World for Resolving the Business
Interruption Insurance Deficit
Across the world, governments and insurers have established working groups to
consider proposals for future insurance of business interruption losses resulting from
a pandemic. Considerations have included incentivising risk prevention measures,
using different models of risk transfer between insurers, reinsurers and governments,
see EIOPA (2020), and charging a flat rate levy in all insurance products to create
a central fund to be paid to commercial businesses in the event of a World Health
Organization declared pandemic, see GDV (2020).
Parametric solutions are also being considered:
1. The French, Fédération française de l’assurance, have devised a parametric solu-
tion providing coverage for business interruption losses resulting from various
pre-determined catastrophies (e.g. terrorist attack, pandemic, natural disaster).
Cover will be triggered by state action to close businesses. Payments will be fixed
lumps sums, not indemnity based claims, but will be “calibrated” to replace gross
business disruption costs net of salaries and profits, see FFA (2020).
2. In the United States, insurers and the Federal Government are considering the
development of a national parametric solution. A formulaic payout is proposed to
be made to businesses, triggered by a presidential declaration of viral emergency.
Businesses would choose the desired level of protection for three months relief
of up to 80% of their payroll. Businesses would purchase the insurance via state-
regulated insurance entities. Aid would come from the Federal Government, see
Insurance Journal (2020).
13.7 What Is Parametric Insurance?
Parametric insurance is not a new phenomenon. For around 20years, insurers have
used parametric triggers in relation to catastrophic events such as flooding, hurricanes
and earthquakes, and it has been used successfully to write policies relating to Ebola
and Zika outbreaks. Parametric insurance (also called index-based insurance) is a
“pre-valued” policy. Pre-agreed payments are made upon a trigger event occurring.
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Trigger events depend on the nature of the parametric policy and can include envi-
ronmental triggers such as wind speed and rainfall measurements, see Molini et al.
(2007). Previously, it has been used to protect the agriculture industry against losses
due to catastrophic weather events, because the level of actual losses affecting often
large areas of the world are not viable for indemnity insurance. Payments are linked
to a pre-agreed index, which is linked to loss of production. For example, rainfall in a
particular area.Where rainfall falls below a certain level (drought conditions) or over
a certain level (flood), pre-set payments are “triggered”. Payments are automatically
paid upon the trigger event occurring at a pre-agreed amount.
Smart contracts are often used. These are usually associated with block chain
technology, but are not exclusive to it. Smart contracts are self-executing contracts, so
the agreed amount is paid automatically in accordance with written lines of computer
code.
To work well, parametric insurance requires the following:
(1) a recognised and trusted set of data which both parties to the contract agree to
rely on;
(2) a pre-agreed payment figure, which may or may not be linked to various levels
of data; and
(3) a clearly defined event which acts as a trigger;
(4) an acceptance by the insured in clear terms that payments may not (and probably
will not in most cases) put the insured back in the position they had been before
the trigger event.
13.7.1 Working Examples of Parametric Insurance
13.7.1.1 Case Study 1—Flooding
The insurance need: flood damage to commercial premises in flood prone areas. The
UK is experiencing increasing flood events. According to a study from Heriot-Watt
University, flooding in the UK could increase by an average of 15–35% by 2080, see
Ellis et al. (2021). Many businesses who have previously suffered flood damage or
are located in an area at risk of flooding find it hard and sometimes impossible to
find indemnity based insurance to protect their property from flooding at a premium
they can afford.
An Insurtech parametric solution: FloodFlash11 uses an internet connected flood
depth sensor which is fixed to the premises. The insured chooses a depth of flooding
(for example, 0.5 m) which will trigger payment under the insurance policy. The
insured also chooses the sum theywant to receive when the sensor notifies Floodflash
11 Flood Flash—rapid payout flood insurance for any business.
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that the trigger ismet. The premium for insurance is calculated using the depth trigger
and the agreed settlement amount. Payment of the pre-agreed settlement figure is
made to the insured automatically within hours of the trigger being met. Several
triggers can be set, for example, a payment of £50,000 is triggered when the water
depth reaches 0.5 m, then a payment of a further £50,000 is triggered when the water
depth reaches 1.2 m.
Why it works: The payments are swift, but are usually less than the cost of recovery
from the flood as the insuredwill set the flood depth trigger and the settlement amount
to the amount of premium it can afford. Fast payment often means that businesses
can use the settlement as a “first responder” pot of money to get the business trading
again. For the insurer, meteorological predictions have become more sophisticated
so that flood events can be predicted more accurately, and the level of payment is
already set, meaning risk can be better measured, and significant claims and loss
adjuster costs are negated. The insurer can offer smaller settlement amounts on risks
it would reject for insurance on an indemnity basis.
13.7.1.2 Case Study 2—Earthquakes
The insurance need: Insurance for households against losses due to earthquakes in
areas of high earthquake risk areas. In the United States, damage caused by earth-
quake is not commonly included in household insurance policies. Where it is avail-
able, traditional indemnity based insurers require large deductibles, because other-
wise the premiums are too high to be affordable. When there is an earthquake there
aremany claims at once and it takes time to process.Where there is catastrophic dam-
age, insurance often pays for replacement accommodation whilst rebuilding takes
place, but for lower level damage insurance payments are slow.
An insurtech meeting the needs of customers through parametric insurance:
Jumpstart Recovery12 uses its tech platform to monitor data from the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) Shake Maps. When peak ground hits a velocity of 30cm
per second in a certain area, the USGS turns its Shake Map red in that area. This trig-
gers the Jumpstart platform to automatically send a text to its policyholders whose
properties are insured in the area that turns red, asking if they have suffered a loss.
The insured texts “yes” in response, and $10,000 is automatically sent to the insured’s
bank account.
Why parametric insurance is a good solution: This is a great example of para-
metric insurance providing a fast effective solution to a large amount of low level
losses arising from one catastrophic event. It is a first responder type insurance which
provides fast payment to cover immediate losses. It is not a replacement for more
comprehensive indemnity based insurance against the cost of rebuilding, but either
compliments it, or provides lower level risk transfer for those who cannot afford the
“bells and whistles” of full indemnity based insurance.
12 https://www.jumpstartrecovery.com/.
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13.7.2 Challenges
There are challenges to the use of parametric insurance for business interruptions
policies.
13.7.2.1 Triggers and Quality of Data
Parametric insurance is hugely dependent on the basis of the trigger used for payment.
There needs to be confidence on the part of both the insured and the insurer in the
veracity of the data. By veracity I mean the accuracy and truthfulness of the data
being used, as well as the ability of the insured, and potentially a court, to verify the
truth of the data and that the trigger has been fired in the correct circumstances.
Some parametric insurance terms rely on more than one data point. For example,
the World Bank Pandemic Emergency Financing Facility’s parametric catastrophe
bond13 relies on publicly available data to determine how much money the facility
would release to the poorest countries in the world. According to theWorld Bank, the
triggers are based on outbreak size (the number of cases of infections and fatalities),
outbreak growth (over a defined time period), and outbreak spread (with two or more
IBRD/IDA countries affected by the outbreak). Pay-out occurs only after a slew of
conditions are met in connection with a country: (1) a rolling daily average of at least
250 cases; (2) the virus exists for at least 84days; (3) total confirmed deaths to be
greater than 250 cases (for class B issuances) or 2,500 cases (for class A issuances);
(4) an exponential growth rate; and (5) geographic spread of the virus. The World
Bank was criticised by the Financial Times, see Financial Times (2020), for making
the parametric triggers so high that it was nearly 40days after the World Health
Organization officially announced that COVID-19 was a pandemic, before the first
payments were made. The more data points relied on, the more chance there is of
the trigger being in dispute.
Statistical parameters could be used, relying on third parties to determine whether
a trigger has been satisfied. Such triggers are typically utilised in catastrophe bonds
and insurance-linked securities (instruments connected to insurance-related risks that
provide issuers funding for specific events), where scientific measurements of the
severity of tornadoes or hurricanes are used. Third party analytics of infection rates
or death rates in a particular area could be used as a trigger for pandemic insurance.
The epidemic data analytics firmMetabiota has also developed the Pathogen Sen-
timent Index, Metabiota (2018), that measures the effects of changes to behaviour in
a pandemic, giving “fear” score based on disease attributes, symptoms and mortality,
disease transmission and availability of treatment, to provide a score to reflect reduc-
tion in consumption. Others are based on an index of available data to determine
when the policy pay-outs can begin. Some pandemic insurance has used the rate of
13 A financing mechanism used at the World Bank (https://www.worldbank.org/) is designed to
provide an additional source of financing to help the world’s poorest countries respond to cross-
border, large-scale outbreaks.
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hotel bookings in comparison to year-on-year averages or the measures of footfall
in pedestrian areas.
My view is that for a pandemic business interruption solution for SMEs, a simple
single trigger should be used and would mean a faster rollout of the product andmore
transparency for the policyholder. While using several third party behaviour-based
metrics are useful for international organisations where a more sophisticated trigger
for difference areas of the business is needed, for SMEs a single parametric trigger
relying on one datapoint would be preferable where there are many smaller claims.
Civil authority triggers could be a solution. However, the challenge for insurers is
to pick which civil authority trigger to use in a rapidly changing political response to
a novel situation. In the UK, the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (All
Tiers) (England) Regulation 2020 came into force came into force on 2nd Decem-
ber 2020. This legislation introduced the concept of “tiers” and has been updated
and amended several times during as the pandemic has evolved and our knowledge
of how the disease spreads has increased. These regulations have been made under
Section45 of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, which allows UK
Government to make a regulation “imposing or enabling the imposition of restric-
tions or requirements on or in relation to persons, things or premises in the event
of, or in response to, a threat of public health”.14 A specific trigger regarding the
implementation of regulations restricting access under this Act could be used, but
then the devolved nature of the United Kingdom means that the Welsh and Scottish
Government have devolved powers to make these regulations, so this would only
work for England unless the Welsh and Scottish regulations were added to the trig-
ger. There is also the issue of “Guidance”. In the early stage of the pandemic, the UK
Government issued guidance that people should stay at home, severely impacting
the entertainment and leisure industry, despite there being no regulation in place.
An alternative trigger would be infection rates in a particular area. There are
potential difficulties with how these figures are arrived at: in the UK they are based
on the percentage of people who have tested positive for COVID-19 at a point in
time, but an alternative trigger might be the incidence rate—a measure of only the
new infections in a given period of time. This trigger relies on a good testing regime.
We know that at the start of the pandemic in the UK, testing was not well developed,
and it is widely accepted that infection rates were far higher in reality compared with
the figures recorded.
13.7.2.2 Pricing Challenges
For insurers, it will be a continuing challenge to build a risk model that can price
premiums that are affordable and get the ratio right between premiums and claims
payments. Can AI, machine learning help? Do we trust it enough? There are devel-
opments in this area which could help. US Insurtech, Thimble, joined the 5th cohort
of Lloyds lab accelerator programme in 2020, Lloyds Lab (2021). Thimble is using
14 Section45C(3)(c) of the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984.
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AI to devise a parametric business interruption insurance policy that has low limits
before payment is made, and pays out incrementally and instantly, for example where
businesses in a certain zip code are forced to close. There is certainly more that can
be done in this area and Insurtechs continue to work on solutions.
13.7.2.3 Legal And/or Regulatory Uncertainty
Few countries have specific laws or regulations about parametric insurance. Whilst
parametric insurance is an accepted concept in many countries, it can cause uncer-
tainty as to lawfulness in jurisdictions where the indemnity principle sits at the core
of insurance law and regulation. For example, in India and South Africa parametric
insurance is often purchased by farmers in relation to drought and flood. The law
in India around contingency based agreements means that the insured must prove a
loss to the insurer. This requirement means that when a trigger is met, there is then
the same slowness in claim payments under parametric insurance, as for traditional
insurance. South Africa similarly has legal requirements for the insured to prove loss,
but has approached the issue in a different way, by not requiring the insured to prove
the extent of loss, only that some loss has occurred. Countries where parametric
insurance is now well established includes the United States, many African states,
the UK, France and the Caribbean.
13.7.3 Opportunities
13.7.3.1 Combination Policies
There is room for a combination parametric/indemnity policy. This would be ameans
of indemnifying against loss to a certain extent, but it would also provide an immedi-
ate parametric based payment as a first response. I am not aware of a single insurance
policy that provides both options at the time of writing.
13.7.3.2 Combining Parametric Insurance with Government Support
Parametric insurance could be a simple method of providing a combination of Gov-
ernment support and insurance claim payments. In the UK, Government has worked
with insurers in relation to flooding loss (Flood Re). Flood Re is a joint initiative
between the UKGovernment and insurers. All home insurance companies in the UK
pay a levy to Flood Re, which is a reinsurer set up for the purpose. All those insurers
can then use Flood Re to reinsure the flood risk part of a policy where a home is in an
area that is at higher risk of flooding, so providing a transfer of risk where insurance
might otherwise be refused. A scheme could be implemented at Government level
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where payments triggered by parametric technology are be partly insurance funded,
partly government funded.
13.7.3.3 Capital Investment
Insurance has not typically been attractive to capital markets as part of an investment
portfolio. Insurance linked securities (ILS) are traded, but are not a main stream
investment. The clean transparent nature of parametric insurance is likely to be more
attractive, as investors only need to understand the event trigger, not potential quan-
tum (as payments are always a pre-valued fixed sum). It could be that as parametric
insurance grows in popularity insurers/reinsurers can hedge against risk aggregated
exposure to parametric triggers with parametric ILS securities, thereby transferring
the risk of a pandemic to some extent away from government and insurers/reinsurers
to capital markets and institutional investors.
13.7.4 Could Parametric Insurance Be the Answer for SMEs
During a Pandemic?
Parametric pandemic insurance could be the solution as a “first defence” against
business interruption during a pandemic. For larger businesses it may well be that
both a parametric insurance product and amore specialist traditional indemnity based
pandemic insurance policy are the way forward. However, for the many SMEs in
the UK and the rest of the world, for whom a huge protection gap has emerged,
parametric insurance could be the only affordable option.
In the same way as a paramedic being first on the scene of an accident can make
the difference between life and death in the aftermath of an accident, payment within
48h of forced closure to a pandemic, could mean the difference between business
survival and closure. The paramedic is very quickly available to give life-saving
aid with enough equipment and enough training to keep those involved alive. The
treatment does not cure the victims of their injuries, but it is enough to keep them
alive, to relieve some of the pain, and to give comfort until the ambulance arrives
with more equipment and the injured is taken to hospital for more thorough treatment
and hopefully a full recovery. Parametric business insurance can work in the same
way, providing fast, automatic payment with no requirement for proof of loss, upon
a mutually agreed trigger associated with the pandemic that affects that business.
Furthermore, parametric insurance allows those fast automatic payments to be made
repeatedly, every time a prescribed trigger event occurs.
The payment is unlikely to indemnify all losses, but will be enough to keep
the business alive in the immediate crisis so that it does not fail, but lives to trade
another day. That initial payment may be enough to purchase necessary PPE and
change the premises to meet social distancing requirements, or may pay for fixed
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cost commitments such as rent/salaries during lockdown or reduced trade due to
social distancing measures.
Causation is taken out of the equation in a parametric solution. All the problems
that business owners have experienced under indemnity business interruption policies
are gone: complicated terms, having to prove their losses are caused by COVID-19
being on or near the premises, lengthy waits for payment. It does not matter whether
losses are due to a general downturn, poor management or COVID-19, the agreed
sum is paid automatically.
Parametric insurance is not only good for the insured. For insurers, it significantly
reduces the administrative claims burden and allows for smaller pay-outs in return
for payments policyholders can afford. An army of loss adjusters and claims handlers
are not required. Payments are made automatically when data feeds from the agreed
source hit the trigger. There is no requirement to assess or prove loss.
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Chapter 14
An Actuary’s Opinion: How to Get
Through a Pandemic
Frank Schiller
Abstract We discuss in this chapter how the insights and methods presented in
the previous chapters can be effectively and practically implemented to manage and
mitigate pandemics. The findings are not only analysed for the current COVID-19
crisis, but we also present some insights that could be gained for future pandemics
and other extreme events. Coming from an actuarial background, the main focus lies
on practical and technical aspects of the presented articles, namely on data, mod-
els and possible risk mitigation through (re)insurance, capital markets and similar
approaches.
14.1 Questions to Be Tackled from an Actuary’s Perspective
The COVID-19 pandemic and the widespread shutdown of social and economic
life in 2020 hit the insurance industry hard. In addition to losses in investments
due to falling share prices and lower interest rates in reinvestment, non-life insurers
and reinsurers in particular suffered high claims costs especially in travel insur-
ance, business closure and event cancellation. Even if the situation of the industry
is not existentially threatening from today’s perspective, the COVID-19 pandemic
has impressively shown the negative effects extreme events can have on the finan-
cial and solvency situation of companies (see also Frank et al. (2020) and Actuarial
Association of Europa (2020)).
To make matters worse, the course of the COVID-19 pandemic is a “natural
disaster in slowmotion”,with no end in sight even at present.With all the uncertainties
of further waves and the effectiveness of the vaccination program the further course
of the pandemic and the economic consequences are still difficult to predict.
Management of the crisis for both the private and public sectors is based on the
analysis of data and appropriate models and metrics. Therefore, in Sect. 14.2 we
first discuss the learnings and their practical application from COVID-19 on models,
risk modelling and assessment. We especially share some thoughts on the general
insurability of a pandemic in Sect. 14.2.1 including a first assessment of how the
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risk appetite and the capacity for covering a pandemic might have changed due to
COVID-19 and what innovative solutions for a pandemic cover could be expected
for the future. In 2020 we especially gained more experience on how to manage
an extreme event like a world-wide pandemic and we elaborate in Sect. 14.2.2 on
aspects of data quality and information uncertainty, how the massively increased
volatility during such a crisis can be handled and, based on this experience, which
changes of the general risk management framework Solvency II can be expected for
the future. Finally, in Sect. 14.2.3 we summarize some potential future consequences
which COVID-19 could have on existing products and how this can be monitored
and reflected in their prices and reserves. In Sect. 14.3 we discuss how to improve
measures for mitigating risks from a governmental perspective. Again, we first dis-
cuss in Sect. 14.3.1 what can be learnt for the management of the crisis, now from
the perspective of a government. Finally, we present in Sect. 14.3.2 some thoughts
on how the economy can generally be made more resilient for such a crisis, how
pandemic risks can be covered and better spread on several risk carriers, what role
the capital market and especially the World Bank could have and why we have to
especially solve the issue of basis risk to implement an effective risk transfer for a
pandemic. In a brief summary in Sect. 14.4 we conclude with the main takeaways
and what are relevant learnings after such a pandemic.
14.2 Managing a Pandemic as a (Re)insurer
The COVID-19 pandemic is testing the models, methods and processes (re)insurers
have used so far. Let us first consider in general terms how we can deal with new
knowledge and uncertainties in assessing risks during an extreme event such as a
pandemic. For assessing prices and risks three types of models are typically used:
calculation or pricing models, valuation models, and risk models.
The COVID-19 pandemic may have an impact on all three types in different
ways. A conscious approach to the respective characteristics and requirements and
the questions derived from them for the individual model types are important:
• Calculation/pricing: Are pricing assumptions still valid? Is there a sufficient mar-
gin/return on investment (also in conjunction with a possible adjustment of the
allocation of capital costs from the risk model)?
• Reserving: For which potential losses should provisions already be formed and
reported, even under uncertainty?Howdo assumptions already need to be adjusted,
if necessary, also for the expected payments and future projections?
• Risk: Are the model assumptions still appropriate? Was the exposure fully and
correctly considered in the valuation? Are there other dependencies/correlations
in extreme events between individual models?
In the following sections we will consider effects and learnings of COVID-19 on
all three types of models and the respective processes and measures when applying
these models.
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14.2.1 Insurability of a Pandemic
The main purpose of (re)insurance is to provide compensation for losses from risks.
Insurance is ery effective when covering, e.g., losses stemming from accidents with
limited exposures. In this case the main risk is simply volatility and large enough
portfolios help to diversify effectively against high aggregate losses. Even local
catastrophic events like floods, storms, earthquakes or epidemics are (re)insurable, if
on a global level these risks have comparable low frequency, limited size, and, hence,
can be diversified against other rare risks in a global portfolio. For such covers, it
might happen that a (re)insurer faces rather high losses in a single year but these can
be compensated by reserves and equity buffers build up in the previous 5–10 years—
some companies even accept longer periods for certain risks and under Solvency II
(re)insurance companies have to hold equity to compensate for a 200-years event.
Risk equalisation in the collective or over time no longer works if the risks are
systemic or world-wide events have to be considered. A pandemic is a very relevant
example for such an event. Obviously, in such a situation the diversification over a
world-wide portfolio would not work as effectively as it is necessary for a collective
diversification. Assets and liabilities of several lines of business from life, health to
non-life are effected. And losses could be so extreme that it is simply not possible
to built up sufficient reserves and equity to compensate for the total loss that needs
to be (re)insured in such an event (see also Frank et al. (2020) for a more detailed
discussion).
Risk appetite and capacity for pandemic risks
With COVID-19 we saw quite impressively that during a pandemic collective risk
sharing over different risks within a (re)insurance portfolio does not work. Both
sides of the balance sheet, assets and liabilities, were affected, in some cases heavily.
And also especially for the liabilities, claims in many lines of business were trig-
gered simultaneously, starting from the obvious life and health business1 to non-life
portfolios with main exposures in business closure, business interruption and event
cancellation, and other lines of business like, e.g., credit insurance (see also Actuarial
Association of Europa (2020) for a more detailed overview and current data can be
observed on Roser et al. (2020)).
The problem of the massive potential exposure during a pandemic can be better
illustrated by an example fromGermany (more detailed data can be found in Destatis
(2020), GDV (2019) and GDV (2020)). When only considering a business closure
insurance for the hospitality industry sector2 during lockdown we could face a loss
1 For COVID-19 in 2020 only to a very limited extend in many countries, since portfolio exposures
are comparably small for the older population—for other pandemics like flu other age groups might
be affected.
2 In 2019 the annual turnover for this sector in Germany was e94.7bn, https://www.dehoga-
bundesverband.de/zahlen-fakten/umsatz/.
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of more than e90bn.3 In contrast to that in 2018 the annual premium income of
the German non-life insurance sector was only e70.7bn, the claims expenditures
e52.5bn and the own funds were onlye110bn. For such rare events like a pandemic
the premium income would increase not more than 2–3% of exposure, i.e., less than
e3bn. All in all after such an extreme event the German non-life insurers would be
insolvent, if they provided such a cover without a relevant limitation.
In several chapters of this book insurability of a pandemic is discussed coming
from different perspectives. Obviously, improving the models does not help, as the
problem lies with the simultaneous trigger on different lines of business and both,
assets and liabilities, and in aggregate a too large total exposure. Improved data and
model quality would only improve the prize of the cover, which is not relevant during
the realisation of such rare events.What is important, however, is clarity on the claims
trigger itself. Treatywording has to be strong and clear and the definition of the claims
trigger simple but adequate for transparently transferring the risk as promised from
the client. In such cases, parametric (re)insurance might be a very valuable too, as
discussed in the chapter on “The Legal Challenges of Insuring Against a Pandemic”
by R. Hillier. The payout is quicker and supports more effectively the safeguard-
ing of the whole economy. However, the main problem with parametric triggers is
always their potential basis risk, i.e. the real claims costs might be materially larger
or smaller than the amount paid through the parametric (re)insurance. We discuss
this issue in more detail in Sect. 14.3.2.
New solutions and innovations after the pandemic
Greater demand for pandemic cover from clients on the one hand, but lower risk
appetite among reinsurers on the other, will drive innovation and new solutions for
this cover.
During the crisis (re)insurance companies have developed rather a more lim-
ited risk appetite for pandemics. This means that relevant exposure of carve-out or
even stand-alone covers for a pandemic will be not available in (re)isurance. To
the contrary, the focus will more and more lie on how to enhance the diversifica-
tion of portfolios, to limit exposures for extreme events, and to better stabilize the
whole balance sheet also during an extreme event. This could even mean that several
(re)insurers will rather further limit or even try to exclude a pandemic cover for their
new products.
On the other hand, the demand for mitigating pandemic risks is now higher than
before the crisis formany decisionmakers in the concerned sectors. Solutions formit-
igating or transferring such risks cannot be provided alone by the private (re)insurance
sector and solutions will have to include the public sector. This topic is dealt with
excellently in the chapter on “Risk Sharing and Stochastic Premia in the Presence
of Systematic Risk: The case study of the UK COVID-19 economic losses” by
3 The actual reduction in turnover in 2020 was e35.2bn or 36.5%, https://www.dehoga-
bundesverband.de/zahlen-fakten/umsatz/.
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H. Assa and T. J. Boonen. A more detailed discussion from an actuarial point of
view on such solutions is given in Sect. 14.3.2.
14.2.2 Risk Management During a Pandemic
The information uncertainty during the pandemic poses particular challenges toman-
agement and risk management of a (re)insurance company but also to the manage-
ment of the crisis under social economic and general economic aspects, and we can
learn from the current pandemic how to improve these measures for this crisis and
also future extreme events. For (re)insurance it is important to better understand:
• How can the period of increased uncertainty be managed?
• How to adjust requirements during the pandemic, if necessary, even with uncertain
information,
• and especially taking into account errors and uncertainties inmodelling and assess-
ing the risk situation?
Data quality and information uncertainty
Especially at the beginning of the COVID-19 crisis we had to cope with limited
statistical comparability between countries due to different methods used to measure
rates of infection and death, aswell as different approaches to testing, testing capacity
and criteria applied for test eligibility. As a consequence, it was extremely difficult
to assess and compare the success of different approaches taken by the countries to
contain the pandemic. Also for this reason some research institutes even decided not
to look into the data of reported cases at all but only analyse the reported deaths,
as they appeared to be more reliable (see for example Imperial College COVID-
19 response team (2021)). Even for a single country the data originating from the
first till half year are not really comparable to the second wave starting in October
for the same reasons, and this still leads to relevant uncertainties in interpreting the
observations.
Now, after one year, testing quality and capacity has increased significantly and
so the data quality of the reported cases. Still, we have to cope with quality issues
during the reporting process and itmight be valuable to applymethods as described in
“Outlier Detection for Pandemic-related Data Using Compositional Functional Data
Analysis” by Ch. Rieser and P. Filzmoser to smoothen the data. However, a major
problem remains the attribution of deaths that were directly caused by COVID-19
and not only died with a COVID-19 infection (a more detailed discussion can be
found in Ealy et al. (2020)). To solve this ambiguity of potential wrong or missing
attributions to deaths caused by COVID-19, it is helpful to analyse the observed
excess mortality instead. Reporting and understanding of this data has proven to be
of adequate quality for most countries, and hence this is also a robust source for a
deeper analysis of pricing and reserving adjustments required due to the pandemic.
A valid source for Europe can be found online at EuroMOMO, EuroMOMO (2021).
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Managing volatility
The COVID-19 related fluctuations on the capital markets since March 2020 have
shown that short-term, temporary volatility can be much higher than long-term
volatility. As of mid-August 2020, share prices have already recovered significantly
from the previous low in mid-March and are partly back at the level of year-end
2019. The temporary increase in spreads for government and corporate bonds after
the lockdown also reduced the market values of interest-bearing securities on the
asset side and led to a loss of own funds. The effect of the (temporary) market distor-
tions on own funds was partially mitigated by the instrument of volatility adjustment
(VA) under Solvency II, which serves to avoid pro-cyclical behaviour by market
participants. The symmetric adjustment factor (“equity dampener”) has mitigated
equity stress in the standard formula by up to 10% for the same reasons.
In many (re)insurance companies, the impact and uncertainty of the COVID-
19 pandemic have triggered special analyses and sometimes also ad-hoc ORSA4
reporting, depending on the requirements as defined in the internal ORSA guidelines
and the actual relevance of COVID-19 on the companies’ economic balance sheet.
In addition, the supervisors have taken an interest in the current risk situation of
the companies and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the risk profile of the
companies and have carried out special queries.
Since the development and duration of the pandemicwas uncertain from the begin-
ning and is still difficult to predict, scenario analyses in all phases of the pandemic
are proven instruments for assessing risks and determining the risk profile. In this
process, several scenarios are run, each with a different course of the pandemic, and
the effects of the macroeconomic developments associated with these courses on the
company’s capital investment, insured portfolio and ultimately equity and solvency
capital requirements are estimated.
In this context it is important to provide robust tools to analyse data and trans-
parent models to calibrate and run such scenarios and use the results for deciding
what measures are adequate to manage through the current status of the pandemic.
Aspects of improving data analysis and models are covered in several chapters of
this book, as in “Some Investigations with a Simple Actuarial Model for Infections
such as COVID-19” by A. D. Wilkie, “A Mortality Model for Pandemics and Other
Contagion Events” by G. Venter or “Epidemic Compartmental Models and Their
Insurance Applications” by R. Feng et al. With this input a cascading approach with
a crisis intervention team for balance sheet management can provide the relevant
guidance for business decisions:
• Risk drivers assessed as highly relevant are identified with high frequency. For a
pandemic, new drivers can be added, such as new business or reported losses of
highly exposed segments.And these driverswould then also be able to be taken into
account in parallel in the assessment of the risks by running the above mentioned
scenarios.
4 Own Risk Solvency Assessment, as required by Solvency II.
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• Relevant limits are set for these risk drivers and if they are exceeded, measures
are initiated by crisis team. The crisis team should also plan regular meetings
with high frequency and have been mandated by the Executive Board with the
corresponding decision-making powers.
• The crisis team regularly reports to the board of directors on the development,
proposes adjustments to the risk appetite and correspondingmeasures, and thereby
also obtains an adjusted mandate.
In addition to the crisis team for economic and balance sheet riskmanagement issues,
it may also make sense to set up another team to deal with purely operational issues
such as business continuity, IT and human resources. A representative of risk man-
agement, e.g. the RMF,5 should also participate in this group and build a bridge
between the two groups.
Adjustments to risk models and processes
We have experienced so far that the principle based Solvency II framework enabled
(re)insurers quite effectively to manage through this crisis. Currently, the Solvency
II Review 2020 is in its final phase and it is a good opportunity to directly reflect
learnings of the crisis in adapting the framework accordingly (cf. EIOPA (2020b)).
Also in the future, Solvency II will be reviewed with a predefined frequency and new
insights and requirements can be reflected. So far, no relevant changes to the standard
formula due to COVID-19 are expected. Only topics on extended or improved report-
ing, e.g. of the ORSA, are under discussion in some of the latest EIOPA consultation
papers (cf. EIOPA (2020a)). Again, the chapters on modelling and scenario analysis
in this book mentioned above might provide helpful input for how to improve and
extend the ORSA report with relevant scenarios for pandemic events.
14.2.3 Reflecting Potential Future Consequences
of COVID-19
For the capital market and many non-life insurance covers, most of the effects of
COVID-19 were rather immediate and directly observable. In the global economy
and in life and health (re)insurance we have to consider long-term effects. Some of
these effects are discussed in this book, e.g. , behavioural changes of the population
due to COVID-19, others might be relevant to be reflected in pricing and reserv-
ing updates of existing products, as, e.g., different demand and consumption with
effects on the economy, effects on the health of recovered with longer term impacts
and potential triggering of claims at a later point in time (e.g. the chronic fatigue
syndrome, effects on the respiratory system, the heart, or neurological illnesses as
5 RiskManagement Function, one of the second line of defence riskmanagement functions required
by Solvency II.
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late effects of COVID-19), or a worsened general health status because of poorer
health care during the pandemic. Again, all these effects might only be observed in
the future and we will need a close cooperation between data scientists, modelling,
actuarial and medical experts. Methods to monitor and model such developments are
again discussed in this book in several chapters and from different perspectives, as
again “AMortality Model for Pandemics and Other Contagion Events” by G. Venter
and “Outlier Detection for Pandemic-related Data Using Compositional Functional
Data Analysis” by Ch. Rieser and P. Filzmoser.
14.3 Managing Pandemics from a Governmental
Perspective
For governments and public bodies it might be relevant to learn from the current
pandemic
• how to optimally impose measures like a lockdown, what are effective test strate-
gies and how to implement a vaccination program,
• how to manage through the sometimes conflicting objectives of minimising both
the number of casualties of the pandemic and the economic loss during the pan-
demic crisis,
• and finally how to prepare better in advance to mitigate some of the risks by
providing obligatory or facultative (re)insurance or risk pools?
14.3.1 Deciding on the Right Measures During a Pandemic
What we discuss on how to implement an adequate risk management during a pan-
demic in Sect. 14.2.2 is also true for governments. Managing uncertainty is very rel-
evant especially at the beginning of the pandemic and politicians and public servants
need to consult closely with experts from all different areas to understand potential
options for mitigating risks during a pandemic and to closely manage their effects,
both positive and negative. This book features several chapters on strategies how to
better and quicker test for infected, optimal strategies to implement a lockdown in
the different stages of the pandemic, and already some thoughts on the effectiveness
of vaccination, see “Pooled Testing in the COVID-19 Pandemic” by M. Aldridge
and D. Ellis and “Diagnostic Tests and Procedures During a Pandemic” by S. Dun-
bar and Y. Tang, “Changes in Behaviour Induced by COVID-19: Obedience to the
Introduced Measures” by N. Badenes-Plà and “COVID-19 and Optimal Lockdown
Strategies: The Effect of New and More Virulent Strains” by J. P. Caulkins et al.
After the SARS epidemic in the late 2000s the Robert Koch Institute prepared
an analysis of potential future pandemics for the German Bundestag in 2013 (cf.
Deutscher Bundestag (2013)). In this work, as in later analyses of the topic, con-
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sideration of lockdown as one of the possible solutions to contain a pandemic was
completely absent. Also further risk analysis like the Risk Radar of the CRO-Forum
in 2019 (cf. CRO-Forum (2019)) still had no reference to amajor risk stemming from
a potential lockdown during a pandemic. All in all, the research results presented
in this book and the open and transparent discussion of potential measures during a
pandemic will help the (re)insurance industry and also other sectors like trade and
hospitality to better reflect and prepare for measures taken by the government.
14.3.2 Mitigating Economic Risks for Future Pandemics
After COVID-19 we all have to ask ourselves what we can do to become more
resilient in future extreme situations to come. Simply applying the same measures
as during COVID-19 might not be good enough, as the next crisis might probably
be completely different. The next pandemic might affect a completely different age
profile (as already did the Spanish flu one hundred years ago), and we might have to
manage completely different events like a global black-out, global cyber attacks or,
not to forget, the climate change.
Risk cover for future pandemics
As already discussed in Sect. 14.2.1 the private (re)insurance sector will not be able to
provide sufficient cover to protect the whole economy against the next pandemic. For
such extreme exposures only pool solutions with limitation of the maximal exposure
for the entire insurance industry are possible as private-sector insurance solutions
for pandemics. Beyond this maximal exposure and also to limit the moral hazard
of governments implementing a lockdown without having to compensate for any
economic losses, states must provide the major part of the cover. Due to the systemic
nature of pandemic risks, the diversification of risks via pools on a global level will
only work to a limited extent, unlike natural catastrophe, nuclear power plant and
terrorism risks, where already pool solutions exist in Europe, as e.g. the Insurance
Compensation Consortium in Spain, EXTREMUS in Germany and an earthquake
pool in Switzerland.
A more detailed discussion on this topic, the potential design of such a pool
solution using parametric triggers and the role of the World Bank can be found in
three chapters of this book: “Risk Sharing and Stochastic Premia in the Presence
of Systematic Risk: The case study of the UK COVID-19 economic losses” by H.
Assa and T. J. Boonen, “The Legal Challenges of Insuring Against a Pandemic” by
R. Hillier and “All-Hands-On-Deck!—How International Organisations Respond to
the COVID-19 Pandemic” by M. C. Boado-Penas et al.
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The potential role of the capital market
Often the capital market is seen as one possibility to off-load parts of the pandemic
exposure of a (re)insurance company. First concepts for such solutions have been
tested in themid- to end-2000s asmortality catastrophe bonds. The experience shows
that the appetite in the capitalmarket is rather limited and this solution cannot provide
a relevant relief for the total exposure. The main reasons for this limited interest—
in contrast to other catastrophe bonds for, e.g., earthquakes or hurricanes—is the
expected and, again during COVID-19, observed high correlation of a pandemic
loss and losses in the capital market. Only well diversifying alternative investment
products have shown a relevant demand from investors.
However, especially for the world’s poorest countries, epidemic or pandemic
covers are not affordable at all. To provide a certain economic protection for such
countries the World Bank launched in 2016 the Pandemic Emergency Financing
Facility (PEF) covering a maximum exposure of US$195.84 m for 64 of the poor-
est countries. It was actually designed for covering and providing quick support for
expenditures during local epidemics like Ebola. During COVID-19 the full amount
was paid out (cf. TheWorld Bank (2021)). Until now, the cover has not been renewed
by the World Bank, but it might be a very useful tool for providing and effectively
protecting the development aid for these countries and hence it might be of political
interest to launch a second bond.
Why basis risk sometimes prevents effective risk transfer
The PEF’s parametric criteria are often criticised for being too slow and complicated.
The facility, which is based on a set of disbursement triggers, only releases funds
once there have already been a certain number of cases, deaths and countries affected
by an outbreak. In particular, when infections occur only singularly in a country, the
PEF does not provide funds even though there is an obvious need: a classic case of
basis risk.
Basis risk has to be considered from two perspectives: a pure economic for effec-
tively hedging against adverse cash flowswhich should bemitigated, and a regulatory
for criteria if and to what extend risk mitigation instruments can be considered under
Solvency II:
1. Economically, for a risk transferring instrument it has to be ensured that inmost of
the cases when a compensating cash flow should be provided by the instrument,
this cash flow should also be triggered and paid out in the amount expected. If
not then this has to be considered as basis risk.
2. For reflecting basis risk under Solvency II, EIOPA issued a guideline6 to be
considered when and how the treatment of risk mitigation techniques in the cal-
culation of the Solvency Capital Requirement with the standard formula needs to
be assessed.
6 https://www.eiopa.europa.eu/content/guidelines-basis-risk_en.
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As parametric triggers cannot directly use internal portfolio information of the insurer
and must approximate the desired effect by publicly available data, it is obvious
that there will be always situations where the instrument was originally intended to
provide a compensating cash flow but actually does not. In case of a pandemic and
an instrument based on parametric triggers covering the mortality risk of a portfolio,
this can especially happen, if
• the age profile of the portfolio and the public data base,
• the social status and hence the availability and access to medical treatment in the
different portfolios,
• the gender mix, health status or other relevant risk drivers for the mortality rate
during the pandemic event.
do not match. As different events might be driven by different risk drivers, it is almost
impossible to find a perfect fit for all conceivable situations. And then the parametric
trigger should also be transparent, easy and quick to calculate. Effectively achieving
both goals is impossible and we have to cope with a certain but hopefully limited
residual basis risk when trying to mitigate risks of extreme events with instruments
using a parametric design.
14.4 Conclusion: Our Learnings
For us, one of the most important lessons learned was that it is impossible to predict
and (re)insure such rare and extreme events as a pandemic. Each new crisis will be
different from the last, and we certainly do not have the right risk models and mitiga-
tion techniques to safelymanoeuvre through this event. For example, in the event of a
blackout following a global cyber-attack, it will be the newly established home office
environment that will be the Achilles’ heel, rather than the perfect solutions, as was
the case with COVID-19. Therefore, we must always remain critical and quickly
learn to adapt our measures during a crisis based on new data, robust statistical
methods and experts’ insights. Solvency II, as a principles-based risk management
framework that builds a more resilient risk culture in companies, helped us stay in
control during COVID-19. And the same approach, with appropriate adjustments,
will work during other extreme events.
However, we have also learned that the capacity for these extreme events in the
(re)insurance market, but also in the financial market, is limited and may not be
sufficient to cover all macroeconomic risks. In such extreme events, governments
need to step in and stand by the affected companies.
In the event of a crisis, wemust act together in a determined and concertedmanner.
Global disasters cannot be dealt with by individual states or industries acting alone.
Especially for the coming climate crisis, we will have to think about how we can
tackle the problem across sectors and as a community of states.
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